LECTURES

ON DOGMATIC THEOLOGY
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PREFACE

It may be well here to touch upon the master idea that guides our work. Since the beginning of the 19th century, Rationalists have set about attacking Catholic dogma with altogether new tactics. They have striven to show that our most fundamental dogmas, at no matter what period of their history we consider them, whether upon their first appearance in Holy Writ, or at the time of their development in Tradition, or at the time of their conciliar definition, are an altogether human product. Such criticism, confined for a time within certain intellectual circles, has gradually worked its way into the different classes of society and has given rise to that Modernism denounced and condemned by Pope Pius X in the Encyclical Pascendi gregis dominici.

Now, this is just the objection that we are most desirous of combatting. We have undertaken to show that Catholic dogma, on the contrary, at whatever period of its history we examine it, remains absolutely inexplicable so far as contingent causes are concerned, and that it requires always, now under one form, now under another, the intervention of the Holy Spirit.

We candidly declare that we have approached this task
in a profoundly Catholic spirit and with respectful submission to the directions of the Church. We can, we must avow, conceive of no other attitude in one who would devote himself to the study of special dogma. To attempt to restore individual dogmas in their historical settings without the guidance of the definitions and directions of the Church, were sheer folly. No exact account could be rendered of them, nor could we discover their harmony and unity. Besides we should be exposed to the frequent shock of apparent contradiction.

We have, nevertheless, examined most carefully the numerous documents upon which we ground our assertions; we have, too, taken into account not only the opinions of their authors, but also the influence of the environment in which they wrote. Only where faith and the scientific spirit work together, it seems to us, can the true theological spirit be found.

Such are the principles that have guided us. If in this way we succeed in enlightening the minds and moving the hearts of our readers to a clearer and fuller realization of the meaning of the true Christian life, we shall have attained our sole object.

L. Labauche, S. S.


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GOD

INTRODUCTION

« God is Love », says St. John¹. It is characteristic of the one who loves to give himself, writes St. Thomas; and, continues that great Doctor, it is characteristic of one who loves infinitely to give himself without limit². These two principles explain the whole economy of our salvation.

Before man was, God loved him. He was nothing but the object of the love of God. Men discern that which is good, and because it is good, they love it. But infinite love is different; it is creative. God creates us because He loves us. And just as this love creates us, so it preserves us and makes us act.

By an act of foolish ingratitude, all mankind, epitomized in the person of its head, despised the love of God and transgressed the law that He had imposed. Rather than annihilate us, as He might have done, God chose that the obstacle that severed the relation of His love with man be removed by adequate expiation of the fault. The Word was made flesh and dwelt amongst us. By a life of suffering, which ended

1. I John, iv, 8, 16.
T. I.
in the death on the Cross, He brought men out of the bondage of sin and effected their reconciliation with God.

The Incarnation of the Word was at once a mystery of salvation and a mystery of light: for by it men not only learned the extent of the love of God, but they also received the clear revelation of one God in three Persons. Our three great mysteries — the mystery of the Redemption, the mystery of the Incarnation, and the mystery of the Most Holy Trinity — considered in the order of their manifestation to man, appear very closely allied. To merit our salvation, the Word was made flesh and thus revealed to us the mystery of the Divine Life.

We might follow the order just described and take up first the mystery of the Redemption, then that of the Incarnation, and finally that of the Most Holy Trinity. This, no doubt, would be more in accord with the order of the New Testament, but it would be less so with that found in the Tradition of the Fathers. The Holy Spirit permitted heresy to assail first the mystery of the Most Holy Trinity, then that of the Incarnation, and finally that of the Redemption; thus theology, whose mission it is to explain, defend, and throw light upon dogmas, was constrained to go whithersoever the adversary carried the fight. While giving up the plan of finality as found in the sacred books, we follow the plan of efficient causality, which is no less harmonious, no less wonderful.

These studies will comprise three parts, as follows:

Part I. — *The Most Holy Trinity.*

Part II. — *The Incarnate Word.*

Part III. — *Christ, the Redeemer.*
There are three persons in God. These three are all equally God, for they have but one and the same substance.

The Father begets the Son from all eternity; so, too, from all eternity, the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Father and the Son, as from one principle.

The Father sends the Son into the world; the Holy Ghost is sent by the Father and the Son.

These are the three great and distinct views that are given us of the dogma of the Most Holy Trinity. In the first, we have the dogma of the Divine Persons; in the second, that of the Divine Processions; and in the third, that of the Divine Missions.

It may be well here to define certain ideas to which we shall have constant recourse throughout the work. Then, after having exposed and justified the different points of the dogma of the Trinity, we shall try to ascertain how this dogma can be reconciled with the legitimate demands of reason.

Hence the division into five chapters:

Chapter I. — Preliminary Notions.

Chapter II. — The Divine Persons.
Chapter III. — The Divine Processions.

Chapter IV. — The Divine Missions.

Chapter V. — Agreement between Faith and Reason in the Dogma of the Most Holy Trinity.
CHAPTER I

SOME PRELIMINARY NOTIONS

Among the ideas that must be clearly defined at the outset of this work, two, viz., those of substance and nature, will serve in explaining the Unity in God; and two, viz., those of person and distinction, the Plurality in God. We shall first see what these terms mean in the theological sense which they have had since the great Christological councils; and after that we shall study with profit the evolution of these ideas. As will be seen, we have been preoccupied chiefly with the theological idea of person.

ARTICLE I

Substance, nature, person real, distinction.

Idea of Substance. — That which does not exist in itself, but must have something besides itself in which to exist, (ens in alio,) is called accident. That in which the accident resides and which does not itself exist in something else, but in itself, is called substance. Hence the definition is: Substantia est res cui competit habere esse in se et non in alio¹.

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¹ Cf. Thomas Aquinas, Quaest. disp. de Potentia, q. v, a. 3. ad 4°n: Ens per se non est definitio substantiae, ut Avicenna dicit. Ens enim non potest esse alicujus genus... Sed si substantia possit habere definitionem, non obstante quod est genus generalissimum, erit ejus definitio, quod substantia est res cujus quidditati debetur esse non in aliquo.
Idea of Nature. — Substance is not merely an inert principle capable of receiving motion. It is a principle which tends to a determinate end and which brings to bear upon that end all the energy with which it is endowed or which is subject to it. Looked at in this light, it should be called nature, and not substance. We may define nature thus: \( \text{Natura est substantia quatenus est principium primum seu fundamentale passionum et operationum} \).1

Hence, the terms substance and nature designate but one and the same thing looked at from different points of view. When a thing is considered as existing in itself, and not in something else, it is called substance; but when considered as a power which tends to some determinate end, it is called nature2.

Idea of Person. — The power to exist in itself is, then, the distinguishing mark of substance; and consequently this feature is common to all substance.

But what is necessary that a substance be a person? The human soul is a substance, yet it is not a person. Whence is this? Without a doubt, the human soul can exist in itself; it can, moreover, elaborate sensible data and get at realities; and it can will freely. Yet it can get at realities only on condition that the senses supply the intelligence with sensible data; and, as for the different sensations, it can experience these only in connection with the body, the body serving as

1. *Ibid.*, *Sum. Theol.*, III, q. ii, a. 1. *Sciendum est quod... derivatum est nomen naturae ad significandum quodlibet principium intrinsecum motus, secundum quod Philosophus dicit quod natura est principium motus in eo in quo per se est et non secundum accidentem.*

2. Likewise, between the substance and the essence of a being, taken in the first sense, there is but a difference of point of view. The essence of a being is that being taken with all its constituent elements, that is, those elements with which it does or can exist, and without which it neither does nor can exist. Essence may also be defined as follows: *Essentia est id per quod ens consti-
material co-principle. This is owing to the fact that the human soul is not a specifically complete substance. But, that a substance may be a person, it must be primarily complete in its species.

Does this specific completeness suffice? It does not. Human substance, made up of body and soul, is specifically complete; but we can see at once that, if this substance be looked at only insofar as it can be predicated, in a judgment, of all men, it is not a person. But we may also look at substance as further endowed with those determining marks that make a substance distinct from all other substances, quid indivisum in se et divisum a quovis alio, an individual substance. Is substance so individualized a person?

Let us look into this closely. Individual substance, observes Cardinal Billot¹, may be clothed with a merely relative individuality. In such a case, it can still be communicated to another person, that is, in a physical union. Thus, in the mystery of the Incarnation, the humanity of Christ, individual, it is true, but only relatively so, was yet physically communicable, i.e., could be physically united to the Eternal Word of the Father.

Individual substance can be clothed, too, with absolute

¹. De Deo uno et trino, vol. III, pars III, c. 1, § 1. De significacione personae generatim: Porro individuum secundum quid, illam dicimus, quae licet singularis, nondum tamen est incommunicabilis ea incommunicabilitate quae requiritur ad hoc ut de nullo possit prae dicari. Cum enim individuum sit indivisum in se et divisum a qualibet alio, illud tantum simpliciter individuum agnoscitur, quod non potest attribi alicui subjecto sed potius ipsum est suppositum quod in prae dicatione supponitur ut omnibus quae de aliquo dicuntur vel dic possunt. Huic autem stricte rationi individui triplicem communicabilitas repugnat: communitas partis, ut in anima separata; communitas assumptibilis, ut in humanitate Christi; communitas numericae identitatis cum pluribus distinctis subsistentibus, ut in natura divina. Solaigitur substantia singularis cui nulla ex his communicabilitas manet, dici potest simpliciter et sine addito substantialia individua. See the same author: De Verbo Incarnato, Part I, chap. ii, § 1, De supposito et persona. A very good exposition of this difficult question will be found in the Commentaries of Father Buonpensiere, In primam Partem Sum. Theol., q. m, a. 3, p. 145-161.
individuality — its individuality can be developed to perfection. In this case, it can no longer be communicated to another person, neither logically nor physically. It is then incommunicable, it is Self, alteri incommunicabilis et suiipsius, seu sui juris.

Now this individual substance alone is a person¹, on condition that it be, moreover, a rational substance, and consequently capable of having psychological consciousness and moral conscience, as well as moral and psychological liberty. In fact, it is reason, and consequently consciousness and liberty, that gives to the absolutely individual substance that higher independence that makes of it a being altogether incommunicable, that makes it Self².

Hence the traditional definition of person, formulated by Boetius: *Naturae rationalis individua substantia*³.

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1. The term person comes from the Greek word πρόσωπον, the primitive sense of which has been changed. Person is also called « hypostasis », from the Greek word ὑπόστασις; and this word, too, has changed from its original meaning. The term « hypostasis » is broader, however, than the term person; for it serves also to designate a fully individualized substance not endowed with reason. The word ὑπόστασις, in its theological meaning, is translated by the two Latin words *subsistentia* and *suppositum*. These two words, the first of which may be taken concretely to signify a subsistent being, serve to designate only fully individual substances not endowed with reason.

2. Cf. D. Mercier, *Ontologie*, n. 148. V. Bernies, *La notion de personnalité*, Revue du Clergé français, July 1, 1905. These authors are but commenting on St. Thomas, *Quaestiones disp. de potentia*, q. ix, a. 1, ad 3³: *Sicut substantia individua propria habet quod per se existat, ita proprium habet quod agat; nihil enim agit nisi ens actu... Hoc autem quod est per se agere excellentior modo convenit substantiis rationalis naturæ quam alis. Nam solae substantiae rationales habent dominium sui actus, ita quod in eis est agere et non agere; aliae vero substantiæ magis aguntur quam agant. Et ideo conveniens fuit ut substantia individua rationalis naturæ speciale nomen haberet.*

3. We should observe that the person, or hypostasis, is sometimes looked at concretely, and then the word stands for individual rational substance endowed with that ultimate perfection which distinguishes it so completely from all others as to render it incommunicable, Self. Frequently too, as most ordinarily happens in studying the mysteries of the Holy Trinity and the Incarnation, this ultimate perfection is considered in a rational substance abstractly, in many cases at least from the substance itself. It is then called *personality, person, hypostasis, sub-*
We can, then, distinguish in person three characteristic elements. The first is that ultimate perfection which springs from the depths of rational substance and which completes its individuality by making it an incommunicable being, Self. The second is the psychological consciousness and moral conscience. The third is psychological liberty, that is, the freedom of choice between two acts either contradictory or merely different; and especially moral freedom, that is, the power to do the good dictated by the moral conscience. But of these three characteristic elements the first alone is fundamental and, strictly speaking, constitutes personality. The other two are but results flowing more or less immediately from the first.

What constitutes that ultimate perfection which makes rational substance an individual, so distinct from all other beings — *tam divisa a quovis alio* — that it becomes as a result incommunicable to another, Self, we have yet to see. Some theologians hold that personality lies in the existence of

**sistentia.** In this case the last of these terms is translated by the word *subsistence*, and not by the words *subsistent being*. This view led Cardinal Billot to give, after St. Thomas, this very exact definition: *Distinctum subsistens in natura rationali.*

1. Some modern authors, following Descartes, see the fundamental principle of person in the psychological consciousness, that is, in the central act by which the personal substance is conscious of its actions, or states, and, to a certain extent, of itself. This they call the psychological *Ego*. But this view implies a superficial analysis; for what these authors call the psychological *Ego* is but a result of the true *Ego*.

Usually the term moral personality, moral *Ego*, is taken to mean the moral conscience together with its moral power, or the moral power alone. It is quite evident, however, that this moral personality, this moral *Ego*, is not the very underlying *Ego*, the true *Ego*, but only a result of this.

2. In the course of our analysis, person has been regarded from the point of view of being. If we examine it from the point of view of action, we shall at once recognize the fact that person is the first principle underlying all action, just as it is the first underlying all being. Let us take an example. Suppose that a certain person's intellect comprehends, or that his hand performs some action, it is neither to the intellect nor to the hand that the action must be finally ascribed, nor is it to be ascribed finally even to the nature of this person, but to the person himself. Hence, person is said to be *principium quad agit*, nature being *principium quo remotum*, and the faculties *principium quo proximum*. 
rational substance, *in as much as this existence is really something distinct from the substance itself, something superadded*. They define existence as the last actualization of substance: *Esse est ultimus actus*. It would appear, as we shall see, that this opinion is drawn from the tradition of the Fathers and is quite in agreement with the spirit of the great Christological councils. Should there be any objection to it, rather than adopt the theories of Cajetan and Suarez, who hold that personality lies in what they call *substantial mode*, it would perhaps be better to resort to mystery itself. This would be a practical acknowledgment that there is something that makes substance a person, but that what this something is we cannot say.

1. Cf. L. Billot, *De Verbo Incarnato*, part III, chap. ii, 1, *De supposito et persona*, p. 61: *Certum igitur est, non solum ex principiis, sed etiam ex certae et explicita sancti Thomae doctrinae, quod esse est principium suppositi seu personalitatis; certum etiam est apud ipsum, quod naturae individuae non habenti suum esse in se, nec suppositi nomen competit nec ratio; thesis VII, p. 88: *Dicendum quod natura humana proprio actu essendi carens, trahitur ad esse personale Verbi, atque hoc modo fit ut quo Verbum est homo; ideo in Christo, unum est substantiale esse existentix.*

2. According to Cajetan, this substantial mode consists of an entity lying between substance and existence and requiring an existence possessing a nature like its own. Cf. In III<sup>a</sup>, q. iv, a. 2. According to Suarez, this entity consists of a new determination of the substance already in existence. Cf. *De Inc.*, disp. XI, sect. iii. For a criticism of these two opinions, see Billot, loc. cit. part I, chap. ii, § 2, p. 63-68.

3. Duns Scotus holds that in created substance there is no room for real distinction between substance individual *secundum quid* and substance individual *simpliciter*, between *individual* substance and *personal* substance. Personality is nothing but *individual substance* regarded in the light of the fact that it is *not assumed* by another person.

In the mystery of the Incarnation, the Word took a human nature endowed with all the intrinsic principles with which any person, for example, Peter, Paul, John, could be endowed. Yet the humanity assumed by the Word was not personal; but only by reason of the fact that the Word did assume it. Cf. In III<sup>a</sup>, dist. 1, q. 1, n. 9, and n. 11, ad 3<sup>um</sup>; dist. vi, q. 1, a. 2 ad 5<sup>um</sup>. On this point Billot has the following: *Haec sententia Scotti ponit Verbum assumptissae humanitatem cum omnibus principiis quibus homo quipsum subsistens, constituitur, omnis enim realitas substantiatis quae est in Petro, inventur univoce in humanitate Christi. Nihilominus humanitas illa non est quid*
The Idea of Real Distinction. — We have a real distinction, distinctio realis, when to two ideas there are two corresponding and distinct realities. Two things may be distinct either because they are separate, or, though not separate, because each one has of its very nature its own distinct characteristics. Thus Peter and Paul are distinct and separate; but thought and the thinking faculty, though not separate, are nevertheless distinct, — the thinking faculty is a power, the thought is an act; the faculty is the cause, the thought is the effect; the faculty is the principle of relation, the thought is the term of relation.

If to two distinct ideas there be but one and the same corresponding reality, these two ideas are said to be distinct only in the mind of the one who conceives them; it is the reason that considers them that makes the distinction. This is called rational distinction, distinctio rationis. Such a distinction is said to be simply rational when the two ideas represent the same objective reality, under the same aspect, though perhaps not with equal clearness. Such, for instance, are the ideas of man and rational animal. The distinction is said to be rational but founded upon reality, or virtual, distinctio rationis cum fundamento in re seu virtuallis, when the two ideas express under different aspects but one objective reality equivalent, however, to many, plurality habens, which may or may not be realized apart

subsistens nec persona, quia ex hoc solo quod assumilur, cadit a ratione totius in se, et induit quamdam rationem partis. De Verbo incarnate, part I, c. ii, § 1, thesis VII, p. 89.

This opinion has always been much opposed by theologians. See Billot's refutation of it, thesis VII, supra. However, it has never been censured by the Church. While criticising it, Cardinal Zagliara says, after Bannes: Teneamus igitur sententiam quae magis veritati conformis nobis videtur, sed ab indigna cujusque generis censura contrariam iuentibus abstinere omnino debemus. Sum. Phil., Ontol., I. III, c. 1, a. 4, n. 8. On the opinion of Scotus, see the remarkable article of Dubois, Le concept de personnalite et l'Union hypostatique, Revue du clergé français, octobre 1, 1904.
from its nature. Such is the distinction held to exist between the perfections of God.

Conclusion. — Our ideas are all acquired from the world about us. Hence, before applying them to God, we must, as far as possible, strip them of everything contingent, of whatever relates only to creatures. This, to be sure, can be done but imperfectly. Hence it is that, while our ideas tell us something about God, they do so but imperfectly. First philosophical, and then rendered theological by abstraction, our ideas are to be taken always at their analogical value.

Although the idea of person, which has just been analyzed and which we take as an example because of its importance, was elaborated in the course of dogmatic controversy, and underwent, even in the last period of its fixation, the transformation which we have just described, it must be still further modified. There is, in fact, a great

1. Before being applied to God, all philosophical concepts must be corrected, i.e., they must be made as capable as possible of expressing ideas relating to the Divinity. No matter how well this transposition may be made, there will always remain in our ideas some relativity to creatures, to the human mind; the concept will be only analogical. This, however, let us note well, does not mean that our ideas can tell us nothing at all about God, as is held by some modern scholars. Such a view would soon lead to agnosticism. Philosophical concepts thus brought by transposition into the sphere of theological concepts, do tell us something about God, but they do so imperfectly.

Before applying a philosophical concept to the Divinity, St. Thomas always takes the pains to correct it, i.e., to render it less inadequate for its work. It may not be out of place to give here an example of his method. Let us take the concept of the number three, which at first sight would seem most difficult to transpose. Observe well what the holy Doctor says: *... dicimus quod termini numerales, secundum quod veniunt in praedicationem divinam, non sumuntur a numero, qui est species quantitatis, quia sic de Deo non die rentur nisi metaphorice, sicut et alien proprietates corporalium, sicut latitudo, longitudo et similia; sed sumuntur a multitutine secundum quod est transcendens. Sum. Theol., I, q. xxx, a. 3.* Bossuet has a good example of this theological method in his *Instruction sur les États d'oraison, 2d tract, ch. xix, Edit. E. Levesque, Paris, 1807.*
difference between person in God and person in human creatures. Human substance, because finite, can exist only in one person; but this limitation is an exigency of its nature as a finite substance. It is otherwise with infinite substance; for faith teaches us that the divine substance, by the very richness of its infinity, exists in three persons.

Let us remark another equally important difference. In man there exists a real distinction between person and substance; in God, between the one substance common to the three persons and each of these three persons, there can be but a rational distinction based on reality, distinctio rationis cum fundamento in re seu virtualis.

ARTICLE II

Evolution of the theological idea of person.

Primitive Meaning of the Words Ὑσία, Ὑπόστασις, Ὑπόστωσις, Persona.

To the word Ὑσία, substance, or essence, Aristotle gives two meanings: first, that of a concrete substance, as, e. g., this man, this horse; and secondly, that of abstract substance, specific, or essential, as, e. g., man in general, horse in general. The word Ὑπόστασις, hypostasis, the ancients applied to that which existed in reality, as opposed to that which existed only in the mind, or to what is unstable. In fact the words hypostasis and Ὑσία, the latter taken in its primary meaning, meant the same thing: the word hypostasis being employed in contradistinction of a purely imaginary being or one which, if real, had little consistency.

The primitive meaning of Ὑπόστωσις was face, or visage. It was early adopted into the language of the stage to signify the mask which served as an actor's disguise in taking some

1. Categories, ch. v, Ὑσία.
2. Cf. Petau, De Trinitate, l. v, c. i, 5.
part in the play; hence it naturally came to mean « rôle », or « personage ». Hence, too, its early use as applied to an ambassador as representing the « person » of his master.

The Latin word persona also meant first a mask, then an actor, later on, a man of a certain reputation, finally it meant simply an individual. This last meaning, says de Régnon, early became predominant, either because grammarians had recourse to it to distinguish between the three cases of discourse, « I, thou, he »; or, more likely, because the term was employed in Roman jurisprudence to distinguish, in Law, that which pertains to men from that which pertains to things. As early as the second century, Gaius wrote : Omne jus quo utimur, vel ad personas pertinet, vel ad res, vel ad actiones.

Under the Roman Empire, until about the middle of the third century, Greek and Latin were in current use. The Christian Doctors translated persona by πρόσωπον, and they gave the Greek word its legal meaning of individual. In the Orient, the word πρόσωπον meant, during the same period, rôle, or character in a drama. The ambiguity to which this word gave rise was responsible for much of the mutual misunderstanding at the time of the Christological and Trinitarian controversies.

The Fathers of the Western Church Early Possess an Exact Trinitarian Terminology. — In the third century, the Fathers of the Western Church used the word πρόσωπον, or persona, to designate the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost. These words then had an accepted theological meaning. They signified not three individual substances, but the three really distinct terms of one and the same substance.

So, when the Sabellians taught that the Word was but

2. Digest., I, tit. v, 1.
another name for the Father, St. Hippolytus answered them thus: «If again he allege His own word when He said, «I and the Father are one», let him attend to the fact, and understand that He did not say, «I and the Father am one, but are one». For the word are is not said of one person, but it refers to two persons, and one power» (εἰς τὸ ἰδόν τὸ πρὸς πατὴρ ἑστίν, δύον μὲν ἐστὶν τὸν Ἰησοῦν). And again farther on: «If, then, the Word was with God, and was also God, what follows? Would one say that He speaks of two Gods? I shall not indeed speak of two Gods, but of one; of two Persons, πρὸς πατὴρ ἐστὶν, however, and of a third economy (disposition) σύνενεμένος ἐστὶν τὴν τρίτην, viz., the grace of the Holy Ghost».

Tertullian is perhaps even more explicit. «Then you have», he says, «two Beings — One that commands that the thing be made, and the Other that executes the order and creates. In what sense, however, you ought to understand Him to be another, I have already explained, on the ground of Personality, not of Substance — in the way of distinction, not of division. But although I must everywhere hold one only substance in three coherent and inseparable Persons, yet I am bound to acknowledge, from the necessity of the case, that He who issues a command is different from Him who executes it. For, indeed, He would not have intended to command Himself if He were only one».

First Stages in the Elaboration of the Greek Terminology. — The Nicene Fathers, after defining that the Son was not made but engendered by the Father, and that He is consubstantial with the Father, anathematized any one

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1. *Contra Noet.*, 7; *P. G. X*, 813.
who would say that the Son «proceeds from another hypostasis, or substance (ἐξ ἐτέρας ὑποστάσεως ἡ οὐσίας) than that of the Father». Did the Fathers of the council wish thereby to identify the words ὑποστάσις and οὐσία? Petau thinks they did. In fact, it is possible that the Fathers did then attribute to the words οὐσία and ὑποστάσις the same meaning; but this was, no doubt, the better to strike the Arians, who persisted in attaching to these words their original philosophical meaning, for it is certain that some time before the council of Nicæa, the Greek Fathers made a distinction between the two words. Origen, in writing against the Sabellians, had already said: «We have come to believe that there are three hypostases—the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost». And St. Denis of Alexandria: «They (the Sabellians) maintain that if there be three hypostases, they must be divided. But, be that as it may, there are three; otherwise let them suppress the Trinity altogether».

Circumstances Which Demanded Still Greater Precision. — Arianism attacked not only the dogma but also the formulas in which it was taught. Once the Fathers of Nicæa had defined the Homoousin of the Father and the Son, the Arians no longer wanted to use the word οὐσία. They preferred the word ὑποστάσις as better adapted to their wonted ambiguity; and to this they attached the meaning of οὐσία. So they said: «Since there are three hypostases in God, there are three beings. Now, only one can be God; therefore neither the Son nor the Holy Ghost is God». There was no end to their repetition of this. As a result of this controversy, the Latins saw that the Greeks used the word ὑποστάσις in the sense of substantia. The Latins then looked

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1. Denzinger-Bannwart, 54.
3. In Joan., t. II; P. G., XIV, 128.
upon the word ἀπόστασις with suspicion, and asked that the Greek formula « three hypostases » be made to conform with the Latin « three persons ».

The contention of the Latins was backed up in the Orient by the Sabellians, who found that the wording « three persons » — which to them meant « three roles » — expressed better the life of the Trinity. The Greek Fathers, on the other hand, were led to suspect the word προσωπος.

This state of confusion, now smouldering, now breaking out into the fires of argumentation, lasted until the provincial council of Alexandria, in the year 362, when the agitation provoked by the confusion of these terms, « hypostasis » and « person », showed how imperative it was to define clearly their meaning.

St. Basil, in a letter to his brother, St. Gregory of Nyssa, undertook to treat of the difference between the terms

1. St. Gregory Nazianzene, in his Panegyric on St. Athanasius, bears witness to the excitement aroused in the council by the words « hypostasis » and « person ». He says: « We Greeks say religiously one substance and three hypostases, the first word signifying the divine nature, the second the trinity of individualizing properties. The Latins were of the same mind, but because of the narrowness of their tongue and poverty of their vocabulary they could not distinguish between hypostasis and substance, so they used the word « persons », that they might not appear to hold that there are three substances.

What was the result? A very laughable one, were it not so lamentable. It was thought that there was a difference of faith where there was but a quarrel over a sound. Sabellianism was seen lurking behind three persons; and behind three hypostases, Arianism, — mere spectres conjured by the spirit of dispute. Bad blood developed, — it always does in dispute; but little more, and with all their splitting of syllables, they would have split the world in two. The blessed Athanasius saw and heard all this; but, being truly a man of God and a great director of souls, he thought it his duty to put an end to a division of reason so unwarranted and out of place. He took it upon himself to apply the remedy to this evil. And how did he go about it? In all goodness and gentleness he called together the two parties and, having carefully examined the thought which lay under their respective formulae, and finding a perfect conformity in their faith, he dismissed the question of words and bound them together by the things they represented. » In laudem Athanasii, or. XXI, 35; P. G., XXXV, 1124-1125.

T. I.
substance and hypostasis. Oυσία, he explains, is that which is common to the individuals of the same species (τὸ κοινόν), that which they all possess alike, and which enables us to call them all by one name, without meaning any of them in particular. But this ousia can have objective existence only when completed by the individual marks that may determine it. The ousia together with these individualizing characteristics is the ὑπόστασις. Though not definitive, this idea of hypostasis was sufficient to throw some light upon the controversy and to keep it from degenerating into a mere quarrel about words. St. Gregory Nazianzene completed the work of St. Basil when he said that, if we leave out the meaning of rôle, or character in a play, the word πρέσωπον may be considered synonymous with the word ὑπόστασις.

Nature of Hypostasis. — What were the individualizing, or distinguishing characteristics which make substance hypostasis, had yet to be determined. Even though St. Basil’s explanation were to triumph, there was yet danger of confusing hypostasis with individual substance, with nature in its full integrity. It was no easy matter to fill in this gap; nor was this done during the Trinitarian controversies, but later on during the Christological controversies of the fifth and sixth centuries.

As early as the year 362, Apollinaris, bishop of Laodicea, less preoccupied, it is true, about the question of the relation between the substance and the three hypostases in God than about the hypostatic union of the Word with human nature, took a hand in the dispute on the question of hypostasis. His work, unlike that of St. Basil, is of a

3. *Or.* XLII, 16; *P. G.*, XXXVI, 477.
According to Apollinaris, hypostasis is intelligent nature, in as much as it exists by itself, complete in itself, integrally, and independent of the individuals that surround it; it is *φύσις τελεία, καθ' ἐκστάσιν*, and hence, in the order in which it exists is *ὑποστάσις*, self-governing, self-possessing, attributing to itself the manifestations of its activities, a center of attribution.

Applying this concept to the Incarnate Word of God, Apollinaris said that, if we hold that there are in Jesus Christ two complete natures, the divine and the human, we must admit also two hypostases. But to admit this would be to destroy in Christ the physical and moral unity. Hence the necessity of denying to Christ's human nature, in order to make possible the hypostatic union, that which makes it a hypostatic nature. Apollinaris did not hesitate to say that Christ's human nature was deprived of what, in it, would have been the connatural principle of higher thought and liberty, that is, the *νοῦς*.

An opinion which so mutilated the nature of Christ could not be accepted. Apollinaris was condemned in 377; and, in 381, at the ecumenical council of Constantinople, the Apollinarists were branded as heretics.

Apollinaris was wrong when he placed personality in the *νοῦς*; but, to say that the hypostatic union could not have taken place unless the humanity of Christ were deprived of its connatural hypostasis, was to state precisely the Christological problem.

In what did hypostasis consist? At the councils of Ephesus (431) and Chalcedon (451), the Fathers answered this question by saying that Christ had assumed a humanity complete, but not hypostatic. So, Christ's humanity,
though complete, was not Self, but was to be referred to the hypostasis of the Word.

But what was the nature of the suppressed hypostasis? Of this the Fathers of the councils just mentioned say nothing; and the Church never defined this point in her teachings. She was satisfied with affirming that the suppression of this hypostasis does not hinder Christ's humanity from being complete. With this principle she condemned successively the Nestorians, who claimed that Christ's humanity had its connatural hypostasis; the Eutychians, who contended that the Sacred Humanity was absorbed by the Divine Nature; and the Monothelites, who held that Christ's humanity was deprived of its will and its human operations.

Theologians, however, have always tried to clear up this mystery. At the beginning of the sixth century, Leontius of Byzantium, a Scythian monk, took up the definitions of St. Basil and St. Gregory Nazianzene and completed them with the aid of Aristotelian philosophy. Nature, he said, is a mark of all being; hypostasis is that which characterizes being by making it something complete in itself and incommunicable. But individuality and concreteness do not always constitute hypostasis. Thus, if considered in themselves, the body and the soul are complete, — nothing is lacking to make my soul this soul, my body this body; yet, neither of them is a person. My body and my soul, remaining but parts of a whole, are communicable to each other in forming that whole¹.

At the beginning of the sixth century, the Christian philosopher Boetius, in refuting Nestorianism and Eutychianism, formulated the following definition: «Naturae rationalis individua substantia²». This definition was

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commented upon by the Scholastic theologians of the Middle Ages. St. Thomas took and developed it somewhat after the manner of Leontius of Byzantium.

**Literature.** — D. *Petau, Dogmata Theologica, De Trinitate*, l. IV, c. I.

Th. *De Régnon, Études sur la Sainte Trinité*, Études II and III.


D. *Mercier, Ontologie*, n. 148.


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CHAPTER II

THE DIVINE PERSONS

God exists in three persons; each of these three persons is equally God, for they all have but one and the same substance. This dogma naturally falls into four propositions; and because of their importance each deserves a special article.

ARTICLE I

Three Persons in One God.

Doctrine of the Church. — There is in God but one substance which exists in three persons. What does this mean?

The Divine Being may be considered under two aspects, the one absolute, the other relative. If we consider the Divine Being absolutely, we say that this Being is One God; but relatively we speak of the same Being as Father, Son, and Holy Ghost. Hence, the same Divine Reality, one when considered absolutely, is seen to exist in three when looked at relatively.

Now, these three Persons are distinct from one another only by the relation of origin which constitutes them; that is, by the relations of paternity, of sonship, and of spiration. These relations are real; so also is the distinction between the three persons a real distinction. But between the Divine Reality considered absolutely and that same Rea-
lity considered relatively, there can be no real distinction; the distinction here is only virtual. Hence, the three Persons, really distinct from one another, are only virtually distinct from the divine substance.

But how, it will be asked, can three persons identical with one and the same thing, be really distinct from one another? Here we are confronted with the mystery of the divine life, a mystery too deep for us to fathom; all that we can do is to scan the surface that has been revealed to us. 1

The dogma of one God in Three Persons was defined by the council of Nicaea 2; and its definition was repeated by the great Christological councils of Constantinople 3, of Ephesus 4, of Chalcedon 5, and in the concise declaration of the symbol ascribed to St. Athanasius 6.

At the beginning of the twelfth century, the Lateran council, owing to the errors of Joachim of Flore, took up again the definition of the dogma of the Trinity. This it stated in terms of remarkable precision, and the formula given by that council is the one we shall take as the Rule of Faith. One God exists in three Persons, the Father, the Son, the Holy Ghost, runs the definition of the council; hence, but one and the same infinite Reality, incomprehensible and ineffable, in three existences, the Father, the Son, the Holy Ghost; but one and the same substance in three Persons; but one and the same substance possessed equally by each of these three Persons: this is the dogma of the Blessed Trinity 7.

2. Denz., 54.
3. Ibid., 86.
4. Ibid., 112-124.
5. Ibid., 148.
6. Ibid., 39.
7. Denz., 428: *Firmiter credimus et simpliciter confitemur quod unus solus est verus Deus, xternus, immensus et incommunicabilis, incomprehens-
For the foundation of this doctrine we shall examine the Old and the New Testament, as well as the Tradition of the Fathers; then we shall study the explanation found in the Theology of St. Thomas.

§ 1.

THE OLD TESTAMENT.

General Idea. — Belief in certain principles acting as intermediaries between God and creatures appears in the earliest books of the Old Testament. Of these principles, those which have a particular bearing upon our question are Wisdom and the Spirit of God.

1

Wisdom.

Wisdom in the Canonical Books of the Old Testament — In the Old Testament the word Wisdom has different meanings. All through the Scriptures it has first of all a human sense; thus, it signifies, for example, political prudence, the skill of an artisan, and, in a general sense, the art of attaining one’s end.

sibilis, omnipotens et ineffabilis, Pater et Filius et Spiritus Sanctus : tres quidem personæ sed una essentia, substantia seu natura simplex omnino : Pater a nullo, Filius a Patre solo, ac Spiritus Sanctus pariter ab utroque : absque initio, semper ac sine fine : Pater generans, Filius nascens, et Spiritus Sanctus procedens. — Ibid., 431 : ... credimus et confitemur, cum Petro Lombardo, quod una quaedam summa res est, incomprehensibilis quidem et ineffabilis quæ veraciter est Pater, et Filius et Spiritus Sanctus ; tres simul personæ ac sigillatim quælibet carumdem : et ideo in Deo solummodo Trinitas est, non quaternitas ; quia quælibet trium personarum est illa res, videlicet substantia, essentia, seu natura divina.

2. Ex., XXVIII, 3.
From the first, however, the word wisdom has also a special meaning with regard to God. It means good practical sense in interpreting and in keeping His Law.

In the book of Job, the term often occurs with a new meaning, to designate a whole body of doctrine. Wisdom is that attribute of God by which He directs everything that He brings into existence, whether animate or inanimate beings. It is by this wisdom that He inspires men with the fear of the Lord.

The book of Baruch is, in this respect, much like that of Job. God possesses wisdom, as is shown by the order that he causes to reign in the world.

In Proverbs, in Ecclesiasticus, and especially in the book of Wisdom, Wisdom, as an attribute of God, is mentioned with elaborate developments. Proverbs speaks of Wisdom not only as an attribute of God, but almost as another being, existing side by side with God, to which God gives life and the power to create the world with Him.

1. III Kings, iii, 12.
5. Baruch, iii, 15, 29, 32-35.

« The Lord possessed me, » says Wisdom, « in the beginning of his ways. Before he made anything from the beginning;
I was set up from eternity,
And of old before the earth was made;
The depths were not as yet, and I was already conceived,
neither had the fountains of water as yet sprung out:
The mountains with their huge bulk had not as yet been established:
Before the hills I was brought forth:
He had not yet made the earth, nor the rivers,
Nor the poles of the world.
When he prepared the heavens, I was present:
when with a certain law and compass he enclosed the depths:
When he established the sky above,
and poised the fountains of waters:
When he compassed the sea with its bounds,
The doctrine in Ecclesiasticus is the same as that in Proverbs; Wisdom is represented as something almost distinct from God. This distinction is brought out even more strongly in the Book of Wisdom, where Wisdom is called an emanation of divine splendor, the reflection of the eternal Light, a spotless mirror reflecting the face of God.

Mark, however, that so far the doctrine of Wisdom is far from being positively settled. While there are some texts that show, between God and Wisdom, such opposition of relation as is spoken of in the dogma of the Trinity, there are others that represent Wisdom simply as an attribute of God, an attribute very active, it is true, but still only an attribute. In a word, in all the Scriptures we have so far seen, the dogmatic hypostasis is nowhere found.

The Word of God in Palestinian Literature. — In the second half of the last century B.C. and at the beginning of the new era, the doctrine of the Word of Yahweh supplanted that of Wisdom. In the Targoumim, the Word of Yahweh,

and set a law to the waters
that they should not pass their limits:
when he balanced the foundations of the earth:
I was with him forming all things:
and was delighted every day,
playing before him at all times;
Playing in the world:
and my delights were to be with the children of men.»
1. Eccl., xxiv.
« For she (wisdom) is a vapor of the power of God,
and a certain pure emanation of the glory of the almighty God:
and therefore no defiled thing cometh into her.
For she is the brightness of eternal light,
and the unspotted mirror of God's majesty,
and the image of his goodness. »
3. The Targoumim are a collection of paraphrased translations, done in the Aramean tongue, of the Hebrew text of the Holy Books. In their present form, they date no farther back than the year 150 A.D. They are only a codification of the traditional exegesis of the synagogues; but they give us at least the Jewish
the Memra, is often spoken of instead of Yahweh. This change first occurs in those passages in which the text ascribes to Yahweh bodily organs, especially the organs of speech. Here we find such expressions as the « mouth » of the Word of God; the « voice » of the Word of God; the « hand » of the Word of God; the « eyes » of the Word of God; the « tongue » of the Word of God; the « breath » of the Word of God.

The Targoumists go even further and deny to the Divinity not only bodily organs, but even a soul, with all its psychic functions. Where God says, in the Old Testament, « My soul », they represent Him as saying « My Word » . It is not God who feels angry, it is His Memra. It is His Memra that detests evil; his Memra, and not He Himself, feels sorrow.

Having transferred all corporal and psychical qualities from God to His Word, it was only natural that they should consider this Word as intermediary between God and man. Hence, when they took an oath, it was not Yahweh but His word that was called upon to witness. To this Word men were converted; in it they placed their confidence and


2. Onkelos, Targum on Deuteron., iv, 33; v, 21.
3. Onkelos, Targ. on Exod., xxxiii, 22.
4. Jonathan, Targ. on Isaias, i, 16.
5. Id., Targ. on Is., xxx, 27.
7. Onkelos, Targ. on Levit., xxxvi, 30.
8. Jonathan, Targ. on II Sam., xxii, 16.
11. Onkelos, Targum on Gen., xxi, 23; xxii, 16; xxiv, 3.
looked to it for help. The Word takes the place of Yahweh in relation to the entire Creation, as Creator, as Sovereign, and as Judge; and in the special relations to Israel, as Protector of the Patriarchs, as Lawgiver on Sinai, and as the one who inspired the Prophets.

From this we see that there is some distinction in the minds of the Targoumists between Yahweh's Memra and Yahweh Himself; for it would be to no purpose to take the Word as intermediary between God and man, unless the Word were distinct from God. It is true that this distinction is not radical, for it often happens that the Word is used as a substitute for the name of Yahweh himself, as when it is said that the Word was in the Ark of the Covenant. This name is thus frequently substituted for the name of Yahweh, or Elohim. There is, then, no well-defined distinction of persons between the Memra of Yahweh and Yahweh himself; the Targoumist concept lies midway between the concept of simple attribute and that of the hypostasis of our dogma.

Origin of the Palestinian Doctrine of the Word of God.
— How are we to explain the substitution of this new concept of the Word of God, the Memra, for that of Wisdom?

We must first observe that Alexandrian philosophy could exert but feeble influence in the formation of the doctrine of the Memra.

1. Onkelos, Targum on Genesis, xxi, 20 and seq.
2. Jonathan, Targum on Isaias, xlvi, 12.
3. Onkelos, Targum on G., vi, 6-7; vii, 16; xv, 1-16; xxvi, 24-28.
4. Onkelos, Targum on Levit., viii, 35; xxvi, 11.
5. Onkelos, Targum on Genesis, xv, 1, 6.
7. During the course of the last two centuries of the old era, Platonic philosophy was held in high esteem at Alexandria. They did not pretend to teach pure Platonism, however; but Platonism was the chief philosophy taught, and great pains were taken to modify it by views borrowed from other systems, chiefly from Stoicism. This eclectic philosophy was called Neo-platonism.

At the time of Christ's birth, the most prominent Alexandrian philosopher
The most that can be admitted is that the term Logos found its way into Palestine, where it preserved its Ara-

was Philo (20? B. C. -50? A. D.), a Jew thoroughly devoted to the beliefs of his people. It is not to be wondered at, then, that his doctrine is a blend of Platonism, Stoicism, and the Bible.

Philo admitted that there is a personal God, Providence, who transcends the world, and whom contact with the world would profane. God had to make use of intermediaries in creating the world. These are the λόγοι, which are ranged, in order, with the Logos at their head.

It is in his explanation of the nature of the Logos that Philo shows most clearly from what sources he borrowed. He sometimes represents the Logos as the cause of the admirable unity and order that we see in the world. The λόγοι are so many immediate powers of operation. Here Philo draws on Stoic philosophy.

Usually, however, the Logos is given as the intermediary principle between God and the world. He is called the name of God, δύναμις θεοῦ; another God, ἔστιν θεός; a second God, ὑπότρεπτος θεός. He is the organ of Creation, ὁ γὰρ ὁ λόγος θεοῦ ἔστιν κατασκευασμένος ὁ κόσμος. Since the world is called the Son of God, the Logos ought to be called his First-born, τὸν προτόγονον νῦν κτίστο λόγον. He, and not God himself, appeared in the theopanies of the Old Testament. It is he that was charged to carry out God’s orders in the world; he is the angel, the archangel, and the prophet. So, too, he pleads before God for man; he is the suppliant, ηδὼς: the High-priest, ὁ ἀρχιερατος λόγος. Here, Philo draws upon the Scriptures, and his views are colored with Platonism.

These two conceptions of the Logos are quite different, and it is not easy to see how Philo reconciled them together. It seems that the Logos, regarded as the cause of the order and the unity of the world, lacks personality; it seems to be nothing but the activity of God, conceived in an abstract manner and personified.

Is this the case with the Logos whom Philo calls the Eldest Son of God, and again angel, archangel, suppliant, and High-priest? Drummond sees in Philo’s Logos only a personified abstraction. Cf. Philo Judaeus, vol. II, p. 192. Lebreton is of the same opinion. Philo, he observes, was much given to personifying things in the abstract, no matter how unimportant, such as laughing, and the human speech; and were we to take all his metaphors to the letter, we should get ourselves into no end of difficulties. Cf. Les théories du Logos au début de l’ère chrétienne, Revue des Études religieuses, March 20, 1906. — Les Origines du dogme de la Trinité, pp. 201-203. — Breheret thinks it a poor method to fall back upon the inconsistencies of Philo, or upon the fluctuating character of his views. According to this writer, the Logos and the logoi are merely personified abstractions. There is, he holds, a reality corresponding to this whole intellectual system, and that is God, the source of cosmic unity and of its manifold aspects which we so admire in the different beings. But all these abstractions from the most humble, be it the lowest of the logoi, to the most exalted, even the Logos, are so many steps which the human mind has to scale while mounting.
mean form, Memra. This might have taken place either at the end of the second or at the beginning of the first century B.C., that is, at a time when there was cordial intercourse between the Pharisaic schools of Palestine and the Jewish school at Alexandria. We may say with certainty, too, that if Alexandrian influence made itself felt in Palestine, it was before the time of Philo; for, despite the fact he professed to have profound respect for the beliefs of his countrymen and tried to show that whatever good there was in Greek philosophy was borrowed from the books of Moses and the Prophets, he was nevertheless looked upon by the Jews of Palestine as a rationalist. From this time on, too, we find that there was a weakening of the ties that bound the Jewish school of Alexandria with the schools of Palestine. The Palestinian Jew regarded the Jew of Alexandria somewhat as a heretic. The philosophy of Alexandria, cannot, then, account for this concept of the Word of God.

As a Palestinian doctrine, its roots must be in the Old Testament; for, in Palestine, as we have seen, theology was too conservative, too traditional to borrow from any other source. In fact, Genesis 1, speaks of the Word of Yahweh and represents it as playing an important part in the Creation. But, in this primitive concept of the Word, we can see scarcely more than a poetic personification of the voluntary action of God, such as we find in the Psalms.


To sum up, it would appear that Philo's Logos is but the energy of God conceived of in the abstract, apart from God himself, and personified. In fact, the Logos without God is, for Philo, no more personal than is God without the Logos. Moreover, the Philonian Logos is a force whose function is the organization of matter; it is in no way connected with the function of bringing to men the life and the light of God, the gifts of salvation.

1. Gen., c. 1: « God said... And it was done ».
2. Ps., xxxiii, 6-9:
   « By the Word of Yahweh the heavens were established;
   And all the power of them by the spirit of his mouth:»
There are texts, however, which go further and speak of the Word as «Messenger ».  

But outside of the hints about the Word of God, found in the canonical books, we can find even in Palestine several causes which enable us to understand the development of this doctrine. First of all, there was that peculiar theological tendency to spiritualize God beyond measure; to represent him as far removed from the world by the systematic suppression of everything that would show His immediate contact with it, and of all qualities and activities approaching ever so little to anthropomorphism; and secondly, a feeling that there is need of some beings, more or less distinct from the Divinity, to act as intermediaries between God and man and so maintain the relations that must exist between them. This certainly accounts to some extent for the pains the Targoumists took to substitute the Memra of Yahweh for Yahweh himself.

Let us observe, too, that the canonical books of the Old Testament contain a doctrine that parallels that of the Word. It is the traditional and authorized doctrine of Wisdom. Wisdom and the Memra have more than one feature in common. Like the Memra, Wisdom created the universe; she was always intermediary in God’s protection of Israel; and the concept of Wisdom fluctuated, just as did that of the Memra, between attribute and hypostasis. Accordingly, we can affirm with certainty that the doctrine of Wisdom, so richly developed in the Old Testament, was the source and origin of the doctrine of the Word.

If these causes seem insufficient to explain this doc-

Gathering together the waters of the sea, as in a vessel;
Laying up the depths in storehouses.
Let all the earth fear the Lord,
and let all the inhabitants of the world be in awe of him.
For he spoke and they were made:
He commanded and they were created.

1. Is., ix, 7; lv, 10,11. — Ps., cvii, 20; — cxlvii, 15.
trine, we must recall the fact that the time had now come for the hope of Israel, to be realized. While the Pharisees with unabated zeal, were calling upon the Word of Yahweh, were swearing by that Word, and by it still explained the Creation, there was growing up at Nazareth, Jesus, the Incarnate Word, of whom it would be said: "Omnia per ipsum facta sunt... dedit potestatem filios Dei fieri." To this religious working, which God promotes in the souls of the well disposed, must we look for the last cause in the explanation of the development of the doctrine of the Word of God, which sprang up in Palestine in the time of our Lord.

St. John's Logos. — During the second half of the 19th century, many rationalistic critics insisted that St. John's Logos was only a doctrine borrowed from Alexandrian philosophy. But nowadays this view is hardly maintained. Harnack recognizes in the Johannine Logos a direct descendant of the Palestinian doctrine of the Word, and believes that all that was borrowed from the Logos of Alexandrian philosophy was the name. Loisy holds nearly the same opinion and says that the fourth Gospel borrowed from Alexandria only its allegorical method and the term Logos.

1. John, I, 3, 12.

This last book is less dogmatic in tone.

3. History of Dogma, I, 97-98: "The elements operative in the Johannine theology were not Greek Theologoumena — even the Logos has little more in common with that of Philo than the name, and its mention at the beginning of the book is a mystery, not the solution of one — but the Apostolic testimony concerning Christ has created from the old faith of Psalmists and Prophets, a new faith in a man who lived with the disciples of Jesus among the Greeks." Cf. Harnack, What is Christianity, lecture xi, p. 218-220.

4. Le Quatrième Evangile, pp. 119-120: "The fourth Gospel is not an abstract philosophical work; it is a book of religion, and a profoundly Christian book.
He ought to add that the name of the Johannine *Logos* must have come from the Palestinian Word itself, for this Word would have been called by that name, at a quite early date, by the translation of the term *Logos* into the term *Memra*, Word.

As we have said, Alexandrian influence could not have made itself felt in Palestine except before the time of Philo; for that author was instrumental in bringing about, between the Jews of Palestine and those of Alexandria, a spirit of distrust which put a damper on the intellectual relations between the two.

Be that as it may, an unbiased examination of the Philonian *Logos* and the *Logos* of St. John will show sufficiently how different were the two concepts. It cannot be denied that the *Logos* of St. John is also represented as the intermediary through which God does everything; but at the same time this *Logos* is, from the beginning, the Life and the Light, vivifying and enlightening, with Divine life and light, every man that comes into the world. Since men would not participate in this life and light, the Logos was made man, and gave to the humanity which he assumed the fullness of life and light; and he dwelt among men as one of them, communicating to them of the fullness of his life and light. But this rôle of Sanctifier and Savior, fulfilled by the *Logos* of St. John, is entirely foreign to Philo's *Logos*.

It has no learned theory under which to subordinate Tradition; but it throws light upon Tradition by means of the elements and the method supplied to it by the philosophy of the Greeks. If the idea of the Logos and the Johannine principle of symbolism are not Greek and Alexandrian, nothing is; but the idea of the Incarnation and the symbols employed in the Gospel are the author's own and are Christian. There is a transposing of doctrine and of method rather than a borrowing in the absolute sense of that word. It is surely not the author's purpose to transform Apostolic Tradition in order to subjugate it and himself to the theories of Philo; and, though he may appear to take great liberty with the data of the Synoptists, he does the same with the material drawn from other sources, and we may say that Philo would recognize himself in the fourth Gospel far less easily than Matthew or Luke. »
And not only in function do the two differ, but in nature as well. We have seen that the *Logos* of Philo was, to put it briefly, only the divine power regarded in the abstract and personified. But the *Logos* of St. John is altogether different; it is really a person; there is an ontological opposition between it and God, such as exists between the Son and the Father, who is Himself a person. The *Logos* alone is incarnate; and during the time that he is working the world's salvation, there exists the most intimate relation between himself and God, his Father.

II

THE SPIRIT OF GOD.

The Spirit of God in the Canonical Books of the Old Testament. — In the Old Testament, it is chiefly Wisdom that is revealed as the intermediary between God and the world in its creation and government. However, the Spirit of God is also spoken of in a sufficiently clear manner. It appears first as the power presiding over the formation of the world, as we learn from Genesis, where it is represented as hovering over chaos, everywhere stimulating by the warm emanation of its breath the colossal powers of nature. The Spirit of God is the source of life: « Lord, thou shall send forth thy spirit, and they shall be created », cries out the Psalmist. It is the source of the life of man: « The Spirit of God created me », says one of Job's friends, « and the breath of the Lord animates me ». 

But the chief mission of the Spirit of God is the author

1. *Gen.*, i, 2. The Spirit of God is said to have moved over the waters. This is an image of the eagle hovering over its young and working its wings to warm them up and give them life.
3. *Job*, xxxii, 4. See also *Gen.*, ii, 7.
of human life; the Spirit grants the special gift by which Joseph is enabled to interpret the dreams of Pharaoh; and the same Spirit imparts to Joshua the virtue which makes him worthy to succeed Moses. This office of dispenser of special gifts, the Spirit will exercise in favor of the Messiah; he will give the King that is to come the intellectual gifts of wisdom and knowledge, the practical gifts of counsel and strength, and the religious gifts of understanding and the fear of the Lord. In Isaias we find the servant of Yahweh saying: « The Spirit of God is upon me; for God hath anointed me to carry good news to the unfortunate ».

The Spirit of God enlightened the Prophets; hence is the Prophet called the Man of the Spirit of God, vir spiritualis, as the Vulgate has it; and the Prophet considers himself as speaking by the Spirit of God.

And, finally, the Spirit of God sanctifies men. The Psalm Miserere is typical of this. The Psalmist asks God not to take from him the Spirit of holiness.

From all this, we see that the Spirit of God is the intermediary through which God works in the world. The functions exercised by the Spirit are not always easily distinguishable from those exercised by Wisdom. But for one who believes in the dogma of the Trinity and sees in the Old Testament the earliest foreshadowings of this mystery, there is nothing astounding in this; for all the Divine operations,
outside of the life of the Trinity, are common to the three Persons.

Despite this lack of precision, the Spirit of God stands forth, in the books of the Old Testament, as an intermediary distinct from Wisdom. How far is it distinct from God himself? Is the distinction sharp enough, at this time, to allow us to call the Spirit of God a hypostasis? No one goes so far.

The Spirit of God is, like Wisdom, manifested after the manner of an attribute, somewhat distinct from God, but to an extent not perfectly clear. The Jews could hardly go any further; they would have been afraid of compromising Monotheism.

Palestinian Idea of the Spirit of God. — We saw above that, in the Palestine of our Savior's time, the concept of the Word of God was substituted for that of the Wisdom of God. Though this was not directly responsible for the doctrine of the Spirit of God, yet the development of the latter was greatly accelerated thereby.

Thus, in the Targoumim, the Spirit of God is not only the attribute by which God gives creatures life and communicates special gifts, such as revelation and the Messianic anointing, but it is also the Spirit from before Yahweh. So, too, though the Old Testament often speaks of the Spirit of God, the Spirit of wisdom, of piety, and of strength, we

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The old Jewish doctrine of Wisdom received analogous treatment in the Jewish school at Alexandria; but this school did not, on the other hand, know the doctrine of the Spirit of God. Philo himself saw in the Spirit of God, spoken of in the history of the Creation, neither an attribute of God, nor, far less, a hypostasis. He took it to mean only the air. The reason is that the Neo-Platonic term πνεῦμα, which originated exclusively in the Stoic school, meant only a material force, whereas the term Spirit of God, found in the Sacred Books, was essentially a power wholly cut off from matter. Cf. M. Hackspill, *Étude sur le milieu religieux et intellectuel du N. T.*, Revue biblique, Jan. 1902.
never find the Spirit of holiness (= Holy Spirit), but always the Spirit of the holiness of Yahweh (= Holy Spirit of Yahweh). But the Targoumists do not refrain from using the word Holy Spirit, an expression which points out much more clearly a distinction between Yahweh and his Spirit.

Yet it does not go far enough to show that the hypostasis of the Spirit of God had been clearly revealed.

To sum up, it may be said that, in the Old Testament, God's relations with man are all carried on through intermediaries, chief among which are the Wisdom and the Spirit of God. These intermediaries are not, so far, represented

1. There is frequently mentioned in the Old Testament another intermediary called the Angel of Yahweh. This Angel is nearly always found to take part in the principal theophanies (the sensible appearances of Yahweh) of the Old Testament. It is through him that Yahweh struggles with Jacob for a whole night (Gen., xxxii, 24-30), and appears to Moses in the midst of a burning bush (Ex., iii, 2).

Now, what is this angel? In certain texts he is represented as clearly distinct from God and inferior to Him. Thus, in Ex., xxxiii, 1-11. God tells Moses that He will send an angel before him to put the Chanaaneans to flight; and on hearing this, the people are disconsolate and feel that they have been deceived, for they expected to have Yahweh personally present. Their sorrow at this prompts God to come Himself, under the visible form of a pillar of clouds, and confer with Moses. This narrative shows quite clearly that, in the writer's mind, the Angel of God is an intermediary distinct from God and inferior to Him.

Again, this Angel is sometimes regarded as equal to God. Thus, in Gen., xlvi, 16, Jacob blesses the sons of Joseph in the name of Yahweh and His Angel, and he uses a formula of benediction which shows clearly that he identifies the Angel with God Himself. How are we to regard this Angel, who is at once equal to God and inferior to Him?

Lagrange observes that if, in the Old Testament, there are theophanies in which the divine intervention is brought about through the Angel of Yahweh, there are others in which God comes personally; that the mediation of the Angel is more frequent in the later canonical books than in the earlier ones, that the Septuagint often ascribes to the mediation of the Angel what in the original Hebrew is ascribed directly to God. These observations lead him to this conclusion: Without concluding from these various apparitions that Yahweh had a sensible form proper to Himself under which He must necessarily appear, the ancients made no mystery of admitting the sensible appearances of Yahweh; but later on, the tendency was to regard these apparitions as conducted by the aid of an ordinary envoy of Yahweh. So, the old texts were altered, but this was done with so much respect and moderation that the affirmation 'I am
as distinct from God as a hypostasis; but the distinction is sufficiently well marked to allow us to say that the dogma of the Holy Trinity was clearly foreshadowed in the Old Testament.

SECTION II


General Idea. — Though the dogma of the Blessed Trinity was only strongly intimated in the Old Testament, we may affirm that it was clearly revealed in the New Testament. We shall take up the statements regarding this dogma first in the synoptic Gospels, then in the Gospel of St. John, and finally in the Epistles of St. Paul.

The Dogma of the Blessed Trinity in the Synoptic Gospels. — It was chiefly through a fact — the fact of the Incarnation of the only Son of God — that the dogma of the Blessed Trinity was revealed. If we accept this fact, it is quite evident that we must also admit in God plurality of hypostases and unity of substance, the former to explain the Incarnation, the latter to save Monotheism. We shall see, moreover, that the great argument upon which this dogma rests — whether we consider the dogma of the Trinity in itself or according to the way in which it has always been explained and defended — is the fact of the Incarnation.

Now, this fact is related in St. Matthew and St. Luke,

the Lord' was allowed to remain on the lips of the mysterious being. When was this scrupulosity in vogue? It is found as early as Osee, and yet Jeremia still sees something of sensible objects in the ministry of an angel. It is impossible to fix the date; an idea does not become prevalent upon its first being conceived, and on the other hand, this idea may have exercised a certain influence before it was ever recorded. The work of altering these expressions, whether done in an authorized revision, or by the meddling of copyists, was not yet finished when the Old Testament was translated into Greek. We should be even more loath to attempt to fix the time when it began. » Cf. L'Ange de Yahweh, Revue biblique, April 1903.
not in a casual manner, but by bringing, as it were, the divine hypostases into play. The Father sends the Angel Gabriel. The Holy Ghost is in a particular way the author of the mystery; Mary conceives a Son whom the angels call the Savior of the world, the Son of the Most High, the Son of God.

The dogma of the Blessed Trinity is again proclaimed at the baptism of Our Lord, which is recorded by the three Synoptists. Jesus sees the Spirit of God descending upon him in the form of a dove; a voice from heaven calls him the Beloved Son of the Father. We may also cite the following text recorded by St. Matthew and St. Luke, even though it mentions only the Father and the Son: « All things are delivered to me by my Father. And no one knoweth the Son, but the Father; neither doth anyone know the Father, but the Son, and he to whom it shall please the Son to reveal him.» It is evidently question here of some transcendent relation out of which arises the divinity of the Son, as well as the hypostasis of the Father and that of the Son.

Finally, before the Ascension, which is to establish his glory permanently, the Master declares to his assembled disciples that all power is given to him, and he commissions them to go all over the world to preach the Gospel and to baptize in the name of the Father, and of the Son and of the Holy Ghost: « All power is given to me in heaven and in earth. Going, therefore, teach ye all nations, baptizing them in the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Ghost; teaching them to observe all things whatsoever

I have commanded you: and behold I am with you all days, even to the consummation of the world. »

The Trinity could be no more explicitly stated than in this passage, hence it has been held as the great Trinitarian formula. The Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost are here represented as three individuals really distinct and constituting three hypostases. Not only is this distinction brought out by the three terms Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, and by the general tenor of the text, but also by the expression « in the name of the Father », a term that in all languages, and especially in the Hebrew and in the Aramaic, always designates a person. True, this phrase is used only before the term Father, but the connective « and » before « Son » and « Holy Ghost », shows clearly that this phrase is understood and is to be repeated before each of the other names.

The Dogma of the Trinity in the Gospel of St. John. — From the first, the prologue of this Gospel contains, without a doubt, the revelation of the hypostasis of the Father and that of the Son. « The Word », it says, « was in God » (τῷ πρῷ τῷ Θεῷ, literally « towards » God, which means in very active relation with God. The preposition πρῷ with the


2. The vast theological importance of this text accounts, no doubt, for the fact that its authenticity has been so much questioned. It has been remarked that the passage « baptizing them in the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Ghost », is not found in the quotations of Eusebius of Caesarea, which are of earlier date than the council of Nicea. The text quoted reads as follows : « Go, teach all nations in my name, teaching them to observe all that I have commanded you. » Cf. Demonstratio evangelica, l. Ill, 6; P. G., XXII, 233. It has been said on this account that the text of Eusebius is the one which was originally found in the Gospel. The passage as we have it, would then be a gloss suggested by the wording of the baptismal liturgy. Cf. F. C. Conybeare, Zeitschrift für N. T. Wissenschaft, 1901, pp. 275-283. But such a conclusion rests upon a foundation entirely too weak, for St. Irenaeus gives this passage of St. Matthew with its Trinitarian formula. Cf. Adv. Haer., l. III, 17; P. G., VII, 929. And so does Tertullian; Cf. De Baptismo, 13; P. L., I, 1215. For a remarkable discussion on this question see J. Lebreton, op. cit., note E, pp. 478-479.
accusative always has the idea of activity; whereas, the same preposition with the dative shows passivity and means to be near something. In the expression « And the Word was with God », the preposition « with », παρά, signifies an interchange of thought, sentiment, and life between the two Persons: a relation of activity with God, a communicated life.

It has been remarked that, in the text, the Word is said to be only tending « towards » God (παρά τῷ ὧν ἐγένετο). Now, this expression is evidently taken in the same sense here as it is in the following passage from the first epistle of St. John: « We declare unto you the life which was with the Father, and hath appeared unto us! ». It is question here of the hypostasis of God the Father: hence, the Word of God is an individual, in constant communication with God the Father, just as one person may be in communication with another. The Word and the Father are two persons.

Farther on in the prologue, we read that God made everything by his Word: « πάντα ἐκ τοῦ φθορίου ἐγένετο ». The Greek expression ἐκ τοῦ φθορίου, with the preposition governing the pronoun, requires that the Word be a subject really distinct from the Father, a person. This furnishes a second argument in favor of the personality of the Word, and at the same time of the Father.

After describing the Word and its creative action, the Evangelist goes on to say that the Word came unto his own; that he gave all who received him the power to become the children of God; and that the Word — that Word who, from his eternal generation, was possessed of the fulness of Divinity — was made flesh. All these expressions show that the Word must be a Person other than that of the Father, that it must be one Person, the Father another.

Farther on in the Gospel, we find again revealed the

1. I John, 1, 2-3.
hypostatic character of the Father and the Son, this time together with that of the Holy Ghost. Jesus says to his Apostles: « And I will ask the Father and he shall give you another Paraclete, that he may abide with you forever: the Spirit of truth... ». This other « Paraclete » — the word means advocate, defender, helper, comforter, and hence consoler — is also an individual distinct from the Incarnate Word and from the Father; it is a third hypostasis.

The hypostatic character of the Paraclete is again affirmed with equal force in the chapter following, where Jesus says: « But when the Paraclete cometh, whom I will send you from the Father, he shall give testimony of me. » In other words, the Holy Spirit, who comes from the Father through the Son, is he that will give testimony in the person of the Incarnate Word. Here the Holy Spirit evidently appears as an hypostasis, just as truly as the Father and the Son.

1. John, xiv, 16.
3. In the course of our exposition, we have been led to make a comparison between the Gospel of St. John and his first Epistle. This is because the doctrine in these two works is, at bottom, the same. No one will contend that no light is thrown on either work by a comparison with the other.

Let us observe also that the first Epistle of St. John contains a remarkably precise statement of the Trinity. It is found in the verse called the « Three Witnesses »: « Quoniam tres sunt qui testimonium dant in caelo: Pater, Verbum et Spiritus Sanctus; et hi tres unum sunt », v, 7. The authenticity of this verse has been much questioned, as is well known; and, while it is not in the province of our work to take side in the matter, it is only proper that we should recall the reasons that militate in favor of its authenticity and those that are usually adduced against it.

In favor of its authenticity we have first the decree of the council of Trent declaring canonical « all the books of the Old Testament and of the New... together with all their parts... and in the text of the Vulgate ». Cf. Denz., 783-784. In the second place, there is the decision of the Congregation of the Holy Office, of January 13, 1897. To the question: « Utrum tuto negari aut saltem in dubium revocari possit esse authenticum textum S. Ioannis in epistola prima, cap. v (v 7), quod sic se habet: quoniam tres sunt... », the Congregation answered: « Negative ». Cardinal Franzelin brings out the fact that the passage in question, or traces of it at any rate, is found in Tertul-
The Dogma of the Trinity in the Epistles of St. Paul. —
St. Paul has nowhere given fully the doctrine of the Blessed

lian, St. Cyprian, St. Fulgentius, Cassiodorus, and some others. From all these testimonies he concludes that the verse of the Three Witnesses must have existed in the primitive text of the epistle of St. John. If, later on, it is not found in a great many manuscripts, this is due to the fact that the copyist, for some reason or other, or perhaps out of sheer negligence, failed to transcribe it. Cf. De Deo trino, pp. 41-71.

Following are the arguments against the authenticity of this passage. Father Cornely, in his Introduction au Nouveau Testament, pp. 679-682, and the Abbé Paulin Martin, in his Cours professé à l'Institut catholique, in 1885-1886, claim that it is wrong to appeal to the decree of the council of Trent in vindicating the authenticity of the verse of the «Three Witnesses», for the words «together with all their parts» have reference only to those passages rejected by Protestants. As for the decision of the Congregation of the Holy Office, Father Pesen says that this does not prevent us from pursuing the critical study of the verse in question until we arrive at a certain solution on the matter: Itaque, nunc sicut ante illud decretum, licet critice in hoc comma inquirere, donec pro rationum criticarum dignitate firmam judicium formari possit, idque sine utta in congregationem Sancti Officii vel Summum Pontificem irreverentia. Authenticam vero dogmaticam negare vel in dubium vocare et post decretum et ante decretum semper erat illicitum. Praelect. dogmat., vol. II, p. 250, note. Besides, it is quite clear that Papal infallibility is in no way implied in the question.

The authenticity of the verse of the «Three Witnesses» is seriously questioned because, excepting a single text of the twelfth century, none of the many Greek manuscripts dating before the Lateran council (1215) have it. It is not found in the principal Latin Fathers, St. Hilary, St. Ambrose, St. Jerome, St. Augustine; and none of the texts cited by Franzelin refer indubitably to this verse.

M. Künstle, professor at the University of Freiburg-in-Brisgau has shown that the first evidence of this verse is found in the Liber apologeticus, written by Priscillian, about the year 380. We read there: «Et ascendens (Christus) in caelos venientibus ad se iter construit totus in Patre et Pater in ipso, ut manifestaretur quod scriptum est: Gloria in excelsis Deo et par hominibus in terra bonae voluntatis, sicut Johannes ait: Tria sunt qui testimonium dicunt in terra: aqua, caro et sanguis; et haec tria in unum sunt. Et tria sunt quae testimonium dicunt in caelo: Pater, Verbum et Spiritus: et haec tria unum sunt in Christo Jesu. According to M. Künstle, Priscillian interpolated this last passage in the first epistle of St. John, so as to justify in this way his unitarian theories. The text was then retouched so as to appear orthodox, and in this shape found its way into several Spanish documents. Cf. Das comma Joanneum auf seine Herkunft untersucht, B. 1-8, 1905. In the Revue pratique d'Apologetique, July 15, 1906, Fr. Lebreton, reviewing this work says. «Besides the scientific interest of this publication I cannot
Trinity. In his teachings on the divinity of the preexistent Christ, however, he always represents him as an individual distinct from the Father, that is, as a person. And when he gives us to understand, by the attributes that he discerns in the Holy Spirit, that this Holy Spirit is God, just as are the Father and the Son, St. Paul shows very clearly that the Holy Ghost is distinct from the Father as well as from the Son; he shows that the Holy Ghost is another person.

But the Apostle does not only mention the three Persons severally; there are passages in which he represents all three as perfectly distinct and of the same rank, thus showing at one stroke their hypostatic character and their divine equality. For example, in this text from the epistle to the Galatians, where he tells them that if they have become the children of God it is because God has sent them the Spirit of his Son, who (the Spirit) leads them to consider God as Father. So too, in another passage, from the second epistle to the Corinthians: «Now he that confirmeth us with you in Christ, and that hath anointed us, is God: Who also hath sealed us, and given us the pledge of the Holy Spirit in our hearts».

And in the following form of benediction: «The grace of our Lord Jesus Christ, and the charity of God, and the communication of the Holy Ghost be

refrain from noting here its apologetic interest. Since the appearance of the decree of the Holy Office, January 13, 1897, it has often been thrown up to Catholics that they have been doomed by their Church to maintain an indefensible position in the field of criticism. The approbation granted by the Archbishop of Freiburg to M. Künstle's book, rids us of this persistent objection. And the secretary of the Biblical Commission, Dom L. Janssens, wrote in a review of the book: «While congratulating the author on his very interesting work, I cannot but rejoice at the Episcopal approbation under which it appears. » See LEBRETON, Les Origines du dogme de la Trinité, note K, pp. 525-531.

2. See in particular 1 Cor., ii, 10-11.
4. II Cor., i, 21-22.
with you all », the doctrine is even more clearly exposed, and the passage might be taken as the equivalent of a Tri-nitarian formula.

§ III

PATRISTIC TRADITION.

General Idea. — The dogma of the Blessed Trinity, well foreshadowed in the Old Testament, was clearly revealed in the New. To be sure, all that is taught here is that the Son, who comes from the Father, was made man and that all sanctification comes to us through the Spirit, which proceeds from the Father and the Son. But it is clearly proclaimed that there is but one God, who is God the Father, God the Son, and God the Holy Ghost; and that the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost are really distinct from one another. And this constitutes the dogma of the Trinity.

The Apostolic Fathers faithfully transmitted the doctrine which they had received. In the third century, the heresy of the Sabellians, or Modalists, compelled the Fathers to defend the doctrine of real distinction between the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost. In the course of this work of transmission and defense, the dogma of one God, Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, found expression in much more forcible language than heretofore. They put it that in God there were three Persons in one substance.

The Apostolic Fathers. — St. Clement teaches that

1. II Cor., xiii, 13.
2. The term Apostolic Fathers is applied strictly to those writers of Christian antiquity who knew or might have known the Apostles or some of them. Such were most probably the author of the Didache (end of first cent.), the author of what is known as the Letter of St. Barnabas (96-97), and, without any doubt, St. Clement of Rome (92-101), St. Ignatius of Antioch († 107). St. Polycarp of Smyrna († 155). The term now also includes Hermas (140-155), Papias of Hierapolis († 161 or 163), the author of the Letter to Diognetus (about 150).
there is but one God, but that this God is God the Father, God the Son, and God the Holy Ghost. God the Father is more especially the author of the works of power. The Son was made man to save us. And the Holy Ghost inspired the sacred writers of the Old Testament. In thus ascribing particular work to each, the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost, as St. Paul did, St. Clement shows clearly that he distinguishes three Persons in God. And furthermore, in two Trinitarian formulas, he sets forth with sufficient clearness that he places these three Persons on the same level. «We have », says he, «but one God, one Christ, one Spirit of grace bestowed upon us». Just as truly, he solemnly avers, as God liveth, as Christ liveth, as the Holy Ghost liveth, he that keepeth these commandments with humility and courage will be numbered among the elect.

St. Clement follows rather the doctrine of St. Paul. St. Ignatius of Antioch, adhering rather to the doctrine of St. John, expresses himself more clearly. «The faithful», writes he, «should be subject to their bishops, as Christ, according to the flesh, is subject to his Father, and the Apostles to Christ, to the Father, and to the Spirit». And in another epistle, he says that the faithful should be «the stones of the temple of the Father, raised aloft by the instrument of Christ which is the cross, making use of the Holy Spirit as a rope».

1. Ad Cor., xxviii, 4, 5.
2. Ad Cor., xlii, 6.
3. Ad Cor., vii, 4; xlv, 2.
4. Ad Cor., xlvii, 6.
5. Ad Cor., LVIII, 2: «Ζηγα γάρ ὁ θεός καὶ ζη ὁ χυριος Ἰσθούς χριστος καὶ το Πνεύμα το ἄγιον.....» Under the Old Law oaths were taken in the name of Yahweh, cf. I Kings, xiv, 39; xx, 3; xxvi, 16; xxix, 6. St. Clement swears in the name of God, of Christ, and of the Holy Ghost, showing thereby that he regards these three Persons as occupying the same rank.
In the prayer which he offered to God before his martyrdom, St. Polycarp has in mind a doctrine identically the same as that held by St. Ignatius: « In all things (O God the Father), I praise thee, I bless thee, I glorify thee, through Jesus Christ, the eternal and heavenly Pontiff, the beloved Son, to whom, together with the Holy Ghost, be glory now and forever ». This Trinitarian doxology, destined to become so famous in the Church, makes here its appearance for the first time; further on it is repeated by the narrator, and this time in better form: « Fare ye well, brethren »; says he, « and walk ye according to the Gospel of Jesus Christ, to whom be glory, together with the Father and the Holy Ghost. »

Thus it was the martyrs died: in the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Ghost; thus, too, according to the Didache, were the catechumens baptized: in the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Ghost.

This testimony of the Fathers shows us that from the beginning there was firm faith in the mystery of the Blessed Trinity.

The Apologetic Fathers. — The faith of the Apologists

3. Didache, vii, 1.
4. It is true that Hermas exposes a different doctrine. He would say that it was the Holy Ghost that was made flesh to constitute the Son of God; and this he gets from that passage in St. Luke (iii, 21-22) which narrates the baptism of Jesus and says that the Holy Spirit came upon the Savior, while a voice from heaven said: « Thou art my beloved Son. » Cf. Simil. V, v, 2; vi, 5-7. On this point, see L. Duchesne, The early history of the Church, vol. I, pp. 170-171. — J. Tixeront, History of Dogma, I, pp. 114-116. We should not, however, forget that these words of Hermas are rather an attempt to explain the dogma of the Trinity rather than a statement of the dogma itself. Though Hermas, as a philosopher, might indulge in unacceptable speculations on the divine mystery, as a Christian, he must confess the mystery with as great precision as the other Apostolic Fathers.
5. In the second century the Jews assailed the Christians just as they did
is not less firm than that of the Apostolic Fathers. Alongside of the Supreme God, writes St. Justin, there is another — not an angel, but God. This is the Son engendered by the Father before all creatures. Being truly the Son of God, he is distinct from God the Father not only in name, as a ray of light is distinct from the sun, but numerically. Yet, the two are always in perfect accord. There is also in God a third One, the Holy Ghost, who is the author of the prophecies. Hence, according to this famous apologist, there is only one God, Father, Son, and Holy Ghost. Likewise in the ceremony of the Eucharist, he that presides "praises and glorifies the Father of the universe through the name of the Son and of the Holy Spirit." And finally he says again: "In all the offerings we make, we bless the Creator of the universe through his Son Jesus Christ and through the Holy Ghost.

After St. Justin, his disciple Tatian taught the same doctrine. First of all, he says, the Father engenders a Son, not by division but distribution; for "that which is divided is de-

the Pagans; and the Pagans likewise persecuted the Christians. But usually neither Pagan nor Jew could give a good reason for this attitude. In this atmosphere of hatred and blood, the apologies were written — defensive and offensive arms which did not only protect the breastworks of the Christians, but sallied forth and attacked the enemy on their own grounds. Among the Apologists of the second century, we shall cite St. Justin (150-155), his disciple Tatian (163-167), Athenagoras (176-180), and St. Theophilus of Antioch (180).

1. Dial., cxxvi; cxxviii.
2. Dial., xlviii; lvi; lxi.
3. Dial., cxxviii.
4. Dial., lvi, 11: "Εστι οὖν τοῦ πάντα ποιησάντος Θεοῦ, ἀριθμὸς γένους, ἀλλὰ οὐ γνώμην."
6. Apol., lxi.
prived of that portion which is taken from it, but distribution presupposes voluntary dispensation and causes no diminution in that from which it is drawn. Just as the light of a torch which serves to kindle many fires, is not diminished because other torches have been kindled from it, so the Logos, proceeding from the power of God, does not deprive of Logos him from whom it was engendered. » Alongside the Father and the Son, Tatian places the Holy Ghost, whom he calls the similitude of God, the deacon of the suffering God.

Athenagoras, in his « Supplication for Christians », makes a complete profession of faith in the mystery of the Blessed Trinity: « We believe in one only God, not begotten but eternal, invisible and impassible..... who, by his Word, created the universe, embellished it and preserves it. We acknowledge also the Son of God..... As for the Holy Ghost, who works in the prophets, we hold that he is an emanation of God, coming from and entering the Godhead like a ray from the sun. Who would not be astounded, then, to hear us called atheists, when we affirm that there is one God the Father, one Son God, and the Holy Ghost; and when we proclaim their unity in power, and their distinction in rank? »

Let us finally quote St. Theophilus of Antioch, who is commonly held to have been the first to use the word « Trinity ». « The three days that preceded the creation of the luminaries », writes he, « are an image of the Trinity (τρεις ἡμέρας τριάδος), an image of God, of his Word, and of his Wisdom ».

We see that these testimonies, — whether provoked by the Jews, who stuck obstinately to the monotheism of the Old Law, or by the Pagans, who accused the Christians of being
atheists, — are most expressive and constitute an admirable profession of faith in the Most Holy Trinity.

St. Irenaeus. — St. Irenaeus, in refuting the heresies of his time, has given an exposition of the doctrine of the Trinity, free from all alloy. There is but one God, the God of the Old Testament and of the New. But in this one God, St. Irenaeus sees three persons, the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost. The Son is begotten of the Father from all eternity. Being truly God, he reveals the Father to both angels and men; and, moved by the immense love he bears us, he makes himself like unto us, that we may become like unto him. As for the Holy Ghost, he is eternal, existing with God before the creation of the world. He inspired the prophets, and it is through him that the Incarnate Word sanctifies the Church. Following is the symbol of St. Irenaeus: « The Church, whose seed is scattered throughout the world to its extremities, has received from the Apostles and their disciples this faith: She believes in only one God, the Father Almighty, who made the heavens and the earth and the sea, and all that is in them; and in one Jesus Christ, the Son of God, who became

1. The work of St. Irenaeus, bishop of Lyons (d. about 202), is entitled Contra Haereses and comprises five books. The original Greek text is lost. All that is left is a very old Latin translation, full of stylistic imperfections, but all the more valuable because of its literalness. Portions of the Greek text have been recovered, for they are cited in the writings of the fourth and fifth centuries, particularly in the Ecclesiastical History of Eusebius and in the writings of Theodoret. In Migne's Patrology, these portions are set next to the Latin text, in the volume containing the Contra Haereses, P. G., VII.

3. Haer., 1. I, x; 1, IV, xx, 1, 3.
5. Haer., 1. III, vi, 2; 1. IV, iv, 2.
incarnate for our salvation; and in the Holy Ghost, who, through the prophets, announced the designs of God, the coming, the virginal birth, the passion, the resurrection from the dead, and the ascension into heaven in the flesh, of Christ, our beloved Lord, and his coming from on high in the glory of his Father to restore all things, to bring again to life the flesh of man, in order that, before Jesus Christ, our Lord, our God, our Savior, and our King, according to the decree of the invisible Father, every knee should bend, in heaven, on earth, and under the earth, and that every tongue should confess him, and that he should pronounce upon all a just judgment: that the souls of the wicked, the rebellious angels and those that fell into apostasy, and impious and unjust men, criminals and blasphemers should be sent into everlasting fire; and that the just, the saints, those who keep the commandments and persevere in charity, whether from the beginning or from the time of their repentance, should receive the gift of life, of incorruptibility, and of eternal glory. »

Patriformianism at Rome, in the Beginning of the Third Century. — At the beginning of the third century, a certain number of Christian doctors, imbued with the idea that too great a distinction was being set up between the Father and the Son, and that thus the Divinity of Christ was endangered, taught a doctrine diametrically opposite to that already stated.

In Rome, the leader of the party, Sabellius, was extremely radical. He taught that the Word has no separate existence — that this is another name for the Father. And it was the Father, consequently, who was born of Mary and who suffered. Hence the name Patriformianism given to this theory.

1. Haer., 1, I, x, 1.
2. Tertullian claims that it was a certain Praxeas who first taught this
The Struggle against Patripassianism; St. Hippolytus and Tertullian. — Patripassianism was attacked at Rome by St. Hippolytus. God, he maintained, is one; but his essential unity allows of a mysterious economy, or communication to three terms really distinct. By virtue of this economy, the Father is in the Son, and the Son is in the Father; the Holy Ghost is the third term of this economy. This economy is the very law of divine unity; so much so that divine unity is incomprehensible, unless we believe in the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost.

Despite the active warfare of St. Hippolytus, Sabellianism continued to grow and to gain adherents. Pope Callistus therefore intervened and condemned Sabellius for heresy.

Meanwhile Tertullian, too, was wielding his powerful arm against the new doctrine. There is in God, he said, but one substance; yet in this one substance, there is room
for a trinity of persons\(^1\). Divine unity excludes division, but it does not exclude a distinction of persons\(^2\). After appealing to these principles and developing them, Tertullian makes the following grand profession of faith: « We make between God and his Word the distinction of Father and Son, and we hold that they are two... and three with the Holy Ghost. Without the slightest doubt, they are not two Gods, or two Lords, even though the Father is God, the Son is God, and the Holy Ghost is God — though each of them is God. Nor is God only one person, as would be the case had the Father himself come into the world; but he who has appeared to us and whom we confess to be God, is Christ; he is not the same as the Father, and the Holy Ghost is still another and a third person. But the name God, and Lord, is common to each; they are but one God\(^3\».

Modalism in the East. — Sabellianism developed also

1. Adv. Prax., ii : Custodiatur aedonicix sacramentum, quæ unitatem in trinitatem disponit, tres dirigens, Patrem et Filium et Spiritum Sanctum. Tres autem non statu, sed gradu; nec substantia, sed forma; nec potestate, sed specie: unus autem substantix, et unius status, et unius potestatis; quia unus Deus, ex quo et gradu isti et formæ et species, in nomine Patris et Filii et Spiritus Sancti deputantur.


in the East, the doctrine of Sabellius thus returning to the land of its birth, where no doubt it always had some supporters. But then it took on a more philosophical form, which is properly called modalism. The dogma of three Persons in one God was interpreted as nothing but a series of manifestations, or transitory irradiations, of but one and the same divine substance, in the transitory modes of the same substance. The Modalists held that there is but one God; but that this God, having manifested himself to men chiefly in three ways, took three corresponding names. In the Old Testament, he manifested himself as Lawgiver; hence, God the Father. In the New Testament, he manifested himself in human form as our Redeemer; hence, God the Son. And the Holy Ghost designates God in his manifestation as the Sanctifier of souls.

The Struggle against Modalism; Origen¹ and St. Denis of Alexandria². — Origen combated Modalism in several of his writings. There are some, said he, who hold that the Father and the Son are but different modalities of one

1. Origen was born of Christian parents in the year 185 or 186, probably at Alexandria. A disciple of Clement of Alexandria, at the age of eighteen, he succeeded his master as director of the catechetical school, where he displayed great activity. While on a journey to Caesarea, he was ordained priest unknown to the bishop of Alexandria. On his return he was declared degraded from his position in the school and from the priesthood. He then took up his residence at Caesarea, where he established a school of theology, which became quite flourishing. One of the most famous disciples of this new school was St. Gregory, surnamed Thaumaturgus. Origen died in the year 254 or 255, as a result of the torments he underwent during the persecution of Decius.

2. St. Denis of Alexandria was born, probably at Alexandria, about the year 200. In this city, he followed Origen's teaching; and in the year 231 or 232, he succeeded Heracles as director of the catechetical school. Heracles was the successor of Origen in this position, but he held his place but a few months, and St. Denis remained at the head of the Alexandrian school for more than sixteen years. His teaching won for him the name of Great. Though he was made bishop of Alexandria, he still continued his teaching. He died at the time of the first synod of Alexandria, in the year 264 or 265.
and the same substance. But they are mistaken; the Father and the Son have, it is true, the same substance, but they are numerically distinct. He likewise affirms that the Holy Ghost is distinct from both Father and Son.

St. Denis of Alexandria went even further in his attack upon the new doctrine. To many it seemed that in his zeal he exaggerated the distinction between the Father and the Son to such an extent as to subordinate the Son to the Father in a way that was incompatible with the absolute divinity of the Son. When called upon by Pope St. Denis to explain, he did so in a letter in which he showed that the heterodox tendencies imputed to him were to be found only in certain exaggerated formulas which he had used in his refutation of the heretics. In a memoir drawn up in justification of St. Denis of Alexandria, St. Athanasius says that St. Denis spoke « economically », ἐν εἰκονομίᾳ, after the manner of the Apostles, insisting emphatically upon the truth which he wished to inculcate.

Paul of Samosata and the Synod of Antioch. — So far the Sabellians had at heart the defense of the divinity of Christ, and they identified him with the Father in order the better to show that, together with the Father, he was but one God. Paul of Samosata, bishop of Antioch, realized that Christ could not be God unless he was of one and the same personal substance with God, consubstantial (ἐνοςόστιος) with God. As this seemed impossible to him, he held

1. *In Joan.*, t. X, 21; *P. G.*, XIV, 376.
2. *In Joan.*, t. II, 6.
3. *De Sent. Dion.*, 6-12; *P. G.*, XXV, 488-497.
4. According to the theology of Paul of Samosata, Christ could not be God unless he be but one and the same person, or substance (he considered these two terms as absolutely synonymous) with God. Now, this cannot be. Therefore, he concluded, Christ is not God. According to the system of the bishop of Antioch, the word ὁμοούσιος had a modalist meaning. Hence it was that the Fathers of the council of Antioch rejected the term ὁμοούσιος. Cf. J. Tixeront, *History of Dogmas*, I, p. 403-404.
that Christ was nothing but a man invested with a divine mission.

Following is a complete exposition of his doctrine: There is in God but one person (πρόσωπον ἐν); in him we distinguish principally reason (λόγος), which is nothing but a simple attribute without personality (ἀνυπόστατος). We say that this Logos was engendered by the Father, and that he is the Son of God; but this is just a way we have of speaking. It is the Logos, however, that spoke and acted through the prophets, and above all in Jesus, the Son of Mary. Chosen by God in a very special manner to be the agent of his Logos, Jesus was possessed of an eminently supernatural character. By his sufferings he redeemed the world; and as a recompense God gave him a name which is above all other names, made him judge of the living and the dead, and clothed him with a dignity wholly divine, so in one sense we are justified in calling him God.

Firmilian, bishop of Cappadocia, and Gregory of Caesarea, who was soon to be called Gregory Thaumaturgus together with several other bishops, went to Antioch with the intention of putting an end to the heresy. Denis of Alexandria was also asked to come; but owing to his extreme old age, he was unable to attend, so he contented himself with writing a letter to the Church at Antioch. The first synod held at Antioch amounted to nothing. Paul, subtle and distinguished quibbler as he was, succeeded in evading condemnation. But in another synod, held in 267 or 268, he was convicted of heresy, deposed and excommunicated. Upon his refusing to submit, the emperor Aurelian intervened and enforced the sentence of the council.

1. Paul of Samosata’s views on God and Christ are very nearly like the views of Unitarian Protestants.

St. Gregory Thaumaturgus. — Chosen disciple of Origen at Caesarea, adversary of Sabellianism and of the doctrines of Paul of Samosata, and bishop of Neo-Caesarea, St. Gregory Thaumaturgus was always looked upon by the Greeks as the highest authority at the end of the third century. There is extant of his, a remarkable exposition of Trinitarian faith, drawn up about the year 265:

« One God, Father of the living Logos, of Wisdom subsistent, of Power, of the Impress of the eternal: the Perfect engendering the Perfect; the Father of the only Son.

« One Lord, one from a single one, God of God: the Impress and the Image of the Divinity: the efficacious Word, the Wisdom which embraces the disposition of all things, the efficient cause of all Creation: the true Son of the true Father, invisible of the invisible, incorruptible of the incorruptible, immortal of the immortal, eternal of the eternal.

« And one Holy Ghost, receiving his existence from God, and manifested by the Son: perfect Image of the perfect Son, Life which is the cause of life, the source of holiness, holiness producing sanctification: in whom is revealed God the Father, who is above all things and in all things, and the Son, through whom are all things.

« A perfect Trinity, divisible or separable neither in glory, nor in eternity, nor in royalty.

« There is nothing in the Trinity, that is created or servile, nothing adventitious, nothing which did not exist from the first, but came only afterwards. Never, therefore, was the Son wanting to the Father, or the Holy Ghost to the Son: but always the same Trinity, immutable and inalterable! »

Modalism and Arianism at the Beginning of the Fourth Century. — Arius was born at Alexandria about 256. Having

become a priest, he was appointed in 313 by bishop Alexander to the church at Baucalis.

Alexander was wont to assemble the priests of his church, for the purpose of giving them doctrinal and disciplinary instructions. In those days of religious ferment, this was a most salutary measure. But one day, after the bishop had exposed the dogma of the Trinity, Arius thought he saw Sabellian tendencies in the bishop's teaching; and accordingly he told him of this in public. The bishop explained, but Arius was not convinced. He was obstinate in his views; he held that the Son was so distinct from the Father as to be inferior to him in substance, that the Son was not eternal, but only the first creature of the Father. Whatever did not agree with his teachings, Arius stigmatized as Sabellian. This was the origin of the heresy that was to bear the name of Arius.

From this time on, the Sabellian and the Modalist controversies became of minor importance. All effort was concentrated upon showing that the Son is God absolutely, as well as the Father. The terms Sabellianism and Modalism were no longer used except by the Arians, who so designated the doctrines of those who opposed them.

Let us remark, however, that the Fathers of the council of Nicaea in condemning Arianism, framed their definition of the dogma of the Trinity so as to reach the Sabellians as well. The very foundation of the symbol which they drew up, which we shall examine later, is the existence of one God in three Persons. The term Person was not used, but the Fathers defined very clearly what they meant when they said that in God, the Father, the Son and the Holy Ghost are really distinct.

§ IV.

THEOLOGY OF ST. THOMAS.

St. Thomas' Precursors. — St. Thomas follows directly in the footsteps of St. Augustine, whose views he adopts.
Of these, however, he makes a synthesis, and expresses them with greater precision and greater depth.

When St. Augustine came upon the field, the great struggle with Arianism was at an end. The illustrious bishop of Hippo was less concerned about fighting adversaries than searching into the mystery. In his exposition, he starts with the divine essence, one, simple, and indivisible, and shows how this essence is expanded — not by superiority of nature, nor priority of time, but merely in the order of origin — into three persons who are really distinct. But what is the nature of these three persons who though really distinct, do not destroy indivisible unity or divine simplicity? They are relations not to be confounded with substance, since they are nothing absolute, yet they cannot be called accidents, since they are essential to the divine nature and are eternal and necessary, like this nature.

In expounding the Trinity, St. Augustine looks to the world about him for images and analogies. There is nothing surprising about this; for, since all things were created by the Trinity, is it not natural that these things should bear the impress of the Trinity upon them? The human soul, the most perfect creation after the angels, bears striking evidence of its divine origin. So, too, the immanent operations of our intellect and of our will, which make up our intellectual life, are pressed into service as symbols of the divine life. The Son is Son by the very fact that he is the Word, which proceeds from the intellect of the Father — this is truly generation. The Holy Ghost proceeds from the conjoint love of the Father and the Son.

In this doctrine, the principal elements of the synthesis of St. Thomas are recognizable. We may add that the Trinitarian theology of St. Augustine, before being studied by St. Thomas, was used by the Master of the Sentences and by

1. De Trinit., I. V-XV.
Albert the Great. The latter was the incomparable master of the Angel of the School, who for a long time closely adhered to the teaching of the former.

**Principles of the Thomistic Synthesis.** — St. Thomas starts with the revealed truth that there are two processions in God. We learn from the Sacred Books that, from all eternity, God the Father begets a Son, and that the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Father and the Son. These processions, immanent in God, St. Thomas studies by comparison with the principal operations of our intellectual life, viz., thought and love. The procession of the Son he compares to thought; that of the Holy Ghost, to love.

From the fact of the divine processions, St. Thomas reasons to the existence of real relations. In fact, each procession in God constitutes two actual relations. The procession of the Word by the act of thought-generation, establishes an active relation between the Father and the Son, and a passive relation between the Son and the Father. The procession of the Holy Ghost by the joint love of the Father and the Son, sets up an active relation of the Father and Son with the Holy Ghost, and a passive relation of the Holy Ghost with the persons of Father and Son. Hence, the two processions in God are the bases of four real relations: paternity and filiation, and active and passive spiration.

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1. *Sum. theol.*, I, q. xxviii, a. 1 and 2; q. xxxvii, a. 1 and 2. We shall farther on return to St. Thomas' doctrine on the nature of the divine processions.

2. Relation in general is defined as the being such and such with regard or respect to some other thing: *Respectus alicujus ad aliquid, ut ad terminum*. The relations which we study here are all based on an action emanating from a principle and tending to a term only virtually distinct from the substance of the principle. They consist either in an active relation between the principle and the term, or in a passive relation between the term and the principle.

3. *Sum. theol.*, I, q. xxviii, a. 4: *Secundum quamlibet autem processionem oportet duas accipere relationes oppositas, quarum una sit procedentis a principio, et alia ipsius principii. Processio autem Verbi dictur...*
In creatures, real relations, whether considered as to their foundations or as to the related beings themselves, are all accidents. This cannot be with God, for in Him there are no accidents. If we examine these real relations as to their foundations, we find that they are one with the divine substance; and if we look at their relative being, we find that they are only virtually distinct from the divine substance. Though the real relations in God, be only virtually distinct from the substance, those relations which are opposed the one to another are really distinct from one another.

Viewed concretely, person is a rational substance so individualized as to be distinct from all other substances, and hence incommunicable. Viewed abstractly, person, or personality, is that determination which individualizes rational substance to such an extent as to make it completely distinct from the substance, and therefore distinct from all other substances.

1. Sum. theol., 1ª, q. xxviii, a. 2: Quicquid autem in rebus creatis habet esse accidentale, secundum quod transferitur in Deum, habet esse substantiale: nihil enim est in Deo ut accidentes in subjecto; sed quicquid est in Deo, est ejus essentia. Sic igitur ex ea parte qua relatio in rebus creatis habet esse accidentale in subjecto, relatio realiter existens in Deo habet esse essentiae divinae, idem omnino ei existens. In hoc vero quod ad aliquid dicitur, non significatur aliqua habitudo ad essentiam sed magis ad suum oppositum. Et sic manifestum est quod relatio realiter existens in Deo est idem essentiae secundum rem, et non differt nisi secundum intelligitiv rationem, prout in relatione importatur respectus ad suum oppositum, qui non importatur in nomine essentiae. Patet ergo quod in Deo non est aliud esse relationis et essentiae, sed unum et idem.

2. Ibid., a. 3: Ex eo quod aliquid alioci attribuitur, oportet quod attribuantur ei omnia quae sunt de ratione illius. Sicut cuicunque attribuitur homo, oportet quod attribuat et esse ratione. De ratione autem relationis est respectus unius ad alterum, secundum quem aliquid alieni oppositione relative. Cum igitur in Deo realiter sit relatio, oportet quod realiter sit ibi oppositio. Relativa autem oppositio in sui ratione includit distinctionem. Unde oportet quod in Deo sit realis distinctioni, non quidem secun-
distinct from all other substances, and hence incommunicable.  

Now, in the Godhead, only the relations of origin are really distinguishing: Distinctio in divinis non fit nisi per relationem originis. Hence it must be these relations of origin that constitute persons in the Godhead.

But we have admitted four real relations in the Godhead. Are there also four persons? No; for, in order to constitute a person, a real relation must be distinct from the other relations; and it cannot be distinct from them unless it be opposed to them. Now, of the four relations, active spiration is indeed opposed to passive spiration, and that is enough to make it a real relation; but it is common to both Father and Son, and hence, the distinction required to constitute a person is not realized. So, in the Godhead, there are only three persons, neither more nor less.

dum rem absolutam, quae est essentia, in qua est summa unitas, et simplicitas, sed secundum rem relaticam.

2. Sum. theol., I, q. xxi, a 4.
Like the relations of origin, the divine persons are really distinct from one another, though they are identical with one and the same substance; or, to put it more exactly, though they are only virtually distinct from one and the same substance.

The Thomistic Synthesis. — Personality is that which distinguishes one rational substance from another in such a way that it renders it incommunicable. What, then, constitutes personality in God? Owing to its infinite perfection and simplicity, there can be in the Godhead no other principle of distinctness than that constituted by the relations of origin. The divine persons are what constitutes the distinction between these relations. How many relations are there in God? The Father begets the Son from all eternity; and from the Father, in as much as he begets the Son, proceeds the Holy Ghost. Hence, there are only three relations of origin distinct from one another, viz., paternity, by which the Father begets the Son; filiation, by which the Son is begotten by the Father; and spiration, by which the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Father through His begetting a Son. These relations are such that none can exist without the other two. Hence, when you say Father, you include Father engendering the Son; and, as a result of that act, producing the Holy Ghost. These relations are eternal and constitute the very life of God. There are, then, three persons in God, and these are really distinct, since they express three really distinct relations of origin.

The divine relations, however, are not like human relations, which are but accidents inhering in the substance and really distinct from it. Owing to the infinite simplicity and perfection of the divine reality, there can be no

1. On the different points that have been treated of in this lesson, see the remarkable Commentary of B. Conpensiere, In I. Partem Sum. theol., q. xxvii. pp. 131-195.
such thing as substance and accidents; and of course there can, for a greater reason, be no distinction between substance and accident. God is substance according to his entire being. Hence the relations of paternity, filiation, and spiration which, in God, form the constituent elements of person are substantial relations which can be only virtually distinct from the divine substance.

Such being the case, we can readily admit that there are three persons in God, without endangering the divine unity; but to see how these three persons, only virtually distinct from the divine substance, can be really distinct from one another, is difficult. St. Thomas here observes that it is their virtual distinction from the divine substance that makes this real distinction between the three persons possible. It were better, perhaps, to fall back, in such a strait, upon the analogical character of our concepts of God and of all the terms we use in speaking of Him. As a matter of fact, that is the last word that can be said on the subject.

The dogma of the Blessed Trinity eventually comes to the mere statement of this ineffable mystery. The Father begets a Son, and in this generation communicates to him his whole substance; and the Father and the Son in turn give their entire substance to the Holy Ghost. But, as the Son receives all the substance of the Father, so he renders again to the Father all this substance; and the Holy Ghost, receiving all the substance of both Father and Son, likewise

1. Sum. theol., 1ª, q. xxviii, a. 3, ad 1ºm : Quocumque uni et eidem sunt eadem, sibi invicem sunt eadem, in his quæ sunt idem re et ratione, sicut tunica et indumentum; non autem in his quæ differunt ratione. Unde, licet actio sit idem motui, similibiter et passio; non tamen sequitur quod actio et passio sint idem : quia in actione importatur respectus, ut a quo est motus in mobili, in passione vero, ut qui est ab alio. Et similibiter licet paternitas sit idem secundum rem cum essentia divina, et similibiter filiation; tamen haec duo in suis propriis rationibus important oppositos respectus. Unde distinguuntur ab invicem. Cf. Buonpensiere, loc. laud., a. 2).
renders again to them the substance which he receives. It is in this mutual communication of life that we see the trinity of persons in the Godhead. The person of the Father consists in the giving of his divine substance; that of the Son in receiving this divine substance from his Father; and the person of the Holy Ghost in receiving this substance from both Father and Son. Thus, the divine substance is possessed equally by all three persons from all eternity.  

ARTICLE II

The Son is God.

Doctrine of the Church. — We believe that the person of the Son, as well as that of the Holy Ghost, is absolutely God.

1. The Thomistic synthesis starts with the unity of the divine substance and ascends to the Trinity of persons through the processions. The reason for saying that it is the relations of origin that constitute the divine persons, is that otherwise the unity of the divine substance would be at stake, and this must be safeguarded at any cost.

Parallel to this synthesis, which, as we have said, proceeds from the principles of St. Augustine, another system, was elaborated which, instead of starting from the unity of the divine substance, first took up the persons. It proceeds rather from the theology of the Greek Fathers. Its principal expounders were Richard of Saint Victor, Alexander of Hales, and St. Bonaventure.

Richard of Saint Victor established his whole system on these words of St. John: « God is Love ». Now, love demands a plurality of persons in God. There is, then, in God He that loves, and He whom God judges worthy of His love — Condignus, upon whom He has bestowed supreme love and who returns that supreme love. And, besides, there is the common Friend — Condilectus. In mutual love, such as is manifested among men, especially when this love is ardent, there is nothing rarer, yet nothing more beautiful, than the desire to have another besides ourselves, who is loved like us by the same one that loves us, and loves us supremely. So, the perfection and the consummation of the love that exists between the two persons, requires an associate who will share in their mutual love. According to this view, the Holy Ghost is the fruit required by the reciprocal love that reigns between the Father and the Son. See the complete exposition of this system in Th. de RÉGNON, op. cit., Étude X.

T. I. 5
Evidently this doctrine can be proved only from texts having reference to the person of the Son of God and establishing the fact that this person is God. But the texts refer almost exclusively, not to the person of the Son, considered in itself, but to the person of the Son made man, i.e., Christ. The explanation is to be found in the fact that the person of the Son was hardly manifested in any other way than by the revelation of the Son of God made man.

Since such is the case, it goes without saying that we shall be obliged to adapt ourselves to the circumstances and to make no distinction between the Son of God, engendered by his Father from all eternity, and the Son of God made man in the womb of the Blessed Virgin, Our Lord Jesus Christ.

Him we believe to be God absolutely. We do not hold that he is God in this sense, that there is between him and God the Father some transcendental and unique relation of origin and holiness; for if this were so, he would be improperly styled God, and would be only deified to whatever extent a simple creature can be — he would be only divine. But we believe and profess that the only Son of God the Father is God, both before and since the Incarnation, just as the Father is, because the Father begot him from all eternity by the communication of His entire substance, because he possesses that substance just as the Father possesses it, and because he and the Father live identically the same divine life.

Such is the doctrine defined by the council of Nicea¹, and promulgated again by the great Christological councils of Constantinople², Ephesus³, and Chalcedon⁴. It holds the place of paramount importance in the symbols of Nicea and

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¹ Denz., 54.
² Denz., 86.
³ Denz., 113-124.
⁴ Denz., 148.
Constantinople\(^1\), and in that of St. Athanasius\(^2\); and is the fundamental dogma of the Catholic Church.

We shall trace the origin of this dogma in the *Holy Scriptures* and in the *Tradition of the Fathers*.

\[\text{§ I.}\]

**THE DIVINITY OF THE SON ACCORDING TO THE SYNOPTIC GOSPELS.**

**Jesus the Messias.** — During the second half of the last century B. C., and at the beginning of the new era, the Messianic hope fired the enthusiasm of men to the highest pitch\(^3\). Physical and social upheavals were looked for: the

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1. Denz., 86.
3. Three books mostly have preserved for us the record of the Messianic hopes during the years preceding the coming of our Lord. These are the *Book of Henoch*, ch. xc, 37-38; the *Psalter of Solomon*, xvii-xviii, cf. Swete, *The Old Testament in Greek*, vol. III; the *Sibylline Books*, 1. III, cf. Alexandre, *Oracula sibyllina*, Paris, 1845-1856.

The *Book of Henoch* is a collection of apocalyptic tracts the dates of which run from the years 170 to 61 B. C. The original texts, which no doubt was in Hebrew, is lost; but we have some very early, and more or less faithful, versions of them in Latin, Ethiopic, and Greek. The *Psalms of Solomon*, originally in Hebrew, have come down to us only in the Greek version. It is thought that they were written by a Pharisee, between the years 70 and 40 B. C. The *Sibylline Books* contain oracles supposed to have come from the mouth of the Pagan Sibyl, though in reality they were written by a number of authors, some of whom were Pagans, some Jews, and others Christians. The composition is all in Greek hexameters. The third book gives the Jewish portion of the work. The first section, verses 1-92, dates from the second half of the last century B. C.; the second section, verses 97-118, is older and is usually placed about the year 140 B. C.

Among the writings of the first century which may be helpful in studying the question of the Messianic Hope, it may be well to mention particularly the *Assumption of Moses*, composed in Hebrew or Aramaic (4 B. C. — 6 or 7 A. D.), of which we have only a Latin version; the *Book of Jubilees*, written in Hebrew, about the same period, of which we have an Ethiopic and a Latin version; the *Apocalypse of Baruch*, composed in Hebrew (50-90 A. D.), which is preserved in Syriac; *The Apocalypse of Esdras*, known as the *Fourth Book of Esdras*, composed either in Hebrew or in Greek, by a Jewish author (81-96 A. D.), and preserved only in various versions; the Latin version figures as appen-
pangs, as it were, in bringing forth the new order of things. The Messianic king was to manifest himself of a sudden; either that having remained hidden for a number of years he would present himself suddenly, or that he was to come suddenly on the clouds. Then would he judge between the people of Israel and their oppressors; and among the people, between the good and the wicked. The wicked were to be set apart and were to undergo dire punishment. Then was to be inaugurated the Messianic Kingdom, which was called either the Kingdom of God, because it was to be a new Theocracy, far superior to the old and governed by the Messias in the name of God, or the Kingdom of Heaven — the name "Heaven" was often used at that time instead of the name of God; and this kingdom was to come from heaven where its head was to reign, and men were to come into the full realization of this kingdom only after death in this earthly habitation, when they would enter into an ideal place called heaven. The kingdom of God was to extend over the whole earth, and the Gentiles were to form part of it; but the kingdom was to belong in

dix in our Vulgate; the Eighteen Benedictions, or the Prayer of the Jews, 70-100 A. D.; the Targoumin, an Aramean version paraphrased from the original Hebrew, the origin and importance of which were spoken of above, p. 26.

1. The term Messias, in Hebrew Mashiah, and in Aramean Meshishā means, strictly speaking, the Anointed, or Sacred (χριστός, Christus, or Unctus). This title was for a long time given to those who had been consecrated kings of Israel by holy unction. The expected Messias, the Anointed of the Lord par excellence, was looked upon by the Jews as a king, or rather as the King, the founder and supreme ruler of the new kingdom, the final and incomparably glorious king, in a word, as the Messias-King. Cf. M. LEWIN, Christ and the Gospel.

2. After consulting the Princes of the priests and the Scribes of the people, Herod tells the Magi that the Messias is to be born at Bethleham. Cf. Matt., ii, 2-6.

3. Cf. HENCH, XLVI, LXII. — IV ESDR., XIII, 3. These writings evidently use Daniel, vii, 13. There are, then, two traditions concerning the manner of the Messianic coming. This remark, especially pertinent in the study of the Messianic Kingdom, is otherwise also very important.
a special manner to the children of Abraham. Material prosperity was to be unbounded; but this was to be above all the Kingdom of Holiness, of the Life of God in the hearts of men.

For the Messias-King was to be at the same time the great Prophet. Himself free from all sin, he was to lead men in the way of justice and of the fear of the Lord.

1. *Psalter of Solomon,* xvii, 21-34:
« Look down, Lord, and make their King, the Son of David, arise unto them,
« At the time that thou hast fixed, O God, to rule over thy servant Israel,
« And gird him with strength, that he may reduce the unjust princes,
« That he may purify Jerusalem of the peoples that throng and destroy her.
« Wise and just, let him drive out the sinners from thy inheritance,
« Let him break the insolence of the sinners as a potter’s vase;
« With a rod of iron let him break to pieces all their confidence;
« Let him destroy by a word from his mouth all the nations that are immoral;
« Let his threats put the nations to flight before him,
« Let him convict the sinners by the thoughts of their (own) hearts.
« And he will unite again a holy people whom he will guide in justice,
« And he will judge the tribes of the sanctified people through the Lord his God,
« And he will not permit injustice to install itself again in their midst.
« And no man clever in doing evil will dwell amongst them,
« For he will hold them all as the children of their God.
« And he will distribute them in tribes over the land;
« Neither colonist nor stranger will dwell any more among them.
« He will judge the peoples and the nations in the wisdom of his justice.
« And he will have the peoples of the nations under his yoke to serve him,
« And he will give glory to the Lord before the eyes of the whole earth,
« And he will purify Jerusalem and make it holy again, as in the beginning.
« The nations will come from the ends of the earth to see his glory,
« And they will bring with them as presents the weaklings (of Jerusalem),
« And they will see the glory of the Lord with which God hath glorified him.
« And he (reigns) over them as a just king, instructed by God.
« And in his day there is no injustice among them,
« For all are holy, and their king is the Christ « of » the Lord.
« For he will not set his hopes in horses, in knights, in bows,
« Nor will he have treasures of gold and silver heaped up for war,
« Nor place his hopes in numbers against the day of combat.
« The Lord himself is his King, the hope of him that is strong in the confidence of God,
« And he will forgive all nations that are in fear before him. »
Moreover, he would surpass all other prophets, both for the extent of his revelations and the glory of his miracles.

Not only was the Messias to be holy, but his person was to be truly superhuman. To him was attributed, before his apperition on earth, a preexistence in heaven. Chosen by God from all eternity to become the perfect King of Israel, he lived in communion with God a long time before the beginning of his mission¹. But, while there was a tendency to regard the preexistent Messias as a person far above humanity, there still persisted the belief that he was a creature of God², which avoided identifying him with God, or even with the Word of God³.

What attitude will Jesus take amidst beliefs so interspersed with human considerations? From the beginning of our Savior's public life, John the Baptist represents him as the Messias entrusted with the fulfilment of the final judgment and the establishment of the Kingdom of God. This serves as a prelude to the manifestations made at the Baptism of Jesus. The Holy Ghost coming down upon him publicly consecrates him the Anointed one of God, the Christ, the Messias, as is proclaimed by the voice from heaven which says: «This is my beloved Son⁴. » And this solemn affirmation is followed by a sort of counter proof when Satan, sus-

¹ Henoch, ch. xlvi, 3: « Before the sun and the signs were created, before the stars of the heavens were made, his name was named before the Lord of spirits »; ch. lx, 7: « For before him is hidden the Son of man, and the Most High keeps him before his power and reveals him to the elect ». The IV book of Esdras (ch. xii, 32; ch. xiii, 24, 52), and the Targoumim of Jonathan on Zachary (ch. iv, 7), use terms no less significant. On this subject, see the recent work of Lagrange, Le Messianisme chez les Juifs, pp. 218-224.

² It is precisely because the Jews refused to recognize the divinity of Jesus that they failed to see in him the Savior. As late as the time of St. Justin, Tryphon said, when acting as the interpreter of the Jewish people, that the expected Messias was to be only a man descended from man: « Πάντες ἤμεῖς τὸν χριστὸν ἀνθρωπον ζη ανθρωπον προεκδοκώμεν γενήσεως ». Dialogue with Tryphon, xlii.


pecting that Jesus is the Messias, asks him to give the characteristic signs; and Jesus rebukes him, but without declining the title of Messias. What Jesus refused Satan, he granted the people. The promised Messias was to work wonders. Jesus multiplies his miracles throughout his ministry.

In the meantime Jesus makes some important declarations. In the Jewish mind the Kingdom was to appear with the Messias. Jesus declares that the Kingdom is come with Him. One day Jesus and his disciples were at Caesarea, and he asks them: « Whom do men say that I am? » And Peter answers, according to St. Matthew, « Thou art the Christ, the Son of the living God »; and according to St. Mark: « Thou art Christ »; and according to St. Luke: « Thou art the Christ of God ». And Jesus gives Peter his approval.

Peter's confession and the approval of Jesus positively raise the veil. From this day on, the allusions of the Savior become more and more frequent. The triumphal entry into Jerusalem reveals his Messianic dignity. And finally, before the High-priest, Jesus affirms that he is « the Christ, the Son of God »; and he adds these words: « Hereafter you shall see the Son of man sitting on the right hand of the power of God, and coming in the clouds of heaven. »

From all these testimonies we must conclude that Jesus thought himself to be the Messias and that he was willing to be held as such. But if we confine ourselves to the sole title of Messias which Jesus received or attributed to himself, we are not justified in saying that he held himself up as a

3. Mat., xvi, 16.
7. Harnack is rightly astounded to find that a scholar such as Wellhausen could doubt that Jesus designated himself as the Messias. As for him, he believes that in order to arrive at such a conclusion one would have to disjoin the Gospel narrative. Cf. What is Christianity, Lecture 8, p. 149.
Messias superior to the one expected by his contemporaries. The name « Son of man » already had a higher import.

Jesus, the Son of Man. — The expression « Son of Man » is often used in the Old Testament to mean simply man. Ezechiel always uses it to designate the prophet who had to make known the designs of God. It is an humble appellation used to mark the disproportion existing between God and the instrument of his revelations. Not so, however, in the book of Daniel. There the « Son of Man » means the Messianic King, coming on the clouds of heaven and surrounded with great glory.

Jesus permitted himself to be called the Messias. When asked if he was the Messias, he answered that he was. Yet, the title by which he preferred to be known was that of the Son of man. What meaning did he attach to this? According to some critics, Jesus represented himself as the Son of man met with in Daniel. Now, this triumphant king was just such a one as the people looked for under the title of Messias. The two expressions were in fact synonymous. And in representing himself as the Son of man, Jesus represented himself as the

2. Ezechiel uses this term 80 times.
4. Let us observe that this expression is frequently used in the book of Henoch. It often means only man; in the book of Parables, ch. xlvi-lxxi, this expression means Messias. Let us cite, for example, the beginning of chapter xlvi : « There I saw a someone who had « a head of days » (God), and his head was like white wool; and with him was another whose form resembled that of a man, and his form was full of grace, as one of the holy angels. I asked the angel that walked with me and that taught me all the secrets regarding this Son of man : « Who is he, and whence comes he; why walks he with the Head of days? » And he answered and said : « That is the Son of man, who possesses justice and with whom justice dwells, who will reveal all the treasures of secrets, because the Lord of spirits has chosen him, and his lot conquered by right before the Lord of spirits for all eternity. The Son of man whom you saw will make kings and the powerful arise from their couches and the strong from their seats; he will break the reins of the strong, and will crush the teeth of sinners. »
Messias. But at the time that Jesus taught, the synonymous character of these words was generally unknown. In representing himself as the Son of man, Jesus wished to conceal his Messianic character. This policy would permit him to reveal himself rather by his works and would enable him the more easily to escape all tumultuous and compromising ova-

tions.

Other critics think that Jesus, when he represented himself as the Son of man, wished to have it known that he compared himself not with the national Messias met with in Daniel and looked for by his contemporaries, but with the servant of God, foretold in Isaias, who was to be a man of sorrows, scorned and detested by the people, and who, by his sufferings and ignominious death, was to redeem the multitudes.

But are not these two opinions too restrictive? Jesus indeed represented himself above all as the Servant of God, come into the world to live in humility and obedience even to the death of the cross, in order to redeem man. But immediately after his death he was to enter into glory, and such glory as no man ever conceived. Through his death unto sin and resurrection unto glory, all men, were to die unto sin and rise unto glory. They would, indeed, have wilfully to unite themselves to the life of Christ, to share in his death by self-denial, before participating in his glory.


2. P. Batiffol, L'Enseignement de Jésus, p. 198-199 : « The expression Son of man is related not only to the poverty, the humility, and the labors of Jesus, but also to his passion. It thus calls up the idea of the servant of God, described by Isaias, « a man of sorrows and knowing suffering ». (Is., lxi, 1-12). And, in fact, probably the content of the expression Son of man, as used by Jesus, embraces the idea of servant of Yahweh, whose death is the ransom price of the people. This meaning surely excludes all idea of Messianic glory and of triumphal royalty ».
This glorification of Christ, together with that of those who were to be united to him, was to be accompanied by earthly catastrophes surpassing in extent all that the contemporaries of Jesus, in their poetic language had ever depicted.

It seems, then, that in representing himself as the Son of man, Jesus really represented himself as the Messias, but a Messias who before entering into his glory was to suffer all the humiliations of the Servant of God, as predicted by Isaias.

This explanation seems more in conformity with the general tone of the Gospel discourses. It must be confessed, however, that whether one follows this opinion or either of the other two which this one seeks to reconcile, we cannot see in the name Son of man, a claim of the Divinity. But we find it in the title of Son of God, to which the Savior laid no less formal claim.

Jesus the Son of God. — In the Old Testament, the word « Son », apart from its proper and strict meaning, is used to indicate all relations of intimacy, viz., as those of origin, of dependence, and of affection such as exist between father and son. The expression « Son of God », in particular, was applied to all individuals united to God by some close relation. In Genesis, in the Psalms, and in the Book of Job, it is applied to the angels; in the Psalms, it is given to magistrates; in the book of Wisdom, it is applied to the just.

1. Is. lxxi, 1-12. The doctrine of a suffering Messias, though by no means common in the time of our Lord, was nevertheless not completely forgotten. See on this point Lagrange, Le Messianisme chez les Juifs, p. 236-256.
2. There is, it seems, but a shade of difference between the opinion just given and that received by W. Sanday, Jesus Christ in Dictionary of the Bible, p. 625; — M. Lepin, op. cit., p. 113; — J. Tixeront, History of Dogmas, vol. 1, p. 63.
4. Ps. xxix, 1.
5. Job, i, 6; ii, 1; xxxviii, 7.
6. Ps. lxxxii, 6-7.
7. Wisdom, ii, 13, 18; v, 5.
Yet this is not the most common meaning of the expression «Son of God». It is more frequently the name given to the chosen people of God, the Jews\(^1\), and still more frequently to the king of Israel\(^2\), who is the actual ruler of the chosen people, and above all to the great king who was to establish the ideal kingdom. This last meaning is the more common in the apocryphal writings, where Son of God usually means the Messias whose coming was expected in the near future\(^3\).

It is of paramount importance to determine exactly the signification of the expression «Son of God» as used in the canonical and the apocryphal books; for in all probability the contemporaries of Jesus must have given him this title in the sense which it then had.

The Savior is called Son of God by the angel on the day of the Annunciation; by a voice from heaven at his Baptism and at his Transfiguration; by the devil; by his own contemporaries; and by himself. Let us dismiss the instances when this name was given by the angel, by the voice from heaven, and by the devil; for the circumstances would hardly enable us to determine the sense, and let us consider the name as applied to Jesus by himself and by his contemporaries.

There is no doubt that, in the minds of the Jews who questioned our Savior, the two expressions «Son of God» and «Messias» were synonymous. There seems to be room for no other interpretation of the terms used by the president of the Sanhedrim. Jesus was called blasphemer just because he said that he was the Messias, the Son of God, and thereby claimed between himself and God that close relation which the Anointed of God should bear to the Father, whereas it

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2. II Kings vii, 14; — Ps. ii, 7-11; lxxxix, 26-27.
3. Henoch, cv, 2; — Solomon's Psalter, xvii, 26-36; xviii, 8. — IV Esdr. vii, 28-29; xiii, 32.
was evident, according to the narrow views of the high priest, that Jesus did not possess the characteristics of the Messias 1.

Shall we interpret differently the texts containing the confession of St. Peter? We have already quoted the important declaration of Jesus: « Whom do men say that I am? », I, the Son of man. This Jesus asks Peter; and the Apostle answers, according to St. Matthew: « Thou art the Christ, the Son of the living God 2 », according to St. Mark: « Thou art the Christ 3 », and according to St. Luke: « Thou art the Christ of God 4 ». Then Jesus says to him: « Blessed art thou, Simon Bar-Jona: because flesh and blood hath not revealed it to thee, but my Father who is in heaven 5. » Then the Savior promises to give to Peter the keys of the Kingdom of heaven 6, and he requests the disciples to say nothing of what they have heard about him to any man 7.

According to some critics, we must here, as elsewhere, regard as identical the two expressions Christ, or Messias, and Son of God. Their synonymous character is clearly shown by the variants which the evangelists did not hesitate to introduce into their accounts of Peter's answer 8. If Jesus told Peter that he had received what he said not from flesh and blood but by the revelation of God, it was because Peter, unlike the other Jews, saw in the Son of man the expected Messias 9. Peter had raised the veil with which Jesus had so far concealed his Messianic character.

It seems indeed that it is the word with which Jesus approved of Peter's answer that must throw light upon the

2. Mat., xvi, 16.
5. Mat., xvi, 17.
8. V. Rose, Studies on the Gospels, ch. vi, Son of God.
9. V. Rose, ch. v, Son of man, p. 169.
true sense of this passage. Could it be that this solemn discourse, followed in the first Gospel by so important a promise, was called forth by the bare fact that Peter had put an end to the uncertainty about the Messiahship of Jesus? We must bear in mind that this uncertainty must by this time have been fairly well dispelled, for the voice from heaven on the day of his Baptism, as well as his numerous miracles, had long since marked Jesus as the Messias. If the Savior tells Peter, then, that special light from on high was necessary to enable him to make the affirmation just mentioned, it must be that the Apostle saw in his Master more than the Messianic dignity expressed by the word Son of God; that is, he must have seen in him the true Son of God.

Moreover, is it not always under this title, though necessarily obscure to a Jewish mind, that Jesus spoke of himself? If we examine all the instances when Jesus spoke of his relations with God, it seems that this question must be answered in the affirmative.

Thus, when he speaks of God the Father, he never puts himself on the same level with his disciples. He says « your Father », and « my Father »; but never « our Father ». In some passages the purpose of this antithesis is made perfectly clear. « Come, ye blessed of my Father, possess you the kingdom prepared for you from the foundation of the world », says our Savior to the Apostles; and a little farther on: « I will not drink from henceforth of this fruit of the vine, until that day when I shall drink it with you in the kingdom of my Father ».

2. Mat., v, 16, 45, 48; vi, 1, 6, 8, 14, 15, 26, 32; vii, 11; x, 20, 29; xviii, 14.
   — Mark, xi, 25. — Luke, vi, 36; xi, 13; xii, 30, 32.
3. Mat., vii, 21; x, 32-33; xii, 50; xv, 13; xvi, 27; xviii, 10, 19, 35; xx, 23.
5. Ibid, xxvi, 29.
In the parable of the wicked husbandmen, the Savior is still more emphatic. A householder having planted a vineyard, hired it to some husbandmen and started on a voyage. And at the season, he sent his servants to get the fruit of the vineyard. The husbandmen laid hands on them and put them to death. Then the householder sent his son, saying «They will reverence my son». But when they saw the son coming, they said «Here is the heir; come, let us kill him, and we shall have the inheritance». And when they had laid hands on him, they killed him⁴. The Savior's idea is here perfectly clear. The servants sent by the householder to the husbandmen, by whom they are put to death, represent the prophets sent by God and put to death by the Jews. The householder's own son, the last to be sent, represents Jesus. He holds the same position, as regards God and the prophets, as does the son represented in the parable, as regards the householder and the servants—he is truly the Son of God. Hence can he say: «All things are delivered to me by my Father. And no one knoweth the Son, but the Father: neither doth anyone know the Father, but the Son, and he to whom it shall please the Son to reveal him²». So transcendent is the person of the Son that only the Father knows fully what he is; and likewise, so transcendent is the person of the Father that only the Son knows him. This mutual knowledge of each other presupposes between two persons a certain relation of equality which can spring only from a common, or identical life.

When he proclaims himself the Son of God, therefore, Jesus at the same time proclaims his divinity. Yet this affirmation, no matter how decisive, is less important than is the general attitude taken by our Savior during his entire earthly existence. In fact, Jesus always impressed himself upon the

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2. Mat., xi, 27.
people rather by deed than by word. Words are subject to a variety of interpretations, actions are unvarying in their import.

Jesus both God and Man. — The most striking feature in the person of our Savior is the great contrast between his profound humility and the consciousness of his own superiority. He is always modest, humble, and reserved; yet he declares that he is greater than Moses or Elias, who appear beside him at the transfiguration.

He is greater than David, who calls him his Lord; and John the Baptist, whom he calls the greatest of the prophets, is only his precursor. Jesus represents himself as superior even to the angels, who are at his service. At the time of his Passion, he says that all he need do is utter a word and his Father would send him twelve legions.

They are not only his Father's angels; they are his as well, and they carry out his will. At his last coming the angels will form a guard of honor about him; he will send them all over the world to gather the just, his elect. As we see, then, Jesus sets himself above angels and men, and next to God.

Hence Jesus lays claim to the most exalted powers. In his own name, by his own authority, and by his own personal virtue, he commands the elements, drives out demons, heals the sick, and raises the dead. He works all these prodigies by one word of his, without the intervention of any other power.

2. Matt. xxii, 42-46. — Mark, xii, 33-37. — Luke, xx, 41-44. « An unbiased reading of the statements of Jesus cannot avoid the conclusion that the Messiah is in reality the Son of one more exalted than David, that is, the Son of God ».
5. Matt., xxvi, 53.

2. Matt. xxii, 42-46. — Mark, xii, 33-37. — Luke, xx, 41-44. « An unbiased reading of the statements of Jesus cannot avoid the conclusion that the Messiah is in reality the Son of one more exalted than David, that is, the Son of God ». Dalman, The Words of Jesus, p. 286.
As regards the Law, he displays unheard of independence. On the one hand, he proclaims the divine origin of the Law; and on the other, he modifies it and claims for himself the power to do so, using words that show that he considers himself invested with sovereign authority. « You have heard », says he, « that it was said to the Ancients... And I say to you....»

This independence he claims particularly in regard to the Sabbath. He heals on that day, and he allows his disciples to gather the ears; and when he is reproached for this, he declares that he is Lord of the Sabbath also.

And elsewhere, he explains his conduct by saying that the priests, when in the temple, break the Sabbath without sin. And here is one greater than the temple.

The remission of sin is the exercise of a divine right. This Jesus acknowledges, yet he makes use of the right. When objection is raised against his doing so, he proves that he has that right, by healing physically the one whom he has just healed morally. The argument is irrefutable. In fact, the Savior declares that it is just as easy for him to say to the paralytic « Thy sins are forgiven thee » as it is to say « Arise and walk ». The whole thing lies in the doing. But that it may be known that the sins of the paralytic are really forgiven him and that Jesus truly has the power to forgive sins, he says to the paralytic : « Arise, take up thy bed, and go into thy house ». And the man arises and goes to his house. This power to forgive sin belongs so properly to Jesus that he transmits it to his Apostles,

1. Matt., v, 22, 28, 32, 33, 39, 44.
3. Matt., xii, 5-6.
Invested with the power to forgive the sins of those who believe in him, and having come into the world to give his life as a ransom for the sins of many, he will, at the end of the world, be the judge of the living and the dead. He will come in all his glory and, of his own authority, he will pronounce upon all men the sentence of eternal life or death.

The Savior, then, placed himself above not only the most celebrated men in the history of Israel, but even above the angels. He did not hesitate to lay claim to the most exalted powers, viz., the power to perform miracles, to transform the Law, to remit sins, and to set himself up as the supreme judge of the living and the dead. He ascribed to himself incomparable superiority and, by attribution, proclaimed himself not only the great envoy of God, but the Man-God. Thus we understand how he — so jealous of the rights of God, so bent upon rejecting the honors of the Jews, so severe upon pharisaic pride — is acquiescent in receiving from those who believed in him with a true faith the adoration due only to the Divinity.

No wonder then if, not only as regards his teachings,
but as regards his person as well, he did require faith, obedience, love, and absolute attachment, an attachment which demanded the renunciation of everything besides himself 1.

§ II

The Divinity of the Son according to the Gospel of St. John.

Character of the Gospel according to St. John. — It was for the beloved disciple to make known to men in the most explicit manner the inmost nature of the Savior. His entire Gospel, almost, is an affirmation of the divinity of Jesus. In the prologue he describes his eternal preexistence; and all through the narrative he shows the equality of the Father and the Son. His vision has penetrated even to the mystery of the communion of life between the Father and the Son.

The Word of God. — The Word is from all eternity; he is God 2; and this, because he is in God, literally towards God, that is to say, continually in active relation with God 3. He is, in fact, the Only Begotten of the Father, and possesses through eternal generation the fulness of divine life 4. And after he was made man we contemplated his glory. This glory, as that which an only son receives from his father, was his very own 5. By him all things were made 6; and through him we received the Law, Revelation, of the Most High ». So too, the holy women and the apostles who fell prostrate before the Risen Lord undoubtedly thus meant to pay Him religious homage. »

1. Matt., x, 32-33, 37-42; xi, 28; xiv, 24-25.
2. Jn., i, 1.
5. Jn., i, 14.
and the gifts of salvation. No one ever saw God; but, through the humanity which he took upon himself, we have, in seeing the only Son who possesses the fulness of the Divinity, known God.

His Equality with the Father. — This equality, already affirmed in the prologue, is the subject of important declarations in the course of the Gospel.

Jesus knows the Father as the Father knows him; and he alone has seen the Father. Jesus loves the Father as the Father loves him. The Son has the same power as the Father; for the Father shows the Son everything he does, and everything that is done by the Father is done also by the Son. The Son has received from the Father the two attributes characteristic of the divinity, viz., the power to give life and to judge. "For as the Father raiseth up the dead, and giveth life, so the Son also giveth life to whom he will. For neither doth the Father judge any man: but hath given all judgment to the Son." Equal to the Father in intelligence, love, and power, he has the same title to honor as the Father has. To refuse to honor the Son, is to refuse to give the Father the worship that is due him.

The Community of Life between Father and Son. — But if the Son is equal to the Father, it is because they are bound together by the strongest ties, so much so that they live in each other. "Do you not believe that I am in the Father, and the Father in me...? Believe upon my word that I am

2. Jn., i, 18.
4. Jn., iii, 35; v, 20; x, 17; xiv, 31; xv, 9; xvii, 24.
7. Jn., v, 23; xii, 23; xiv, 21-23.
8. Jn., v, 53; xv, 23.
in the Father and the Father in me. » Hence, to see the Son is to see the Father; to know the Son is to know the Father; to receive the Son is to receive the Father; all that the Father possesses the Son likewise possesses. In a word, the Father and the Son have but one and the same life; they are but one. « I and the Father are one. » Have we not already here an affirmation of the unity of substance of the Father and the Son?

§ III

The Divinity of the Son from the Epistles of St. Paul.

Importance of St Paul’s Testimony. — « I give you to understand, brethren », writes the Apostle to the Galatians, « that the Gospel which was preached by me is not according to man. For neither did I receive it from man, nor did learn it; but by the revelation of Jesus Christ. »

This word of St. Paul gives us a basis for reckoning the value of his whole testimony. The glorious Christ vouchsafed Paul on the way to Damascus a vision of himself. At the same time that He made him an apostle, he revealed to him his Gospel. So it is from the Savior himself that Paul learned the doctrine that he taught.

Moreover, his teaching does not differ from that of the other Apostles.

1. Jn., xiv, 10; xvii, 22.
5. Jn., xvi, 15.
8. Gal., i, 11-12.
9. I Cor., xi, 23.
It is known and accepted by Peter, James, and John. « When they had seen that to me was committed the Gospel of the uncircumcision, as to Peter was that of the circumcision, (for he who wrought in Peter to the apostleship of the circumcision, wrought in me also among the Gentiles); and when they had known the grace that was given to me, James and Cephas and John, who seemed to be pillars, gave to me and Barnabas the right hand of fellowship; that we should go unto the Gentiles, and they unto the circumcision. »

The general teaching of St. Paul on the Divinity of Christ. — Christ was a man like us; he was born of woman; he appeared to us as a servant; he was subject to the law of Moses; he was obedient to the will of God, even unto the death of the cross. Yet, personally he did not know sin. All mankind sinned in Adam; through Christ all were reconciled. This was because the first man, Adam, was of earth, whereas Christ was of heaven, heavenly.

He existed, then, before his appearance in the flesh, for he is the beginning and the end of all creation and of all sanctification, rich and in the same condition as God, the Son of God. And there can be no question here of any

2. 1 Cor., xv, 21; Rom., v, 15; viii, 3.
5. Gal., iv, 4.
6. Phil., ii, 8.
7. 2 Cor., v, 21.
9. 1 Cor., xv, 47-49.
12. 2 Cor., viii, 9.
14. Gal., i, 16; ii, 20; iv, 5; — I Thess., i, 10; — 1 Cor., i, 9; xv, 28; 2 Cor.,
but a substantial relation; for, in speaking of this Son of God, the Apostle calls him the true Son of God, the image of God, the Wisdom of God, and in several passages, simply God.

Hence Christ, the Son of God, is above all, according to St. Paul, the Lord. There is no doubt but even before they recognized him as the Messias, the disciples called Jesus Lord; some who came and begged him for miracles so addressed him. But, on their lips, this name had a restricted meaning. Jesus was their Lord in this, that he was their wonder-worker, their prophet, their doctor. But the great Apostle speaks in an entirely different way. For him, Jesus is Lord, without restriction. After raising him from the dead, God made him sit at his right hand in heaven, above all principalities, above all powers, above all authority, all dignity; and his name is above any that can be mentioned, not only now, but in the ages to come. In a word, at the same time that he was raised by God from the dead, he was enthroned as Lord of all things. Hence is he to be adored as God. At the name of Jesus every knee should bend in heaven, on earth, and under the earth.
him as God. Just as the Jews found salvation in the invocation of the name of Kp. — Yahweh, so Christians will be saved by calling upon the name of Kp. — Yahweh. This they will do if it be given them by the Holy Ghost; for no one can say « Jesus is the Lord », except it be given him by the Holy Ghost.

According to St. Paul, then, Jesus is man, but he is at the same time the true Son of God, God of God. And he is above all the Lord, to whom we must pray, whom we must adore.

Examination of Some Particularly Significant Texts. — Some doctors of the Christian Church at Colossus, in Phrygia, exaggerated the homage to be paid to angels. They ascribed to them so important a rôle in the Creation as to make them equal to the preexistent Christ. St. Paul, in his epistle to the Colossians, attacks them, saying that this knowledge is « according to the traditions of men, according to the elements of the world ». It is the false knowledge of Christ, to which he opposes the true knowledge, which he gives as follows: « He (Christ) is the image of the living God, the first-born of all creatures: for in him were all things created in heaven, on earth, visible, and invisible, whether

1. Joel, ii, 32.
2. Rom., x, 9.
3. I Cor., xii, 3.
4. On this point, Rose has rightly remarked: « And if it be borne in mind that the word Kp. was among the Greeks, synonymous with God; that Paul, imbued with the elementary notions of their theology, did not fear to circulate among Christian communities, recently converted and as yet scarcely shorn of their former beliefs, who having still preserved their forms, and who by the natural ardor of their thought, came to believe in Jesus the Savior as God, the whole meaning and bearing of St. Paul's confession is easily grasped. » — Cf. l. c., p. 349.
5. Col., ii, 8.
6. Ibid., i, 9 : « Ο θεός ου πεπεμβαν ου πεπεμβαν αναποαμογενος και αιτομογενος ον πληρωθε την επιγνωσιν τοι θελήματος αυτου εν πάση σοφίᾳ και συνέσει πνευματικής... »
or dominations, or principalities, or powers: all things were created by him and in him: and he is before all, and by him all things consist. And he is the head of the body, the Church, who is the beginning, the first-born from the dead: that in all things he may hold the primacy: because in him it hath well pleased the Father, that all fulness should dwell, and through him to reconcile all things to Himself, making peace through the blood of his cross, both as to the things on earth, and the things that are in heaven.

Christ, then, cannot be placed on the same level as the angels. He is the Creator of all things, above everything that exists, eternal; he possesses... the fulness of the Godhead, — in more explicit terms, as the Apostle puts it further on, in him dwelleth all the fulness of the Godhead corporally. Although he does not call him God formally, the Apostle predicates of him characteristics which can be found only in God. There is not the slightest doubt that for him Christ is truly God.

We are all the more strongly drawn to this conclusion, if we take the pains to compare the doctrine of the epistles with that of the sapiential books, from which they draw their inspiration. Thus, he says that the preexistent Christ is the image of the invisible God, born before all creatures; for all things were made by him and for him. He is born before all, and all things subsist in him. In other words, St Paul identifies the Wisdom of the Old Testament with the preexistent Christ. Although only indirect, it would be difficult to find a stronger affirmation of the divinity of Christ.

But, it will be objected, since the Apostle worked out a Christological doctrine, is it not queer that he did not state explicitly that Christ is God, that Christ is the true Son of God? Let us remember that St. Paul did not address his epistle

2. Col., ii, 9.
to such as would raise an objection of this kind. He was writing to the Colossians. Now, what were the needs of these Christians? The contents of his letter show it very explicitly. They had to be taught that the preexistent Christ was not to be confounded with the intermediary beings which, according to certain philosophers, had a hand in the Creation. If, then, the Apostle did not state with greater precision the relation between the preexistent Christ and God the Father, it is because the controversy which he wished to settle had nothing to do with this question, but concerned only the relation between Christ and creatures.

It was questions of the moral order that led St. Paul, in the epistle to the Philippians, to declare again the divinity of Christ.

« Let this mind be in you which was also in Christ Jesus: Who being in the condition of God (ἐν μορφῇ θεοῦ ὑπέρφηκεν), thought it not a thing to be grasped to be on an equality with God (τὰ εἰς αὐτὸ ὑπάρχει) : but emptied himself, taking the condition of a servant (μορφὴν δοῦλου), being made in the likeness of men, and in habit found as man (καὶ σχήματι εὑρεθεὶς ὡς ὑγιός). He humbled himself, becoming obedient unto death: even to the death of the cross. For which cause God also hath exalted him. »

These texts, so clear in themselves, become even clearer when examined in the light of their necessary relation with the epistle to the Colossians. All things were made by Christ, all things subsist in Him, all things are for Him. Hence, He must exist in the condition of God, must, consequently, possess the divine nature and be truly God.

After such declarations as these, it is not surprising to find, in the epistle to the Romans, the following statement :

« (The Israelites) of whom is Christ according to the flesh, who is over all things, God blessed forever. Amen.

1. Phil., ii, 6-7.
One could scarcely wish a text clearer or more categorical than this formula. Hence, for a long time, exegetes of the liberal school have tried to divide this phrase so as to have the closing doxology apply not to Christ but to God the Father.

Erasmus, in 1516, in his annotations to the *Novum Testamentum graece*, put a period after κατὰ σάρξ, and translated the passage thus: «The Israelites of whom Christ is according to the flesh. He that is above all things is God Who is blessed forever.» This punctuation was adopted by Tischendorf, in 1842.

According to Reuss, we should put a comma after κατὰ σάρξ, and a period after ἐπὶ πάντων, and translate: «The Israelites of whom, according to the flesh, is Christ who is above all things. God be blessed forever.»

What are we to think of this controversy?

Tradition has always interpreted this text in the sense it has when we follow the punctuation adopted by Catholics. And the punctuation which originated with Erasmus is so arbitrary that this author himself finally gave it up. It was formally disapproved of by Theodore Beza; and, though it favored his doctrine, it was rejected by Socinus.

Moreover, neither the punctuation of Erasmus nor that of Reuss is consistent with certain philological principles. The construction of a doxology of the Father should, according to the invariable usage of biblical Greek, be not θεὸς εὐλογητὸς, but rather the inverted order εὐλογητὸς ὁ θεὸς. Finally, the context, the general tenor of the thought, and the construction of the phrase seem to favor rather the traditional interpretation.

2. *Études pauliniennes*, ii, 80-83.
Moreover, in the epistle to Titus, there is a declaration almost identical with that of the epistle to the Romans.

« Looking for the blessed hope and coming of the glory of our great God and Savior Jesus Christ, who gave himself for us, that he might redeem us from all iniquity. »

It is quite generally agreed that, if the epistle to the Hebrews was not composed by St. Paul, it was at least written under his influence and reproduces his teachings. But the prologue of this epistle is an admirable profession of the divinity of Christ. We shall conclude this lesson with an exposition of this doctrine.

Judaism had, besides its priesthood, three kinds of mediators: the prophets, the angels, and Moses. But how inferior their rank to that of Christ! Formerly God spoke to the patriarchs through the prophets and through them gave fragmentary revelations; but to us He now speaks through Christ and through him He has given us His complete revelation. He has spoken to us through the Son, i.e., him who is the effulgence of the glory of the Father and the figure of His substance. The angels only carried out the behests of the divinity as regards the elect. Christ is the Son engendered from all eternity. What the Old Testament says of Yahweh is applicable to Christ. Thus it is said that He created the earth, and that the heavens are the work of His hand; He is incapable of change, yet He changes all these things at will. He is the king of the people; He holds the sceptre of justice. He is God; and the angels owe Him homage. And Moses was the faithful steward of

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3. Hebr., i, 3.
5. Hebr., i, 5.
8. Hebr., i, 8.
the house of God, i. e., of the people of God; but he was only a servant and the house did not belong to him. As Son, Christ rules His own house, i. e., the Church; for He is its founder. It is difficult to see that the prologue of St. John's Gospel or the epistles to the Philippians or the Colossians can add to this affirmation of the divinity of Christ.

§ IV

TRADITION OF THE FATHERS.

General Idea. — From apostolic times up to the beginning of the fourth century, generation after generation proclaimed that Christ is truly God. But now and then in this universal harmony a faint discordant note arose, and there were some who said that Jesus was but a man superior to other men in sanctity and knowledge, whom the pre-existing Christ or the Holy Ghost had adopted on the day of his baptism. But so great was the faith of the people in the Christ-God that these discordant notes failed to make any impression. If, at the beginning of the fourth century, Arianism, owing to the cleverness of those who supported it, led many astray, it was but a short time before it was condemned by the council of Nicea.

Apostolic Fathers. — The epistle of St. Barnabas teaches the doctrine of the absolute divinity of the Son by reproducing and developing St. Paul's Christology. The preexistent Christ appeared in the flesh, according to this document, that He might be seen and touched by men. Those who cannot behold the sun, which is but a work of His hand and will pass away, could not see Him and touch Him in Himself. Hidden under His veil of flesh, it is not easy

3. Ibid., v, 10.
to recognize Him; in vain does He say that He is the Son of God, for, trusting to appearances, men cannot believe it. Hence it is only after His mission has been fulfilled that He reveals Himself in His true nature. Because He is merely hidden in the flesh, he resurrects Himself from the dead and raises Himself to heaven. The Christ-God truly dwells in the hearts of His own; and, by His presence there, is the fountain-head of wisdom, knowledge, and the forgiveness of sins.

In his epistle to the Corinthians, St. Clement, in a form somewhat attenuated, it is true, gives the Christology of St. Paul. The splendor of the Majesty of God, Christ, he tells us, is as much superior to the angels as the name which is His is superior to theirs. For, of the angels, it is said that they are the ministers of God; but of Christ it is said: «Thou art my son, to-day have I begotten thee». These words, taken from the Psalms (xiv and ii), had already been applied to Christ in the epistle to the Hebrews, to signify His absolute divinity. St. Clement uses them in the same sense. And again, in speaking of Christ, he says: «Being the sceptre of the glory of God, He might have come in His glory, but He came in humility». The illustrious martyr recalls, in this passage, the epistle of St. Paul to the Philippians, just as in the passage where he says: «If you love Christ, keep His commandments, for who can express what is the love of God», he recalls, no doubt, the epistle

2. Ibid., xv, 9: «Διὸ καὶ ἐγομεν τὴν ἡμέραν τὴν ὑγιόντος εἰς ἐνέργον, ἐν δὲ καὶ ἔκεισσεν ἀνέστη ἐκ νεκρῶν καὶ φανερώθη ἐλπὶ σωφρονούσιν.»
3. Ibid., xv, 9: «Διὸ ἐν τῷ κατοικητηρίῳ ἡμῶν ἀληθὸς ὁ Θεὸς κατοικεῖ ἐν ἡμῖν.»
4. Ad Cor., xxxvi, 2-5.
5. Ps. civ, 4; ii, 7.
6. Hebr., i, 7; v, 5.
7. Ad Cor., xvi, 2.
to the Romans\(^1\). Such is the doctrine of St. Clement\(^2\).

The two works just spoken of drew their inspiration rather from the doctrine of St. Paul. St. Ignatius of Antioch, in his letters, affirms no less formally the divinity of Christ, but he draws rather upon St. John. Our God, Jesus Christ, he says, was conceived in the womb of Mary, according to the divine dispensation, of the race of David and of the Holy Ghost \(^3\). Hence it is that there is but one physician in the flesh and in the spirit, born and not born, God in the flesh, really life in death, born of Mary and of God, now possible and then impassible, Jesus Christ, our Lord \(^4\). And this is the physician: « There is but one God who manifested Himself in Jesus Christ, His Son, who is His Word, not proceeding forth from silence and who in all things pleased Him that sent Him \(^5\). » So St. Ignatius gives us a complete Christological doctrine. He affirms both the divinity and the humanity of Christ, each the possession of but one and the same subject which is the Word.

This testimony is enough to permit us to say that the first generation of Christians believed in the absolute divinity of Christ; a conclusion which is of the highest importance. If the Apostolic Fathers believed in the absolute divinity of Christ, how are we to explain their faith? Shall we say that it was the result of reflection and meditation, under the guidance of the Spirit of God? Such a conjecture would be no explanation of the faith of the Apostolic Fathers; it could

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1. Rom., viii, 35.
2. A second Epistle to the Corinthians, attributed to St. Clement, but whose authenticity is disputed and which, according to critics, belongs to the middle of the second century, is even more explicit. Suffice it to quote its opening words: « Our convictions for Jesus ought to be the same as those for God, the same as for the Judge of the living and the dead ». This second epistle is placed by Funk immediately after the first.
3. Ad Eph., xviii, 2.
5. Ad Magn., viii, 2: « ὅτι εἰς θεὸς ἔστιν, ὁ φανερώσας ἑαυτὸν διὰ Ἰησοῦ χριστοῦ τοῦ υἱοῦ αὐτοῦ, ὃς ἔστιν αὐτοῦ λόγος ἀπὸ αἰνής προελθὼν ». 
not be adduced even as a hypothesis, for a hypothesis must have probability on its side, and this has not. If the letters which we have cited were not written before the year 70, they cannot be of later origin than the first century. St. Clement suffered martyrdom in the year 101, and St. Ignatius in the year 107; and only the epistle of Barnabas might have been written a little later. If we reflect that these expressions are above all the expression of a firm and resolute faith, which brings those animated with it to martyrdom, and not merely the result of speculation; and if we remark, furthermore, that they are the words of believers addressed to Christians who also believe firmly, we will unhesitatingly conclude that, in order to explain the existence of such a faith at the end of first century, we must admit that its propagation commenced, at the latest, about the year 50, that is, about the time of the Apostles. In other words, the Apostolic Fathers could have believed in the absolute divinity of Christ only because the Apostles taught them this doctrine.

All that remains, then, is Renan's trite saying: «The Apostles deified Christ». This is to ignore the history as well as the psychology of the Christian faith. In fact, the elevation of Jesus the Messias to the title of Jesus the Messias and God, was altogether beyond the Jewish thought. To arrive at this result, it would have been necessary to shake off the idea that the Messias was to be a temporal king and was to inaugurate an earthly royalty. It would have been necessary, too, for them to rid themselves of this other idea, which obtained no less than the first with the ultra-spiritualistic contemporaries of the Savior, that Yahweh could not come in direct contact with matter. Besides, this transformation would have come about in a few years. We must confess that this is asking too much of the Christian faith. Never did that faith know such rapid evolution, not even as regards the fixing of a simple dogmatic concept. To explain the faith of the first Christians in the absolute divinity of
Christ, we have to admit that the Savior Himself revealed this divinity to His Apostles. This inference and the conclusion drawn from our study of the New Testament reinforce each other.

Saint Justin. — In his First Apology, addressed, as we know, to Antoninus Pius, St. Justin declares that he does not acknowledge the gods of the heathen; but, on the contrary, he believes in God the Father and in His Son, who came from Him among us, the Word become man and called Jesus Christ 1.

But especially in the Dialogue with Trypho do we find the doctrine of the divinity of Christ brought out. There were two principal difficulties which prevented the Jews from acknowledging the divinity of Christ, viz., their faith in one God only, and their hope in a Messias who was to be the greatest of the sons of men, but yet only a man born of men 2.

To meet these objections, St. Justin undertakes to prove from Scripture that Christ had a preexistence as God. Only through Him, in fact, under the form of an angel or of some other sensible sign, could God manifest Himself, in the Old Testament, to Abraham, to Jacob, to Moses, and dwell in the ark; for the ineffable God, the Father, could not accomplish directly all that the Old Testament ascribes to Him 3.

1. I Apol., v, vi.
2. Dial., xlix: « And Trypho said, Those who affirm him to have been a man, and to have been anointed by election and then to have become Christ, appear to me to speak more plausibly than you who hold those opinions which you express. For we all expect that Christ will be a man [born] of men (καὶ γὰρ πάντες ἡμεῖς τὸν χριστὸν ἀνθρώπων ἐξ ἀνθρώπων προσοδόκημεν γεννήσεσθαι), and that Elias when he comes will anoint him. But if this man appear to be Christ, he must certainly be known as man [born] of men; but from the circumstance that Elias has not yet come, I infer that this man is not the Christ ».
3. Dial., cxxvii: « I suppose that I have stated sufficiently, that wherever God says, 'God went up from Abraham', or, 'The Lord spake to Moses', and 'The Lord came down to behold the tower which the sons of men had built', or
But this intermediary of God in the Old Testament is called God and is God. Really distinct from the Father, He is not, however, opposed to Him as a rival, but is in perfect accord with Him. He is dependent upon the Father and His entire office is to do the will of the Father; He is another God under God the Father. Though subordinate to the Father, He is still equal to the Father; for, not only is He so like the Father that God could say to Him at the beginning «Let us make man to our image», but He is God, engendered by God before all creatures, and to be the origin of all that exists.

when 'God shut Noe into the ark', you must not imagine that the unbegotten God Himself came down or went up from any place. For the ineffable Father and Lord of all neither has come to any place, nor walks, nor sleeps, nor rises up, but remains in his own place, wherever that is, quick to behold and quick to hear, having neither eyes nor ears, but being of indescribable might; and He sees all things, and knows all things, and none of us escapes His observation; and He is not moved or confined to a spot in the whole world, for He existed before the world was made. Now, then, could He talk with any one or appear on the smallest portion of the earth? ... Therefore, neither Abraham, nor Isaac, nor Jacob, nor any other man, saw the Father and ineffable Lord of all, and also of Christ, but saw Him who was according to His will His Son, being God, and His Angel because He ministered to His will; whom also it pleased Him to be born man by the Virgin; who was also fire when He conversed with Moses from the bush.

1. Ibid., cxxxviii: «Καὶ ὅτι κύριος ᾧν ὁ Χριστός, καὶ Θεοῦ ὑπάρχων ». — LXX: «... ἀπὸ τῶν γραφῶν δὼσον, ὅτι ἄρχην πρὸ πάντων τῶν κτισμάτων ὁ Θεὸς γεγένηκε δύναμιν τινὰ ἐξ ἐαυτοῦ λογικῆν, ἤτις καὶ δόξα κυρίου ὑπὸ τοῦ πνεύματος τοῦ ἀγίου καλεῖται, ποτὲ δὲ υἱὸς ποτὲ δὲ σοφία, ποτὲ δὲ ἀγγελος, ποτὲ δὲ Θεὸς, ποτὲ δὲ κύριος καὶ λόγος... — ἔξει γὰρ πάντα προσονομαζόμεθα εἰ τοῦ ὑπηρετεῖν τῷ πατρικῷ βουλήματι καὶ εἰ τοῦ ἀπὸ τοῦ πατρὸς θελήσεις γεγεννήσθαι ».  

2. Ibid., cxxxvi: « But Who is He that is called at one time « the angel of the great counsel », and « a man » by Ezechiel, and « like the the Son of Man » by Daniel, and « a child » by Isaias, and « Christ » and « God to be worshipped » by David, and « Christ » and « a Priest » by many, and « Wisdom » by Solomon, and « Joseph » and « Juda » and a « Star » by Moses, and « the East », by Zacharias, and « the Suffering One » and « Jacob » and « Israel » by Isaias again, and « a Rod », and « Flower », and « Cornerstone », and « Son of God »? But if you knew, Trypho, you would not have blasphemed Him, who has now come, and been born, and suffered, and ascended to heaven; who shall also come again, and then your twelve tribes shall mourn. For if you had understood...
Saint Irenaeus. — The Son is God, truly God, affirms St. Irenaeus. The chief office of the Son is not to create, — though He is the hand by which God creates, — but rather to reveal the Father. He manifests Himself first, from the beginning and before the creation of the world, to the angels and the powers of heaven, and then to men. Finally, He became man to restore humanity, to bring it back to its fountain-head, and to give it the incorruptibility and the immortality lost by sin. And « those (the Cærin-thians) who assert that Jesus Christ was simply a mere man, begotten by Joseph, remaining in the bondage of the old disobedience are in a state of death; having been not as yet joined to the Word of God the Father, nor receiving liberty through the Son »... « But being ignorant of Him who from the Virgin is Emmanuel, they die deprived of His gift, which is eternal life; and not receiving the incorruptible Word they remain in mortal flesh and are debtors to death, not obtaining the antidote of life, antidotum vitae non accipientes... For it was for this end that the Word of God was made man, and He who was the Son of God became the Son of Man, that man, having been taken into the divine Word, and receiving the adoption might become the son of God. For, by no other means could we have attained to incorruptibility and immortality. But how could we be joined to incorruptibility and immortality unless, first, incorruptibility and immortality had become that which we also are, so that the corruptible might be swallowed up by incorruptibility and the mortal by immortality, that we might receive the adoption of the sons of God.»

what has been written by the the prophets, you would not have denied that He was God, Son of the only, unbegotten, unutterable God (οὐχ ἂν ἔξηρνέσθον αὐτὸν εἶναι Θεὸν, τοῦ μόνου καὶ ἀγεννητοῦ καὶ ἀρρητοῦ Θεοῦ υἱόν). »

1. Hist., l. III, ch. vi, 1, 2.
2. Ibid., l. IV, ch. xx, 1; V, ch. vi, 1.
3. Ibid., l. II, c. xxx, 9; l. IV, c. vi, 5, 7, 20.
4. Ibid., l. III, c. xix, 1.
St. Justin and St. Irenaeus, the two most prominent Fathers of the second century, are, then, strong in their affirmation of the divinity of Christ. Christ is truly God and truly man: this is the fundamental article of their faith and of the faith of that multitude of Christians among whom they live.

The Condemnation of Theodotus. — The condemnation of Theodotus offers a testimony of the faith of the Church of the second century no less striking than that already adduced. Under Pope Victor, there arrived at Rome a rich Christian from Byzantium. His name was Theodotus. He set himself up as a teacher; and, taking up the ideas of Cerinthus, he taught that Jesus was only a man like other men, though born in a miraculous manner. Brought up under ordinary conditions, he gave evidence of great sanctity. At his baptism on the banks of the Jordan, Christ, or the Holy Ghost, came down upon him in the form of a dove; and thus he received the power to perform miracles. But, for all that, he was not God. It was only after his resurrection that this quality was ascribed to him by some of his disciples. Pope Victor did not hesitate to condemn such doctrines. And more, Theodotus was excommunicated. This happened in the year 190.

Tertullian. — Before confining our attention to the Orient and commencing the exposition of the dogmatic quarrel which led up to the council of Nicaea, it is no more than right to take up the important testimony of Tertullian.

Jesus Christ is, he affirms, of our blood; for He was born of the Virgin Mary. He is a perfect man, partaking of our passions, our weakness, and our infirmities, sin alone excepted. But He is equally God. God was born from

1. De carne Christi, 5-9; P. L., II, 760-773.
the womb of a mother; He made Himself little in order to make us great. This is what the Apostle teaches when he says that Christ, truly man and of the race of David, was manifested as the Son of God. In Him there are, then, two states, or two substances, not mingled but united into one single person. And too, the death of the cross is to be imputed to God Himself: we were purchased by the blood of a God.

Clement of Alexandria, Origen, St. Denis of Alexandria.

— At the end of the second century, Clement, entrusted with the care of the catechetical school of Alexandria, unfolds the doctrine of the divinity of the Son. Born of the Father from eternity, the Logos is like unto Him, truly God like Him. Everywhere present, nowhere contained, He is all intelligent, He sees all, hears all, knows all, governs all. His attributes are the same as those of the Father: the Father is in the Son and vice versa. We pray to both: they are but one and the same God. Nevertheless, certain expressions used by Clement have been judged severely, and that rightly. Speaking of the relation that exists between the Father and the Son, he says « that the nature of the Son is the nearest to Him who is alone the Almighty One ».

1. De patientia, 3.
4. Ad uxor., II, 3 : « Quod sciam, non sumus nostri sed pretio empli et quali pretio? Sanguine Dei »
5. Cohort., c. x; P. G., VIII, 228.
7. Ibid., V, 6; VII, 12.
8. Ibid., VII, 2.
A disciple of Clement and his successor as head of the Didascalic, upon which he was to shed incomparable lustre, Origen exposes in all his writings the doctrine of the divinity of Christ. The Son, as he teaches, is really distinct from the Father, and engendered by Him from all eternity. And He is God not by virtue of an extrinsic participation but essentially: He is of the same substance as the Father, and consubstantial with the Father. But, although of the same substance as the Father, He nevertheless possesses that substance less fully than the Father. It is, as it were, attenuated and diminished in Him, because it is communicated.

Thus, Origen believed wrongly that the real distinction between the Father and the Son can rest only upon a certain inferiority of the Son as regards the Father.

St. Denis of Alexandria, while defending the real distinction between the Father and the Son against the Sabellians, teaches the divinity of the Son. God, he writes in the second letter to Pope St. Denis, «is the eternal light; the Son is the brightness of this light; but, the light is always in existence: hence the Son is as eternal as God Himself». And again, the Holy Ghost «produces the word and through it manifests Himself; the word is an emanation of the mind, and to speak after human fashion, is emitted

1. De oral., 15.
4. In epist. ad Hebr. fragm., P. G., XIV, 1308: Sic et sapientia ex Deo procedens ex ipsa substantia Dei generatur. Sic nihilominus et secundum similitudinem corporalis aporrhoeae esse dicitur aporrhoea gloriae omnipotentis pura et sincera. Quae utraque similitudines manifestissime ostendunt communionem substantiae esse filio cum patre. Aporrhoea enim ὑπόσιος videtur, id est unius substantiae, cum illo corpore ex quo est vel aporrhoea vel vapor: Origen then professed the consubstantiality of the Word.
5. In Joan., I, VI, 23; I, XXXII, 18; P. G., XIV. — Contra Celsum, I, II, 9 I, VI, 60; P. G., XI.
6. De sent. Dion., 15; P. G., XXV.
from the heart by the mouth; the spirit is like the immanent word. Thus the spirit is as it were, the Father of the word and exists in it; the word is, so to speak, the daughter of the spirit... Thus each is in each, although one is distinct from the other, and they are one although they are two. And it is thus that the Father and the Son are said to be one and to be in one another\(^1\).

**Arianism.** — About the year 318, Arius taught at Alexandria a doctrine which attracted widespread attention. We acknowledge, said he, but one sole God, engendered and not created, alone eternal, alone without beginning, alone true, alone immortal, alone perfect, alone powerful, the creator and ruler of all things, immutable, invisible to the eyes of all, even to those of the Son. God was not always Father. He was at first alone. But wishing to create the world, He created directly a certain being called the Logos, Wisdom, that He might create all other beings through Him. The Logos was made out of nothing, and not out of the divine substance; there was a time when he did not exist, and he was created not necessarily but voluntarily. He is the only one of all creatures created immediately by God that he might be the creator of all other beings. Hence, he has towards God and the world a very singular relationship, on account of which we call him, though improperly, God. He is not essentially good, for he is of a changeable and mutable nature, and uses his free will as he chooses; if he remains good, it is because he wills it. But God, foreseeing his merits, adopted him as Son. There results from this adoptive sonship no real participation in the divinity, no real resemblance to it. God can have no like. The Logos became flesh in this sense that it fulfils in Jesus Christ the function of soul.

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Arius' whole Christology, then, resolves itself into these three propositions. God, being unable to create directly the material world, creates directly the Logos, in order to use it as intermediary in the creation of the material world. The Logos being the sole immediate creature of God destined to become the creator of all other beings, receives improperly the title of God. This Logos is free to choose between good and evil; and God, foreseeing that he will always choose the good, adopts him, because of his merits, as His son.  

This concept of the Logos as a creature and a demiurge, and adoptive Son of God, although contrary to tradition, was not entirely new. 

Philo, too, held that God, being a spiritual being, could not create the material world without the assistance of a created Logos. Likewise, at the beginning of the second century, Cerinthus had taught the doctrine of adoption. And, at the end of the same century, both in Asia Minor and at Rome, Theodotus had maintained the opinion that Christ was not God, but the greatest of the prophets and, as such, the Son of God par excellence. Paul of Samosata professed almost the same doctrine. It is safe to say, then, that all the ideas which made up Arianism had already been put forth by heretics. Arius' whole originality lay in this, that he succeeded in bringing all these scattered fragments into one synthesis, and fought with a wonderful zeal, or stubbornness, to make his doctrine triumph.  

The Beginning of the Fight against Arianism. — St. Alexander, bishop of Alexandria, after having sought, by

1. The doctrine of Arius is taken from a letter which he wrote to St. Alexander, bishop of Alexandria, and which is quoted by St. Athanasius. Cf. De Synodis, 16; P. G., XXVI, 708-712. 

peaceful means, to bring Arius back to the truth, had to prohibit him formally from teaching his errors. To this Arius paid no attention; so the struggle began.

In the year 320, Alexander convoked in council all the bishops of Egypt. Arius was condemned. He sought refuge with Eusebius of Nicomedia, who strengthened him in his opinions and denounced to the eastern bishops what he called the narrow-mindedness of the bishop of Alexandria.

By that time the doctrine of Arius commenced to be known in the West. Osius, bishop of Cordova, showed Constantine how urgent it was to put a stop to Arianism. Athanasius, deacon of Alexandria, attacked the new heresy. Constantine, dismayed at the proportions the quarrel took on, summoned all the bishops of the world to Nicæa.

The Council of Nicæa. — So, all these bishops were called together at Nicæa, by Constantine, in the year 325. Three hundred and eighteen of them came, almost all from the East. From the West there came some few, among whom were Osius, bishop of Cordova, Cecilian of Carthage, and the two Roman priests, Victor and Vincent, as representatives of Pope Sylvester.

From the very first session several tendencies among the Fathers of the council made themselves manifest. The great majority of the Fathers (about 300), declared themselves in favor of the doctrine of Alexander. A few (only three or four) upheld Arianism. The others, with Eusebius of Nicomedia and Eusebius of Caesarea at their head, fluctuated between these two extremes.

Eusebius of Caesarea drew up a symbol which he read before the council. Following is the principal passage:

1. See the account of the early opposition to Arianism in the able work of De Broglie. L’Église et l’Empire romain au IVe siècle, Règne de Constantin, t. 1, 1re part., c. iii.
"We believe in only one God, the Father almighty, the Creator of all things, visible and invisible. And in the Lord, Jesus Christ, the Word of God, God of God, light of light, life of life, the only Son, the first born of all creatures, begotten by the Father from eternity, by whom all things were made, and who, for our salvation, became flesh and dwelt amongst us..."

Eusebius himself tells us that, as a whole, his symbol was accepted because there was nothing objectionable in it. But, as it was silent on some of the salient points of the Arian controversy, it was modified by the introduction of some things and the suppression of some useless words.

The result was the Nicene symbol, which reads as follows:

"We believe in one God, the Father almighty, the author of all things, visible and invisible; and in one Lord, Jesus Christ, the Son of God, the only begotten of the Father, that is, of the essence of the Father, God of God, light of light, true God of true God; begotten and not made, consubstantial with the Father, by whom all things were made; who for us, men, and for our salvation, came down, became incarnate, was made man, suffered, arose again the third day, ascended into heaven and he will come to judge the living and the dead; and in the Holy Ghost.

"As for those who say: There was a time when He was not; before He was begotten, He was not; He was made out of nothing, or out of some other substance or essence (εἴ έπερ παντὸς η ὡστίς); the Son of God is a created being, changeable, mutable; to them the Catholic Church says anathema ».

This symbol was accepted and signed by all the bishops present, except two, and these two were deposed and exiled as well as Arius, by Constantine. The same fate awaited Euse-
bius of Nicomedia, who was exiled some time after for having upheld the Arians of Alexandria.

So, Arianism was officially condemned. The Arians had said: «The Word is the first creature of God»; the council pronounced: «The Word is God of God, engendered and not made, consubstantial with the Father».

**ARTICLE III**

**The Holy Ghost is God.**

**Doctrine of the Church.** — We believe that the person of the Holy Ghost is God, just as the Father is, just as the Son is: we believe that the Holy Ghost is God in the most absolute manner.

The reason for this lies in the consideration that the Holy Ghost possesses the same substance as the Father and the Son, for just as the Father and the Son, the Holy Ghost has nothing proper or distinct but the relative character which constitutes his personality.

And this doctrine, thus understood, has been formally defined. The council of Nicæa, in putting the third person of the Blessed Trinity on a level with the person of the Son, merely pointed out the divinity of the Holy Ghost¹. The Fathers of this council were concerned above all with the definition of the absolute divinity of the Son. But the council of Constantinople, in 381, had principally in view the definition of the doctrine of the Holy Ghost against the Macedonians. And, after declaring again the definition of the divinity of the Son, they pronounced the following profession: «We believe in the Holy Ghost, who is Lord, who gives life, who proceeds from the Father, to whom, together

¹. Denz., 54.
with the Father and the Son, honor and glory are due, and who spoke through the prophets.\(^1\)

Yet, the Fathers of Constantinople avoided declaring explicitly that the Holy Ghost is God. Their teaching, however, was equivalent to such a declaration; and, if they did not make use of the explicit terms, this was due to reasons which the history of the controversy will reveal.

We shall now proceed to find the foundations of this dogma of our faith in the New Testament and in the Patristic Tradition.

§ 1

**THE NEW TESTAMENT**

**Direct Affirmations are Wanting.** — The divinity of the Holy Ghost is not directly affirmed in the New Testament. This gap will, in the fourth century, be the great argument of the Macedonians: to all the arguments brought forth they will reply: « Novelty, not Scriptural ».

**Indirect Affirmations Numerous.** — The divinity of the Holy Ghost is often taught in the New Testament in an indirect manner, that is, by the attribution to the Spirit of names and works belonging only to God.

Thus, there is ascribed to the Holy Ghost knowledge wholly divine. He is the Spirit of truth who will come to give testimony in favor of the Incarnate Word.\(^2\) The Holy Ghost it is who has revealed to us the Wisdom mysteriously hidden in the bosom of God, « For the Spirit searcheth all things, yea the deep things of God »\(^3\). It is just as natural for the Spirit to know these deep things of God as it is for the spirit of man to know what goes on within him: « For

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1. Denz., 86.
3. I Cor., ii, 10.
what man knoweth the things of a man, but the spirit of a
man that is in him? So the things also that are of God no
man knoweth, but the Spirit of God »¹. This passage in the
first epistle to the Corinthians would remind one of that
text from the Synoptics, in which almost all critics agree in
seeing the divinity of the Son affirmed: « No one knoweth
the Son, but the Father: neither doth any one know the
Father, but the Son, and he to whom it shall please the Son
to reveal him² ».

Moreover, the very sanctity of God is recognized in the
Holy Spirit. He is the Holy Spirit not only in this that He is
the principle of all sanctification, but also in this that He
possesses essential sanctity, in that He is God. Such is the
doctrine found in most of the epistles of St. Paul.

Let us observe, also, that the Holy Ghost appears through-
out the New Testament as the author of truly divine ope-
rations. St. Peter tells us that « no prophecy of Scripture is
made by private interpretation. For prophecy came not by
the will of man at any time: but the holy men of God spoke,
inspired by the Holy Ghost³ ». Author of the prophecies,
the Holy Ghost is also, but with the Father and the Son, the
author of the Incarnation of the Son⁴, of all sanctification or
justification⁵, of charisms and all the extraordinary gifts with
which some are favored for the good of the Church⁶.

Is is not surprising, then, to find that the Holy Ghost
is always placed on the same level as the Father and the Son⁷,
and that the same honor that is paid to the Father and the
Son is regarded as His due: « Fly fornication, » says St. Paul

¹ I Cor., ii, 11.
² Mat., xi, 27.
⁴ Luke, i, 35.
⁵ I Cor., vi, 11.
⁶ I Cor., xiii, 4-11.
⁷ Mat., xxviii, 18-30; Jn., xiv, 16; xv, 26; Gal., iv, 6; II Cor., i, 21-22; xiii, 13.
to the Corinthians... «Know you not that your members are the temple of the Holy Ghost, who is in you, whom you have from God; and you are not your own? For you are bought with a great price. Glorify and bear God in your body». St. Peter speaks in the same strain when he condemns Ananias and tells him that to lie to the Holy Ghost is to lie to God.

§ II

TRADITION OF THE FATHERS.

General Idea. — The greater number of the Fathers of the first three centuries but transmitted the doctrine of the New Testament on the Holy Ghost. Their theological discussions were centered upon the person of the Son and his relation to the Father.

Even Arianism struck at the Holy Ghost only indirectly. As the Son, said Arius, is the first born of the Father, so the Holy Ghost is the noblest of the Son's creatures. Hence it is that the Nicene Fathers did not enter into lengthy discussion about the Holy Ghost. They were satisfied, as we have said, to place Him in the same rank as the Father and the Son.

Now, about the year 360, the Arians, unsuccessful in the attempt to promulgate their ideas about the Son, tried to renew the struggle by making the Holy Ghost the object of their attack. An Arian bishop, named Macedonius, taught that the Holy Ghost is only a creature which ranks in dignity between God and the angels. He is not, therefore, of the same substance as the Father and the Son, whose servant and minister He is. There was formed a party called the sect of the Macedonians, or Pneumatomachists. The chief defenders of the divinity of the Holy Ghost were

1. I Cor., vi, 18-20.
St. Athanasius, St. Basil, and St. Gregory of Nazianzus.

St. Athanasius. — The main object of the Pneumatomachists was to show that the Holy Ghost, being but a creature of the Son, is inferior to the Son, just as the Son, who is a creature of the Father, is of necessity inferior to the Father. St. Athanasius' argument consisted simply in showing from texts taken from the Scriptures that the Holy Ghost is related to the Son just as the Son is related to the Father. And, since the Son is equal to the Father, the Holy Ghost must be equal to both the Father and the Son. St. Athanasius, as we can see, makes use of an indirect argument. He holds that the Holy Ghost is God because there are in Him properties which belong only to God. We find an example of this reasoning in the first letter of the holy Doctor to Serapion, in which, in order to show that the Holy Ghost is really creator, he says: «How, without injustice to the Son, can we call Him a creature who is united to the Son as the Son is to the Father, and who is glorified with the Father and the Son, concerning whom we have a dogma contained in the dogma of the Son, and who does everything that the Father does through the Son"?

We must remark, however, that St. Athanasius avoids saying openly that the Holy Ghost is God. The explanation of this is to be found in the fact that the adversary tries to prove by indirect argument that the Holy Ghost is not God, and St. Athanasius endeavors merely to retort the argument.

Moreover, the explicit affirmation of the divinity of the Holy Ghost would merely have provoked the hostility of the adversaries to the highest degree; for even those among the Pneumatomachists who acknowledged the equality of the Son and the Holy Ghost would not listen to the formal declaration that the Holy Ghost was God. This term, they objected, was not scriptural.

St. Basil. — St. Basil, appointed to the bishopric of Caesarea in the year 370, headed the orthodox defense. He, too, was generally content with showing that since the Holy Ghost possessed all the attributes of God He ought to be considered God. If he adopted such tactics, it was only to avoid the endless difficulties to which any more direct terms would inevitably have given rise. Of this we are informed by St. Gregory of Nazianzus, in his panegyric of St. Basil. Gregory goes so far as to say that this way of acting was inspired by God to further the struggle against Arianism. Whatever we are to think about such a method, it throws invaluable light upon the condition of religious affairs towards the end of the fourth century. It shows that not only the simple faithful but even the most illustrious doctors of the Church were strongly affected by the theological questions then under discussion. The dogma which they defended was of vital importance to every one. The least innovation in such matters gave rise to a sort of revolution. Christian faith was a sacred trust and was guarded with jealous care. No one was permitted to expound it more rigorously or to analyze it more minutely than was absolutely called for to defend it against heresy.

St. Gregory Nazianzene. — After the death of Basil, in 379, when Gregory Nazianzene, now leader of the orthodox party, arrived at Constantinople to inculcate there the dogma of the divinity of the Holy Ghost, he openly declared that the Holy Ghost is God. His doctrine of the Holy Ghost is exposed mainly in five of his discourses called the Theological Discourses. Following is the order of ideas found in the fifth of these discourses. First, he puts this question: « You say that the Holy Ghost is not scriptural ». He answers by this dilemma: « The Holy Ghost is either God or a creature;

1. *In laudem Basillii*, or. xliii, 69.
there is no alternative. If He is a creature, tell me, pray, why do we believe in Him? To believe in something is quite different from believing something. We can believe something created, but we can believe only in the divinity. If the Holy Ghost, then, is God, He is neither creature, nor servant, nor any thing of the kind. » Then follows a regular series of objections and answers. The last argument of the Macedonians is the same as the first: « Not scriptural ». This Gregory answers by showing that his adversary is the slave of words1.

The Council of Constantinople, 381. — Not only did St Gregory of Nazianzus overthrow the objections of the Macedonians by arguments that seem to be incontrovertible, but he worked for their condemnation.

It was in the year 381. Theodosius, having become emperor of the East, showed himself altogether in favor of orthodoxy. At the request of Gregory of Nazianzus, he convoked the council of Constantinople.

This assembly, unlike that of Nicæa, was not troubled by dissension. The overthrow of Arianism and Macedonianism was complete. The Macedonian bishops were called to the council and 36 of them came; but it was only to hear the condemnation of their doctrines.

The Fathers of the council, however, not wishing to abuse their power, introduced into their symbol neither the word God nor that of consubstantial in their designation of the nature of the Holy Ghost2. This was only to avoid keeping open the rupture which seemed now to be closed.


2. *Deviz*, 86. Some writers think that the Constantinople Creed did not originate at the council, but was in existence as early as the middle of the fourth century. Their arguments are not convincing. We still hold the traditional opinion. Cf. *Tixeront*, *History of Dogmas*, II, p. 64.
ARTICLE IV

The Three Divine Persons are Consubstantial.

Doctrine of the Church. — The doctrine of the Divine Unity is just as formally expressed in the New Testament as it is in the Old. Now, in the New Testament, it is clearly taught that God is Father, Son, and Holy Ghost. The Father, Son, and Holy Ghost are not merely three modes of being of the same existence; they are three really distinct terms having but one and the same divine life, three centers in which the divine life takes on a particularly distinctive character of intensity. They are three persons, or hypostases, of the same substance.

We have now seen sufficiently what is the trinity of persons; let us now turn our attention to the unity of substance.

And, first of all, if there be but one God and that God exist in three persons, it is quite evident that there can be in God neither absolute unity nor absolute trinity; in other words, there must be, in God, a link so coupling the unity and the trinity as to make them identical and cause them to be inseparably merged together.

What can this element be?

Let us determine this by the elimination of the heretical opinions which were held in the fourth century and which we shall meet farther on.

Peter, Paul, and John love one another. Then I say that they are three persons, of course, and that these three persons are one. But is it in this sense that I say that the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost are but one? No; for Peter, Paul, and John are made one only by the bond of love which unites them, and the union existing between them is called a moral union. This union does not prevent Peter, Paul, and John from being three subjects really and numeri-
cally distinct as to person and individual substance. Were the union existing between the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost of such a nature as this, it is quite evident that there would be three Gods and not one God.

Peter, Paul, and John are three men, that is, three persons having the same specific nature. Hence, I say that they are three persons and that these three persons are but one. Is it in this sense that I say that the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost are but one? No; for Peter, Paul, and John are united as one by the bond of the human nature which they all possess; and this is called specific union. Nor does this specific union prevent Peter, Paul, and John from being three really and numerically distinct subjects both as to person and individual substance. If the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost were bound together by such a specific union only, it is clear, again, that they would constitute three Gods and not only one God.

Again let us suppose that Peter is Paul’s father, and Paul is John’s. I would say that they are three persons, and that these three persons are but one. Is this my meaning when I say that the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost are but one? Clearly not. Peter, Paul, and John are but one in the sense that they are bound together by the ties of blood; and the union existing between them is called union of kin. It does not prevent the three from being really and numerically distinct both as to person and individual substance. So, too, were the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost bound together only by such ties as these, clearly there would be three Gods and not only one God.

What unites the three persons into one Godhead is, then, something more than the bond of love, or of community of species, or blood; and the union resulting therefrom is more than the moral union, or the union of kin, or the specific union. In what, then, does it consist?

It consists in this that the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost have but one and the same substance, but one and the
same life, so that this substance, this life, whether in the Son or in the Holy Ghost, is in no way inferior, as subordinationism would have it, to that of the Father; it is of such a nature that this substance, or life, in the Son and the Holy Ghost does not merely resemble, as the subordinationists said after they became semi-Arians, that of the Father; but it is of such a nature that the substance, or life, whether of the Father, the Son, or the Holy Ghost, is absolutely identical in its inmost being, its properties, and in all that goes to constitute its absolute infinity. The Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost have, then, identically the same substance, or life; hence, they are consubstantial, ὀμοσώσιως.\(^1\)

Between the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost, there is nothing distinctive, and, consequently, nothing which constitutes person, but the relation of origin, as St. Thomas phrases it: *Distinctio in divinis non fit nisi per relationem originis.*

These relations of origin are not something that did exist and now exist no longer. They are from all eternity, having no beginning, no end.

Such is the dogma of consubstantiality. It was formally defined, in the sense which we have just explained, by the council of Nicaea (325)\(^2\); and this definition was repeated by the councils of Constantinople (381)\(^3\), Ephesus (431)\(^4\), Chalcedon (451)\(^5\), Constantinople (551)\(^6\), Constantinople (680-681)\(^7\).

*Let us* examine the foundations of this doctrine in the New Testament and in the Tradition of the Fathers.

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1. The word ὀμοσώσιως (ὀμός = οὐσία) means that the Father, the Son and the Holy Ghost have the same essence or substance, the same inmost or absolute being.
2. Denz., 51.
3. Ibid., 86.
4. Ibid., 123.
5. Ibid., 148.
6. Ibid., 220.
7. Ibid., 290.
§ 1

THE NEW TESTAMENT.

The Synoptic Gospels and the Epistles of St. Paul. — Do we find the doctrine of consubstantiality in the New Testament? In the synoptic Gospels and in the epistles of St. Paul, we find it frequently repeated that there is but one God, the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost. It follows, then, that these writings teach that the trinity does not exclude unity in God, nor does unity exclude the trinity. There must be some mysterious bond which merges the two together. But, of the nature of this bond, the writings mentioned say nothing.

St. John's Gospel. — St. John's Gospel is more explicit; especially in the celebrated text in which, addressing the Jews who decry Him as blasphemer, Jesus says: « My Father and I are one. » This declaration, taken *simpliciter et sine addito*, writes St. Thomas, can be understood as neither a moral union, nor a conformity of will, nor unity of power or common operation; it means a metaphysical relation, identity of nature, or of essence.

The attempt has sometimes been made to restrict the import of this text by explaining it in the light of this other text found a little further on in the same Gospel: « Holy Father, keep them in thy name, whom thou hast given me: that they may be one, as we also are..... And not for them only do I pray, but for them also who through their word shall believe in me: That they all may be one, as thou, Father, in me, and I in thee: that they also may be one in us: that the world may believe that thou hast sent me. And the glory which thou hast given me, I have given to them: that they

1. Jn., x, 30.
2. In Joan. Evang., cap. x, lect. V.
may be one as we also are one. I in them, and thou in me: that they may be made perfect in one; and the world may know that thou hast sent me, and hast loved them, as thou hast also loved me'. » In this passage, they hold, there is question of nothing but conformity of will, or action, between the Savior and His Father; for the union between the Father and the Son is here represented just as that which Christ wishes to reign between God and men. But to institute such parallelism here is altogether gratuitous; for one might well reply that the Savior represents the union which exists between the Father and Himself as a model and offers this as a motive for the union of the faithful with God. And we must observe, furthermore, that unity of will, power, knowledge, action, and life between the Father and the Son, everywhere affirmed in the Gospel of St. John, is almost equivalent to an affirmation of the unity of substance.

§ II

TRADITION OF THE FATHERS.

General Idea. — The main characteristic feature of the New Testament, in so far as the concept of God is concerned, is, as we have seen, the clear way in which it reveals the existence of one God, Father, Son, and Holy Ghost. God is one; but, despite the essential unity which it maintains, the Godhead, after that, seems, as the Fathers express it, to be distributed as it were, between the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost.

Now this doctrine was held, also, as a fundamental belief by the Apologist Fathers and by the Fathers of the third century. Even the writings of the heretics, though they cannot be taken as direct evidences of the faith of the Church, have, nevertheless, great importance as indirect evidences.

They keep, though with a perverted sense, the terms which, in the Church, were expressive of true doctrine; whilst the condemnations pronounced against them, serve to bring out by contrast the opposition which existed between their errors and the authentic doctrine.

The Dogma of Consubstantiality, from the Second Century until the beginning of the Fourth Century. — To the Jewish philosophers who persisted in clinging to the Monotheism of the Old Testament and taunted the Christians with having many gods, and the Pagans who upbraided them for their atheism, the Apologists of the second century said: « We hold that there is one God, the Father, a Son, God, and the Holy Ghost; and we show their power in unity, and their distinction in rank. » They admit, then, in God, a bond through which there is an indescribable blending of unity and trinity; and furthermore, they prove this. It consists in this that the Son is engendered from the Father before all creatures, writes St. Justin. But this generation, adds Tatian, takes place without division, after the manner of a torch which imparts its fire to other torches. We must admit that the doctrine of the bond of unity between the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost has not yet reached that perfection to which it will attain under the Nicene Fathers. Nevertheless, we can see that all that was required to bring it to this perfection was to subject it to a somewhat rigorous analysis.

Unable to explain the trinity in the unity of the Godhead, and fearing lest the doctrine of three persons in one God might lead to the admission of three Gods, each inferior to the next in nature or power, Sabellius taught that Son was but another name for the Father; the Modalists held that the Father,
the Son, and the Holy Ghost were but transitory modes of but one and the same substance of the Godhead. St. Hippolytus and Tertullian, in the West; Origen and St. Denis of Alexandria, in the East, protested saying that in the Godhead, the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost are distinct from all eternity by their relation of origin and that they possess one and same substance. The Son is of the Father's substance, says Origen, ὢμοοὐσιος. He had coined the right word. And yet, continues the illustrious Alexandrian, if the Son possesses the divine substance, He must possess it to a lesser degree than the Father: it is, as it were, attenuated, or diminished in Him; for the Son, as such, must be inferior to his Father, just as an effect is inferior to its cause.

St. Denis of Alexandria, for his somewhat excessive urging the doctrine of subordination has to send explanations to St. Denis of Rome. Thus consubstantiality proved to be the only solution of the mystery of three persons in one God: in part defined, in part only anticipated, the tendencies towards unitarianism and tritheism are condemned and the term ὢμοοὐσιος is brought into existence. Nevertheless, there yet remains to be found a last doctrinal precision which, so far, has not been grasped; but towards this the Holy Ghost is directing the Christian thought.

But now the term ὢμοοὐσιος takes on a Sabellian meaning. Christ can be God only, says Paul of Samosata, on the condition that He form but one and the same person, or substance, with God, — that He be ὢμοοὐσιος with God. This

1. The Wisdom that proceeds from the Father, says Origen, « is begotten of God's substance », for « she is an emanation from the glory of the Almighty » and « the emanation is consubstantial (ὁμοοὐσιος) to that from which it emanates ». This is taken from a fragment of his Commentary on the Epistle to the Hebrews. It has been preserved only in a Latin version quoted above, p. 101.

doctrine, along with the term sophistically employed by Paul of Samosata, was condemned by the council of Antioch, in 267 or 268. It is not easy to sever a term from an idea which it has once represented. And for a long time many of the Fathers will not be able to hear the word ὦμουσίας, without suspecting of Sabellianism those who use it.

Thus, then, from the second century to the end of the third, there was unceasing effort to reconcile the trinity of persons with the Divine unity. The Father, the Son, the Holy Ghost are, owing to their relation of origin, distinct, from all eternity; and yet, there is but one God. The unity between the Father and the Son comes from this that the Father communicates His own substance to the Son. The Son possesses the Father's substance; but, several of the Fathers affirm, since it is communicated to Him by the Father, it cannot be that the Son possesses it in its fulness.

Arius precipitated the issue of this controversy by going far beyond the tenets of Subordinationism and affirming categorically that the preexistent Christ was nothing but the first creature of the Father.

The Dogma of Consubstantiality and the Council of Nicaea. — The first part of the creed sums up the conclusions of the first attempts made to explain the unity in the trinity in the Godhead. « We believe », said the Fathers, « in one Lord, Jesus Christ, the Son of God, the only begotten of the Father, God of God, light of light, true God of true God ». This doctrine the Fathers put forth against Arius, whose doctrine they condemn. Thus, they say, the Son is « begotten and not made ». And moreover, they add, « engendered by the Father from all eternity », He is « consubstantial with the Father, ὦμουσίας τῶν πατρί », that is, He is of the same essence or substance as the Father, the same as the Father in His inmost and absolute being. The difference
between them lies solely in the relation of origin which exists eternally between the Father and the Son.

**Anti-Nicene Reaction.** — About the year 330, the bishops exiled after the council of Nicaea had all been recalled. Little by little they organized an opposition party to fight the Nicene definitions. Prominent among them were some out and out Arians, but especially many subordinationists, who refused to admit the consubstantiality of the Son, because, they held, this expression was clearly Sabellian. The two leaders were Eusebius of Nicomedia and Eusebius of Caesarea.

Then there occurred an incident which set the whole party agoing. Marcellus, bishop of Ancyra, one of the defenders of the εὐςοῦσιν of Nicaea, had just published a book against the Arians. The Eusebians thought they saw in it well defined Sabellianism. They at once assembled in council and deposed the bishop of Ancyra (335).

The reason for the accusation was anything but clear, and Athanasius, who had been made bishop of Alexandria, thought it his duty to defend Marcellus. The bishop of Ancyra afterwards came to Rome where he explained his doctrine satisfactorily and was declared orthodox, in 341.

Meanwhile, Constantine died in 337, leaving the empire of the East to his son, Constantius, a prince given to dogmatising and devoted to the Eusebians. Sure of the emperor's support, they united again in council and condemned Marcellianism. These were the first skirmishes before the battle.

In 341 Eusebius of Nicomedia passed away. He was bishop of Constantinople for two years; and, at his death, there arose violent disturbances, which affected Constantius very much. He determined to have an understanding with his brother Constans, emperor of the West, and with the Pope, with a view to convoking a council to reestablish religious peace. This was the council of Sardica (343).

But the Anti-Nicenians, led by Acacius of Caesarea and
Basil of Ancyra, refused to come, thus defeating the purpose of the council. Nevertheless, in 346, Athanasius, now an exile since 336, managed to return to Alexandria.

In 350, Constans, the emperor of the West died, and so Constantius became sole emperor. The Anti-Nicenians, thinking the time had come for them to assert themselves, met in the council of Sirmium, where they drew up a rule of subordinationist faith (351). But they did not stop at that. They succeeded, by various means, in having Athanasius again exiled. Hilary of Poitiers, now the principal representative of the doctrine of Athanasius in the West, was exiled to Phrygia.

About the only tie that held the Anti-Nicenians together was their common opposition to the defenders of the definitions of the council of Nicæa. And, once their adversaries seemed to have been completely crushed, they could no longer agree and broke up into three factions.

The first of these factions consisted of downright Arians, under the leadership of Aetius, Eunomius, and Eudoxius. They held that the Son is but a simple creature of the Father, and that, consequently, he is of different substance from the Father. The Son, said they, is κτίσμα τοῦ πατρός, and therefore ἐξ ἑτέρας οὐσίας and ἀνέμοιος; hence He is neither ἐμοιότος, nor ὑμοιότος, nor even simply ὑμιός. These were called Anomoeans.

The second group, with Basil of Ancyra at their head, was much more important than the first. They maintained that the Son could not be of the same substance as the Father, ὑμοιότος but that He was of a like substance, ὑμοιούσιος. These were the Semi-Arians, properly so called.

A third party, under Acacius of Caesarea, said that the Son was like the Father, but that it was not necessary to define this likeness any more precisely than did the Scriptures. All that is necessary is to say that the Son is like the Father according to the Scriptures, ὑμιός κατὰ τὰς γραφὰς. These were called Homoeans.
Now, in 357, a few Anomoean bishops met at Sirmium and drew up a formula in which they rejected the ἐμοιούσις and the ἐμοιούσις. The Semi-Arians protested, and got up a formula in which they affirmed that the Word is not a creature, but the Son of the Father in the natural sense; and hence the resemblance between the substance of the Father and that of the Son, so that they said, the Son is ἐμοιούσις with the Father. On the other hand, they rejected the term ἐμοιούσις as being Sabellian.

But they went even further. They got the emperor Constantius to compel Pope Liberius, then an exile at Berea for having defended Athanasius, to sign their formula. The Pope gave his signature, but only after having stipulated that the Son is like the Father in substance and in everything, ἐμοιος κατ’ ὑστιν κατ’ ἄλλα πάντα.

They then tried to win over all the bishops of the Catholic world. With this in view, they asked Constantius to convocate a council. But meantime the Anomoeans, having broken with the Homoeans, succeeded in winning the confidence of Constantius, who decided he would call two councils, one at Rimini for the West, and the other at Seleucia for the East.

At Rimini, a Homoean formula was submitted to the Fathers. The Son, it had, engendered from all eternity by the Father is like the Father, according to the Scriptures. On their refusal to approve this doctrine, Constantius resorted to trickery and violence and got them to subscribe to it. At Seleucia, he had recourse to the same tactics and secured the same result. And so, at both places, was approved the homoean formula, homoean especially in appearance; for, in reality, it was Arian. Interpreting this twofold victory, St. Jerome was right when he said that the world awoke to find itself Arian. Luckily for orthodoxy, Constantius, the author of this unworthy feat, died in 361 1.

1. See the exposé of this long controversy in A. de Broglie, op. cit. Cons-
With the death of Constantius disappeared the strongest support of the Arians. On the other hand, the Semi-Arians, incensed at the conduct of their adversaries, became more and more reconciled to the definitions of the Nicene council. And in this, they were assisted by the enlightened and conciliatory intervention of Athanasius. In the West, St. Hilary of Poitiers worked for the same end and with equally good results. From 369-380, four councils were held at Rome, with Pope St. Damasus presiding, and in these the definitions of the Nicene council were renewed, whilst an article on the divinity and consubstantiality of the Holy Ghost was added to the creed. In 362 at a council held under Athanasius, at Alexandria, a large number of Semi-Arians recognized the council of Nicæa, condemned Arianism and all who held that the Holy Ghost is only a creature of the Son. At Antioch, in 363, the patriarch Meletius with 27 bishops, among them Acacius of Caesarea, accepted the ἐμοιώτις of Nicæa, contenting themselves with the observation that this word seemed to them to mean the same as the word ἐμοιώτις. St. Athanasius, before his death in 373, thus witnessed the triumph of Nicene orthodoxy.

Arguments of the Anomoeans. — The Anomoeans, or Arians, tried to bolster up their claims with the authority of the Scriptures. They quoted from the Old Testament that text from Proverbs, where Wisdom, in speaking of itself, says: "The Lord has created me (ἐκ τῶν ἐμοίωτῶν) to be the beginning of His ways." In the New Testament they exploited this passage from St. Mark: "But of that day or hour no man knoweth, neither the angels in heaven nor the Son, but the

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*Provenance*:
- *Prov.* viii, 22.
Father\(^1\), and this one from St. Luke: « And Jesus advanced in wisdom and age, and grace with God and men\(^2\) ». From St. John they gleaned all the texts bearing upon the dependence of the Son on the Father. There was this text: « The Son cannot do anything of himself »; and this one: « The Father is greater than I »; and finally this: « Now this is eternal life: that they may know thee, the only true God, and Jesus Christ, whom thou hast sent ».

Though they had but little respect for the Fathers, — who rather contradicted them, — the Anomoeans liked to fall back upon the doctrine of Origen and Denis of Alexandria.

But they chose to argue from reason rather than to quote authorities. An engendered being, they contended, cannot be the cause of its own existence; it must necessarily depend upon the unbegotten one. But are there in God one or two unbegotten beings? If two, there must be two principles totally distinct and separate; and this is practically to admit of two Gods. If there be only one such being, the Son can be but the creature of God.

St. Athanasius’ Reply. — About all the texts in Holy Writ, which seem to indicate any inferiority of the Son to the Father, said St. Athanasius, refer not to the Son, but to the humanity which He took the day of His Incarnation. Thus, « it was as man that the Savior said: « The Lord created me ». He wanted to express the following thought: My Father made me a body, He created me for the salvation of men. In this passage, the word ἔκ τοῦ θεοῦ refers not to the Word, but to the created body with which the Word was clothed\(^6\). So, too, he

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1. Mark, xiii, 32.
4. Ibid., xiv, 28.
5. Ibid., xvii, 3.
6. Contra arianos, or. II, 47; P. G., XXVI, 258.
reasons on the text from St. Mark: « Everyone knows that the Savior spoke in this way on account of the flesh, as man. In fact, such an imperfection could not belong to the Word, but must belong to human nature, of which ignorance is a feature. » Evidently, the text from St. Luke must be interpreted of the human nature. As for the passages from St. John, there is only one that presents any difficulty, and that is the one that has the following declaration of the Savior: « The Father who sent me is greater than I ». But, says St. Athanasius, this text proclaims a certain superiority of the Father over the Son, but it only refers to the relation of paternity and filiation which unites the Father and the Son; and there is nothing in it derogatory to the perfect equality of the Father and the Son, or to the consubstantiality of the divine persons.

After explaining the sense of the Scriptures, St. Athanasius points to the fact that the Arians have no right to appeal to the authority of Origen and Denis of Alexandria. There is no doubt, he says, that we occasionally run across strange passages in their writings; but if we take care to interpret these in the light of context and circumstances, we see that their doctrine is perfectly orthodox. Speaking of St. Denis, he addresses this reproach to the Arians: « Since these fomentors of impiety pretend that St. Denis is with them, let them write and let them confess what he himself wrote, let them proclaim what he has taught on consubstantiality, on the eternity of the Son, let them use his comparisons. »

In their discussions, the Arians, as we have said, had recourse to dialectics rather than to authority. St. Athanasius does not hesitate to attack them on their own ground. The whole reasoning of the Arians rested upon equivo-

1. Ibid., or. III, 43.
2. Ibid., or. I, 58.
cation brought about by the word ἀγέννητος. In fact this word is capable of being understood in two ways; either it means « that which was not made, that which was not created, that which is eternal », and, in this sense, it is applicable both to the Father and to the Son; or it means « that which was not begotten », and, in this sense, is applicable only to the Father. Unless we make this distinction, we fall into error. « The Arians are wrong, then, when they look to their dilemma for victory. Is there but one ἀγέννητος, or are there two? » If they define ἀγέννητος « that which is not made or created, that which is eternal », let them understand that, not only once, but a thousand times, according to this meaning, the Son also is ἀγέννητος; for He is not of the γέννητον; He is not made; He is coexistent with the Father from all eternity..... If, therefore, when vanquished on this side, they wish to give the word the meaning of one « not come from any one, having no Father », we will inform them that, according to this sense, there is but one ἀγέννητος, and that is the Father. But they will gain nothing thereby; for to say that the Father is ἀγέννητος, in this sense, does not make it that the Son is γέννητος, in the sense of being made or created, since it has been shown that He is the Word and like the one that engendered Him. If, then, God is ἀγέννητος, His image, that is, His Word, is not γέννητος, that is, made, or created, but γέννημα (that is, he that is engendered, the offspring).

The Arguments of the Semi-Arians. — The Semi-Arians rejected the term ὑμοούσιος for two reasons, one philosophical, the other scriptural.

Since the Son is Son, He must possess the substance of the Father. All generation, in fact, supposes a communication of the substance of the father.

But the Son must have numerically the same identical

1. Contra arianos, or. 1, 31; P. G., XXVI, 76.
substance as the Father. To admit the contrary would be to admit two substances in God, and consequently two Gods.

Yet, since the Son is simply the Son, there is no doubt that he must have the same divine substance, but less fully than the Father has it; for the effect is always inferior to the cause.

Now, went on the Semi-Arians, the term δυσόσιος, which affirms absolute identity between the substance of the Father and the substance of the Son, is equivalent to saying that the Son is in reality not the Son, that He is but a transient mode of the divine substance. In other words, the term δυσόσιος has nothing but a Sabellian signification.

The term δυσόσιος, on the other hand, indicates only the likeness which the Son has in virtue of His generation, and does not deny the reality of the three Divine Persons.

Then, too, the word δυσόσιος, meaning, as it does, but the likeness which results from eternal generation, may be taken as equivalent to the scriptural term Son. As for the word δυσόσιος, it is a new expression signifying a novel and unscriptural idea.

St. Athanasius' Reply. — It is quite evident that the arguments of the Semi-Arians differed entirely from those of the Arians. According to the Arians, the Son was of a substance numerically distinct from that of the Father and was created by the Father; while according to the Semi-Arians, the substance of the Son was numerically the same as that of the Father, but the Son, as such, possesses it in a lesser degree. Yet Semi-Arianism was hardly conceivable to a

1. We mention here only the Semi-Arians of the type of Eusebius of Caesarea or of Basil of An써ra. These were but rehearsing the subordination ideas of Origen or Denis of Alexandria. Some there were also, who, coming nearer to Arianism, taught that the generation of the Son consisted in the communication of part of the Father's substance.
mind that tried to get a clear representation of how one could possess in a lesser degree the divine substance. If the Father engenders a Son, this can take place only by the communication of the whole divine substance. Consequently, the whole substance will belong to the Son as well as to the Father; in other words, the Son will be \( \epsilon \mu \sigma \sigma \alpha \varsigma \) with the Father.

It was to demonstrate this truth that St. Athanasius directed his efforts\(^1\).

The objection was urged that, as long as we admit that the Son is only the Son, we must conceive of Him as an effect of the Father. And, it was added, the effect is necessarily inferior to the cause.

Between the Father and the Son, answered St. Athanasius, there does not exist the relation of cause and effect which is found among men between a father and his son. In God, the Father is the root and the Son is the stem springing from this root. And as the fountain-head is not the efficient cause of the stream, nor the root the efficient cause of the stem, but only the starting point, the origin, the mere principle; so, in God, the Father is not the efficient cause of the Son, but only the starting point, the origin, the mere principle\(^2\). The words « source » and « root » are well chosen; they produce the idea of extension by communication of substance rather than production by way of efficient causality.

Let no one raise the objection, continues St. Athanasius, that the \textit{homoousia} of the Father and the Son is not indicated in the Scriptures! Does not St. John recall this saying of the Savior’s: « The Father and I are one\(^3\) »? and this other: « I am in the Father and the Father in me\(^4\) »? He teaches here the identity of substance in the Father and the Son\(^5\).

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1. \textit{De synodis}, 4, 53.
3. \textit{Jn.}, x, 30.
Such reasoning had some effect upon the Semi-Arians; but what went further in bringing them to orthodoxy was the exaggeration of several members of their party, who plunged headlong into pure Arianism. Perhaps, too, the dishonest conduct of the Arians themselves had even more influence than this upon them. Gradually they came to acknowledge that the Son, who was like the Father by virtue of His eternal generation, possesses also the same substance as the Father, and as perfectly as the Father. And this was admitting all that the Nicene ὤμοιός ὑπὸς meant. Nevertheless, they still held out against accepting that term and chose instead the term ὤμοιός ὑπὸς.

There is not the slightest doubt that this had now come to be merely a quarrel about words. St. Athanasius understood this so clearly that, at the council of Alexandria in 362, he allowed the ὤμοιός ὑπὸς to stand, provided that by this term was understood that the Son had the very substance of the Father and that the Father had it equally with the Son.

Conclusion on the mode of Development of this Dogma. — A concept is said to be clear when it merely enables us to distinguish one thing from another. If this concept is subjected to such further analysis, that we can distinguish the characteristics of the first thing from those of the second, it is said to be a distinct concept. And it is more or less distinct according to the extent in which we are enabled to distinguish more or less completely these characteristics.

1. « Some historians have suggested that, after using it first in the strict meaning of the numerical unity of the substance of the Father and the Son, the Bishop of Alexandria had, from about the year 359 till the end of his life, given up this rigid view and almost identified unconsciously the meaning of the word ὤμοιός ὑπὸς with that of the word ὤμοιός ὑπὸς. This is a mistake. It is true that in the De Synodis, a conciliatory document which was composed during the year 359, St. Athanasius makes advances to the Semi-Arians: he shows them that their principles, if constantly followed, must lead them to admit what is implied in « consubstantial; » he also declares that the Orthodox will pay more attention to the substance of their doctrine than to their formulas; but, on the other hand, he yields none of the points defined by the Council of Nicaea, nothing of what is the whole truth. » (J. Tixeront, History of Dogmas, Vol. II, ch. III, p. 71.)
Now, we may say that faith in the mystery of the most holy Trinity in general, and in consubstantiality in particular, was first expressed by a clear concept. This concept, through theological reflection and under the guidance of the Holy Ghost, became more and more distinct. Several Apologists and some of the Fathers of the third century gave it inexact expression; but this was inevitable. It was due to the struggles of the mind seeking expression for its thoughts. After the Nicene council such affirmations would have been considered rightly as heretical.

A good idea of the work of this period may be obtained from a happy simile from the pen of Mgr Duchesne: « There are two conditions required so that damage done to the hold of a ship will cause it to leak: first, the injury must be sustained in the hold below the water line, and then, be so great as to allow the water to find its way in great quantities into the vessel. Now, the ship may set sail under ballast, at the outset of a long voyage, and take on little by little its merchandise. The water-line rises all along its hull; or, in other words, the ship draws more water; and a break which at first cleared the hold will now be plunged beneath the water as the level is raised. The ship will then be in danger from an accident which at the beginning of the voyage was of no consequence. Just so is it with the teaching of the Church on the mystery of the blessed Trinity. During its long voyage the vessel of Tradition gradually drew more and more water in its ocean; the surface immersed has become more extensive than it was at first, though it remains the same ship, the same doctrinal cargo. So, little breaks, which in the second and third century could be sustained without any danger, because above the water line, had now to be looked after, at the risk of imperilling everything, because they came under water 1. »

1. Les témoins anténicéens du dogme de la Trinité, in Revue des sciences ecclésiastiques, Déc. 1882.
CHAPTER III

THE DIVINE PROCESSIONS

The three persons are one and the same God because they have one and the same substance: this is a summary statement of the propositions we have just examined.

This truth is a mere statement of the mystery of the divine life.

We shall now enter more deeply into the mystery of this life.

The Catholic doctrine on this point is summed up in the second part of the formula which we gave at the beginning of these studies. The Father, we said, engendered a Son from all eternity; so too, from all eternity, the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Father and the Son as from one principle.

The subject of this chapter, then, naturally gives rise to two new propositions, of which we will treat in as many articles.

ARTICLE I

The Son proceeds from the Father from all eternity by way of Generation.

Doctrine of the Church. — In stating this proposition: « The Son proceeds from the Father », we consider the Son both before and after the Incarnation. The reason for taking this point of view was given when we proved the divinity of the Son.
Procession is the emanating of one thing from another: *Processio est emanatio unius ab altero*. The starting point is called the principle; opposed to the principle is the term; the procession consists essentially in the action. If the procession terminates outside the substance of the principle, the procession is transitive; if it terminates in a term which belongs essentially to the same substance as the principle, the procession is said to be immanent. Now we say that the Son proceeds from the Father by immanent procession. And we add that He proceeds from the Father by way of generation.

In the order of created beings, generation is defined: *Productio viventis a vivente conjuncto, ad efformandum naturam specificum similem, vi productionis*. The definition states that generation takes place when from a living conjugate principle there results a specifically similar being. In God, the Son proceeds from the Father by way of generation, that is, in a manner resembling somewhat the generation of created beings, but yet quite different, since all our concepts of things created can be applied to God by way of analogy only.

But, it will be asked, in what does the eternal generation of the Son consist?

In this: 1 st. The Son is begotten of the Father in such a way as to entail no inferiority of the Son in substance or in power, nor even to render the Son posterior in actual existence. Nor can we say that the Father is the cause and the Son the effect. But we can and should say that the Father is the starting point, the origin, the principle of the Son. This phraseology indicates not efficient causality, but extension by the communication of substance.

2 nd. The Son is begotten of the Father not by a transient act, but by a lasting generation which continues through all eternity.

3 rd. This generation constitutes the person of the Father as well as that of the Son, so that the Father is nothing but He who begets the Son from all eternity and the Son nothing
but He who is begotten of the Father from all eternity. Let this generation cease for a moment, were it possible, and that would be the end of the Father and the Son and of the divine life itself.

To sum up, the generation of the Son is that eternal act by which the Father communicates to the Son all the substance He possesses. As a result of this communication the Son is in every way like the Father, just as in the created order the son is of the same species as those who generate him; and this generation can and must be called eternal generation.

Defined for the first time by the council of Nicæa, the dogma of the eternal generation of the Son is contained also in the creed of Constantinople and in that of St. Athanasius.

We shall look for the foundation of this dogma in the New Testament and in the Tradition of the Fathers. Then we shall give its explanation as essayed by St. Thomas.

§ 1

THE NEW TESTAMENT.

The Synoptic Gospels. — In the synoptic Gospels the revelation of the eternal generation of the Son is correlative with the revelation of His divine filiation, true or natural. Now, as we have established above, if we wish to adhere to the testimony of the synoptic Gospels alone, we must admit that Jesus represented Himself as the true Son of God.

St. John’s Gospel. — St. John’s Gospel is more explicit. From the prologue, the Word is represented as living in the

2. Denz., 54.
3. Ibid., 86.
4. Ibid., 39.
5. Cf. supra, pp. 72-82.
most active and intimate relations with God. But the Apostle does not merely affirm this. To him was granted a glimpse of the relation between the Word and God, and this he has described. We have seen, he tells us, the glory of the Word Incarnate. This glory He possessed as His own, just as an only begotten Son possesses the glory of his Father. In fact, he adds, He is the only Son, the only begotten Son, that is, He who possesses by way of eternal generation the fulness of the divinity. And, throughout his Gospel, every time he speaks of Son, he understands the Son begotten of the Father from all eternity.

St. Paul's Epistles. — In his different epistles, St. Paul makes use of language almost as elevated as that of St. John. Christ, he states, existed before he appeared in the flesh, as the beginning and the end of all creation, and of all sanctification, rich, and in the condition of God, the Son of God. And let us observe here that there can be question of none but substantial relation; for, speaking of the Son of God, the Apostle calls Him the Image of God, the Wisdom of God, the true Son of God. But nowhere in all the New Testament is the doctrine of the eternal generation of the preexistent Christ so fully developed as in the prologue of the epistle to the Hebrews. If the Son is above the Prophets, above the angels, and above Moses, it is because He is the Son engendered by the Father from all eternity. And here there is no question as to the

1. Jn., i, 1.
2. Ibid., i, 14.
3. Ibid., i, 18.
4. Gal., i, 16; ii, 20; iv, 4; — I Thess., i, 10; — I Cor., i, 19; xv, 28; — II Cor., i, 19; xi, 31; — Rom., i, 3, 4, 9; v, 10; vii, 3, 29, 32; — Eph., iv, 13; — Col., i, 13.
5. II Cor., iv, 4; — Col., i, 15.
6. I Cor., i, 30.
7. Rom., ix, 1-2; — Tit., i, 3.
8. Rom., xvii, 32.
meaning of the word Son: it means Son by nature, the only begotten, as it does in the prologue of St. John's Gospel. In fact, this Son through whom God spoke to us and whom He declared Lord of all things by raising Him up in the flesh, is He through whom He made the world. The brightness of His glory, the figure of His substance, and upholding all things by the word of His power, after having accomplished the purgation of sins, He sitteth on the right hand of the majesty on high. These two last phrases sum up, in an inverted parallelism, the entire work and the dignity of the only Son of the Father.

§ II

THE TRADITION OF THE FATHERS.

General Idea. — In the teaching of the Fathers, the doctrine of the eternal generation of the Son is frequently interwoven with the dogma of His divinity. The Son is God because God the Father, in begetting Him, communicated to Him His divine substance. Hence, it is not expedient to draw the line too sharply between two dogmas so closely related. Nevertheless, it is well, in the mystery of the divinity of the Son, to examine more closely His eternal generation.

In speaking of the Savior, the epistle of Barnabas affirms that He is not only the Son of man, but that He is the Son of God, since He is the image of God, made accessible to men through the Incarnation. This is only a comment upon the doctrine of St. Paul.

St. Ignatius of Antioch reproduces rather the doctrine of St. John, especially in the passage, quoted above, of the

1. Ibid., I, 1-2.
2. Ibid., I, 3-4.
3. Barn., xii, 10.
4. Ibid., v, 10-12.
epistle to the Magnesians where he says: « There is but one God who manifested Himself through Jesus Christ, His Son, who is also His Word, given forth after silence, and pleasing in all things to Him that sent Him. »

The Apologist Fathers. — St. Justin laid much stress upon the doctrine of the generation of the Son. For this illustrious apologist, just as for us, the generation of the Son is the foundation of His absolute divinity. Addressing Trypho, he says: "If you understood what was said by the prophets (about the Messias), you would not deny that He is God, the only begotten Son, and the ineffable God." Tatian, the disciple of St. Justin, enters more deeply into the mystery of the generation of the Son: « Just as one torch, » he says, « may serve the purpose of lighting many fires without its light being diminished because other torches have been lighted from it, so the Logos, issuing from the power of the Father, does not deprive of Logos Him who engendered it. » Hence, according to Tatian, the generation of the Logos is like the light communicated from one torch to another; the Word is the light of light, *lumen de lumine, φως εξ φωτός*. These expressions, as we know, found their way into the creeds of Nicea and Constantinople.

St. Theophilus of Antioch is no less positive in his affirmations on this subject than the other Apologists. But he insists rather upon a somewhat special feature of the doctrine, and he would have it that there were in the Logos two states. God, wrote he, possesses within Himself, from all eternity, a Logos (λόγος ἐνθιδειπτος), which he utters at the moment of Creation (λόγος προφητευτ). Does he mean by

4. *Ad Autolyc.* 1, n, 22.
this that God did not beget His Son until the Creation and that, before this, the Son existed only in a potential state and more or less really distinct from God, the Father? Some Catholic writers think that this is the teaching of St. Theophilus of Antioch; and they add that this Father’s doctrine is the same as that exposed, though in less explicit terms, by St. Justin¹, Tatian², and Athenagoras³. Such an interpretation, it seems to us, need not be put upon these texts. It would seem to us, on the contrary, that this Interior Logos, as well as the External Logos, indicates a personal subject, engendered eternally by the Father. Yet, one cannot well fail to acknowledge that these expressions, the Immanent Logos and the Emitted Logos, are equivocal and of such a nature as to lead into error one who is not forewarned. These are terms which it would be difficult indeed to understand in the orthodox sense, had they been used after the Nicene council.

Origen. — Perhaps no author has developed more fully than Origen has, the doctrine of the eternal generation of the Word. « The generation of the Word », writes he, « does not entail the division of substance in the Father. The generation of the Son from the Father, the invisible image of an invisible nature, we must conceive rather as the will proceeding from the intelligence without division or separation from it⁴. » The generation of the Son is brought about by the communication of the entire substance of the Father. « He that saves is one, salvation is one. The living Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost are one; one not by a mixture of the three, but by the identity of the substance in the three perfect, correlative hypostases. The Father engen-

2. Or. adv. Gr., 5.
4. Periarchon, 1, i, c. ii, 6; l, iv, 28; P. G., XI, 135, 402.
dered according to nature; hence the begotten one is con-
substantial with Him. « The Son is generated from eter-
nity. » No more can we conceive without the Father, the
Son, the impress of His substance, His Word and His Wisdom,
than the light can exist without its rays. How dare we, then,
claim that there was a time when the Son did not exist? As
well might we say that there was a time when truth was not,
when Wisdom was not, when life was not. These perfec-
tions pertain to the essence of God and are inseparable from
his substance; and, if reason can distinguish them, they
are, in truth, but one and the same thing in which consists
the fulness of the divinity. Even these expressions: « There
never was a time when He was not », must be understood
leniently. In fact, « when » and « never » indicate time,
and everything that concerns the Father, the Son, and the
Holy Ghost is above all time, is everlasting and eternal.
This is the privilege of the Trinity alone; everything else is
measured by time and duration. Moreover, this genera-
tion is everlasting: « Having engendered a Son, God did
not cease engendering Him after birth, but He engenders
Him forever... What is the Savior? The effulgence of the
glory of the Father. But once produced the light never
ceases. As long as the source of light lasts, the light con-
tinues. So is it with the Son as regards the Father. Our Savior
is the Wisdom of God: but this Wisdom is the radiance
of the eternal light. » Hence, nothing shows better the
dignity of the Son than these words: Thou art my Son, to-day
have I begotten thee. These are the words of God to his
Son; and, for God, to-day is forever; for there is no night
in God, nor is there, I am sure, any morning, but His day
embraces, so to speak, His entire life, not produced but

1. In Matth. fragm., P. G., XVII. Cf. In epist. ad Hebr. fragm., P. G.,
XIV, 1308.
2. Periarchon, 1. iv, 28.
3. In Jerem., homil. ix, 4; P. G., xiii, 357.
eternal. Such is the « to-day » when the Son is engendered. His generation has no beginning, any more than the day of his generation has.

St. Athanasius. — It was for St. Athanasius to defend and develop the doctrine of the eternal generation of the Word against the Arians, who maintained that the Logos was only the first creature of God. He based the doctrine directly on the Holy Scriptures. He that reads the New Testament with an unprejudiced mind, says he, must confess that Christ is the true Son of God. Such is the general testimony of the Gospels. To be convinced of this, all one has to do is to read the declarations of the Father and of the Son Himself.

But St. Athanasius uses indirect proofs, also, and shows that the denial of this thesis would lead to conclusions that could not be accepted. If the Son is not engendered, he says, the Christian faith crumbles to nothing; for, we are ever, both in our liturgical formulas and in our prayers, associating the Father and the Son. And, if the Son is not engendered, we adore several unequal Gods and we fall into pagan polytheism. Moreover, if the Son is not engendered, the Incarnation becomes useless and the Redemption vain. For Jesus to bring humanity into communion with God it was necessary that He be flesh and that He be also God.

No doubt, also says this illustrious and saintly doctor, the word generation is astounding when applied to God; but we must observe well that it is so with all our words. They all take on a different meaning when transferred from man to God. There are some elements of our concept of

1. In Joan., t. 1, 32; P. G., XIV, 77.
2. Contra Arianos, or. I, 15, 16.
3. Ibid., or. II, 46.
4. Ibid., or. II, 49.
5. Ibid., or. I, 16, 39; or. II.
generation that are applicable to God. The Son, for instance, has His origin in the Father and is the same in nature as the Father. Other elements of our concepts, on the other hand, are applicable to man only, and we must be careful not to push the comparison too far; for, whereas in human generation there is a succession from the father to the son and from the son to the father, in the divine generation the Father and the Son are bound by eternal relations.

§ III

THE THEOLOGY OF ST. THOMAS.

Leading Principles. — St. Thomas seems to have two guiding principles in his theology on the divine processions. The first, a principle of faith, can be formulated as follows: "We must admit processions in God." The second is a principle of reason: "The term procession must be taken in as spiritual a sense as possible, in so far as it corresponds to the intellectual life. But here again this meaning gives us but an image of the divine reality."

The first principle is evident. The Word said of Himself, in St. John's Gospel: "I proceeded from the Father." And of the Holy Ghost, the Word said: "Who proceeded from the Father."

The second principle has also a strong claim to admission. In common language this term, procession, conveys the idea of a transitive action, that is to say, an action which terminates outside of the substance of its principle. But such a procession is impossible in God. In Him, in fact, the principle and the term have but one and the same sub-

1. Ibid., or. I, 26.
2. Ibid., or. I, 21, 22.
3. Jn., viii, 42.
4. Ibid., xv, 26.
stance. Hence we have to compare the divine procession to those immanent actions which, in us, constitute intellectual life. Here again, no doubt, we can get but defective images; for everything that goes on within us bears the imprint of inevitable imperfection. Nevertheless, these images, though defective, are of some help, for we see repeated within the narrow limits of our soul that which goes on in the divine immensity.

The Procession of the Son. — It is, then, by examining the immanent operations of our own intellectual life that we must arrive at some idea of the divine processions. We shall, for the time being, consider the procession of the Son only.

Every time we think, a procession takes place in us, that is, an intellectual concept comes from our knowledge of objects. This is what we call the interior word, and it precedes the spoken word. The more profound our intelligence, the more intimate is our concept, and the more closely does it tend to become identified with the intelligence itself. This is what goes on in us. But, God thinks because

1. *Sum. Theol.*, 1, q. xxvii, a. i : *Cum autem Deus sit super omnia, ea quae in Deo dicuntur, non sunt intelligenda secundum modum infimarum creaturarum, quae sunt corpora, sed secundum similitudinem supremarum creaturarum, quae sunt intellectuales substantiae, a quibus etiam similitudo accepta deficit a representatione divinorum. Non ergo accipienda est processio, secundum quod est in corporalibus vel per motum localem, vel per actionem aliquid causae in exteriorum effectum, ut calor a calefaciente in calefactum; sed secundum emanationem intelligibilem, utpote verbi intelligibilis a dicente, quod manet in ipso. Et sic fides catholica processionem ponit in divinis.


3. *Ibid.*, ad 2um : *Manifestum est enim quod quanto aliquid magis intelligitur, tanto conceptio intellectualis est magis intima intelligenti, et magis unum. Nam intellectus secundum hoc quod actu intelligit, secundum hoc fit unum cum intellecto. Unde cum divinum intelligere sit in finem perfectionis,
He is a pure spirit; and, for a pure spirit, to live is to think. And besides, faith tells us that God has a Word. If we combine these two elements, the one rational, the other revealed, we shall conclude by saying: "In the divine simplicity, we must distinguish between the God who thinks and the Word of God, and we must oppose the one to the other as the thinking principle and the term of the thought." The first procession that we find in God is, then, analogical to the mental word, which, though it proceeds from the intellect, yet remains in it.

This Procession is Generation. — We have generation, says St. Thomas, when, from a living and conjugate principle, there results a living being of the same kind and species.

But, by the very fact that God thinks, His thought is Himself, and He reproduces Himself completely in an interior Word, and this Word contains identically the perfections of God: being, life, eternity, divinity. This is truly a Son consubstantial to the Father; and everything is common, all is one between the Father and the Son, save that the Father is the thinking God and the Son is, as it were, the God-thought, quasi Deus intellectus; or, to put it more exactly, save that the Father is God speaking intellectually, and the Son is His intellectual Word.

The procession of the Son has, then, all the characteristics of a true generation. The Son proceeds from the Father by an intellectual act, which is the vital operation of God; He springs from a conjugate principle; He resembles this conjoint principle in all things. Procession in God is, then, properly called generation, and the Word which proceeds is rightly called the Son.

necesse est quod verbum divinum sit perfecte unum cum eo a quo procedit, absque omni diversitate.

2. Contra Gentiles, I. IV, c. xi.
Nevertheless, even though the Word springs eternally from a conjugate principle, He remains eternally united to it. And this, because in God generation is an act which lasts for eternity. All that the Father is, is that He begets the Son; all that the Son is, is that He is begotten of the Father. This character, peculiar to eternal generation and distinctive of it, far from weakening it, gives it, on the contrary, that quality of infinite perfection which all the divine operations have of necessity.

ARTICLE II

The Holy Ghost Proceeds, from all eternity, from the Father and the Son, as from a common principle.

Doctrine of the Church. — Procession, as we said in the preceding article, is a real relation of origin.

Now, whereas the Son proceeds from the Father, the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Father and the Son, as from a common principle.

Hence, the principle whence the Holy Ghost springs is not the Father alone, nor the Son alone; but it is at once the Father and the Son, and the Father complete and the Son complete. It is not by juxtaposition, nor by the combination of two actions, the action of the Father and the action of the Son; but only one really indivisible action, since it is produced by the simultaneous action of the Father and the Son. Just as the Son requires the Father, and just as His personality consists in this that He is eternally engendered by the

Father; so the Holy Ghost requires the Father and the Son, so, too, His personality consists in this that He is eternally put forth by the Father begetting the Son. Furthermore, just as the Father requires the Son and would cease to exist were the Son to go out of existence, so the Father, conjointly with the Son, requires the Holy Ghost and would cease being a conjugate principle, and consequently would cease to exist at all, were the existence of the Holy Ghost to stop.

The procession of the Holy Ghost was defined as follows by the council of Constantinople, in 381: « We believe in the Holy Ghost who is Lord, who gives life, who proceeds from the Father, who is to be honored and glorified with the Father and the Son, who spoke through the Prophets. »

As we can see, the Fathers were content to define that the Holy Ghost proceeded from the Father. But if they spoke in this way, it was only « to avoid having the Son taken for the primordial principle of the Holy Ghost, as though He did not derive from the Father the virtue according to which the Holy Ghost proceeded from Him. »

Nevertheless, such an incomplete formula for so important a doctrine could not suffice. And, from the fifth century, several particular councils held in the West declared that the Holy Ghost proceeded from the Father and the Son.

Finally, the fourth Lateran council (1215) gave the following definition: Pater a nullo, Filius autem a solo Patre, ac Spiritus Sanctus ab unoque pariter. And the second council of Lyons likewise declared (1274): Fatemur quod Spiritus Sanctus æternaliter a Patre et Filio, non tanquam ex duobus principiis, sed tanquam ex uno prin-
picio, non duabus spirationibus sed unica spiratione procedit. The council of Florence (1438) took this formula and made it more definite: Spiritus Sanctus ex Patre et Filio aeterna- liter est, et essentiam suam suumque esse subsistens habet ex Patre simul et ex utroque aeternaliter tanquam ab uno principio et una spiratione procedit.

We shall seek the foundations of this doctrine in the New Testament and in the Tradition of the Fathers. And in the third place we shall give St. Thomas’ explanation of the same doctrine.

SECTION I


The Holy Ghost Proceeds from the Father. — The fact that the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Father, is taught in the New Testament in a rather casual manner. In several passages, the Holy Ghost is said formally to proceed from the Father, to be given by the Father, to come from God, that is, the Father.

The Holy Ghost Proceeds from the Son. — The Holy Ghost proceeds not only from the Father but He comes from the Son as well. This doctrine, though less common by far than the first, is indicated in certain passages of the New Testament. The Son will send the Paraclete from the Father, says the Gospel according to St. John. Wishing to manifest to His Apostles the gift he was making them, the Savior breathed on them, saying: «Receive ye the Holy Ghost ».

1. Ibid., 460.
2. Ibid., 691.
4. Ibid., xiv, 16.
5. I Cor., ii, 12.
7. Ibid., xx, 22.
In this latter text, the action accompanies the word to show that the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Son also.

This doctrine is clearly taught also by St. Paul. God has sent into your hearts the Spirit of His Son in order to lead you to give yourselves up to the Father, he writes to the Galatians. And to the Romans: «Now if any man have not the Spirit of Christ, he is none of His». So, according to this Apostle, the Spirit of God is equally the Spirit of the Son.

The Holy Ghost proceeds from the Father and the Son as from a conjoint principle. — Even this special feature of the procession of the Holy Ghost, according to which the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Father and the Son as from a common principle, is indicated in the Gospel according to St. John. In fact, the Holy Ghost is represented as coming from the Father through the Son. This is precisely the doctrine of the Greek Fathers of the fourth century and the fifth, when they say that the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Father in so far as He is Father, or from the Son inasmuch as He is Son. The Holy Ghost proceeds from the Father inasmuch as He is Father, that is, inasmuch as He begets a Son. In other words, He proceeds from the Father through the Son, the Father and the Son being considered as one conjoint principle.

SECTION II

The Tradition of the Fathers.

General Idea. — About the year 360, the Arians, as we have said, unable to bring to success their ideas about the

2. Rom., viii, 9.
Son reopened the struggle by attacking the person of the Holy Ghost. The Macedonians said that the Holy Ghost was only a creature of the Son. St. Athanasius, and then St. Basil and St. Gregory Nazianzene, took up the defense of orthodoxy. From the Holy Scriptures, by rigorous reasoning they demonstrated that the Holy Ghost is God and equal to the Father and the Son. This doctrine was confirmed by the council of Constantinople in the year 381. At the same time, the Greek Fathers of the end of the fourth century were led to expose with more precision the doctrine of the procession of the Holy Ghost. This work was continued during the fifth century; and, until the seventh, both the Greek and the Latin Fathers were in perfect accord upon the question. From this time on, the Greek Fathers upbraided the Latins for having introduced into the symbol of Nicæa and Constantinople the word Filioque. And yet this innovation made by the Latins was perfectly legitimate.

The Greek Fathers at the End of the fourth century and the Doctrine of the Procession of the Holy Ghost. — The Father is the starting point, the origin, the principle of the Son and the Holy Ghost. The declarations of the Greek Fathers on this subject are as explicit as can be.

But does the Son play a part in the procession of the Holy Ghost? If so, in what does it consist? Is the Son the passive intermediary of the substance of the Father, like a canal which transmits the water it receives from a river? Or does He, on the contrary, participate in the fecundity of the Father so far as to continue with the Father as the conjoint principle whence the Holy Ghost proceeds? Such are the questions that we Westerners freely ask ourselves in reading the writings of the Greek Fathers.

And, first of all, there is no doubt that according to the Greek Fathers of the fourth century the Son does play a part in the procession of the Holy Ghost.

On this point, St. Athanasius declares that the Holy Ghost
is the spirit of the Son, His « sanctifying and illuminating power, which is said to proceed from the Father (ἐκ πατρὸς ἐκπορευέται), since the Son, who comes from the Father, causes it to shine, sends it, and imparts it » . And again he says that the Holy Ghost pertains to the Son as the Son pertains to the Father: « Since the Son, because He comes from the Father, belongs to the Father’s substance, the Holy Ghost, who is said to be from God, must, of necessity, be the property, according to His substance, of the Son. » In other words, the Holy Ghost receives His being from the Son, just as the Son receives His being from the Father.

In a similar strain, St. Basil writes: « That relation which exists between the Father and the Son exists between the Son and the Holy Ghost. The Holy Ghost comes from the Father, He is like the breath from His mouth... But He emanates from the Father through His only Son. »

St. Gregory of Nyssa compares the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost to three torches, the first of which imparts light to the second, and, through it, to the third. From the teaching implied in this metaphor we see that, according to St. Gregory, the Holy Ghost comes from the Father and the Son.

Didymus the Blind does not deviate from this. The Holy Ghost, he says, is the image of the Son, just as the Son is the image of the Father. And, elsewhere, the Holy Ghost, he says, proceeds from the Son.

St. Epiphanius speaks in a way that reminds us of the

2. Ibid., 21.
3. De Spiritu Sancto, 43, 46, 47; P. G., XXXII.
6. De Spiritu sancto, 36: Spiritus quoque Sanctus qui est Spiritus veritatis, Spiritusque sapientiae, non posse, Filio loquente, audire quin nescit, cum hoc ipsum sit quod profertur a Filio, id est procedens a veritate, consolator manans de consolatore, Deus de Deo, Spiritus veritatis procedens.
Latins. « The Holy Ghost », writes he, « is not the Son, but He is of the substance itself of the Father and of the Son ». And farther on, in the same treatise, he says that « Christ is held to be of the Father, God of God : the Holy Ghost is of Christ, or of both (παρ' ἀμφοτέρων), as Christ says, in St. John: ‘ He proceeds from the Father and He will receive of me. ’ » « Just as there are adoptive sons, so there are spirits by adoption and calling; but the Holy Ghost alone, (as coming) from the Father and the Son (ἀπ' Πατρί καὶ Υἱῷ), is called the Spirit of truth, and the Spirit of God, the Spirit of Christ, and the Spirit of Grace. »

These testimonies are sufficient to show that, according to the doctrine of the Greek Fathers at the end of the fourth century, the Holy Ghost proceeds indeed from the Father, but also from the Son.

It is likewise equally clear that, according to this teaching the Son is not simply an intermediary of the substance of the Father; He participates in the fecundity of the Father; He is with the Father, although under the Father, the dynamic principle of the Holy Ghost.

The Greek Fathers of the Fifth Century. — The teaching of the Greek Fathers of the fifth century on the procession of the Holy Ghost is more fully developed and at the same time more concise than that of the preceding centuries. The Macedonian party needed no longer to be handled so carefully. The struggle, too, was now against the Nestorians, whose teachings reverted to the affirmation that the Christ was but a mere creature sanctified by the coming of the Holy Ghost.

The great adversary of Nestorianism was St. Cyril of Alexandria. Consequently, it is to the writings of this great

1. Ancoratus, 7; P. G., XLIII, 29.
2. Ibid., 67.
3. Ibid., 72.
Doctor that we must turn to find the Greek doctrine on the procession of the Holy Ghost.

Like St. Athanasius, St. Cyril says that the Holy Ghost is of the Son; He is the Son's own, because He comes from the Son and through Him (ἐκ τούτων τοῦ πατρὸς καὶ τοῦ φίλου τῆς πίστεως). Hence, he concludes against Nestorius, the Son does not possess the Spirit by participation, like the soul of one sanctified.

Like St. Epiphanius, Didymus, and the other Greek Fathers of the fourth century, St. Cyril declares that the Holy Ghost comes from the Father and the Son, or from both (ἁ ψυχή έστιν).

Nevertheless, St. Cyril makes use of a formula, which St. John Damascene, in the eighth century, will look upon as the most perfect expression of the procession of the Holy Ghost. "The Spirit, he writes, "is the Spirit of God the Father and, at the same time, the Spirit of the Son, springing, in substance, from both at once (ἡ ψυχή έστιν), that is to say, coming from the Father through the Son (ἡ ψυχή τούτων ἐκ τοῦ πατρὸς καὶ τοῦ φίλου τῆς πίστεως)." So, according to St. Cyril, the Spirit comes from both at once, which means, as he tells us, that He comes from the Father through the Son. He considers these two formulas as identical, though, for him, the second is but the explanation of the first. The Holy Ghost comes at once from both Father and Son; but this takes place according to a certain order: He comes from the Father through the Son. In fact, the Father, in begetting the Son, makes this same Son, conjointly with Himself, the active principle of the Holy Ghost.

St. Augustine and the Doctrine of the Procession of the

2. Thesaurus, assert. XXXIV; P. G., LXXV, 585.
3. De recta fide, 21; P. G., LXXV, 1408.
Holy Ghost. — At the beginning of the fifth century, then, two formulas were used in the East to express the doctrine of the procession of the Holy Ghost. It was put either that the Holy Ghost proceeded « from the two together », or that He proceeded « from the Father through the Son ». And St. Cyril held these two expressions as equivalent.

Now, St. Augustine, at the same time, used the same language. The Father engenders the Son, wrote he, in such a way that, from this generation, there results the procession of the Holy Ghost¹. So the Holy Ghost comes from the two together, from the Father and the Son. But, since it is the Father who, in engendering the Son, makes this Son, in union with Himself, the principle of the Holy Ghost, the Holy Ghost comes at once from Father and Son, in this sense that He comes from the Father through the Son².

Moreover, St. Ambrose³, St. Hilary of Poitiers⁴, and,


3. De Spiritu Sancto, l. I, c. x; P. L., XVI, 733: Spiritus quoque Sanctus, cum procedit a Patre et Filio, non separatur a Patre, non separatur a Filio.

some time before them, Tertullian\(^1\), expressed this doctrine in just about the same terms.

The Graeco-Latin Conflict on the \textit{Filioque}. — Until the beginning of the seventh century, there was not a sign of dissension between the East and the West as to the procession of the Holy Ghost.

The Greeks say that the Holy Ghost comes «from the two together», or, «from the Father through the Son».

Yet, the formula «from the Father through the Son» came more and more into favor with them.

And when they wish to speak of the origin of the Holy Ghost, they do not resort to any term that presents itself; but, if they affirm that the Holy Ghost comes «from the Father», they always use the word \(\varepsilon^{\kappa} \pi \rho \nu \rho \varepsilon \upsilon \zeta \theta \iota \kappa \iota \iota\); and if they say that the Holy Ghost comes «from the Son», or «from the two together», or «from the Father through the Son», they use the word \(\pi \rho \nu \iota \varepsilon \nu \nu \iota\), or some other word. The reason for this distinction is that the Father, who begets the Son, in doing so makes the Son the co-principle, with Himself, of the Holy Ghost. The Holy Ghost comes principally, therefore, from the Father; and the word \(\varepsilon^{\kappa} \pi \rho \nu \rho \varepsilon \upsilon \zeta \theta \iota \kappa \iota \iota\) brings out this idea. Moreover, Scripture reserves this word to indicate that the Holy Ghost comes from the Father\(^2\).

The Latins, on the other hand, say that the Holy Ghost comes «from the Father and the Son», \emph{a Patre et Filio}, or, \emph{ab utroque}. They are acquainted with the Greek formula «from the Father through the Son», which they translate: \emph{A Patre per Filium}, and which they are willing to identify with the formula \emph{ab utroque}.

But whether they wish to say that the Holy Ghost comes

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1. \textit{Adversus Praxeam}, c. \textit{viii}; \textit{P. L.}, II, 164: \textit{Tertius enim est Spiritus a Deo Filio, sicut tertius a radice, fructus ex frutice. El tertius a fonte, rivus ex flumine. Et tertius a sole, apex ex radio.}

2. \textit{Jn.}, xv, 26.
from the Father or from the Son, they use only the verb *procedere*.

Moreover, the Councils of Toledo, beginning in 447, assert, in their professions of faith, the procession from the Father and the Son, *Filioque*. The introduction of this formula in the *Credo* sung by the faithful was but a step farther.

So, if there was until the VIIth century, perfect understanding between the Greeks and the Latins on the question of the procession of the Holy Ghost, it was not because there had long been wanting something on both sides to quarrel about. It was inevitable that some day or other the ill-disposed should take advantage of those disagreements.

Difficulties first arose about the year 650. Pope St. Martin had just condemned, in the Lateran council (649), all the Greek heresies and, in particular, Monothelism, which was much in favor at Constantinople. Following this, as we learn from St. Maximus, in a letter to the priest Marinus, « they of the Queen City », that is Constantinople, picked up two passages from the Synodic of the Holy Father. The first of these was about the Trinity. They reproached him for having said that the Holy Ghost « *proceeds from the Father and the Son* » 1. The incident appears to have been but trivial.

But, in the year 809, the atmosphere became again clouded and this time the storm broke. There were some Latin monks at Constantinople who incorporated the *Filioque* in their chant; and, for this, certain Greek monks upbraided them. A battle ensued. The Latins carried their protest to Pope Leo III, and they declared that their custom was legitimate and in use even at the court of Charlemagne. The Pope heard their protest and wrote the eastern Churches a letter in which he twice repeated that the Holy Ghost proceeds

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from the Father and the Son. At the same time Charlemagne called a council at Aix-la-Chapelle for the purpose of discussing the question. The *Filioque* was there solemnly proclaimed. Nevertheless, Leo III, while approving the doctrine of this council without reserve and ordaining that it be taught, blamed them for having introduced this formula in the Creed. He feared that this would provoke discussions between the Latins and the Greeks. But right or wrong, the logic of the matter prevailed and the *Filioque* was still sung. In 1014, the Emperor St. Henry II asked Pope Benedict VIII have it sung also in Rome. The Pope consented.

The Introduction of the *Filioque* into the Symbol of Nicæa and Constantinople Legitimate. — The doctrine of the procession of the Holy Ghost from the Father and the Son has always been a point of faith, in the eastern as well as in the western church. It was contained by implication in the Creed of Constantinople. If not expressed in explicit terms, this was only to avoid causing disputes which were properly judged to be useless and dangerous. Nevertheless, it was only proper that, on such a fundamental article, the Creed should be rendered as precise as possible. When the Latins saw that the Greeks attached excessive importance to what they considered a question of mere form, what they had looked upon as only fitting they now regarded as strict duty. Every precaution was taken not to offend the Greeks; but when it had become evident that the question of words threatened to develop into formal heresy, they came out boldly with their declaration. The council of Florence (1438) declared that the introduction of the *Filioque* was both lawful and reasonable.

1. See the genuine details of this long dispute in Th. de Régnon, *Études sur la Très sainte Trinité*, Étude XVIII.

SECTION III

St. Thomas’ Theology.

The distinguishing Feature of the Second Procession. — We see in our rational soul not only the act of the intellect, whereby we understand, but also the act of the will, whereby we love. And, observes St. Thomas, just as, through our intellectual concepts, the object known is present to our intellect, so, through love, the object loved is present, so to speak, to him who loves.

But, can we compare the procession of the Holy Ghost to love, as we compared the generation of the Son to thought? The Angelic Doctor answers that we can. For, on the one hand, there is nothing to which we can compare the divine processions but the immanent actions that make up the intellectual life of man; and, on the other hand, the Sacred Scriptures speak of the Holy Ghost as the term of love, just as they represent the Son as the Word, that is, as the term of thought. Hence are all the names given the Holy Ghost indicative of love. The Spirit is the Consoler, the Gift; His symbol is fire, and even His name, which is used of material things to designate the breath or the wind, conveys the idea of impulsion, of motion. Now it is characteristic of love to drive, to draw the will to the object loved. Hence must we admit in the divine essence the procession of love as well as that of the Word.

1. Sum. theol., 1º, q. xxxvii, a. 1: Sic ut enim ex hoc quod aliquis rem aliquam intelligit, provenit quaedam intellectualis conceptio rei intellectæ in intelligenti, quæ dicitur verbum; ita ex hoc quod aliquis rem aliquam amat, provenit quaedam impressio (ut ita loquar) rei amatæ in affectu amantis, secundum quam amatum dicitur esse in amante, sicut et intellectum in intelligenti; ita quod cum aliquid se ipsum intelligat, et amat, est in se ipso non solum per identitatem rei, sed etiam est intellectum in intelligenti, et amatum in amante.

2. Sum. theol., 1º, q. xxvii, a. 3.
The Procession of Love *ab Utroque*. — To love, says St. Thomas, is nothing else than to emit the breath of love, just as to speak is to produce a word, to bloom is to put forth flowers¹. God speaks forth Himself and the product is His Word. God loves Himself, too. But He loves Himself in speaking forth Himself; love springs forth together from God who speaks, or the Father, and from the spoken Word, or the Son. In other words, God, in thinking Himself, conceives His Word, who is at the same time the reason of all things that God thinks, and, consequently, God thinks all things when He thinks Himself; and from this Word, He proceeds to love all things and Himself. As has been well said: «The monad engendered the monad, and it reflected its own spirit upon itself².» It is then but one and the same love which proceeds from the Father and the Son as the terminal expansion of the divine life. God does not love Himself through the Holy Ghost; but, in loving Himself, He breathes forth love, just as the tree, in blooming, puts forth flowers³.

The Procession of Love is not Generation. — From the very fact that we think of something, as we have said after St. Thomas, there comes to the one thinking a certain conception of the thing thought, and this conception we call word. So too, when we love something, there is produced in the affective faculty a certain impression of the thing loved, so that we can say that the thing loved is present to the lover like the thing thought to the thinker. There is this

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1. *Sum. theol.*, 1°, q. xxxvii, a. 2.
3. Dante, the theologian poet of the xivth century sums up that wonderful doctrine in the following stanza of his great poem:

*O Light eterne, sole in thyself that dwellest,*

*Sole knowest thyself, and known unto thyself,*

*And knowing, lovest and smil'est on thyself.*

*Cf. La Divina Commedia, Del Paradiso*, canto xxxiii.
difference, however, between the intellect and the will. The intellect thinks only when the thing thought of is in the intellect in its own likeness; whereas the will does not will in that it has a certain likeness of the thing willed, but in that it tends to the thing willed. Hence it is that the intellectual procession comes about by likeness; it has, as a result, the character of generation, since everything that generates begets its like. But the procession which we compare to the willing does not come about by likeness though it entails it; it has not, then, the character of generation, but rather of inclination, like the motion which impels the lover to the object loved. This procession has, then, no special name.

Conclusion: Circumincension. — We have learned from the exposition of the divine processions that God the Father is nothing but He who begets the Son; the Son nothing but He who is eternally begotten of the Father; the Holy Ghost nothing but He who results eternally from the Father begetting the Son. Hence, the three divine persons are so related that they could neither exist nor be conceived of unless together. Likewise, two relative terms can neither

1. Sum. theol., 1, q. xxvii, a. 4 : Processio amoris in divinis non debet dici generatione. Ad eujus evidentiam sciendum est, quod hoc est differentiation inter intellectum et voluntatem, quod intellectus sit in actu per hoc quod res intellecta est in intellectu secundum suam similitudinem ; voluntas autem sit in actu, non per hoc quod aliqua similitudo voliit sit in voluntate, sed ex hoc quod voluntas habet quandam inclinationem in rem volitam. Processio igitur quae attenditur secundum rationem intellectus, est secundum rationem similitudinis ; et in tantum potest habere rationem generationis, quia omne generans generat sibi simile. Processio autem quae attenditur secundum rationem voluntatis, non consideratur secundum rationem similitudinis, sed magis secundum rationem impellentis, et moventis in aliquid. Et ideo quod procedit in divinis per modum amoris, non procedit ut genitum, vel ut filius, sed magis procedit ut spiritus : quo nomine quxdam vitalis motio et impulsio designatur, prout aliquis ex amore dicitur moveri, vel impelli ad aliquid faciendum.

2. Ibid., ad 3°.
exist nor be conceived of apart. Since the property of each person is its relation of origin, each by his very nature is drawn to the utmost towards another besides himself. None of the persons, then, can abide outside of the others, for the very nature of his being takes him continually into the others; the divine persons dwell within one another by virtue of real reciprocal irruption. This circulation of the Father to the Son and of the Son to the Father, of the Father and the Son to the Holy Ghost and of the Holy Ghost to the Father and the Son, is what the Greeks have called perichoresis, περιχώρησις, and the Latins circumincessio, circumincessio.

1. The word περιχώρησις does not seem to have been applied to the Trinity e before St John Damascene. The Schoolmen of the xvth century thought they could translate it by the word circuminsessio (from the verb circuminsidere, synonym of inhabitare). Instead of designating by circuminsession the reciprocal relations of the hypostases, which result from their very nature, they rather understand the reciprocal inexistence of the three persons, which results from their consubstantiality. Petavius protested against that mistranslation. Cf. De Trinitate, l. iv, c. xvi, 2-4. We propose to translate the word περιχώρησις by the Latin circumincedere, from circumincedere, the active sense of which seems to correspond better to the Greek. See Tanqueray, Synopsis, De Deo trino, 650.
CHAPTER IV

THE DIVINE MISSIONS

After examining the dogma of the existence of one God in three persons and the dogma of the divine processions, we know as much as can be known about the mystery of the interior life of the Trinity, *vita Dei ad intra*. After that comes the question of the life of God as regards the world, and in an especial manner, as regards man, *vita Dei ad extra*. The exterior life of the Son and of the Holy Ghost constitutes what is called the divine missions, or more exactly, the missions of the divine persons; and, on this point, the doctrine is summed up in the following formula: «The Father sends the Son into the world; the Holy Ghost is sent by the Father and the Son. »

This chapter will be divided into two brief articles, the first of which will be devoted to the divine missions, and the second to some secondary questions relative to the divine missions.

ARTICLE I.

The Divine Missions.

Object and Division of this Article. — It is proper to describe first the missions of the Holy Ghost; then we shall take up the missions of the Son; and finally, we shall determine, by way of conclusion, the notion of divine missions.
The Mission of the Holy Ghost described. — The divine life starting in the Father and the Son at the same time extends to the Holy Ghost. As the Greek Fathers put it, the Holy Ghost is the term, the limit of the divine life, τέλος. But this life stretches out in time and space to touch our souls and animate them with the life of the Trinity. And since the Holy Ghost is the term of the divine life, it must be He that is the principle, or source, of the new life in our souls, παντοτές, or, so to speak, the finger of God, ἐξωτερικός τοῦ θεοῦ.

But as the Son is so intimately related to the Father, so much so that He cannot exist without the Father, so, too, the Holy Ghost is so intimately related to the Father and the Son as to be unable to exist without the Father and the Son. Hence, through the Holy Ghost, the Father and the Son act in our souls. Nevertheless, the creation and conservation of the life of grace, in the soul of the faithful, is still an act more especially attributable to the Holy Ghost than to the other two persons, in this sense that the Holy Ghost, the term of the divine life, is the person that is immediately concerned as the principle of the external works of the Trinity, and, consequently, the immediate principle of our sanctification. The Holy Ghost who proceeds from the Father and the Son, inasmuch as He enters the soul of the faithful there to create and preserve grace and to bestow upon the soul other gifts, is said to be sent by the Father and the Son. We call this action the mission of the Holy Ghost¹.

This doctrine of the Greek Fathers on the mission of the Holy Ghost was taken up by Petarau, and, it seems to us, somewhat exaggerated. He represents sanctification by the Holy Ghost as a function so peculiar to the Holy Ghost as to render it a property². But such a conclusion is contrary

1. Cf. Th. de Régnon, op. cit., Etude XXVI.
2. De Trinitate, l. VIII, c. vi, 8: Jam qux dubitandi causx supra expostitx sunt a nobis, cas explicare nullux est labor. Horum primum illud fuit, t. i.
to the following principle universally accepted in theology: « All the operations of the Trinity ad extra are common to the three persons."}

The Greek Fathers, it seems to us, understand it somewhat differently. They maintain that the Holy Ghost is more especially the principle of our sanctification because, in the revelation that has been given to us of the mystery of God, the Holy Ghost is represented as the term of the divine life, and in a manner turned towards men and, consequently, the immediate principle of all ad extra works, and He through whom the Father and the Son intervene. In the work of our sanctification, the Father and the Son act indeed, but through the Holy Ghost.

The Schoolmen could never be brought to acknowledge that the work of sanctification of souls is a special attribute of the Holy Ghost. For them, the work of sanctifying souls pertains to all three persons equally. It is quite true, they admit, that in the Sacred Scriptures, the work of sanctifying souls is always ascribed to the Holy Ghost; but this is because of the relation that exists between that office of life-giver and the personal, or distinctive name of the Holy Ghost. It is a question of attribution resting upon mere appropriation.

The Missions of the Son described. — Every time, then, that the Holy Ghost comes into our souls to sanctify them,

quod ceteræ personæ perinde commorari dicuntur in sanctis, ac Spiritus ipse. Quis hoc negat? Sed interest quo id modo fiat. Non enim idem valet in cunctis. Pater ecce atque Spiritus Sanctus in homine Christo non minus manet quam Verbum; sed dissimilis est τῆς ἐνπαρθένου modus ; Verbum enim præter communem illum quem cum reliquis eundem habet, peculiarem alterum oblitet, ut sit, forma instar, divinum vel potius Deum facientis, et hunc Filium. Quippe non absolute et infinite Deus est, quod ipsius essentia ὁμοιωτὸς conjunctio cita personam efficeret ; sed hic Deus, hoc est Filius est, quod sola Filii hypostasis, tanquam forma præstare potest. Sic in homine justo tres utique personæ habitant. Sed solus Spiritus Sanctus quasi forma est sanctificans, et adoptivum reddens sui communicatione filium.

He brings there the Father and the Son; or, to put it more concretely, He comes as the envoy of the Son who, in turn, is sent by the Father who is not sent, since He does not proceed from any other person. To each mission of the Holy Ghost, then, there corresponds a parallel mission of the Son and a coming of the Father.

But this is not the principal mission of the Son. His mission is realised especially in the Incarnation. In this mystery, the Word, sent by the Father, takes into Himself our human nature hypostatically. The features of this mission are especially remarkable. It is a hypostatic mission viz., its term is the union of the human nature with the divine in the hypostasis of the Word. It is also called a substantial mission, because the hypostasis which serves as a bond of union between the two natures is a substantial property; while, on the other hand, the other missions of the Son and those of the Holy Ghost are accidental missions.

The Divine Missions defined. — From this description of the mission of the Holy Ghost and of the Son, it is easy to arrive at the following notion of divine mission: *Processio unius personae ab alia, quatenus concipitur relationem habere ad terminum temporalem.* Hence mission comprises a twofold relation: the one of the person sent to the person or the two persons conjointly sending; and the other of the person sent to the creature to whom He is sent.

The mission may be either visible or invisible, which depends upon whether or not it is accompanied by any exterior sign. The mission of the Holy Ghost in the soul which it sanctifies is invisible; that of the Holy Ghost coming down upon the Apostles on Pentecost is visible. This visible mission either only manifests the effect of grace already produced, and then it is said to be purely representative, as, for example, the appearance of the Holy Ghost under the form of a dove at the baptism of the Savior; or the visible mission actually produces grace, and then it is said
to be both representative and active. And again, the mission is said to be either accidental or substantial, i.e., hypostatic, according to whether it has for its term the purely accidental union of a divine person with man, or a hypostatic union of this same divine person.

**ARTICLE II**

Some Secondary Questions about Persons and Missions.

Object and Division of this Article. — In this article we shall endeavor to see what is meant by the expressions: *notions* in the Trinity, and *properties*, and *names*, of the divine persons.

Notions of the Divine Persons. — By notions of the divine persons we mean the characteristics peculiar to each person. Thus inascibility and paternity are the two notions of the Father.

Filiation is the note of the Son. Active Spiration, by which the Father and the Son put forth the Holy Ghost, is a note common to both Father and Son. Passive Spiration, by which the Holy Ghost is put forth, pertains to the Holy Ghost. There are, then, five notions. Such of these as constitute person are called *notional acts*.

Attributes of the Divine Persons. — Besides the notions which belong to each individual person, there are attributes which belong to all three of them. But owing to the special relation, — either real or logical — they bear to one person in particular, they are attributed to that person. For example, the sanctification of souls is related in a special manner to the person of the Holy Ghost; consequently it is appropriated to Him. So too, the works of Christ, strictly divine, and hence called *Θεερπεπξη*, that is, works which are beyond the scope of Christ's merely human nature and
can be attributed only to God, such as the miracles, bear special relation to the person of the Son; and they are consequently appropriated to Him. For the same reason, the works of power, such as the Creation, are appropriated to the Father. We must not confuse the strictly divine operations of Christ with those which He performed as God-man, called Θεογνής, such as His Redemption of the world by the death on the Cross. Such operations are proper to the Incarnate Word.

Names of the Divine Persons. — The divine names either designate the notions of the persons, and then they are called proper names; or they designate only attributes, and then they are called appropriated names.
CHAPTER V

THE AGREEMENT BETWEEN FAITH AND REASON ON THE MYSTERY OF THE MOST HOLY TRINITY.

Objective truth is reality itself. Subjective truth is, in so far as it corresponds to it, the knowledge of this reality.

Now, when it is question of objective truth known through revelation, the human mind may be in one of two principal states:

Either the truth which man knows by revelation, is a truth which, on the one hand, he would have been unable to discover unaided, but which, on the other hand, once it is revealed, he is able to understand. Such, for example, is the truth that the Catholic Church is to be ruled by a supreme head, the vicar of Jesus Christ. These truths are called mysteries of the second order.

Or the truth which man knows by revelation, is a truth which not only he would have been unable to discover, but which moreover, when once revealed, He is incapable of understanding fully. Such, for example, are the three great mysteries of the Most Holy Trinity, of the Incarnation, and of the Redemption. Such are called mysteries of the first order.

In speaking of the agreement between faith and reason, we have in mind mysteries of the first order. Agreement between faith and reason presupposes that the mind recognizes in the mystery its true characteristics.

Then, there are three demands which reason can legitimately make. These are:
That the authority upon which faith in the mystery rests be well established.

That it be shown that the mystery is not opposed to the principles of reason or to truths duly ascertained.

That the mystery be so explained as not to leave it completely unintelligible.

Is it possible to show agreement between faith and reason on the mystery of the most holy Trinity?

The Blessed Trinity a Mystery of the First Order. — « We accept a truth of faith », said Abelard, « not because God has taught it, but because our reason is convinced. » On the subject of the blessed Trinity, he taught that « it is a truth which all men naturally believe ». Now, to put forth mysteries solely in the name of reason was equivalent to denying them. So, St. Bernard wrote to Pope Innocent II: « Peter Abelard is trying to destroy the merits of Christian faith when he pretends that he can, by human reason alone, know all that God is. He sweeps the heavens on high and the depths below. But, for him, there is nothing hidden, neither in the depths of hell nor in the high heavens. » And in his letter to the bishops and the Roman Cardinals, he says: « The faith of the simple is made fun of, the secrets of God are disgorged, rash disputes on the most exalted topics are stirred up, slurs are cast upon the Fathers because they judged it best to let certain questions lie quiet rather than try to solve them... Thus human reason usurps the right to all things and leaves nothing to faith. It sets upon what is beyond it, it scrutinizes what it could not well bear to look upon, it throws itself recklessly upon things divine, it violates rather than

1. Introd. ad. Theol., l. II, 3; P. L., CLXXVIII: Nec quia Deus id dixerat creditur, sed quia hoc sic esse convincit, recipitur.
3. Epist. cxxx; P. L., CLXXXII, 357.
discloses sacred things; the mysteries closed and sealed from on high, it does not open, but rends them asunder. In fine, everything that it cannot explain, it declares nothing and scorns to believe 1. »

Unlike Hugh of St. Victor, who succeeded in withdrawing himself from the influence of Abelard and in always preserving orthodox doctrine, Richard of St. Victor underwent the influence of the rationalists of his day. At the beginning of his treatise on the Trinity, he writes: « The object of this work is to bring to bear upon questions of faith, so far as God will grant us, reasons not only probable, but even necessary 2 ». And further on: « Thus », he says, « we have proved the plurality of the divine persons by reasons so clear that it seems one must be insane to contradict a demonstration so evident 3 ». This doctrine was taken up again and intensified by Raymond Lully, at the end of the XIIIth century, and by Günther in the XIXth. According to the latter, reason can, and will in the future, explain all our dogmas. Hence, there are no absolute mysteries; for, under the pressure of reason, which is going forward by leaps and bounds every day, humanity will increase continually in the understanding of its faith until it has mastered it in all its details. Aiming particularly at this error, the Vatican council declared that the principal mysteries of faith can never be understood or proved by reason alone, no matter how fully developed it may be, since they are essentially obscure 4.

Without going so far as his precursors, Rosmini contended that the existence of the mystery of the Trinity, once

1. Epist. clxxxviii.
2. De Trinitate, l. i, c. iv; P. L., CXCVI.
3. Ibid., l. III, c. v.
4. Denz., 1796 : Divina enim mysteria suopte natura intellectum creatum sic excedunt, ut etiam revelatione tradita et fide suscepta ipsius tamen fidei velamine contecta et quadam quasi caligine obvoluta maneant, quamdiu in hac mortali vila peregrinamur a Domino.
revealed, was susceptible of being demonstrated by reason, by negative and indirect argument, it is true, yet in such a way as to entitle it to be numbered among scientific truths. This opinion was condemned by the decree of December 14th, 1887 1.

From the exposition of these errors and the condemnations launched against them, it is clear that it would be contrary to faith to maintain that mysteries of the first order, and especially the mystery of the Blessed Trinity, can be known and demonstrated by reason alone.

This doctrine has, moreover, the sanction of Tradition. As early as the second century, St. Irenaeus wrote: «The generation of the Son no one knows except the Father who begets Him and the Son who is begotten. And, since this generation is unspeakable, one cannot be in full possession of his reason to undertake to explain 2 ». St. Gregory Nazianzene writes, in one of his discourses: «You know that there is generation in God? Be not curious to know the «how» of the thing. You know that the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Father? Do not tire yourself out trying to learn the «how» of it. If you do not really know your own self, if you cannot understand the things attested to by your senses, how can you expect to know exactly God, to know what He is, and how great He is? What folly 3! » St. Cyril of Jerusalem is no less explicit in recognizing man’s limitations on this score. «Take it upon faith», he says, «that God has a Son, and do not worry yourself about how this can be. For, in vain will you seek; you will never know!

1. Denz., 1915: Revelato mysterio SS. Trinitatis, potest ipsius existentia demonstrari argumentis mere speculativis, negativis quidem et indirectis, hujus modi tamen ut per ipsa veritas illa ad philosophicas disciplinas revocetur, atque flat propositio scientifica sicut celer: si enim ipsa negaretur, doctrina theosophica puræ rationis non modo incompleta maneret, sed etiam omni ex parte absurditatis scalens annihilaretur.
3. Or. XX, 11; P. G., XXXV, 178.
Tell me first what is He who engenders and then you can

tell me what is He whom He engendered. If you cannot

understand the nature of Him who begets, do not wear

yourself out scrutinizing the mode of this generation. It

should be enough for your piety to know that God has,

by nature, an only Son, the only begotten one 1 ». Let us

see, too, what is said on this question by St. Hilary of Poitiers,

who shared, with St. Athanasius, the honor of fighting

Arianism and suffering for his faith: « The generation of the

Son is the secret of the Father and the Son. If there be any

one who blames the weakness of his intellect for his inabili-
ty to understand this mystery, though he can understand

the individual words, Father and Son, he will feel only the

more afflicted to learn that I, too, am laboring under the

same difficulty. Truly, I neither know, nor do I inquire,

but, nevertheless, I console myself; for even the archangels

are ignorant, the angels have not heard, the prophets have

not understood, the apostles did not question, the Son him-

self has not said a word about this matter. Stop, then, your

complaining 2 ». Shortly before, the holy Doctor said:

« It is the wickedness of heretics and blasphemers that

compels us to do things that are forbidden, to climb inac-

cessible peaks, and to discuss ineffable subjects. Faith alone

ought to be enough to lead us to do what is prescribed, that

is, to adore the Father, and likewise, to venerate the Son,

and to fill our souls with the Holy Ghost. But, alas, we are

compelled to apply our humble language to mysteries that

are beyond all tongues. Owing to the fault of others, we

ourselves are led into the pitfall of exposing to the hazard

of human speech mysteries that should have been concealed

within the religion of our hearts 3 ». Declarations such as

these are to be found in the works of nearly all the Fathers.

St. Thomas, then, summarized well the opinions of Tradition

1. Cat. XI, 19; P. G., XXXIII, 713-716.
3. Ibid., 2.
when he wrote: « It is impossible to arrive at the knowledge of the Trinity of divine persons by means of our unaided reason. He that endeavors to prove the trinity of persons by reason alone, sins against faith in a twofold manner: first, by lowering the dignity of its object, since it is clearly seen that it is grappling with invisible realities far beyond the scope of reason; and, secondly, by hindering its expansion. To try to establish the truths of faith by arguments that are not conclusive is but to expose these truths to the raillery of infidels. For, they will, of course, think that such are the reasons for our belief. Truths of faith should never be proved but by the argument of authority, — at any rate, when it is question of those who recognize the principle of authority; and, as for the others, it is enough to show that these truths are not contrary to the principles of reason or to duly acquired truths ».

Faith in mysteries rests upon sound authority. — All faith rests upon the authority of God, who reveals, and of His Church, which proposes the doctrine as revealed by God. The proof of this authority is given in the treatises on the True Religion, the Church, and the Sources of Theology. All we need do is remember that the authority of God will not be brought into question by any one who believes in the existence of a personal God. The proofs for the authority of the Church are mainly of the historical order. Faith in this authority comes practically as a result of the first grace of faith which is given together with the presentation of the motives of credibility.

Once the authority of the Church is admitted, all that remains is to seek, in Scripture and Tradition, the object of faith. This is work of a historic nature; but it should be performed under the guidance of the Church whose teaching authority is proved by history.

1. Sum. theol., I, q. xxxii, a. 1.
The Mystery of the Most Holy Trinity is not opposed to the principles of reason. — The mystery of the Blessed Trinity, it will be objected, is opposed to the principle of identity. For things identical to one and the same thing are identical to each other. But the three divine persons are identical to one and the same thing, viz., the divine substance. Hence, they must be identical to each other.

Now, it will be urged, such is not the mystery of the Trinity, since, in the Trinity, the three persons, though really identical to one and the same divine substance, are, nevertheless, really distinct from one another. This mystery is, therefore, contrary to the principle of identity.

To answer this objection, we will distinguish the minor of the first argument. It is true that the three divine persons are identical to one and the same substance, in this sense that they have but one and the same divine substance; yet they are virtually distinct. This virtual distinction rests, not solely on the weakness of the human mind, which, in its inability to grasp a subject in its entirety, takes it in two or three phases; but it rests upon the infinite perfection of the divine substance. The substance of man is finite, and hence can exist in but a single subsistence, or hypostasis; but the divine substance, on the contrary, is infinite, and by the very reason of its infinitude is capable of existing in three subsistences, or hypostases.

Moreover, we must remember that the terms and ideas made use of in speaking of the divine reality, though chosen and formulated by the Spirit of revelation, are borrowed from created nature; hence, they are only analogical. Their unsatisfactory and imperfect side marks their human features; but they have other features which allow them to be reconciled with the infinite perfection of God and herein they convey the mystery.

The mystery of the Trinity is not opposed to truths duly acquired. — If there is one truth in philosophy better
established than any other, it is, it will be objected, that personality, or the Ego, can be nothing but consciousness, that is, that act of reason by which we know all the phenomena that take place in us at the moment they happen. This act is universal, since it extends to all phenomena that take place in us; it is necessary, since without it we would be unaware even of our existence, which is equivalent to saying that we would not exist; it is the central act to which all operations in us must be finally referred; hence, it is the constituent act of our human person.

To admit, then, of three persons in God would be to admit that there are three consciousnesses in Him. But, such a conclusion is impossible. It would be opposed to philosophy as well as to theology.

And first, to philosophy. In truth, consciousness must, by its very nature, be universal, and consequently exclusive of any other consciousness.

Secondly, to theology. For, consciousness is the very thing that constitutes the essence of God, at least, in so far as we know Him. To say that there are in Him three consciousnesses, would be equal to saying that there are three essences, and, consequently, three gods.

How are we to meet this difficulty?

Rational theology recognizes but one consciousness in God, and yet it speaks of three persons in Him. This very theology declares that Christ had a human consciousness, and yet it holds that there was no human person in Christ. Hence, it cannot be consciousness that constitutes person, at least in God.

Moreover, is it true that personality consists in consciousness? This assertion rests upon the authority of Descartes, who says that the essence of the soul is consciousness, or thought. But it has always been much questioned. Nowadays, the tendency is to see personality not in the consciousness, or in the center of cognitive activity, but beyond consciousness in a center of activity whence proceeds and
whither reverts all life of intellect and will. This is not a complete return to the old doctrine of personality, which is the one we hold. Much less is it the doctrine of Descartes. Suffice it to say that the supposedly duly acquired truth which was raised as an objection against us is well nigh considered erroneous.

The Mystery of the Blessed Trinity is not entirely obscure. — The mystery of the Trinity could not, as we have already said, be arrived at by the unaided reason. And once revealed, reason cannot make it the object of rational demonstration: reason cannot fathom its depths.

But does this mean that the mystery is altogether obscure? Not at all. Cause always leaves its stamp upon the effect; and the world, the work of the three divine persons, retains the image of its cause. We can, then, get some idea of the Trinity from the marks it has left in the Creation. These resemblances, very faint, indeed, are called natural analogies.

Besides that, the Holy Ghost has vouchsafed to give us a glimpse of this mystery through revelation. He has taught us that we must distinguish God the Father, God the Son, and God the Holy Ghost. The Son, we have been shown, is the Word of God; the Holy Ghost is always spoken of by some name indicative of love. This view of the mystery rests upon ideas and terms borrowed from created things, and is, therefore, analogical. But the elements that make it up were chosen by the Holy Ghost; the order of its development is the effect of the spirit of God. And besides, it is the closest possible analogy to God; it is called analogy explicitly revealed, essential analogy, and fundamental analogy.

By analyzing the data of revelation, we arrive at other analogies the nearer to God in proportion as they cling to revelation. These we will call analogies implicitly revealed.

In this way we first get our concept that the second person proceeds from the first by way of real generation, and, consequently by the communication of the divine substance,
in such a way that the second person is the substantial image of the first.

We see, too, that the third person proceeds from the Father and the Son as from a single principle, and we understand, at least negatively, that this mode of procession is not generation, since the third person is not the Son.

Again, we see that the unity between the three persons is not specific, as between creatures, but numerical; and that, consequently, the distinction between persons is not one of absolute substance but of relations, as expressed by the names of Father, Son, and Holy Ghost.

In Holy Writ, the Son is called the Word of God; the Holy Ghost is called the Love of the Father and the Son. If we try to study the procession of the Word and the procession of Love by comparing these with the immanent operations of the intellect and will which constitute our intellectual life, we shall arrive at mixed analogies, the most exalted attainable to the human mind. We shall be enabled to see that the Word results from the knowledge God has of Himself from all eternity. But God also loves Himself; He loves Himself through His knowledge. Love springs forth at once from the God who knows Himself, or the Father, and the God who is known, or the Word. The term of this conjoint love of Father and Son is the Holy Ghost.

Reason, then, working upon natural analogies, revealed analogies, or mixed analogies, finally succeeds in building up a certain intellectual representation of the mystery of the Trinitarian life. This representation, no doubt, cannot serve to demonstrate the existence of this mystery; nor does it permit us to fathom the depths of divine life. Nevertheless, it gives us a certain idea of the mystery; and the net result is that we find that the mystery is not contrary to reason 1.

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1. Cf. Franzelin, De Deo Trino, thes. XVIII: Sine dubio in spiritu creato potest reperiri analogia aliqua, secundum quam supposta ac proposita revelatione intelligamus aliquatenus, quid si nobis credendum.... *At lan*
tum abest, ut ea possit esse medium demonstrationis, ut analogia ipsa non-nisi ex revelatione reperiri et intelligi possit; idque supposita etiam revelatione non ad demonstrationem existentiam Trinitatis, sed solum ad efferman dum aliquem paulo distinctorem conceptum veritatis creditur. See also thes. XIX. DE REGNO writes: « Toutes nos théories de la Trinité sont de simples comparaisons par voies d’analogie. J’insiste sur ce point important, parce qu’il n’est pas toujours assez compris. On se persuaderait volontiers par exemple, que la théorie de saint Thomas, fondée sur les opérations de l’intelligence et de volonté, exprime les processions divines, imparfaitement sans doute, mais dans leur réalité formelle. Ce serait une erreur. Malgré toute sa beauté, cette théorie demeure dans l’ordre des analogies. » Études sur la Sainte Trinité, Étude VIII, ch. v.
PART TWO

THE INCARNATE WORD

In Our Lord Jesus Christ, the divine nature and the human nature, not intermingled, not changed, are hypostatically united in the person of the Word.

This formula enunciates fully the dogma of the fact of the Incarnation. We shall first give an exposé of that dogma.

Then, there will arise the question as to what is the person of the Word, and what the humanity to which He is united.

In the first part of our Studies, we have seen sufficiently what is the person of the Word. Hence, we shall limit ourselves now to a study of the humanity of the Savior.

Though studying a dogma so full of mystery as the fact of the Incarnation, human reason does not forfeit its right to look for the causes.

We shall consider first, then, the fact of the Incarnation of the Word, then the humanity of our Savior, and finally, the causes of the Incarnation.

Hence the division into three chapters:

Chapter I. — The Fact of the Incarnation.

Chapter II. — The Humanity of our Savior.

Chapter III. — The Causes of the Incarnation.
CHAPTER I

THE FACT OF THE INCARNATION OF THE WORD.

The doctrine of the fact of the Incarnation of the Word may be resolved into three principal propositions:

The first, a substantial statement of the fact. In our Lord Jesus Christ, we say, the divine nature and the human nature are hypostatically united in the person of the Word.

The second, the analysis of this fact. This shows that the two natures are neither intermingled nor changed.

Since this is the case, we must also attribute to the Savior a twofold will and a twofold operation. This is the object of the third proposition.

ARTICLE I

In Our Lord Jesus Christ, the divine nature and the human nature are hypostatically united to the Word of God.

Doctrine of the Church. — Substance, we said at the beginning of these Studies, is not an inert principle capable only of receiving motion. It is a principle which tends to a determinate end and directs to that end all the energies with which it is endowed or which are in its power. Now, from this view-point, we should not call it substance, but nature. Nature may, then, be defined: *Natura est substantia quatenus est principium primum seu fundamentale passionum et operationum.*
But we say that in Our Lord Jesus Christ there are two natures, the divine and the human. And we add that these two natures are united hypostatically in the hypostasis, or person, of the Word. What does this hypostatic union mean?

Two natures can be united together either accidentally or substantially. By accidental union we mean the union of two natures which tend together to the same end, each preserving its own respective form of activity; as, for example, the union of two horses hitched to the same wagon.

If the two natures are so united that they lose their respective forms of activity and take on a form of activity differing from that exercised by either of them before the union, we say that this union is substantial; as, for example, the union of the germ with the ovule, from which there results an entirely new nature.

Now substantial union may take place in three ways: by conversion, by information, or by hypostatic union. Yet, hypostatic union, as we shall see, is a substantial union in a special sense.

Substantial union by conversion, or, if you will, by assimilation, is that which we have just mentioned. The distinctive feature of this union is that the two natures which combine together are both the active causes of the union. And furthermore, the new form of activity is the result of the transformation of the two preexistent activities.

Substantial union by information is that of the human soul, which, according to the creationist hypothesis, is a spiritual principle that gets hold of the generative elements, the moment they are united. In substantial union by conversion, the activity that takes place is but the transformation of preexistent activities; whereas in the case of substantial union by information, the new activity does not result from preexistent activities, but is immediately created by God. Moreover, in the case of substantial union by conversion, the two elements that enter into combination are the active causes of the union; whereas, in the case of substantial union
by information, the preexistent elements assimilated in the phenomenon of generation are passive, — their only function is to receive the spiritual soul.

Hypostatic union is neither an accidental nor a substantial union, understood in the first or second sense.

It consists in this that the body and the soul of Christ substantially united by information made up a complete human nature which, from the very beginning, was deprived of the characteristic element of human personality, because, from that very moment, it was appropriated by the hypostasis or the person of the Word, *assumpta a persona Verbi*. From the time of its constitution, the human nature of Christ was endowed with no other personality than that of the Word. If person, as the Thomists would have it, consists in the existence of the substance, the human substance of Christ existed not of itself but by virtue of the existence of the Word.

It is easy to see how different this hypostatic union is from the substantial union by information. In the latter, the substance informed and the soul informing it are complementary of each other; since both are incomplete substances. Moreover, the informing soul is created by God at the instant it is to fulfil its function of information. In the hypostatic union, on the contrary, the human nature of Christ, deprived of its own personality, requires the person of the Word; but the person of the Word does not require human nature. And besides, though the human nature of Christ was created in time, the person of the Word exists from all eternity. Hence, we can describe hypostatic union by saying that it consists of «the union of the human nature to the person of the Word, in such a way that this human nature, in full possession of its properties, though deprived of its own personality, exists only by virtue of the existence of the Word».

1. The following is the formula employed by the Schoolmen to describe the hypostatic union: *Unio naturæ humanæ facta in persona seu hypostasi Verbi, ita ut illa natura humana omnibus proprietatibus ad hominem spectantibus*
Such — setting aside however the notion of person involved therein — was the doctrine defined in 451, by the Fathers of the council of Chalcedon: « We are unanimous in holding that there is one and the same (ἐνοχ οὐδεὶς σώματος) Son, Our Lord Jesus Christ, complete both as to his humanity and his divinity, true God and true man, composed of a body and a rational soul, of the same substance as his Father in his divinity, and in his humanity, of the same substance as ourselves, like us in all things, sin alone excepted, begotten of the Father before all time, as to his divinity, and as to his humanity, afterwards born of Mary the Virgin and Mother of God, for us and our salvation; one and the same Christ, the Son, Lord, the only Begotten in two natures (ἐνοχ οὐδεὶς σώματος), not intermingled (ἀσυνημέρους), not changed (ἀτρέπτως), not divisible (ἀδιαιρέτως), not separable (ἀγεγρατους); for the difference of the two natures is in no way compromised by their union, but the attributes of each are preserved and subsist in one and the same person and hypostasis. We do not confess, in fact (a son), divided and rent asunder into two persons, but one and the same Son, the only begotten Son, God the Logos, Our Lord Jesus Christ, who was foretold by the Prophets, who revealed himself to us, and who is represented to us in the Creed of the Fathers».

ornata, humand tamen personalitate destituta, ex nullá aliá personalitate existat nisi ex personá seu hypostasi Verbi.

1. Denz., 148. The formula of Chalcedon is equalled as to precision and clearness by none except that of the Athanasian Creed: Est ergo fides recta, ut credamus et confitemur, quia Dominus noster Jesus Christus Dei Filius, Deus et homo est. Deus est ex substantia Patris ante sæcula genitus, et homo est ex substantia matris in sæculo natus: perfectus Deus, perfectus homo, ex anima rationali et humana carne subsistens, equalis Patri secundum divinitatem, minor Patre secundum humanitatem. Qui licet Deus sit et homo, non duo, sed unus est Christus, unus autem non conversione Divinitatis in carnem, sed assumptione humanitatis in Deum, unus omnino non confusione substantiae, sed unitate personae. Nam sicul anima rationalis et caro unus est homo, ita Deus et homo unus est Christus. Denz., 40. This last sentence does not state that the Word is united to the human nature in the same
Such is the dogma of the hypostatic union. Let us seek the origin of this doctrine in the New Testament and in the Tradition of the Fathers, in order to show that the Church, in proposing it to our faith, has merely defined what was given in Revelation. Then we shall give an exposition of the Theology of the Middle Ages, whose great concern was to discover the manner in which the hypostatic union came about.

§ 1

THE NEW TESTAMENT.

General Doctrine of the Incarnation of the Word. — The narrative of the Annunciation, found at the beginning of the Gospel according to St. Matthew, and in the Gospel according to St. Luke, is manifestly a revelation of the Incarnation of the only Son of God the Father. The same doctrine is implicitly contained in all the texts of the New Testament which relate to the Divinity of Christ. But in the prologue to the Gospel of St. John, and in the second chapter of the epistle to the Philippians, there is an explicit exposition of it. These two passages not only contain an exposition of the fact of the Incarnation, but they also indicate, though in a somewhat veiled manner, the way in which this fact took place, viz., by hypostatic union. Hence the necessity for a thorough examination.

Prologue of the Gospel according to St. John. — The prologue of this Gospel sums up in a few propositions the way as the soul is united to the body; but merely that in both instances, there is a hypostatic union, union in one and the same subject, in one and the same person.

1. Mat., 1, 18-24.
entire substance of the Gospel. It is usually divided into three parts:

1. The description of the Word;
2. The birth and the mission of St. John the Baptist;
3. The Incarnation of the Word and the work of salvation.

But the whole of this doctrine serves as framework to and a light upon the great mystery which we are about to study.

The Word described. — This description is found at the beginning of the prologue:

1. In the beginning was the Word,
   And the Word was with God,
   And the Word was God.
2. The same was in the beginning with God.
3. All things were made by him:
   And without him nothing was made
   That which was made, 4. in him was life,
   And the life was the light of men,
4. And the light shineth in darkness,
   And the darkness did not comprehend it.

In this description, the Word is first considered in itself and in its relation to God. In the beginning, that is, from all eternity, was the Word. The Word was in God, literally «towards» God, that is to say, in very active relation with God. And the Word was God. To put it briefly, the Word is God of God.

After this, St. John treats of the Word in its relation to the world. Everything that was made, was made by the Word, in this sense, that everything that God created, He created through the Word.

But the Word of God is not only the intermediary in creation. At once Light and Life, it is He that communicates life and light, the life being also the light. After creating man, therefore, God gave Him also, through His Word, both
life and light. It is question here of the special gifts which God granted to His people: the Law, Revelation, and the divine protection.

And finally, the light shineth in darkness. In other words, the Word made flesh manifested Himself to the Jewish people by His doctrine and His miracles. But the darkness did not comprehend Him, did not receive Him. That is, the greater number of the Jews, hardened in sin, remained insensible to this manifestation.

This description, as we can see, offers a comprehensive view of the divine Word, who appears first in His eternal preexistence, then in His relations to the world. The latter, St. John sums up under three heads: His creative action, His manifestations in the Old Testament through the Law, through Revelation, and through the special helps given the Hebrews; His manifestation in the New Testament through the preaching of the Gospel and through His miracles.

Birth and Mission of St. John the Baptist. — The preceding description serves at the same time as a general exordium to the Gospel. This exordium is followed by an historical preface which takes up the rest of the prologue. It has been justly likened to the Gospel of the Infancy, found in St. Matthew and St. Luke. The plan, it has been pointed out, is like that of St. Luke, who draws a parallel between the birth and the mission of St. John the Baptist and that of Jesus.

Following

1. An exegetical problem is raised apropos of the last words of ἧς 3: «That was made ». The Vulgate reads: Sine ipso factum est nihil quod factum est. In ipso vita erat, whilst the majority of the Fathers read: Sine ipso factum est nihil. Quod factum est in ipso vita erat.... We give the preference to the latter and translate: «That which was made was life in him ». We explain. The ἤς 3–4 speak of the Word before the Incarnation. Now that which was made, viz., men and especially the Jewish people, had life and light in the Word, that is to say, they received through the Word the Law, revelation, a very special protection from God. Christ said in the same sense, «I am the life... every one that liveth... in me, shall not die for ever ». Cf. Jn. xi, 25–26.

2. Th. Calmes, L'Evangile selon saint Jean, pp. 100-111.
There was a man sent from God, whose name was John. He came to make known the Word, which was the Life and the Light. This man was not himself the Word. His whole mission was to point out to his contemporaries, with his finger, as it were, the Word of God. Behold, he tells them, him whom you expect.

In fact, while he was commencing his mission of witness, and telling all that he whom they awaited was in their midst, the Word, now incarnate for some years, was already preparing to manifest Himself. He was in the world, that world which He had created, the world which knew Him not. He manifested Himself to the Jewish people, with whom He had for a long time been in special relations, the Jewish people, His own people. Yet many remained perfectly insensible.
to his manifestation. All that believed in him, all — in other words — that believed that He was the Word made flesh, were rewarded: they became the children of God. They became the children of God through a generation independent of blood, independent of the flesh and carnal passion, independent of the human will; they became the children of God by a spiritual generation.

The Incarnation of the Word and His Work of Salvation. — Following the account of the birth and mission of John the Baptist, is the account of the birth, according to the flesh, and the mission of the Savior:

14. And the Word was made flesh,
And dwelt among us,
And we saw his glory,
The glory as it were of the only begotten of the Father,
Full of grace and truth.
15. John beareth witness of him,
And crieth out saying:
This was he of whom I spoke:
He that shall come after me,
Is preferred before me:
Because he was before me.
16. And of his fulness
We have all received,
And grace for grace.
17. For the Law was given by Moses;
Grace and truth came by Jesus Christ.
18. No man hath seen God at any time:
The only begotten Son
Who is in the bosom of the Father,
He hath declared him.

The Word became flesh, that is, became man, according to the expression of St. Justin: σαρκωποτηθείς ἀνθρώπος γέγονεν.¹

He dwelt among us, full of grace and truth. This means the fulness of divinity, as in the epistle to the Colossians,

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¹ I Apol., xxxii.
where St. Paul says that Christ possesses the fulness of the divinity⁴, in which, he adds in the epistle to the Ephesians, the faithful are to participate? The flesh, far from being a veil concealing His divinity, was the means of which He made use to make it accessible to mankind. We saw His glory. This glory belongs to Him in full right, since He receives it as a son receives the glory of his father.

After telling of the Incarnation of the Word and making some general remarks on the ministry of our Savior, St. John enters upon a very precise account of the beginning of the preaching of the Gospel. For the first time, John the Baptist comes forward as a witness. He proclaims that Jesus is he of whom he had said: « He that cometh after me is greater than I ». « And », continues the precursor — or perhaps the evangelist — « of his fulness we have all received ». We have partaken of this fulness at two different times and under two different forms: the first time under the form of the Law with Moses; and the second, under the form of grace and truth with Jesus Christ. The law has been abolished; now is the time for grace and truth, that is to say, for the superabundant communication of the divine life. So we have received grace for grace.

Furthermore, no man has ever seen God. But we, in seeing His only Son, His only begotten, that is, Him that possesses by way of eternal generation the fulness of the divine life, during His stay in our midst and before His return to the bosom of His Father, we have known Him.

Theological Synthesis. — The preceding commentary contains all the elements of the dogma of the Incarnation. The synthesis is easy. The eternal Word of the Father, true God of true God, begotten of the Father from all eternity, became man. Now on the one hand, He became truly man;

2. Eph., iii, 19.
for having become man, He dwelt amongst us, and made it easily possible for us to ascertain that He was truly man. And on the other hand, in becoming man, He could not cease, and in fact did not cease, being the Word of God; for, though we saw Him as man, we saw Him at the same time full of grace and truth, and possessing, in other words, the fulness of divinity, so much so, that in seeing Him, we knew God. So it is that the Word of God, without ceasing to be the Word of God, became true man. How this fact took place can be known only by an induction not explicitly contained in the text, but rigorously required by the thought which it contains. Such is the inference: « The Word of God took on a human nature which, while possessing all the other attributes of humanity, was deprived of personality, so that it could belong only to the Word ». Hence, one and the same divine person was both God and man at the same time. This kind of union is called hypostatic.

Epistle to the Philippians, Chapter II, 5-11. — The Church at Philippi was always the object of St. Paul’s special love. It was the first church founded by him in Europe. Nowhere had the Apostle met with more simplicity, more docility, more love. So, when he wrote to the Christians of that city, during the time of his captivity, that is, during the period from the year 62 to the year 64, he seems to be in no way concerned about doctrine or discipline. He gives personal news, he exhorts, encourages, consoles, and freely opens his heart to them.

Wishing, however, to give them an example of humility, he exposes, almost casually, one might think, and that in remarkably precise terms, the entire doctrine of the Incarnation. His manner adds singularly to the scope and the strength of his words. It shows, really, that this doctrine forms part of the Apostolic catechesis and belongs to those elementary articles of which no Christian could be ignorant.
Christological Text. — "Let this mind be in you, which was also in Christ Jesus; who, being in the condition of God, counted it not a prize to be on equality with God, but emptied himself, taking the condition of a servant, becoming in the likeness of men; and being found in habit as a man, he humbled himself, becoming obedient unto death, even to the death of the cross. For which cause God hath also highly exalted him, and hath given him a name which is above all names, that in the name of Jesus every knee should bow, of those that are in heaven, on earth, and under the earth: and that every tongue should confess that the Lord Jesus Christ is in the glory of God the Father."  

In order to excite the Philippians to humility, to that generous abnegation which makes us prefer the interest of others to our own, St. Paul cites the example of our Savior. Let this mind be in you, he tells them, which was also in Christ Jesus. When he wishes to stimulate them to the renunciation of self, the Apostle holds up to them the fact of the Incarnation. And this is the fact. Christ, being in the condition of God, possessing therefore the divine nature, being God, did not regard equality with God as prey or

1. Following is the Greek text, punctuated after the critical remarks of Fr. Prat (cf. Théologie de saint Paul, p. 440-441, note): Τούτο φρονεῖτε ἐν ὑμῖν ὑπὲρ ὑμᾶς, ὅτε ἐν μορφῇ Θεοῦ ὑπάρχειν ὑπὸ ἄρπαχμον ὑγῆσατο τὸ εἶναι ἵα Θεόν, ἀλλὰ ἐκατόν ἐκένωσεν μορφήν δούλου λαθὼν, ὑπὸ ὁμοίωματι ἀνθρώπων γενόμενος καὶ σχήματι εὑρεθῆς ὡς ἀνθρώπος: ἐπαύγων ἐκατόν γενόμενος ὑπῆκος μέχρι βαθαντοῦ, βαθαντοῦ δὲ σταυροῦ: διὸ καὶ ὁ Θεός αὐτὸν ὑπερψήθη, καὶ ἐγκαίρως αὐτῷ τὸ ὄνομα τὸ ὑπὲρ παν ὄνομα, ἣν ἐν τῷ ὀνόματι Ιησοῦ πάν γόνη κάμψῃ ἐπουρανίων καὶ ἐπιγείων καὶ καταγυμνών, καὶ πᾶσα γλώσσα ἐξομολογήτηται δι᾽ θυσίας Ἰησοῦς Χριστὸς εἰς δόξαν Θεοῦ πατρὸς.

2. In St. Paul's phraseology, while σχῆμα designates something superficial, movable, instable (cf. I Cor., vii, 31; — Rom., xii, 2; — II Cor., xi, 13-14), μορφή designates something deep and intimate different from, but inhering to nature (cf. Rom., viii, 29; — Gal., iv, 19; — II Cor., iii, 18; — Phil., iii, 19). This meaning of μορφή is the only one which fits Phil., ii, 6-7. For evidently the phrase μορφή Θεοῦ is in correlation to μορφή δούλου and consequently must be explained in the light of the latter. Now a servant's nature is not easily conceivable, whilst a servant's condition or state exhibits a clear meaning. This servant's condition (μορφή δούλου) is inhering to and in separable from a human
booty, to be seized upon eagerly for fear that a moment's abandonment will entail its loss.

What is this equality with God? Most likely, one of honor. This seems, indeed, to conform best to the text. For, it is certain, that in the expression ὁ γὰρ ἄφταγμαν ἡγήσατο τὸ ἐξαν ἰς Θεῷ, ἰς is adverbial, and not adjectival, and does not signify directly « to be equal to God », but « to be on equality with him, on the same level as he is ».

So, Christ, being in the condition of God, and consequently possessing the divine nature, being God, did not seize with avidity upon the equality of honor proper to his condition. On the contrary, he emptied himself. It is quite evident, if we follow the line of thought, that this emptying refers to that which has just been given, as an object to which Christ did not attach himself with avidity, that is, to the equality of treatment. He stripped himself of this equality

nature; it is possible only in a human nature, and implies it always. Therefore the phrase μορφὴ Ἄνγκω must mean here condition of God, but a condition which implies divine nature, quæ connotat naturam divinam as the Schoolmen would say. Cf. J. H. Beelen, Com. in epist. ad Phil.

1. The Greek word ἄφταγματί may be active or passive; in other words, it may mean robbery, or prey or booty to be eagerly seized upon. The Latins have taken the active sense and translate thus: « Being in the form of God, he thought it not robbery to be equal with God; but however, he emptied himself taking the form of a slave. » In other words, though the Word could not see any usurpation in his being equal to God, since he was in the form of God, consubstantial with the Father, still the consciousness of his grandeur did not prevent him from emptying himself. Most of the Greek Fathers have preferred the passive sense. The latter interpretation, according to Fr. Plat (op. cit., p. 444) seems preferable on account of the following four reasons. — 1. The authority of the Greek Fathers who are better judges of the meaning of a Greek sentence; 2. The context which implies rather a lesson of humility than a direct affirmation of Christ's dignity; 3. The meaning of ἄφταγμαν ἡγήσατο as given by the lexicon; 4. The grammatical rules which seem to be better kept if we give to ἰς ἀλὰ the sense of « but » instead of « however ». See J. Labourt, Notes d'exégèse sur Philipp., II, 5-11, Revue biblique, juillet 1898. Also Saint-Paul, Note sur Philip., II, 6. Ibid. oct. 1911, p. 550.

2. The distinction just made between God's condition and the honor due to that condition is perfectly legitimate. Do we not see often persons who though not giving up at all their exalted condition refrain from exacting the honors due to their rank?
by assuming the condition of a servant, that is, by taking upon himself the condition of man, by making himself man, like other men.

Recognized as man by his exterior, that is, by all that appeared in him, he abased himself still further by becoming obedient even unto the death of the cross. But God exalted him without measure, by raising him from the dead and declaring him hereby, Lord of all things, that is, invested with sovereign power in heaven, on earth, and under the earth.

Surely, Christ possessed this Lordship, this sovereign power, even before his Resurrection, since, though man, he was also God. But the proclamation had not yet gone out before the whole world; it was issued only at the Resurrection.

Theological Synthesis. — From the preceding doctrine, it is easy to extract the whole dogma of the Incarnation. Christ, possessing the divine nature, took a human nature like our own. This is again shown by a declaration of the Apostle. Not only, says he, did Christ accept the humiliation of the Incarnation, but he further accepted the ignominy of death on the cross. How could he, though God, be man, like other men even to this extent? To this question there is but one answer, which is hinted at in the text. Though possessing the nature of God, Christ took on a human nature, perfect as to the elements that make up this nature, but deprived of the last determination which would have rendered it a human person. And this he did in order that it should have no personality other than that of the Christ, who possessed the divine nature. So, one and the same divine person was both God and man at the same time. This is the kind of union called hypostatic union.

General Conclusion. — We see from this that St. Paul's teaching is fundamentally identical with that of St. John. The formula "Christ, possessing the divine nature, took a
human nature like ours », is equivalent to this other « And
the Word was made flesh, and dwelt amongst us ». In both,
the unity of the God man is affirmed with the same precision.
This requires the unity of person, of hypostasis. In other
words, it is necessary that the human nature, deprived of
its own hypostasis, be taken, assumed by the hypostasis of
the Word to the extent that it no longer belongs to itself but
only to the hypostasis of the Word.

Let us add, however, that though this conclusion is im-
peratively demanded by the texts of the New Testament, it
will be clearly drawn only by the Fathers of the Church.

§ II

TRADITION OF THE FATHERS.

The question stated. — Our adversaries like to say
that the dogma of the hypostatic union is but the continu-
ation of primitive Docetism. Towards the end of the old era,
the Neo-Platonic school of Alexandria sought an inter-
mediary Logos, in order to explain how God could create the
world of matter, an evil principle. As soon as Christianity
was made known to them, they embraced it with all haste,
for they saw in its Christ, who was preached to them, the
intermediary Logos that was to solve the problem. But the
difficulty was only pushed further back. How could the
Logos, a good principle, and the flesh, a principle of evil,
exist together in Christ? They had recourse to the following
expedient. The Logos was said to have taken flesh only in
appearance, to have become man only in appearance, to have
suffered and died only in appearance. This doctrine received
the name of Docetism, from the Greek word ἀπαρέσκειν, to appear.
Docetism was but one of the many aspects of Gnosticism.

This view was too much opposed to the Gospel to have
any chance of success. In the third century, an effort was
made to show that the Logos had taken real flesh, only
exempt from the deep-seated evil inherent to all flesh, that is, flesh etherealized like that possessed by the souls of men before being embodied through some fault of theirs, or like the flesh of the first man, Adam, before his fall. Little by little, the influence of Docetism shifted, and it was maintained that Christ had taken flesh exempt from that human personality which would have rendered it complete humanity. Under this form, we are told, Docetism prevailed in the Catholic Church and has come down to our own day. This, in particular, is the thesis defended by Harnack in his History of Dogma.\(^1\)

Upon close examination of documentary evidence, however, one has to admit that this theory results from the confusion of two very distinct historical questions. The first is that of the reality of the body of Christ; the second, that of the mode of union between the Logos and the flesh of man. The first of these was treated just about as Harnack says it was, and it supplied the groundwork for the Docetic heresy, which the Apologists, especially St. Ignatius of Antioch\(^2\), after the Apostles themselves, particularly St. John\(^3\), denounced and condemned. The second question also sprang up beside the former, from the very beginning. It has always been answered, at first only implicitly, but gradually more and more explicitly, by the affirmation of the hypostatic union.

The Apostolic Fathers. — The doctrine of the Incarnation, as contained in the Epistle of St. Barnabas, is quite remarkable. How, asks the author, could the Lord, who is God, condescend to undergo death at the hands of men? It was necessary that he assume a body, that he might, in the flesh, conquer death and give proof of the resurrection of the flesh, and expiate the sins of those that had persecuted

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3. The solemn affirmation of the Prologue of St. John's Gospel: *Et Verbum caro factum est*, seems to be directed against Docetists.
his prophets. The point of view taken by the author of the epistle of Barnabas is precisely the one taken later on by the Fathers of the fifth century, in their defense of the dogma of the hypostatic union. It was necessary, said they, that Christ's humanity be possessed by the hypostasis of the Word, that the Word might truly suffer in this humanity, and that in a way which, by its infinite value, might purify the world.

The doctrine of St. Ignatius of Antioch is no less expressive. He affirms, in as satisfactory a manner as possible, that Christ is truly God and truly man, and that there is in him but one and the same subject which is the Word.

St. Irenaeus. — In order to show that Christ must not only be God and man, but must be God and man at the same time, St. Irenaeus expresses himself so: « The Lord is most holy and merciful, and he loves the human race. He reconciled man with God. Had the enemy of man not been vanquished by a man, the defeat of the enemy had not been appropriate; and, on the other hand, had not salvation been procured for us by God, our possession of it would by no means have been assured. Now, had man not been united to God, he could not have shared in incorruptibility. To reestablish concord and friendship between God and man, to place man near God, and to make God known to men, there must be between God and man a mediator who has something in common with both. How could we have shared in the adoption of sons, had not the Son brought us into communion with him, nor the Word made us partakers with him, by becoming man? For this has he traversed the ages and brought men into communion with God. Hence, they that say that his coming is but a vision (the Docetae), that

1. Barn., v, 5-12.
2. Ad Ephes., xviii.
3. Ad Ephes., viii.
he was not born in the flesh, that he never really became man, are yet under the ancient curse, are yet under the patronage of sin, and for them death has not yet been conquered. Hence, according to St. Irenaeus, in order that we might obtain salvation, it was necessary that the Word of God, even while remaining the Word of God, take our humanity and suffer in it. The Word must be the subject to which we refer the humanity and its sufferings. This union of the human nature with the person of the Word can be none other than the hypostatic union.

Origen and Tertullian. — The Apostolic Fathers and St. Irenaeus affirmed the hypostatic union, even though they did not use the term nor seek to develop the mystery. The third century, however, takes us further.

Origen viewed the dogma of the union of the Word with flesh in this light: The Logos unites himself to the soul, and through the soul as intermediary, to a perfect and beautiful body, since each soul has the body which it deserves and which is best fitted to it. According to him, there are two stages, as it were, in the union of the Word with the flesh.

About this time, Tertullian, with far greater precision, said that if the Word was made flesh, it was owing to the fact, that a human nature, perfect as to the gifts which make it a human nature, was deprived of its own personality, so that it might exist only as the person of the Son of God. There is, then, in Christ only one person, but two substances, una persona, duae substantiae. This is the definitive formula of the dogma of the hypostatic union.

1. Haer., i. iii, c. xviii, 6-7.
2. Periarchon, i. ii, vi, 5-6.
3. Ibid., i. ii, vii, 3.
Apollinarism. — The doctrine of the union of the Word with human nature was taught by St. Augustine in very precise terms. In the West the controversy on the hypostatic union was not very evident; but in the East the question assumed at least as much importance as that of Arianism.

The real crisis, however, came only in the fifth century. During the fourth century, matters stood thus: Apollinaris, bishop of Laodicea, was, about 360, one of the most ardent adversaries of Arianism. While maintaining, with St. Athanasius, the divinity and the consubstantiality of the Logos, he was preoccupied also with safeguarding the unity of the Incarnate Word. After the council of Alexandria, in 362, he taught openly that something of the integrity of Christ's human nature must be sacrificed. True, it need not be said, as Arius would have it, that the Logos in becoming incarnate had taken but a body, and that the Logos himself had assumed the function of soul; but, on the other hand, to grant that Christ's humanity possessed the ψυξ, that is, the principle of higher thought and of free will, was to make of him an independent being, incapable of physical union with the Logos, and capable of only a moral union, such as exists among friends. But, if such were the case, the Logos and the Christ would be two complete beings, two persons, one the Son of God by nature, the other the son by adoption only. Would this not be practically equivalent to falling back into Arianism? We must admit, then, went on Apollinaris, that Christ had a human body and a human soul, the soul being the principle of life common to all animate beings; but the function of the ψυξ, of the faculty of reason and will, was performed by the nature of the Son of God.

Evidently carried away by his desire to blend in one person the two natures in Christ, the bishop of Laodicea

restricted the human nature as far as possible. He was denounced as a heretic, in 377, by St. Epiphanius and St. Basil. That same year a council was held at Rome, under St. Damasus. Apollinaris was deposed and his doctrine censured. He was condemned in 381, by the ecumenical council of Constantinople.

Nestorianism. — The Nestorians first appeared as a reactionary party against Apollinarism. Their belief was that it was of paramount importance to maintain the perfections of Christ's humanity.

Theodore, bishop of Mopsuestia, taught, at the beginning of the fifth century, that if Christ is true God and true man, we must admit in him two natures, the divine and the human, and two hypostases; for nature and hypostasis are one and the same thing, he held. At least, hypostasis is a necessary element of human nature.

Starting with this principle, he explains Christ's constitution as follows: The Logos was joined to a perfect human nature, hypostatic, but in a union merely moral, not physical. It was a union of love ἐνωτίς κατά γάρ τιν ².

Is there no difference between this union and the union which exists between a just man and God? This, answered Theodore of Mopsuestia, is the error of Paul of Samosata, who designates the union between the Logos and an hypostatic human nature by the word συνάφεια, which he opposes to the terms μίζες, συγκαταστάσεις, indicating that this is a union which excludes compenetration, an external, an accidental union. But it is definitive, indestructible, ἕχομοιοτάς συνάφεια. Again, speaking metaphorically, he says that Christ's humanity, as regards the Logos, is his « temple », his « clothing », his « organ », ναός, σώμα, ἵματος, ἵναιος, ἔργα, whence, to express

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1. Denz., 85.
the union, the words ἐνύψησις, ἐνάπς, ἐνέργεια may be used.

But this is not satisfactory terminology. The question still remains, whether Theodore of Mopsuestia established a real distinction between the simple union of sanctification and the hypostatic union of the Word with human nature. He declares that he did not mean to identify these two modes of union; but we have to accept his statement without being able to see wherein it is borne out in his works.

The Word hypostatically took on human nature from the very moment of conception; yet Jesus was declared to be the adopted Son of God only on the day of his baptism. In explanation, Theodore would say that from that day on, the Word and man were so united that, as seen by the other two divine persons, the two appeared as only one.

But if the Word was united hypostatically to humanity at conception, should we say that the Blessed Virgin was αὐτόχωρος or Θεότοκος? According to Theodore, only the former of these appellations is correct; the latter, however, could be used in a certain sense.

Here the work of Theodore of Mopsuestia stops. His views were attacked during his own lifetime, but no one foresaw the crisis they were to precipitate in the Church. So matters stood in the year 428. That year, Nestorius was made bishop of Constantinople. Either because his views leaned that way, or because of his aversion for the Alexandrian school and for the person of its patriarch Cyril, Nestorius threw himself into the defense of the doctrine taught by Theodore of Mopsuestia.

He adopted all his theories, laying particular stress on certain conclusions. The Incarnation, he held, was reducible to a simple moral union between the eternal Logos and a

man. So close, so perfect was this union, at least from the
day when Jesus was baptized, that the Word and the man to
whom he was united appeared — whether as seen by the
Father and the Son, or by the faithful who owe him homage — to be but one. Hence, Nestorius occasionally states, too,
that this union between the Word and a perfect humanity
does not introduce two persons in Christ, but only one. Yet, when viewed in a certain intrinsic aspect, the Word and
the man are really two hypostases.

Since such is the case, we must distinguish carefully the
properties that belong to the Logos from those that belong
to the man to whom the Logos is united; the properties of the
one must not be ascribed to the other. Hence, according to
his views, we should not say that the Logos suffered and
died: and above all, — and on this Nestorius insisted most
strongly — we should not say that he was born of Mary.
All these things pertain to the Christ. Nor can we say that
Mary is the mother of God, Θεοτόκος: she is merely the mother
of the man whom the Logos anointed by his love, χριστοτόκος.
Nevertheless, he goes on, if some simple minded monk
persists in using the expression Θεοτόκος, I shall not quarrel
with him; but be it well understood that in so speaking
the term is improperly used, and let it not be taken in its
strict sense.

Language such as this shows the true import of the
doctrine of Nestorius. Evidently we cannot say that Mary is
Θεοτόκος, unless the Savior’s humanity was from the first
deprieved of its own hypostasis and belonged entirely to the

1. Sermo VI, n. 4; P. L., XLVIII, 787: Dixi jam saepius si quis inter vos
simplicior, sive inter quoscumque alios voce hac Θεοτόκος gaudet, apud me
nulla est de voce invidia, tantum ne Virginem faciat Deam. To Pope
Celestine he wrote: Ego et hanc quidem vocem qux est Θεοτόκος, nisi secun-
dum Apollinaris et Arii furorem ad confusionem naturarum proferatur,
volentibus dicere non resisto. Epist. III, n. 2. These and similar fine dis-
tinctions found in the Book of Heraclides of Damascus, have led some to be-
lieve — quite wrongly, we think — that Nestorius was not a Nestorian.
hypostasis of the Word alone. In such a case, this humanity, whether considered in whole or in part, i.e., in its properties, can and should be attributed to the Word of God. But once the supposition is made, that this humanity has its own hypostasis, it must be regarded as an independent Self, both in whole and in part. It would then be attributable to the Word in its totality only, and then in an improper sense, just as we identify two friends with each other, and say that they are one.

The Fight against Nestorianism. — As early as the year 429, St. Cyril of Alexandria attacked the doctrine of Nestorius, in a letter addressed to the monks of Egypt. If Christ's humanity, says he, served but as the temple, or the instrument, of the Divinity, what fundamental difference is there between Christ and Moses? On the contrary, we hold, after Athanasius and the council of Nicæa, that Christ's human nature had no personality other than that of the Logos.

Hence, to Christ we must ascribe a human nature that preserved its integrity, a nature that had all the properties of human nature. With us, the body is, strictly speaking, the only part that death can affect; yet we say that man is mortal. Surely the soul does not die; yet in a way it partakes in the sufferings and the death of the body. So it is with Christ: his divinity by itself cannot die; but the Logos appropriates a human nature with all the attributes peculiar to it. Hence can we say that he underwent death.

Since there was in Christ but one and the same ultimate subject, the Word, it is to this Word that we are to ascribe divinity; it is to this Word also that we are to ascribe human-

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1. Epist. I, 15: P. G., LXXVII.
2. Ibid., 17.
3. Ibid., 17.
ty in whole and in part — that is, with all the properties it comprises, including conception and birth, as well as the rest. It is truly the Word of God that, in his humanity, was conceived by Mary and was born of her. We are right, therefore, in saying that, according to the flesh, the Blessed Virgin was the mother of the Word of God, or simply the mother of God, \(θεοτόκος\).  

Cyril’s letter reached Constantinople and was taken up by Nestorius, who launched the most bitter invectives against his colleague at Alexandria. Thereupon Cyril wrote to him personally, accusing him of sowing discord in the Church. Things have come to such a pass, said Cyril, that some refuse to give Christ the title of God, and call him simply the instrument of God, or a man bearing God in him.  

In a second letter upbraiding Nestorius for his disrespectful conduct towards him, St. Cyril closes his merited reproofs with a remarkable profession of faith. « The Logos », he says, « did not become flesh in this sense, that the nature of God was metamorphosed or changed into \(σάρξ\) and \(ψυχή\), but rather in this, that the Word united to himself hypostatically a \(σάρξ\) animated by a \(ψυχή λογική\), and thus became man in an indefinable manner. The two different natures were brought together and were made a perfect unit (\(πρ̃ς ἐνέτην τὴν ἀληθινὴν τουκρύσεις\)); out of the two natures came one Christ, one Son; not that the union obliterated the difference between the two natures, but rather that it constituted one Lord, Jesus and Son, by the indissoluble union of the divinity and the humanity ». Then Cyril explains the meaning of the expression \(θεοτόκος\). « It does not mean », says he, « that there was first a man born of Mary and that the Logos then came down upon him; but that the Logos took human nature in the womb of Mary, and thus became man. He suffered, too; that is, the Logos, who in himself

1. Ibid., 7-8.  
could undergo no suffering, suffered in the body which he took 1. »

Nestorius answered in an equally dogmatic letter in which he accused Cyril of ignorance of the Nicene Creed, and added that it should not be said « God was born and suffered, or Mary is the Mother of God; because this smacks of Paganism, Apollinarism, and Arianism 2. »

The two patriarchs, unable to come to any agreement, had recourse to Pope Celestine I. In the year 430, he convoked a council at Rome. Nestorius was there declared a heretic, and was threatened with deposition unless he retracted his errors.

Cyril, too, called a council at Alexandria, and submitted a creed containing a profession of faith in the Trinity, the hypostatic union of humanity to the Word, and the divine maternity of Mary. This received the approbation of the council and was followed by twelve decrees condemning the principal points in the doctrine of Nestorius.

In order to show that he held himself no less orthodox and no less powerful than the patriarch of Alexandria, Nestorius came back with a profession of faith and twelve decrees against the doctrine of Cyril 3.

With hopes of putting an end to a conflict that threatened to disrupt the Church, Emperor Theodosius II was urgently requested on all sides to call a general council.

The Council of Ephesus. — The council was convened

1. Epist. IV, Ad Nestorium, 23, 25. We saw above that, according to Theodore of Mopsuestia, the hypostatic humanity was taken by the Word at the moment of its conception, but that adoption took place only at the baptism. This distinction seems to have escaped Nestorius, for the expression of his views in this matter amounts to this unqualified statement: « The Logos came down upon the Man-Christ, who was born of Mary, and dwelt in him as in a temple ».


3. See the anathemas of Cyril and the counter-anathemas of Nestorius in Hefele, op. cit., l. IX.
at Ephesus. There were nigh unto two hundred bishops present, and Cyril was to preside over the assembly, in the name of Pope Celestine I. Nestorius had been urged to attend, but he refused. The opening was several times deferred, that John of Antioch, the chief advocate of Nestorius, might arrive in time; and only after it was shown that he was manifestly in bad faith, was the first session held, the 22d of June, 431.

The Nicene Creed and Cyril’s second letter to Nestorius were read. All the bishops present agreed that Cyril’s letter was in perfect harmony with the Nicene Creed. Then Nestorius’ answer was read; upon which all the bishops declared with one voice: « Whoever does not anathematize Nestorius, should himself be anathematized; for he is anathematized by the true faith and by the holy synod. All in communion with Nestorius should be anathematized. We all anathematize the letter and the doctrines of Nestorius, his partisans, and likewise his impious faith and his equally impious doctrine. »

Then were read the letter of Pope Celestine and the Roman synod, the profession of faith made by the Alexandrian synod, and, no doubt, the twelve anathemas which were to be approved. At any rate, the second council of Constantinople (553) considers these twelve decrees as part of the acts of the council of Ephesus.

From that time the doctrine of Nestorius lay under official condemnation, while the doctrine of St. Cyril stood officially defined. Yet, as we shall see, there was so much haggling over the proceedings of the council of Ephesus, that the council of Chalcedon, in 451, was obliged to take up again the doctrine of the hypostatic union and confirm it anew. It is usually to the acts of the latter council

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that reference is made for the authentic definition of the dogma.

The Nestorian Schism. — At the end of the first session, the Fathers in council judged that, because of his impious doctrines, « Nestorius ought to be condemned to lose his episcopal dignity and priestly communion »; so they passed against him a decree of excommunication and deposition. But far from submitting, Nestorius put up a most strenuous fight. His friend John of Antioch assembled a conventicle of forty-three bishops, who excommunicated and deposed Cyril and « all who had given their assent to his doctrine », that is, the two hundred Fathers of the orthodox council. Then St. Cyril and the Fathers of the council unanimously decreed the excommunication and deposition of John of Antioch and all his adherents. This conflict between the two opposing synods led to a common appeal to the emperor, Theodosius II. His first step was to approve the decisions of both assemblies. Then, once informed on the doctrine and the behavior of the Nestorian party, he pronounced decidedly in favor of St. Cyril, and asked that patriarch to name the new bishop of Constantinople. After that he declared the council ended.

Returning to Alexandria, October 30, 431, St. Cyril at once set about to reconcile to the true faith John of Antioch and the bishops of his province. For three years he devoted himself to this task. John of Antioch finally submitted to Cyril a profession of faith resembling closely the doctrine of the council of Ephesus.

1. That such a profession of faith existed, we know from the letters that Cyril wrote later on to John of Antioch, and from a letter of John's to Cyril. It is easy to ascertain that this profession of faith, except for the beginning and some words at the end, is identical with that which the bishops of the conventicle at Ephesus submitted to Theodosius II, for the purpose of winning him over to the cause of Nestorius. Cf. Mansi, vol. V, p. 303. — Hefele, op. cit. 1., IX, p. 395.
This Cyril at once signed. The signal for peace had been given. John of Antioch now acknowledged the measures that had been passed against Nestorius.

The reconciliation between Cyril and John of Antioch did not, however, bring back the Nestorians to orthodoxy. They set up a separate church which, after many vicissitudes, finally succeeded, principally in Persia, where it exists to our own times.

Adoptionism in the Eighth Century. — In the eighth century, several Spanish bishops maintained a doctrine that has often been likened to Nestorianism. In their Creeds they acknowledged the Son of God, God, begotten of the Father from all eternity, like the Father and consubstantial with him, Son of God not by adoption but by generation, not by grace but by nature. But they held too that the Son of God, as man, is only the adopted son of God.

This theory of adoption has always appeared vague and confused. Does it mean that the only Son of God adopted in time a man born of Mary? If so, this is Nestorianism. Or, does it mean that the Word was hypostatically united to a humanity conceived in the womb of Mary, which He had by the Holy Ghost, enriched with all the treasures of sanctifying grace, and constituted « the adopted Son of God »? If such be the case, the doctrine is inexact especially in form; and dangerous in this, that it may lead to Nestorianism.

The direct effect of sanctifying grace is to render man like God, and to make him a creature having his own natural hypostasis, the adopted Son of God. But if we take a human nature deprived of its own hypostasis and assumed

2. Denz., 311 : Confitemur et credimus Deum Dei Filium ante omnia tempora sine initio ex Patre genitum, coxternum et consubstantialem, non adoptione sed genere.
3. Denz., 311 : Confitemur et credimus cum factum ex muliere, factum sub lege non genere esse Filium Dei sed adoptione, non natura sed gratia.
by the hypostasis of the Word, this nature will receive sanctifying grace in abundance without acquiring, however, the title of adopted Son of God; for adoption always presupposes a real distinction of persons between the one adopting and the adopted. Adoption is defined: \textit{Personae extraneae in filium et haeredem gratuita assumptio}.

Hence, Adoptionism, whether taken in a strict Nestorian sense or in a modified sense, is to be rejected absolutely. It was condemned by several councils, and especially by the council of Frankfort (794)\textsuperscript{1}.

§ III

SCHOLASTIC THEOLOGY.

General Doctrine. — All Catholic theologians, of whatever school, hold that the Word of God took an individual human nature, and made it His humanity to this extent, that it no longer belonged to itself but belonged entirely to the Word of God and was deprived of its own personality. This doctrine is binding, for it contains all that is essential to the dogma of the hypostatic union.

Where controversy starts is at the question as to how this hypostatic union came about. Evidently the union must have been effected without even the slightest intrinsic change in the Word itself. But was the humanity modified? If so, in what did this modification consist? Solutions vary, according to the varying notions of the constitutive element of personality.

Solution of Duns Scotus. — According to this Doctor, human personality is naught else but individual substance considered as not assumed by another person.

In the mystery of the Incarnation, the Word took a

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{1} Denz., 312-313.
\end{footnotesize}
humanity endowed with all the intrinsic elements that might be found in any person. Yet the humanity assumed by the Word is not personal; but, it is solely owing to the fact that it was assumed by the Word.

The objection made to this solution is that it does not sufficiently explain the hypostatic union. For union between two substances that remain otherwise without mixture or even the possibility of mixture, can take place only on the condition that they both partake of the same determining principle and that this principle physically embraces each. Otherwise there could be only an accidental or a moral union. In the hypostatic union, the only principle capable of embracing human nature so as to unite it to the nature of God, is the person of the Word. But how could this individual human nature be determined if, preserving all its intrinsic elements and being self-sufficient, it required in no way that determining principle?

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1. In IIIam dist. 1, q. 1, n. 9, and n. 11, ad 3am — dist. VI, q. 1, a. ad 5am. This opinion has always been questioned, but it has never wanted defenders. Nowadays it has many warm supporters, e.g., Hurter, De Verbo incarnato, thes. CLI, and C. Pesch, De Verbo incarnato, prop. IX.

2. Cf. L. Billot, De Verbo incarnato, thes. VII, p. 90: Ratio unitatis in negatione divisionis constituitur. Omnis autem negatio fundatur in positivo. Ergo in omni unitate oportet inventire aliquid positivum in quo fundetur indivisio. Et si quidem unitas sit unitas simplicissimae, positivum illud est ipsa entitas simplicissimae. Si sit unitas compositionis, oportet quod sit aliquid actus in quo plura unita communicant, sicut anima et corpus que sunt unum per se, communicant in eodem esse simpliciter; sicut subjectum et forma accidentalis communicant in eodem esse secundum quid, et pro tanto dicuntur unum per incidens; sicut lapides in acervo communicant in eadem forma acervi, que ibi nihil aliud est quam compositio el ordo. Ex his principiis quae perspicuus sunt satis, sic arguo: Omnis unitas que ultimo explicatur per ipsam indictionem ut sic, quin detur aliquid positivum indivisionem fundans, est unitas chimaerica. Atqui in dicta sententia, unitas hypostatica ultimo explicatur per ipsam indictionem ut sic, et excluditur omne positivum quod indictionem fundet. Ergo unitas hypostatica quam adstruit ista sententia, non est unitas vera, sed ficta. Major constat ex dictis. Minor probatur, nam in dicta sententia nulla est forma, nullus actus in quo humanitas et Verbum communicant, sed ultima ratio cur sint unum in subsistentia, est quia indivisa sunt, et ratio cur indivisa sunt, est quia divisa non sunt ».
Solution of Cajetan and of Suarez. — According to these two authors, the individual humanity of Christ was really united to the divine Word, because, if deprived of the constitutive element of its own personality, it is no longer self-sufficient. This gap, this need, this exigency was amply satisfied by the person of the Word, who assumed the individual humanity of Christ.

Cajetan and Suarez agree in this, that the hypostatic union was possible only if the individual humanity of Christ lacked the constitutive element of its personality. But they differ in some points. Cajetan holds that personality consists in a *substantial mode*, intermediary between substance and existence, and demanding an existence of the same nature as itself. Suarez says that personality consists in a *substantial mode* that is a new determination added to the already existent substance.

Against both these views it is urged that this so-called *substantial mode* is merely an accident; for the determinations of a substance can be nothing but accidents, unless we speak of that determination which is the very actualization of substance — its existence.

Hence, if the Word is united to a substance that has been merely deprived of some accident, it comes about that, by amply supplying this accident, the Word is united to a really human substance — a substance which is, moreover, personal.

Furthermore, if the Word, by fulfilling the function of an accident, is united to a substance already determined, one of two things must be true: either the substance exists of itself at the time when the union takes place; or it is considered — logically, at least, as not yet existing. In the first supposition, the union that takes place can be none but an accidental union; in the second, it is hard to see how

1. *In IIIum*, q. iv, a. 2,
2. *De Inc.*, disp. XI, sect. 3.
any union can take place at all. Cajetan, who holds the second view, says that the Word communicates to the human substance his hypostasis and his divine existence, and adds that the union takes place only through the hypostasis.

This statement complicates exceedingly the mystery of the Incarnation. Its acceptance makes it difficult to see that the union takes place in the hypostasis. One is inclined to think rather that it took place in the existence. But since, by hypothesis, the existence belongs to the divine nature, the union no longer exists in the hypostasis but in the divine nature.

Solution of St. Thomas. — St. Thomas, it would appear, held that personality consists in the existence of rational substance, inasmuch as this existence is really distinct from the substance. For him, existence is the last actualization of substance: *Esse est ultimus actus*.

Hence he explains the hypostatic union in the following way: the individual human nature of Christ, from the very first moment of its conception in Mary's womb, has been deprived of its own existence, and caught and determined by the Word's existence, so that it never had any existence but that of the Word. Thus the Word was made flesh. There has been in Christ but one existence viz., that of the Word.

This view lends itself admirably to the explanation of conciliar formulae, particularly that of Chalcedon, which says that one and the same substance (ἐις τοῦ ὑπόταγμα τοῦ λαοῦ) is at once God and man. This explains, also, how the union could be substantial, that is, in a really substantial mode, without any mixture or confusion between the two substances, or natures.

2. *Sum. theol.*, III, q. xix, a. 1, ad 4\textsuperscript{um}. — *Quodlib. IX*, a. 3, ad 2\textsuperscript{um}. — *De Potentia*, q. ix, a. 4. — *In III Sent.*, dist. V, q. 1, a. 3.
3. *Sent.*, l. III, dist. VI, q. ii, a. 2; q. iii, a. 2, 6; q. xvii, a. 2. — *Sum. theol.*, I, q. xxix, a. 2; q. lxxvi, a. 1, ad 5\textsuperscript{um}. Cf. Billot, *loc. cit.*, pp. 91-100.

T. 1.
ARTICLE II

In Our Lord Jesus Christ, the Divine Nature and the Human Nature, United in the Same Divine Hypostasis, Exist Without Confusion or Transformation.

Doctrine of the Church. — Though human nature could be deprived of its own personality so as to have no other existence but that in the personality of the Word, it was further necessary — despite the contentions of the Docetae and the Apollinarists — that it remain perfect in the order of perfections constituting human nature, and capable of performing all its proper operations. Otherwise the Incarnation would have been defective: for the Word of God became man that, in His humanity and through it, He might be the principle of operations truly human.

The functions of the human nature in Christ are well summed up when we say that this nature was the principle in which and through which the Incarnate Word accomplished all His human operations, principium quo Verbum humane operatur. As we always ascribe action not to nature, but to person, as its ultimate source, so it follows that, in Christ, the hypostasis of the Word was also the ultimate source of the operations of this human nature, principium quod humane operatur. Hence, all the Savior's works were at once human and divine, theandric, θεανθρωπος: so called to distinguish them from those of His operations which were solely divine, such as His great miracles, — in Greek θεοπρεπες, — also accomplished by the Savior¹.

¹ This doctrine has been very clearly stated by Cardinal de Bérulle, in his Discours de l'Estat et des Grandeurs de Jésus, the second discourse. « Les actions de cette humanité appartiennent proprement au Verbe, et non pas à elle. Car le Verbe Eternel comme personne substituée au droit de la Nature humaine et Personne incrée, par un pouvoir et Amour infiny s'aproprie cette Humanité,
Hence the human nature of the Word must preserve its completeness, its integrity, to this extent, that it remain a human activity performing all its intellectual, moral, and sensible operations, without suffering that permeation, that interference between human activity and divine activity, which would result in confusion between them, which would transform them all into divine activities, divinize them.

This doctrine was defined by the Council of Chalcedon (451), when it declared that the divine nature and the human nature, united in the same divine hypostasis (\(\gamma\varphi\varepsilon\tau\omega\zeta\)), remain not intermingled (\(\sigma\nu\gamma\varphi\varepsilon\tau\omega\zeta\)) nor changed (\(\tau\varepsilon\pi\tau\omega\zeta\)).

Such is the dogma of our Lord’s two natures, the human and the divine. We shall now study this doctrine as found in the New Testament and in the Tradition of the Fathers; then we shall give the Theology of the School.

The New Testament. — We are now dealing with a doctrine nowhere explicitly found in the Scriptures — a fact which should surprise no one. The dogma of the two natures is, however, implicitly contained in the acknowledgment of a Christ that is true God and true man. There can be no difficulty in admitting this.

Tradition of the Fathers, from the Time of the Apostles to the Council of Ephesus. — The Greek Fathers, all through

l'uny a soy, la rend sienne, repose et habite en elle comme en sa propre nature, la tire hors des limites d'un usage commun et naturel, l'joint et la consacre de l'onation de sa Divinité, et prend droit et autorité sur elle et sur ses actions; et généralement sur tout ce qui appartient à cette humanité. Car tout ce qui est en Jésus-Christ est fondé en l'hypostase de sa divinité. Et le Verbe Éternel comme suppost et suppost divin de cette nature humaine, est le propriétaire de toutes ses actions et souffrances, les soutient, les relève et les déifie en sa propre personne, en soustenant, relevant et déifiant la substance de cette humanité, par le moyen de laquelle elles adhèrent à la Divinité, comme par un lien commun d'inhercence hypostatique ».

1. Denz., 148.
this long period, seem to have been but little preoccupied about the more explicit statement of the dogma of the two natures in Christ. All they say is that Christ is both God and man, that he is consubstantial with the Father, that in him there is but one person, the Word, which has both a divine and a human nature. We find Didymus the Blind saying that in Christ the humanity and the divinity remain without mixture, \( \alpha \tau \rho \varepsilon \pi \tau \omega \zeta, \alpha \sigma \nu \gamma \chi \nu \tau \omega \zeta \). St. Athanasius and St. John Chrysostom use similar language.

The Fathers of the Latin Church, prior to the third century, confine themselves to vague formulae. Tertullian, on the other hand, gives an exposition of the dogma of the two natures. St. Augustine treats the question with remarkable clearness. In Jesus-Christ, he says, the Word and the man are united, not by the confusion or transformation of natures, but by hypostatic union, so perfect that the two natures are united in the one person.

Thus we see that the teachings of the illustrious bishop of Hippo are as explicit as can be. He forestalls the Nestorian and the Monophysite heresies. Later on, when Pope Leo the Great wishes to settle the questions that trouble the Orient, he writes a long letter to Flavian, Patriarch of Cons-

3. *In Joan.*, homil. XI, 2.
5. Sermo CLXXXVI, 1; P. L., XXXVIII, 999: Quia omnipotens erat [Verbum], fieri potuit, manens quod erat... quod Verbum caro factum est, non Verbum in carnem pereundo cessit, sed caro ad Verbum, ne ipsa periret, accessit... Idem Deus qui homo, et qui Deus idem homo, non confusione naturarum sed unitate personae.
6. Epist. CXXXVII, 9; P. L., XXXIII, 519: In unitate personae copulans utramque naturam.
tantinople, in language drawn entirely from the writings of St. Augustine. This is the letter that was to be acclaimed by the Fathers of the council of Chalcedon.

After the Council of Ephesus. — During the years following the council of Ephesus, St. Cyril, as we have said, did all in his power to bring about reconciliation with the disaffected bishops of the province of Antioch, who had taken sides with Nestorius. In the year 433, he even accepted the Creed presented by John of Antioch, in which the teachings of the council of Ephesus were given in a somewhat attenuated form. For this, St. Cyril was reproached with having acknowledged a Nestorian formula, and accused of inconstancy in faith.

The Church teaches, no doubt, that the human nature of Christ is not personal in the sense that it possesses its own personality; but we must not infer from this that this human nature is not endowed with its own activities, and that all that is done in Christ is done by the person of the Word. On the contrary, the Church teaches that, excepting those operations that are solely divine, that is, those which require the intervention of God (ἐνεργείας θεοπρεπεται), such as the great miracles, all the other operations performed by our Savior are to be attributed to the human nature of Christ as their immediate cause.

Since, however, there is in Christ but one person, that of the Word, the human nature and all its operations are to be attributed to it as to the ultimate principle of action. This is the doctrine that St. Cyril upheld at the council of Ephesus; and he does not in the least deserve to be called an Apollinarist — as the Nestorians called him — for maintaining this doctrine. He maintained the same doctrine after

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1. This charge, first made by certain bishops of the province of Alexandria, has been renewed by HARNACK. Cf. History of Dogma, vol. IV, pp. 188-189.
the council of Ephesus; and for this, he does not deserve the title of Nestorian.

Nevertheless, Cyril's friendly attitude towards the Antiochians excited the displeasure of the bishops of the province of Alexandria, and led some to ascribe to him sympathy with the Nestorians. Hence, when St. Cyril died, in the year 434, they appointed to succeed him Dioscorus, who, far from favoring the doctrine of the dual personality of Christ, had rather Apollinarist tendencies, in this respect that he restricted as far as possible the humanity of Christ.

At that time, the archimandrite Eutyches, of Constantinople, taught that the Word, through the Incarnation, had absorbed not only the personality of Jesus, but also his human nature; just as the ocean absorbs the waters of the rivers that flow into it. Thus, said he, there is in Christ but one nature, and that is the divine.

Eutyches was condemned by the patriarch of Constantinople, St. Flavian. The decision was approved by Pope St. Leo the Great, who took occasion to send to Flavian a masterly exposition of the Church's faith in the dogma of the two natures. This letter is known as the Epistula dogmatica ad Flaviatium.

By doctrinal tendency and above all by rivalry towards Flavian, the new patriarch of Alexandria, Dioscorus, took sides with Eutyches. Through his agency a council was called at Ephesus (449). This he undertook to control after his own fashion. He would not allow the legate of Pope

1. It should be observed that this author's doctrine was partly Nestorian; for, according to him, Christ's human nature was, before the Incarnation, complete throughout but for personality.

2. Denz., 143: Salva igitur proprietate utriusque naturæ et substantiæ et in unam coeunt personam, suscepta est a majestate humilitas, ab exter nitate mortalitas, et ad resolvendum conditionis nostræ debitum, natura inviolabilitis naturæ est unita passibili: ut, quod nostris remediiis congruebat, unus atque idem mediator Dei et hominum, homo Jesus Christus et mori posset ex uno, et mori non posset ex altero. In integra ergo veri hominis perfectaque naturæ verus natus est Deus, totus in suis, totus in nostris.
Leo I to preside, nor would he suffer the reading of the dogmatic letter sent to the patriarch of Constantinople; he himself struck Flavian, and caused the maltreatment of the bishops favorable to Flavian. He wrung from the council decrees of condemnation and excommunication against Theodoret, bishop of Cyrus, and Ibas, bishop of Edessa, both of whom were charged with Nestorianism.

On learning of all this, Pope Leo the Great excommunicated Dioscorus and Eutyches. The Ephesian council of 449 was but an act of violence perpetrated by Dioscorus against the bishops of the Orient. It is a fake council, and history has properly termed it the Robber-Council of Ephesus.

The Council of Chalcedon. — After the fake council of Ephesus, Dioscorus found himself all-powerful. True he had been excommunicated by Pope Leo I, but this mattered nothing to him; he was upheld by the emperor Theodosius II, who saw in the Pope a rival, and was pleased to join forces with the Pope's adversaries. This, together with many other facts, shows that the final triumph of Catholic dogma is not to be ascribed to the protection of the emperors of Constantinople.

In order to put an end to these troubles, the Pope asked the emperor to convocate a council; but Theodosius refused, and Dioscorus excommunicated the Pope. In the meantime, he emperor died and was succeeded by the empress Pulcheria. More from fear than from conviction, the bishops that had clung to Dioscorus now abandoned him.

A council was called at Chalcedon, in the year 451. Six hundred and thirty bishops responded. The excommunication against Dioscorus was renewed; the doctrine of Eutyches was condemned; and the dogmatic letter of Pope Leo I to Flavian was read and was greeted unanimously with these memorable words: *Petrus per Leonem locutus est*.

1. On the person and the doctrinal work of Pope St. Leo the Great, see
The dogma of two natures in Christ was defined with the greatest precision. We must acknowledge in Christ, says the Creed of Chalcedon, one and the same person possessing two natures not intermingled (ἀυγυμνῶς), nor changed (ἀπεπτωκ), both united in the same divine person, the Word (ἀδιαφέτως, ἀγωρίστως). Thus the dogma of the two natures was definitively settled at the council of Chalcedon; and henceforth Monophysitism lay under formal condemnation.\(^1\)

The Monophysitic Schism. — It was principally after the council of Chalcedon that the doctrine of Eutyches took firmer root and developed: though it assumed, it is true, a somewhat different form.

Eutyches held that the human nature of Christ had been absorbed by the Divinity. A monk named Theodosius pointed out that such an absorption of the human by the divine element was inconceivable. He undertook to demonstrate the unity of the two natures by the process of composition or of conversion, whence would result an intermediary being, participating in both Divinity and humanity, yet being absolutely neither the one nor the other. This doctrine, as obscure as the first and entailing the denial of the divinity of Christ, seemed more acceptable. It is in this form that Monophysitism was perpetuated through the ages and is still found in our own times.

Scholastic Theology. — The theologians did hardly more than to reduce into synthesis and formulæ the results of the monophysitic controversy, the diverse phases of which we are now acquainted with.

There is in Christ but one person, the Word, and two natures, the human and the divine. Now, these two natures

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1. Denz., 148.
must be really without intermingling or transformation. The only two ways in which they could be reduced into one would be either by conversion, or by absorption. By the former process, the two natures would be united in such a way as to form a new being, which would be neither wholly human nor wholly divine. But then Christ would be neither God nor man. By the second process, the human nature would cease to exist, since it would be absorbed by the divine. But then Christ would not be man. Since it is impossible to reduce to unity, either by the process of conversion or the process of absorption, the two natures of Christ, these two natures, the human and the divine, in Christ, remain without intermingling or transformation.


Uno modo ex duobus integris perfectis remanentibus. Quod quidem fieri non potest nisi in his quorum forma est compositio, vel ordo, vel figura... Et secundum hoc posuerunt aliqui unionem esse in Christo. Sed hoc non potest esse... quia compositio, vel ordo, vel figura non est forma substantialis, sed accidentalis: et sic sequetur quod unio incarnationis non esset per se, sed per accidens... et sic non constituueretur una natura in Christo, ut ipsi volunt.

Alio modo fit alicuid unum ex perfectis, sed transmutatis, sicut ex elementis fit mixtum; et sic alicuii dixerunt unionem incarnationis esse factam per modum commixturen. Sed hoc non potest esse. Primo quidem quia natura divina est omnino immutabilis, unde nec ipsa potest converti in aliquid, cum sit incorruptibilis; nec aliqui in ipsum, cum ipsa sit ingenerabilis. Secundo quia id quod est commixtum, nulli miscibilium est idem specie; differt enim caro a quolibet elementorum specie. Et sic Christus non esset ejusdem naturæ cum patre, nec cum matre. Tertio quia ex his quae plurimum distant, non potest fieri commixtio: solevit enim species unius eorum, pula si quis guttam aquæ empho vini apponat. Et secundum hoc cum natura divina in infinitum excedat humanum naturam, non potest esse mixtio; sed remanebit sola natura divina.

Tertio modo si alicquid ex alicquibus non permixtis, vel permutatis, sed imperfectis, sicut ex anima et corpore fit homo; et similiter ex diversis membris unum corpus constituitur. Sed hoc dici non potest de incarnationis mysterio. Primo quidem quia utraque natura est secundum rationem suam perfecta, divina scilicet et humana. Secundo quia natura divina et humana non possunt alicquid constituere per modum partium quantitativarum, sicul membra constituant corpus, quia natura divina est incorporea; neque per modum formæ et materiæ, quia divina natura non potest esse forma alicujus,
In Our Lord Jesus Christ We Must Admit Two Wills and Two Operations.

Doctrine of the Church. — We acknowledge in Our Lord Jesus Christ a divine will and a human will. Each of these controls what is proper to it, conjointly with the other. Far from being opposed to each other, the two are in perfect harmony: the human will always follows the divine, that is, the human will always desires and does what the divine will desires. In the letter which was approved by the council of Constantinople and which served as the basis of all discussions, the patriarch of Jerusalem, St. Sophronius, wrote¹: «The Logos imparted to the human nature and preserved in it, when He wished, the power to perform (ἐνεργεῖν) and to suffer that which is proper to it, in order that His Incarnation might not be regarded as a phantasm. He suffered, then, acted and operated in a human manner, in so far as He willed it and judged it necessary for those who witnessed His actions, but not to the extent to which the purely physical and carnal movements of His human nature would demand. He humbled Himself, therefore, and became man voluntarily and φυσικά, yet He remained God even in this state of lowliness. He dispensed unto Himself His own sufferings and His own human actions; and not only was He the dispenser of these, but He was also their master, though He became flesh in a nature capable of suffering. Hence, what was human in Him was above men: not in the sense

¹ See the whole letter of Sophronius, in Hefele, op. cit., vol. III, part I, I. xvi, pp. 369-376.
that His nature was not truly a human nature: but in this, that He became man freely, and that, once man, He accepted His sufferings voluntarily and not under compulsion or out of necessity, nor even reluctantly, as we do. He suffered when He would and as He would. He permitted those that prepared to make Him suffer, to do so in reality; and He approved the sufferings He underwent. His divine actions the most brilliant and most glorious, those that surpass our weakness, that is, His miracles, all were visible proofs of the divine essence and of the nature of the God Logos, though these were manifested by the flesh and the body united to a rational soul. This Son, who has but one indivisible hypostasis, has also two natures and works His divine miracles through His divine nature, while with the other He performs humble actions. Hence it is that they that have a knowledge of God tell us: Whenever you hear opposing expressions used regarding the Son, distribute them conformably to the two natures, ascribing to the divine nature whatever is great and divine, and to the human whatever is humble and human. Again, they say of the Son: All energy comes from the one Son, but it is for us to determine which nature has performed the given act.

For clearness and precision, the letter of St. Sophronius has no equal except the definition of the council of Constantinople, of which we shall speak later on. Now, in this precise exposition, the patriarch of Jerusalem sought to develop only the doctrine of Sacred Scripture and of the Tradition of the Fathers. All that remains for us is to show that, despite the protestations of the Monothelites, his claims were well founded.

The Dogma of a Twofold Will and a Twofold Operation, before the Council of Chalcedon. — The New Testament nowhere explicitly states that Christ had a twofold will and a twofold operation. Yet, in the narrative of the agony, where Jesus asks that not His will but the will of the Father
be done, this fact is strongly suggested. The dogma itself, however, like the dogma of the two natures, is implicitly contained in the dogma that maintains that Our Lord Jesus Christ is true God and true man.

The Fathers revert again and again to this teaching, and develop it by saying that the Son is consubstantial with the Father, that there is in the Son but one person, the Word, endowed with a human nature and a divine nature. And when Monophysitism appears, they attack it vigorously, condemning it both at Ephesus and at Chalcedon. When they affirm that there are in Christ two natures, not intermingled nor separable, they understand thereby also that there are in Christ two wills, each having its own proper operations. But this doctrine was so special, so technical, that no one thought of expressing it in rigorous and technical terms.

After the Council of Chalcedon. — The doctrine of the Monophysites, as we saw above, attained its greatest development only after the council of Chalcedon. In the year 482, the emperor Zeno, in order to reunite the orthodox and the Monophysites, issued an edict called the *Edict of Union*, or *Henotic*, in which he declared that they would have to abide by the symbol of Nicaea, with the additions made by the symbol of Constantinople, as well as by the council of Ephesus and the twelve decrees of Cyril of Alexandria. In

1. The truth of these assertions may be easily ascertained by reading, for example in Hefele, *loc. cit.*, pp. 401-426, the discussion between Maximus and Pyrrhus. Pyrrhus, the successor of Sergius in the see of Constantinople, and like his predecessor a Monothelite, claims that the Fathers nowhere taught the doctrine of a twofold will and a twofold operation in Christ, but that they held just the opposite. He cites Athanasius, Basil, Gregory of Nyssa, and Cyril of Alexandria. Maximus, the friend of Sophronius, patriarch of Jerusalem, takes up the texts in question and proves to his adversary that they contain implicitly the doctrine of two wills. So strong is the evidence that Pyrrhus is forced to give in.
order to give satisfaction to the Monophysites, the symbol of Chalcedon was overlooked altogether. Pope Felix III rejected entirely the *Henotic*, whereupon there followed a schism that lasted for thirty-five years. This may be regarded as the forerunner of the Greek schism.

In the year 544, the emperor Justinian attempted something of the same sort. In an edict in which he disclaimed any attempt at questioning the council of Chalcedon, he condemned, as tainted with Nestorianism, the writings of Theodore of Mopsuestia, those of Theodoret of Cyrus, and the letter of Ibas of Edessa, attacking a condemnation launched against Theodore of Mopsuestia. This has been called the condemnation of the *Three Chapters*. Theodoret and Ibas might have leaned towards Nestorianism; but thanks to the action of St. Cyril, after the council of Ephesus, they were brought back to orthodoxy, and proved themselves the firm support of the patriarch Flavian against the Monophysites. For this, they were highly commended by the council of Chalcedon. Now, in setting on the same level Theodore of Mopsuestia, on the one hand, and Theodoret and Ibas, on the other, and condemning all three, the emperor Justinian was acting in a way that was equivalent to condemning the council of Chalcedon. The second council of Constantinople, the fifth ecumenical council, convened in the year 553, condemned the *Three Chapters*, renewed the profession of faith formulated by the council of Chalcedon, and anathematized a long list of heretics, among whom was Origen.

So great was the unrest of the minds of the sixth century, that peace was not restored. Owing to the desire to put an end to the conflict as well as to a passion for discussion, a new heresy, as serious as any of the preceding, was bound to arise.

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Before entering upon this new phase of the conflict, we must say something of the work of the Scythian monk, Leontius of Byzantium. A distinguished Aristotelian philosopher and a bitter adversary of Nestorianism and Monophysitism, he undertook the task of refuting these two heresies. His work possesses a happy originality in this, that he set about defining with greater precision the notions of nature and of hypostasis, and in exposing the dogma of the hypostatic union with the utmost exactness in thought and phraseology 1.

Monothelitism. — At the beginning of the seventh century, Monophysitism continued to hold its own as an accredited doctrine. Sergius, patriarch of Constantinople, had come to that exalted position through his Monophysitism. But the supporters of this doctrine held aloof from the emperor, whom they regarded as their adversary because of his reconciliation with Roman orthodoxy.

In order to overcome this distrust, Sergius advised Emperor Heraclius to propose a new formula of faith drawn up in the following terms: « We must admit that there are two natures in Christ, but only one will and one operation. » Whether it was meant by such a formula to suppress in Jesus Christ the human will and human operation, or human operation alone, is a controverted question 2. In the second hypothesis, Christ would have retained His human will, but it would have remained inert. And according to both hypotheses, every activity manifested by Christ was presented as the activity proper to the Word of God. Such was the doctrine that received the name of Monothelitism. It is reducible finally to Monophysitism; but in holding to the

2. On this point, see the dissertation of Petav, De Inc. Verb., I. X, chap. I, 7-9. According to this author, the Monothelites denied in Christ both human will and human operations.
affirmation of the two natures, it retained the appearance of orthodoxy.

The Struggle against Monothelitism. — This doctrine, as we have seen, was vigorously attacked by a Palestinian monk named Sophronius. He endeavored to show that Monothelitism was but Monophysitism in a new garb, and he opposed it by the categoric statement that in Christ there are two wills, each with its own operations.

Thereupon Sergius wrote to Pope Honorius, saying that in teaching that in Christ there are two natures with but a single will, or energy, their only object was to bring back the Monophysites to the true faith. The result, he says, is magnificent; but now comes this monk Sophronius, raising opposition and compromising our success, by saying that there are in Christ two energies, a thing which, moreover, cannot be proved from the testimony of the Fathers. « As for us », he goes on, « suspecting that discussions, and later on heresies, might arise, we judged it proper to do away with this discussion of words, and, with this in view, we have written to the Patriarch of Alexandria (Cyrus, the mainstay of Monothelitism) not to suffer anyone, once reconciled, to speak of one or of two energies; we must be content with simply believing — as the saints and the ecumenical synods have taught us — that the one and the same only Son, Our Lord Jesus Christ, performed both human and divine operations (ἐνεργείᾳ) and that all energy, whether divine or human, came similarly (ὁσιωδεῖς) from one and the same Logos made man, and belongs to one and the same. The expression μία ἐνεργείᾳ should not be used; for, although some holy Fathers have made use of it, it is quite unknown to the faithful and offends their ears, for they fear that it is advanced in order to deny the two natures in Christ, which God forbid. Many, on the other hand, are scandalized by the use of the expression, two energies, because it is found in none of the Fathers, and because it might lead to the
opinion that there are in Christ simultaneously two wills in opposition to each other, in this sense, that the Logos might have willed to undergo for us all the sufferings conducive to our salvation, and that his humanity would have been opposed to this. This would be impious, for it is impossible that the same person have on the same point contradictory wills. The Fathers teach that the human nature of Christ never acted alone, through its own initiative (ἐνα) and in opposition to the inspiration (τῷ ἐνα) of the Logos united to it; but acted when and how the Logos would have it; and, to put it even more clearly, just as in man the body is directed by a rational soul, so in Christ, his entire human nature was directed by the divinity of the Logos; he was moved by God (Θεότητος). So we came to the irrevocable decision that henceforth Sophronius was to speak no more of one or of two energies, but was to keep to the doctrine of the Fathers. The holy man agreed to this, promised to keep his engagement, and asked me to send him this explanation [that is, the dogmatic exposition made by Sergius, and contained in this letter] in writing, that he might show it to those who might ask him about the point in question. This request we readily granted, and he left Constantinople by sea. Some time ago, the emperor sent us from Edessa an order to copy and send to him those passages of the Fathers touching upon the μία ἐνέργεια. This was done. Nevertheless, because of the trouble that has been caused over this question, we have represented to the emperor what cautious treatment this matter required, and have suggested that it were better to drop it and to keep to the doctrine of the Fathers as professed and known by everyone; this doctrine maintains that the one and the same only Son of God performed likewise the human and the divine actions, and that all energy, both human and divine, proceeded in an indis- soluble and indivisible manner (ἀμερίστως καὶ ἀδιπλορίστως) from the one and the same Logos made man. This is what Pope St. Leo teaches, in these words: « Agit utraque
This letter, we must admit, was a clever piece of work. The first object of its author was to show that Monothelitism carried with it, above all, the affirmation that in Christ there was a harmonious union between the human will and the divine; and consequently, that this contention was nothing more than a question of words. Hence there was no use of hesitating about concessions regarding mere form, when it was question of bringing back the Monophysites to the true faith. At bottom, however, the letter was a profession of Monothelite faith.

In answer to the letter of Sergius, Honorius wrote:

"My brother, I have received your letter, and have learned from it that a certain Sophronius caused new troubles against our brother Cyrus, who proclaimed to those recovered from heresy that our Lord had but a single energy...

"We must be guided by what we have learned... acknowledging that Our Lord Jesus Christ, the mediator between God and man, performed His divine works through the medium of His humanity which is united to Him, to Him the Logos, in a hypostatic manner, and that He likewise performed human operations, since His flesh was united in an indissoluble manner to His divinity. He that in the flesh was, through the works that He performed, so resplendent in His perfect divinity, is the same that suffered most cruel torments in the flesh, God and man equally perfect. In His two natures, He is the mediator between God and man... Hence, we acknowledge but a single will in our Lord Jesus Christ; for our human nature was evidently taken by the divinity, and it was taken in its state of innocence, just as it was before the fall... In Christ's members there is not another law and another will opposing the Redeemer; for the Redeemer was born in a supernatural manner.

when Holy Scripture says « I am come not to do my will, but the will of the Father who sent me » and « Not as I will, but as thou wilt, O Father », it does not speak so because there is a difference between the wills (that is, as though the Son had a will opposed to that of the Father), but merely in an accommodated sense, on account of the humanity whose nature he took. These words were uttered as an example to us, to teach us that we are to do not our own will, but the will of the Father... That our Lord Jesus Christ, the Son and the Logos of God, by whom all things were made, performed, in a perfect manner, works both human and divine, is what the Sacred Scriptures say in very explicit terms; but whether, because Scripture speaks of divine and human works, we should profess and teach that there are one or two energies, is a matter that does not concern us, and one that we leave to grammarians who, in order to keep their pupils with them, teach expressions that they themselves have invented. In point of fact, Scripture does not say whether Christ and His adorable spirit had one or two energies; but it does say that He performed different kinds of operations... Since the spirit of Christ works in several ways in His members, should we not a fortiori admit that He performs of Himself, as mediator between God and men, whatever is most perfect, and that He does this in several ways, through the unity of the two natures? As for us, we would believe and reason according to the terms of Holy Writ, and we would obliterate all novel terms that might scandalize the Church of God, for fear that some simple souls might hear us speak of two energies and, not understanding these words, might mistake us for Nestorians; and on the other hand, if we profess explicitly that there is but a single energy, others might think that we were Eutychians... Far better were it that philosophers without a philosophy,

1. John vi, 38.
idle dreamers in the realms of pagan philosophy, continue to howl out at us their proud dissertations on nature, than that Christ's people, the simple and poor in spirit, should be left without care. The disciples of the Fisherman do not suffer themselves to be beguiled by philosophy¹.

Upon receiving this letter, Sergius rejoicing triumphantly announced to the leaders of the Monothelite party that Pope Honorius had given his full approval to their doctrine.

At this juncture, Sophronius, now patriarch of Jerusalem, published a dogmatic letter in which he showed, with invulnerable logic, that there must be in Christ "two wills performing naturally what was proper to each, without having to suffer any division or confusion: for each will performs that which is proper to it, conjointly with the other²." This letter was sent to Sergius and to Pope Honorius. The Pope then wrote a second letter to the Patriarch of Constantinople, telling him to see to it that the expression one or two energies be done away with, since the expression is not Scriptural and is liable to be misleading. Let us be content, he continues, "with acknowledging that the two natures are united in one Christ, that each operates and acts in union with the other; the divine nature operates in that which is divine, the human nature accomplishes that which is of the flesh, without admitting of division or mixture; for, if such were not the case, the nature of God would be changed into humanity, and humanity into the divinity³."  

Historians have ever been engaged in showing the differences that exist between the first and the second letter of Pope Honorius⁴. They agree that the second is orthodox.

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3. These fragments have been preserved in the acts of the thirteenth session of the sixth ecumenical council.
On the first they have much discussion. Some maintain that the letter of the Pope is clearly Monothelite. For, he affirms that the union of the two natures in the single hypostasis of the Logos necessitates the unity of activity in Christ. Hence, he holds throughout to the opinion that a single activity operated human and divine works, through the medium, he grants, of the divine nature and the human nature.

In order to arrive at the solution of so grave a difficulty, we have to peruse with care the documents that we deemed necessary to quote at length. The letter written by Sergius was a snare laid by the Patriarch of Constantinople for Pope Honorius. The chief tenet of Monothelism, he told the Pope, is the harmonious unity of the human will and the divine will, in Christ. By teaching this, he contended, we shall bring back the Monophysites to the true faith. Honorius saw nothing but the good intentions of the Patriarch of Constantinople; and, in his first letter, he dwelt almost exclusively upon what he thought to be Sergius' true meaning. Better informed by the letter that Sophronius wrote upon the import of the debate, he wrote a second letter, more precise than the first. In short, the first letter of Pope Honorius, when interpreted in the light of the historic circumstances that prompted it, is orthodox; but it lacked a certain accuracy of expression which after a more profound study of the subject, he used in the second letter.

However, the agitation created by the Monophysites over Honorius' first letter, led the Fathers of the council of Constantinople to put a rigorous interpretation upon the letter and construe it in a heterodox sense. Hence they thought it their duty to anathematize him, along with the perfidious Sergius.

The only charge that can be brought against Pope Honorius, is that he neglected to secure exact information before answering the Patriarch of Constantinople, and that, as a
consequence, he contributed to the success of Monothelitism. Such, we believe, is the correct appreciation of this lamentable incident. Such is the interpretation put upon it by Pope Leo II, in a letter to the bishops of Spain: « Qui (Honorius) flamnam haaretici dogmati non, ut decuit apostolicam auctoritatem, incipientem exstinxit, sed nelegendo confovit 1 ».

The Third Council of Constantinople, the Sixth Ecumenical. — The Monothelites, upheld by the emperor Heraclius, paid no attention to the letter of Sophronius. Religious feeling was rampant. Constantine II, the successor of Heraclius, forbade anyone to speak of Monothelism or Dyothelism. This but made the situation worse. Constantine Pogonatus, successor to Constans, then submitted to Pope Agatho the plan for a council. The Pope eagerly accepted the proposition and sent his deputies to Constantinople, where the council was convened (680-681). Anathemas were pronounced against Sergius, Cyrus, and also Honorius. At the same time, the creed of Chalcedon was completed by a new one, which ran as follows: « Conformably to the doctrine of the holy Fathers, we teach that there are in Christ two natural wills (ὑς ευσιχας θελήσεις ήτοι θελήματα ἐν κυτῷ) and two natural operations (καὶ δύο ευσιχας ενεργείας) which are indivisibly (ἐκδημετώματος), unchangeably (απερίπτωμος), undividedly (αμερίτως), unconfusedly (ἐνεργοίτως). These two natural wills are not mutually opposed, as impious heretics have claimed, but the human will is obedient; he does not resist, does not disobey, he is subject, on the contrary, to the divine and all-powerful will. The will of the human nature must have energized, but it must also have submitted to the divine will, as the learned Athanasius maintains. In truth, just as his flesh (his humanity) is called, and really is,

the flesh of the God Logos, so the natural will of his flesh is a proper will of the Logos... We teach, furthermore, that there are in our Lord Jesus Christ two natural operations ἁτιμαρίτων, ἀγρέπτως, ἀμαρίτως, ἀυγαγώτως, that is to say, the divine operation and the human will. We do not admit that God and his creation (the humanity of Christ) has but one and the same operation, in order not to allow the creature enter into the substance of the divinity and not to reduce to the level of the creature that which is peculiar to the divine nature. We believe that one and the same performed miracles and underwent sufferings, yet according to their different natures, and we believe that there exist two natures in a single hypostasis, each of which wills and operates, in union with the other, that which is proper to it; we profess likewise that the two wills and the two operations tend to the same end, which is the salvation of the human race.  

This last sentence of the creed of Constantinople comprises, in very succinct form, the dogma of the hypostatic union, the dogma of the two natures, and that of the two wills and the two operations, that is, the three dogmas which together constitute the dogma of the fact of the Incarnation.

1. Denz., 291-292.
2. Once a person has studied the main phases of the fact of the Incarnation there usually arise in his mind certain questions of minor importance.

We have seen that Christ's human nature, in order to be united to the person of the Word, had to undergo a certain modification in being deprived of its own personality. The question comes up whether the Word too, had to undergo any intrinsic modification.

About the middle of the 19th century, Protestants maintained that, in becoming Incarnate, the Word was really stripped, or annihilated, according to the expression of St. Paul, ἐκενωσε (Philipp., 11, 7), in this sense that He was limited and localized as to His being and His divinity, and this to such a degree that He lost the consciousness of His divine personality. This doctrine they called the kenosis of the preexistent Christ. Some went so far as to say that the Incarnation had brought about a profound modification in the Godhead itself. They held that all through the period of the Son's earthly existence there was a momentary interruption of the relations of love that unite
ad intra the Father and the Son, that the Father ceased to engender the Son, that, for the time being, the Holy Ghost proceeded from the Father alone; and that the world was governed without the concurrence of the Son.

It is not difficult to show that such a doctrine is incompatible with the absolute divinity of the Word, or of the preexistent Christ. Furthermore, this doctrine rests upon a false interpretation of the epistle to the Philippians. What the Apostle teaches is that Christ renounced momentarily, in His human nature, the glory due Him as God, because, in this human nature, He first had to expiate through suffering the sins of the human race.

In the Incarnation, the Word then underwent no intrinsic modification. Whatever modification there was, was on the side of His human nature. Instead of being personal and belonging to itself, this nature was deprived of its personality and belonged to the Word of God.

A union of this kind could take place only upon the appearance of the human nature, that is, at the moment of the conception of Jesus.

We readily admit that this union existed all through the period of the earthly existence of our Savior. During the three days that our Savior lay dead, His body and His soul, though separated, were still hypostatically united to the Word.

In the 15th century, there arose a discussion between the Franciscans and the Dominicans as to whether the blood that Jesus had shed remained hypostatically united to the Word. The dispute was laid under interdict by Pope Paul II, in 1464, and was never renewed. The Pope's document follows: *Auctoritate apostolica statuimus et ordinamus, quod nulli Fratrum praedicatorum (Minorum aut Praedicatorum) deinceps liceat de supradicta dubietate disputare, praedicare, vel publice aut private verbum facere, seu aliis suadere quod videlicet haereticum vel peccatum sit, tenere vel credere sanguinem ipsum sacramissimum (ut praemittitur) triduo passionis ejusdem Domini nostri Jesu Christi ab ipso divinitate quomodolibetuisse vel non fuisse divisum vel separatum, donec super dubietatis hujusmodi decisione quid tenendum sit, fuerit per nos et Sedem Apostolicam definitum.* Denz., 718.

The hypostatic union was, then, continuous during the time of the earthly existence of our Savior, and during the time of His death. No one has ever questioned that it must last through eternity. This latter doctrinal view on the question belongs to the common doctrine. Besides, it is strongly set forth in the epistle to the Hebrews, where the risen Christ is represented as the eternal Priest of the New Covenant. Remaining eternally priest, He remains eternally the Incarnate Word.
CHAPTER II

THE HUMANITY OF OUR LORD

The Person of the Word, possessing from all eternity the divine nature, took in time a human nature which combined in it, without intermingling or possibility of intermingling with the divine nature, all the essential elements and all the properties of humanity, with the exception of human personality. These are the conclusions drawn from the preceding chapter.

So far, we have considered the humanity of Christ solely from the point of view of its constituent elements. It remains for us now to examine its attributes.

The Word of God was joined to our human nature by an hypostatic union, in order that human nature become Hominian human nature. And this was done for the salvation of the world. Under such conditions, it would appear that the Word must be united to a nature that was perfect, not only in its constitutive elements, but also in the totality of qualities that become human nature. Nevertheless, the perfection of Christ's human nature must be determined by the end to be attained. Hence it is that the human nature assumed by Christ was passible and mortal; that is, was subject to suffering, even suffering unto death.

This subjection is an imperfection which adds further to the mysteriousness of the Incarnation. It is a mystery to us how the Word of God could unite Himself to our flesh; and it is still further a mystery how He could unite Himself to a flesh subject to such infirmities.
Christ’s passibility and His mortality, together with the power to perform miracles, constitute what may be called the three exterior attributes of the humanity of Christ. We shall confine ourselves to the more interior attributes of this humanity. These may be reduced to three principal heads: the pre-eminent sanctity of our Savior, His wonderful human knowledge, coupled with the most delicate and well-ordered sentiments.

FIRST ARTICLE

The Sanctity of Christ.

Positive Sanctity and Negative Sanctity. — Sanctity consists in the detachment from creatures and adhesion to God: \textit{Aversio a creaturis et conversio ad Deum}. In a soul, these two states are in inverse ratio to each other; the less the attachment to creatures, the greater the union with God. Sanctity consists in a movement that brings the creature nearer to God in proportion as it separates it from creatures.

Hence, sanctity in a soul may be regarded from two different aspects: the one in its detachment from creatures, the other in its union with God. The first aspect represents negative sanctity; the second, positive sanctity.

In a soul of superior sanctity, such as that of our Lord, positive sanctity is predominant, and must be given first place. From the positive sanctity of Christ, we shall be able to estimate the negative.

SECTION I

POSITIVE SANCTITY.

General Description. — We see from the New Testament that Christ strives to be obedient in all things, by conforming to the will of His Father. This abandonment to the will of
God leads Him to have unceasing recourse to prayer. He always acts out of the motive of charity. His actions have their source in the life of grace, which He possesses in all its plenitude. Truly, it would be hard to conceive of a sanctity more admirable.

The Savior's Obedience. — Christ's whole work lay in attending His Father's business; His meat is to do the will of His Father; for this reason, too, Christ foregoes His own pleasure, and does only what is pleasing to God. At the end of His life, if there is any testimony that pleases Him, it is that of having done the will of His Father, of having accomplished His work, of having fulfilled His duty.

Christ's Continual Prayer. — He prays early in the morning, in the day and at night. He prays both before acting, and after the task is accomplished, before performing miracles after his successful work, and during his passion.

Christ's Ardent Charity. — The most striking thing in the Gospel portrayal of Christ's character is certainly His charity. This can hardly be spoken of merely as a trait of His character, so much does it influence all the others, so conspicuous is it as the center of all His ideas, of all His sentiments, of all His acts: better to say that Jesus is all charity.

2. John, iv, 34.
4. John, xvii, 4; xix, 30.
5. Mark, i, 35.
11. Mark, vi, 46.
Christ loves men; and because He loves them, He suffers everything from them, rather than hate them. He shows not the least resentment at the base ingratitude and perfidy of Judas. Upon the treasonable Peter, the disciple of His hope, He casts but one look; and this one look is so full of love and sadness, that the ungrateful disciple is seized with bitter remorse and repents: « Peter going out, wept bitterly », says St. Luke 1. On the cross, He undergoes the most ignominious death, and not the least murmur escapes His lips. And all this, because He loves men, and He knows that by this death He is procuring unto them the greatest of all blessings, eternal salvation.

The love of Jesus is not only a long-suffering love, it is also an active one. Jesus sees and understands the misery of those that suffer; He has the deepest compassion for them, and He relieves their sufferings 2.

Now to compassionate the sufferings of others, to make these sufferings one's own, is the highest degree of active


2. In the first chapter of his gospel, St. Mark narrates the beginnings of the ministry of Jesus in Galilee. He writes: « And there came a leper to him, beseeching him, and kneeling down said to him: If thou wilt, thou canst make me clean. And Jesus, having compassion on him, stretched forth his hand; and touching him, said to him: I will. Be thou made clean. And immediately the leprosy departed from him, and he was made clean ». Cf. Mark, i, 40. This example manifests very well the activity of our Savior's charity. He considers the wretchedness of the poor leper, and realizes that his malady excludes him from Jewish society, to which he is an object of disgust and a vile sinner. But Jesus not only sees and understands this misery, He also suffers from it, and He compassionates it with all His soul: « And Jesus had compassion on him », says the evangelist. This deep anguish at the sufferings of another, this compassion, is it not acting in the highest degree! His compassion goes so far as to impel Jesus to touch the poor leper, a thing that no Jew would have dared to do; and by touching him, He heals him by virtue of the power He possesses. We may add that this is not the only fact of its kind in the history of the ministry of our Lord. There are many others, just as edifying, just as instructive, and manifesting quite as well the activity of the love of Jesus. Suffice it to mention the healing of the daughter of the woman of Canaan (Mat., xv, 22), the healing of the son of the centurion (Mat., iii, 3), the raising of the son of the widow of Naim (Luke, vii, 13), and the raising of Lazarus (John, xi).
charity. Hence it is that St. Peter can say in all truth that Jesus went about doing good.

Finally, if to love is to spend one's self with one's whole soul, even to the point of giving one's self, we must here again admire the love of Jesus for us. He was pleased to proclaim during the course of His ministry that He came to give Himself as a ransom for many. Both priest and victim of His priesthood, He did, in fact, shed His blood most generously for us. By this sacrifice He blotted out the sin of man.

The charity that Jesus had for men was, however, but one of the forms of charity that He entertained for God, His Father. It is, in truth, impossible to love God without wishing, in proportion to our love, to see the kingdom of God established in souls, and without spending ourselves, in an equally proportionate measure, towards the establishing of this kingdom. The love of God and of our neighbor, then, constitute but one and the same love; or, to be more exact, the charity that a Christian should have for his neighbor, is but a logical consequence of the love that he entertains towards God. The one may be measured by the other. Since such is the case, the love of Jesus for men gives us an insight into the degree of His love for His heavenly Father. This charity was manifested chiefly by the care He had for the glory of God the Father; by His obedience in doing all things according to the will of God; by His fidelity in observing the law, which to Him was the expression of the will of God; by His continual prayer, which united Him to God; by the special manner, distinctive and unique, in which He calls God His Father. We must go no further; for we should then be going beyond the love that the holy soul of Jesus entertained for God, and should be entering upon the love of the only Son for the Father, of the Son living with the Father.

and the Holy Ghost in one single communion of Life, Light, and Love.

Christ Received the Fulness of Grace. — In the prologue of the Gospel according to St. John, it is written that the Word of God, the Life and the Light, the Life vivifying all men, the Light enlightening all men, was made flesh. In taking this flesh, the Word communicated to it both life and light in the highest degree, in order that it might thence be diffused among the hearts of all men. Hence, Christ, in His humanity, possesses the fulness of life and light, that is, the plenitude of grace: and of this fulness we have all received.

Theology has taken up this doctrine, and explains as follows the wonderful state of grace of our Savior. First, we acknowledge in Him the grace of union, gratia unionis. Through this grace, the humanity of Christ, without any merit whatsoever on its own part, was hypostatically united to the Word, and belonged no longer to itself but wholly to the Word; and the Word became the sole responsible source of everything that was accomplished in this humanity and through it. This doctrine is of faith, as well as the dogma of the mystery of the Incarnation.

There is besides a doctrine that is commonly held among theologians. It is this: Christ's humanity received ordinary grace in all its fulness. In order to render it worthy of the hypostatic union, His humanity was endowed with habitual grace to the fullest extent that any creature can be endowed. In the holy soul of Jesus, sanctifying grace was raised even to the point of beatific vision. And this was so even from the first instant of the hypostatic union.

1. Cf. Thom., Aq., De veritate, quaest. xxix, a. 1: Duplex est Deum potest esse conjunctio: una secundum esse in una persona..., alia secundum operationem... Prima quidem conjunctio sine secunda ad beatitudinem non sufficient, quia nec ipse Deus beatus esset, si se non cognoscebat et amat; non enim in seipso delectaretur, quod ab beatitudinem requiritur. Ad hoc ergo quod anima Christi sit beata, praeter unionem ipsius ad Verbum in
When a man receives sanctifying grace, he is at the same time put in possession of a cortege of infused virtues enabling him to act supernaturally. These are the theological virtues of faith, hope, and charity, and the moral virtues. Now, in order to be able to act supernaturally, the holy soul of our Savior must likewise receive these infused virtues, but in a measure compatible with the beatific vision. Hence it received the theological virtue of charity. He had not, however, faith or hope, since these bear about the same relation to the beatific vision as does the seed to the full-grown plant. He had, also, the moral virtues, not to give Him dominion over concupiscence, — for He was entirely exempt from the tendencies that constitute concupiscence — but to enable Him to perform the other acts of these virtues; namely, using the goods of this world as a means to go to God.

Let us add that the Savior possessed the fulness of the gifts of the Holy Ghost, according to what the prophet Isaias¹ declared; and that He received also, in an altogether unique manner, all the graces which were to enable Him to perform His preeminent mission of prophet. These graces are called in theology gratiae gratis datae².

SECTION II

NEGATIVE SANCTITY.

General Description. — If the hypostatic union required, as a result, that the humanity of our Lord possess positive

1. Is. xi, 13.
2. Cf. L. Billot, De Verbo Incarnato, thesis XVI, p. 130: At vero non
sanctity, for a still greater reason did it render negative sanctity necessary. The Word of God made that humanity which He assumed His own, to this extent that He became responsible for all that was accomplished in this humanity and through it. Since this is the case, it is impossible to conceive that this humanity commit sin, or even be capable of committing sin. The hypostatic union renders this humanity incapable of committing sin. Such is the proposition which we shall now establish. This we shall do by demonstrating the sinlessness of Christ, His exemption from concupiscence and from original sin, His impeccability, and His miraculous conception.

The Sinlessness of Christ. — A passage frequently brought up as an argument against the sinlessness of Christ, is that containing the following narrative, found in the three synoptic Gospels. An Israelite threw himself at the feet of Jesus and said to him: « Good Master, what must I do to possess eternal life? » Jesus answers: « Why callest thou me good? None is good but God ». The inference is drawn from this that Jesus thereby put Himself in the category of sinners.

The falsity of such an interpretation becomes at once evident, if we take the pains to explain the text in the light of its context. In the eyes of this Jew, Jesus was but a doctor of the Law, like any other. He calls Jesus « good Master », just as he would have addressed any doctor whatsoever; for so optimistic is his disposition, that he in no way doubts the moral excellence of those that speak or act in the name of

God. After Jesus has enumerated the principal commandments of the Law, that man examines his conscience and finds that he can reproach himself with no irregularity and that he has fulfilled the Law in both letter and spirit. Hence, it seems that it was only to make him reflect and to disabuse him of his illusion, that Jesus puts him the question, which is equivalent to saying: «You say that I am good; but do you really know what you are talking about? Are you aware that God alone has just claim upon the title of good? » Jesus does not wish to imply that He Himself is not worthy of the title given Him; He merely wishes to give His questioner a better appreciation of the title, and to impart to him a finer sense of discernment.

The sinlessness of Christ is shown by other testimonies in the New Testament. Jesus declares that He has come to fulfil the Law; that is to say, to strip it of the interpretations that the Scribes have put upon it, and to raise it even to the perfection of the law of love. To the Jews He flings this challenge, which none of them take up: «Which of you will accuse me of sin? » His moral holiness is so great that He can proclaim Himself Son of God, in a quite unique and transcendental sense; that He can remit sin; and offer His blood as a ransom for the sins of men. Him that knew no sin, says St. Paul, God hath made sin for us, that we might be made the justice of God in him. And truly, He took on all our infirmities, sin alone excepted.

Such language as this brings us face to face with this dilemma: Either the one using such language was cons-

1. Mat., v, 17.
2. Joun, viii, 46.
3. Cf. the detailed study of this expression, in the first part of these studies, p. 72-77.
5. 2 Cor., v, 21. « Hath made sin for us », This is an hebraism, signifying that our Lord was made the victim for the sins of men.
cient of being but a man like the rest of us, and then he was guilty of blasphemy or of folly; or he was conscious of being really exempt from all sin, and hence he had the right to assume the title of Son of God, in quite a unique sense, he had the right to forgive sin and to offer up his blood for the remission of sin. The exalted moral character of Jesus wholly precludes the first part of the dilemma.

Finally, the sinlessness of Christ was defined by the council of Florence.

Exemption from Concupiscence and from Original Sin. — Not only did the Savior not commit sin, but He appeared in our midst without bearing in His flesh the internal cause of sin, conculiscence. By conculiscence we mean those three inordinate tendencies towards honors, riches, and pleasures, which are deeply rooted in our corrupted nature.

The sacred humanity of Christ, free from concupiscence, was a fortiori exempt from original sin. This point is expressly mentioned by the council of Florence, when it says that the Savior was conceived without sin, *sine peccato conceptus*.

1. *Denz.*, 711: *Firmiter credit (Ecclesia), profiteur et docet, neminem unquam a viro feminaque conceptum a diaboli dominatione suisse liberatum nisi per meritum mediatrixis Dei et hominum Jesu Christi Domini nostri: qui sine peccato conceptus, natus et mortuus, humili generis hostem, peccata nostra delendo, solus sua morte prostravit: et regni celestis introitum, quem primus homo peccato proprio cum omni successione perdiderat, reservavit: quem aliquando venturum annia Veteris Testamenti sacra, sacrificia, sacramenta, ceremonias praesignarunt.

The same doctrine had already been defined by the council of Ephesus, which declared that He that did become victim for us was wholly without knowing sin. Cf. *Denz.*, p. 122.

2. We not infrequently see conculiscence identified with passion. From the fact that there was in Christ no conculiscence, it is concluded that he had no passions, either. Psychologically, this is entirely wrong. Conculiscence is not passion: it is a disorder of the passions. Christ did have passions, but His passions were thoroughly under the control of reason, and he was consequently free from conculiscence. This doctrine will be discussed later, pp. 280-284.

T. I.
Christ’s Impeccability. — Christ’s sinlessness, His freedom from concupiscence and original sin, grows out of a much more fundamental doctrine, and one which, though not formally defined by the Church, is nevertheless commonly held as certain; and this is the doctrine of Christ’s Impeccability. Nor is the reason of this doctrine far to seek. By the very fact that the Word of God made human nature His own, He is responsible for everything that goes on in this nature. Now, the Word of God could not be the subject of a sinful human nature, nor even of one that had a practical aptitude for sin. Hence, was Christ’s humanity not only sinless but, by the very fact of the hypostatic union, it was rendered absolutely impeccable.

Impeccability and Temptation. — In our endeavor to reconcile these two terms, let us begin with a concrete case. A child has before him good things that make his mouth water, and stir his appetite. He is tempted. What is going on in that child’s soul? His imagination is filled with all the sensible pleasures that he will experience in eating the thing; this impression on his imagination arouses his desire. Under the influence of desire, his will is seriously stirred up; and it is easy to see what would soon happen, were he not restrained by fear of punishment. This is temptation, in all its strength. Let us consider the same set of circumstances, once the child is grown to manhood. There is the same object; the same impression on the imagination of the sensible pleasures that would arise from eating. But now, though face to face with the same sensible pleasures, he remains passive and cold, and that simply because of the subdued condition of his passions. The temptation is now confined to his imagination.

This example will enable us to understand better the traditional teaching of Catholic theology on the temptation of Christ. In the Savior’s soul, the passions were subdued and under perfect control. Hence, the representation of
evil left Him entirely indifferent; temptation was for Him restricted altogether to the imagination.

This solution explains well the temptation of Jesus after His going into the desert. In the account of this temptation, as found in St. Matthew and St. Luke, it does not appear that Jesus was much moved. Not so, however, for the temptation in the garden of Gethsemane.

The latter temptation reveals a lively struggle between the human will of Christ and the will of God. At its close, He says to his Father: «Not as I will, but as Thou wilt.» Here was indeed a real temptation, determined by the prospect of the ignominious death on the cross. To understand this, we must bear in mind the nature of the mystery of the Incarnation. The Word of God, in assuming human nature, took a nature perfectly subordinated to the will which is His own as Word of God, and which is the same will as that of God the Father. Nevertheless, the instincts of this human nature, the constitutional and essential instinct of self preservation, could not be entirely submerged; and when facing death, these instincts were bound strongly to make themselves felt, so that only by the powerful intervention of the Savior’s divine will could they be overcome. This explains very well the prayer that Christ offered up to His heavenly Father: «Not my will, but Thine be done.»

Impeccability and Liberty. — Christ is truly God and has a truly human will. This doctrine was defined by the Church in her struggles against Eutyches and the Monothelites. On the other hand, we have the dogma of the Redemption, viz. through the merits of His sufferings and death, Christ redeemed the world. Now, if Christ has a human will, and if He merited our salvation, it follows necessarily

that His will is free. Though this point has not been defined, it follows necessarily from two dogmas that have been defined.

How, then, are we to reconcile Christ's impeccability with the freedom of His will? We may observe first, that the difficulty lies not in the reconciliation of the two terms liberty and impeccability. There is no doubt that it is the conflict between good and evil, experienced by all of us, that throws most light upon the fact of the freedom of our will. We must, however, admit that the power to commit sin, the power to choose evil, is due to an imperfection in our will. The more reasonable our will, the more untrammeled it is by passion and the lower instincts, the freer it is. We can conceive of a liberty, the exercise of which would consist in the choice between two good acts, the two differing merely in degree of goodness. Such is, in its ideal perfection, the liberty of God; such, too, in its relative perfection, is the freedom of the saints, who are all the freer for their greater sanctity; and such was the freedom of Our Lord. In common with the freedom of God's will, it has this element, that its choice is limited to good; in common with man's will it has this, that the impeccability enjoyed by it is not essential or natural to it, but is granted to it merely by virtue of the relation existing between it and the Word, to which it was joined by the hypostatic union.

Here, then, is where the problem lies. Christ received from the Father the order to die for the world, either freely or under compulsion, that is by necessity. If He accepted it freely, it would seem that He might have refused, and thereby have disobeyed God. Where then would be impeccability? On the other hand, if His choice was not free, but necessary, there was no merit in His death. And then what becomes of the Redemption? It would appear, then, that we must deny either the one or the other of these suppositions, and consequently either impeccability or the
Redemption. The Church, holding both ends of the chain, leaves it to theologians to find the links that join the ends. They have not suffered the task to go unattempted. There are no less than seventeen different solutions offered. Of these we shall examine only the principal and most authorized ones.

First Solution. — According to Petau, the order which the Savior obeyed was not a rigorous precept but merely a paternal wish, which Christ could, without sin, have declined to comply with.

This opinion has in its favor the words of St. John, verified by the Savior's whole life: « I do always the things that please my Father » Yet, if we examine attentively the doctrine of the Synoptic Gospels, we shall find it unmistakably set forth that, from beginning to end of His Gospel, Jesus always said that He had been sent to save the world, and that He foresaw and accepted the bloody death of the cross as a duty, as a charge of His Messianic mission.

Second Solution. — According to Suarez, Christ did not from the first receive the command to die. God the Father proposed to him different ways to redeem the world, and the Savior, of His own accord chose death as the most efficient means, especially to show men the horror with which sin should inspire them. But once the Savior had chosen death, God the Father made this means of salvation the object of a rigorous precept.
There is no serious objection to this opinion; yet, it must be admitted, as Cardinal de Lugo points out, that such a quasi-contract between the Father and our Savior seems very strange indeed 1. We might add, also, that this opinion does not seem to be any too strongly corroborated by the testimony of the New Testament, according to which, Christ seems to have considered His bloody death as the goal of His mission.

Third Solution. — Vasquez of course gives a different solution. According to him, the Savior was free in carrying out the precepts He had received, particularly that of dying on the cross for the salvation of the world. Though He could not refuse to accept death, He was free to submit to it for such or such motives, He could die at such or such a time, and could have in His obedience more or less intense sentiments 2.

This opinion takes into account the fact that Christ always regarded death as a duty imposed upon Him; but unhappily it places all of Christ's merit in the bare accomplishment of the circumstances of His death.

Fourth Solution. — The majority of the other theologians find in the opposition which seems to exist between the Savior's impeccability and His free will, only the general difficulty found in reconciling freedom with efficacious grace 3. By reason of the hypostatic union, there is due to the sacred humanity of Christ an uninterrupted flow of efficacious grace, which must unfailingly determine His will to choose good, and that of the highest order. The Savior's state may be compared with the state of a man very high in sanctity. The greater his sanctity, the more does efficacious

1. De Lugo, De Inc., disp. XXVI, sect. 8, n. 100.
2. Vasquez, disp. LXXIV, chap. v.
3. See the list of these authors in Pesch, loc. cit.
grace support him and prevent his falling. Now, the Savior was all holy; nay, His humanity was so united to the Word of God that it was no longer its own, but the Word’s, to whom it belonged. In Him, efficacious grace was such that it rendered sin practically impossible, and even rendered impossible the practical power to commit sin. Yet, just as in a saint, be his perfection what it may, grace and free will subsist side by side, so in Christ, we find eminent sanctity together with the efficacious grace through which it worked, in no way affecting the freedom of His will.

The Miraculous Conception of Christ. — God is a spirit; God is sanctity itself. If He deigned to unite Himself to flesh, He willed also that the flesh to which He was to be hypostatically united should be wholly free from sin and concupiscence, and that it should be impeccable. He chose to have the woman who was to conceive Him exempted from original sin and from concupiscence. Nay, further, God required that the sacred humanity of the Savior be conceived in Mary’s womb through the operation of the Holy Ghost. Such is the dogma of the miraculous conception of Christ. We find it first in the Creed of the Apostles¹ and in the Niceno-Constantinople Creed². The definition was later renewed, especially by the Lateran council ³.

Traditional Views. — To prove the thesis of the miraculous conception of our Savior, it has long been the custom to reason as follows:

The fruit of the promise should not be born according to the natural course of human generation. In proof of this assertion, appeal is made to Holy Writ, where, it is claimed, this wonderful fact is foreshadowed, in the beginning of

1. Denz., 6.
2. Denz., 86.
3. Denz., 429.
Israel's history, by the quite miraculous event of the birth of Isaac; in the same period, by the miraculous birth of the last two judges; in the miraculous conception of Emmanu-uel, of whom Isaias speaks; and at the end of the history of Israel, in the miraculous birth of John the Baptist.

Thence we turn to the Gospel of the Infancy, whence it is not difficult to draw proofs of the miraculous manner of the conception of Jesus.

Very clear testimony of this fact is found in the Tradition of the Fathers. "Mary's virginity", says St. Ignatius of Antioch, writing about the year 106, "her pregnancy, and likewise the Savior's death, are three mysteries loudly proclaimed indeed to-day, but they took place in the silence of God. In his Dialogue with Trypho, St. Justin sets up a parallel between Eve and the Blessed Virgin. The one, though a virgin and intact, conceived the word of the serpent and thereby engendered disobedience and death; whereas the other received joy and peace when the angel Gabriel brought her the good tidings that the Holy Ghost would come upon her, and the virtue of the Most High would overshadow her. If Christ were the son of Joseph, asks St. Irenaeus, wherein would He differ from other men? How could Peter proclaim Him the Son of the living God? They whose hope lies in a Jesus engendered by Joseph are under the curse of Jechonias and his line. As Adam was formed from a virgin clay by God, so Christ was formed from a virgin Mother. And St. Augustine says that if Christ escaped our hereditary taint, it was only because he was conceived in a
miraculous way. Mary remained a virgin in conceiving and in child-bearing; she was ever a virgin: *Concipiens virgo, pariens virgo, virgo gravida, virgo fetu, virgo perpetua*.

Then is adduced the reason of fitness, drawn from the comparison which St. Paul makes between Adam and our Savior. Just as the Holy Ghost animated the dust of the earth, to make of it the first man, so was the formation of the second Adam, like unto other men in all things, save sin alone, brought about in a manner differing from that usually followed. The second Adam, however, had to be of the same race as the first, for his it was to restore what the first Adam had destroyed. Hence the manner of conception determined by God. Into the substance given by the mother, who was of the race of Adam, the Holy Ghost placed a germ, from which was to spring the sacred humanity of Christ. By this miraculous conception, Jesus belonged indeed to the race of Adam; but, like the first man's, His humanity was the result of a very special act on the part of the Almighty.

**Rationalistic View.** — That this reason of fitness is very lofty, that the testimony of Tradition is perfectly clear, that the foreshadowings of the Old Testament are justly interpreted, Rationalists are perfectly willing to admit. But they object that the whole theology of the question is built upon the doctrine of the extraordinary conception of Jesus, as contained in the Gospel of the Infancy, the historic character of which they deny, as well as the very fact of Christ's miraculous conception.

**First Objection.** — There is, it is objected, a striking discrepancy between the account of St. Matthew and that of St. Luke. The former tells of the adoration of the Magi and of the flight into Egypt, and represents St. Joseph as

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the foster-father of Jesus; the latter, after declaring in his prologue that his narrative contains only what he found after diligently examining all things from the beginning, is silent about the Magi and the flight into Egypt, and speaks of St. Joseph simply as the father of Jesus. Such discrepancy is enough to render these accounts void of all historic value.

Answer to First Objection. — St. Matthew, say the objectors, makes St. Joseph the adoptive father of Jesus, St. Luke the real father; and they hold this a palpable contradiction. Their statement is not exact. No doubt but St. Matthew shows clearly that St. Joseph is not the father of Jesus, when he speaks of the worries that Joseph suffered; but St. Luke’s words are hardly less clear, when he speaks of the anguish that Mary suffered. And, moreover, the manner in which St. Luke says that Joseph is the father of Jesus, is far from being equivalent to an affirmation of fatherhood, properly so-called. What he says is that St. Joseph was, as it was believed, the father of Jesus. And there is no authority for suppressing the words « as it was believed », for they are found in all manuscripts.

St. Matthew, they say, gives an account of the journey of the Magi and of the flight into Egypt, whereas St. Luke, though he declares that he has diligently looked into all things from the beginning, does not mention either of these facts; and in this they see a remarkable opposition.

But this omission in St. Luke is readily accounted for by saying simply that he knew nothing of these incidents. And, even if we suppose that he did know of them, the historical purpose by which he seems to have been guided, would be enough to account for their suppression. St. Luke’s object in the Acts is easy to discern. His purpose is to show how the Gospel, received at Jerusalem, first spread through the different parts of Palestine, and then found its way into Syria, Asia Minor, Macedonia, Athens, and Rome. He wishes to show how Christianity, though
it sprang from a Jewish source, was to spread through Greek civilization, and thence through Roman. Or, to put it in a few words, his plan is to show the spread of Christianity. Such a plan compels him, of necessity, either to slight or to pass over entirely certain details; and the fact is that if we compare closely the Acts and the Epistles of St. Paul, we shall find a number of details so slighted or entirely omitted. In the principal part of his Gospel, St. Luke manifests a similar concern. His object there seems to be to show how Jesus, after preaching the Gospel in Galilee, was led to carry his doctrine into Jerusalem. He omits a number of facts, with which he must have been acquainted, but which have no place in his plan; such, for example, is the trip into the land of Tyre and Sidon, the journeys that Jesus made into Jerusalem, before his final entry. We may then say that St. Luke followed such a plan in the Gospel of the Infancy; and that if he omits the account of the adoration of the Magi and of the flight into Egypt, it is because the narration of these events, quite as well known to him as to St. Matthew, would in no way further his general purpose. St. Luke wished to show the growth of the Infant Jesus in silence and obscurity, in obedience to his parents and to the Law of God. This explanation, it seems, must account for the apparent discrepancies between the Gospel of the Infancy as given by St. Matthew and by St. Luke, and it destroys the arguments upon which rests the denial of the historic character of this Gospel.

Second Objection. — Even if the Gospel of the Infancy be accepted as historical, Rationalists still further object that the miraculous conception of Christ must be rejected as being merely an application of Alexandrian Docetism.

Answer to Second Objection. — Let us observe that the fact of the miraculous conception seems to be an inseparable part of the Gospel of the Infancy, for it is around this fact that all other facts of the Gospel are grouped. The conception of Jesus, like that of John the Baptist, is announced by the angel Gabriel. The answer that the angel gives Mary, and the signs that are to mark the accomplishment of the fact, recall the answer and the predicted signs given to Zachary. Mary visits Elizabeth to impart to her the tidings that the angel brought; and Jesus is manifested by John the Baptist, who is filled with the Holy Ghost from his mother's womb. Zachary's Benedictus is the counterpart of Mary's Magnificat. Everything that took place in the case of Jesus was manifested, though less splendidly, in the circumstances attending the birth of John the Baptist. From his very birth, John the Baptist appears as the sign announcing the birth of Jesus. Hence it is impossible, under the circumstances, to separate the miraculous conception of Jesus from the circumstances that accompanied the conception of John the Baptist; or, — a fact which amounts to the same thing — of almost the entire Gospel of the Infancy. If the other narratives of the Infancy are historic, it must be admitted for a certainty that this one is also, for it dominates all the others.

Third Objection. — But, comes the reply, it is not the miraculous conception of Jesus that controls the other narratives; it is these narratives, some of which may be historical, that have given rise to this docetic interpretation of the conception of Christ.

Answer to Third Objection. — In this objection we find it implicitly admitted that it is impossible to separate the narrative of the miraculous conception from the other narratives contained in the Gospel of the Infancy. Now, it seems that this whole mass of narrative is of Judæo-Pales-
tinian origin, and that it is related in no way to the Docetism of Alexandria. Perhaps no page in the whole New Testament bears so clearly the stamp of the Judaism of Palestine. For the family of Joseph, just as for the family of Zachary, sanctity consists in the fulfilment of the Law of God, in making pilgrimages to the temple at Jerusalem, and in waiting for the Messias, who is to set up the kingdom of God on earth. The temple is still standing, and no one foresees the ruin to come. All these are clearly the marks of a Palestinian author of the first century¹.

Conclusion. — The Gospel of the Infancy can be nothing but one of those very old works compiled by St. Matthew and St. Luke, from the first disciples of our Savior, or from those who later lived with Mary and gathered from her own lips the story of the miraculous birth and childhood of her divine Son. It must be granted, therefore, that the narrative is truly historical. Hence, the traditional view of the dogma of the miraculous conception of Christ loses none of its value and requires no changes.

ARTICLE II

Christ's Human Knowledge.

General Idea. — Being both God and man, the Savior possessed both human knowledge and divine knowledge, just as He possessed a human nature and a divine nature, a human will and a divine will, a human intelligence and a divine one. Christ's divine knowledge is infinite, just as the knowledge of the Father and of the Holy Ghost is infinite.

But Christ's human knowledge, like all things created, was finite. Now the question naturally arises, whether this human knowledge attained to its perfection from the very beginning, or whether there was some progress in knowledge as time went on; and if the latter case be true, in what this progress consisted.

In studying this question we shall first have to take account of both sides, and then determine which opinion we are to admit.

§ I

DOCTRINE OF THE FATHERS

Doctrine of the Greek Fathers. — « It is not because He is ignorant that the Savior asks questions; but since He has taken human nature, He makes use of all that is natural to man, and it is natural to man to ask questions. Christ merely wished to conform to the customs of men. What is there astonishing in this? » Origen here shows that he considered absolute ignorance in certain matters altogether out of keeping with the Lord's dignity.

In the century following, the question of Christ's knowledge became a common theme in Arian polemics. Christ asked questions, argued Arius and his disciples, just as do men who seek information; he said that he did not know the day of the last judgment; and St. Luke says of him that, while living at Nazareth, « he grew in wisdom and grace » 2. From this they conclude that Jesus did not possess all wisdom, and consequently that he was not God equally with the Father.

St. Athanasius answers this argument by saying that Christ, as the Word, did know the day of the last judgment;

1. Origen, Comment. in Matth., vol. X, 14; P. G., XIII, 865.
but that he was not ashamed to confess that as man, by reason of the fact that he had taken on our humanity, he did not know this\(^1\). For, « since ignorance is just as much part of our nature as is hunger, and so forth, Christ had to show that in His humanity He had man's ignorance: first, in order to prove the reality of His human nature; and secondly, in order that, possessing the ignorance of men in His body, He might present to His heavenly Father a humanity delivered and purified from all taints, a holy and a perfect humanity »\(^2\). Likewise, says the holy Doctor, the growth in wisdom, of which St. Luke speaks, is to be understood

1. *Contra Arianos*, or. iii, 43; *P. G.*, XXVI, 413-416: « Now why it was that, though He Knew, He did not tell His disciples plainly at that time, no one may be curious where He has been silent; for ' Who hath known the mind of the Lord, or who hath been His counsellor?' *Rom.*, xi,34. But why, though He knew, He said, ' no, not the Son knows' this I think none of the faithful is ignorant, viz., that He made this as those other declarations as man by reason of the flesh. For this as before is not the Word's deficiency, but of that human nature whose property it is to be ignorant. (Οὐδὲ γὰρ οὐδὲ τούτο ἡμάτωμα τοῦ Αὐτοῦ ἀτίν, ἀλλὰ τῆς ἀνθρωπινῆς φύσεως, τό έστιν ἢ, δακ Καλ Αποστολον. And this again will be seen by honestly examining into the occasion, when and to whom the Savior spoke thus. Not then when the heaven was made by Him, nor when He was with the Father Himself, the Word ' disposing all things', nor before He was become man did He say it, but when ' the Word became flesh'. On this account it is reasonable to ascribe to His manhood everything which, after He became man, He speaks humanly. For it is proper to the Word to know what was made, nor be ignorant either of the beginning or of the end of these (for the works are His), and He knows how many things He wrought, and the limit of their consistence. And knowing of each the beginning and the end, He knows surely the general and common end of all. Certainly when He says in the Gospel concerning Himself in His human character, ' Father, the hour is come, glorify Thy Son', it is plain that He knows also the hour of the end of all things, as the Lord, though as man He is ignorant of it, for ignorance is proper to man, and especially of these things. Moreover this is proper to the Savior's love of man; for since He was made man, He is not ashamed, because of the flesh which is ignorant, to say ' I know not', that He may show that knowing as God, He is but ignorant to the flesh. (Ἐπειδὴ γὰρ γέγονεν ἀνθρωπος οὐκ ἐπισκύνεται διὰ τὴν σάρκα τὴν ἀνθρωπον εἰπειν. Οὐκ οἶδα, ἵνα δείξῃ ὅτι οἴδαι ὡς Θεὸς, ἀγνοεῖ σαρκικῶς. And therefore He said not, ' no, not the Son of God knows', lest the Godhead should seem ignorant, but simply, ' no, not the Son', that the ignorance might be the Son's as born from among men.

2. *Ad Ser.*, epist. II, 9; *P. G.*, XXVI, 624.
as referring not to the divine wisdom of the Savior, but to his human wisdom. St. Gregory Nazianzene, St. Gregory of Nyssa and St. Cyril of Alexandria, all held the same opinion as did St. Athanasius.

Language of this sort, used by so great a number of the Fathers, was not without producing its effect upon theologians, early as well as late. On this point Petau justly remarks: The Fathers give utterance to these opinions rather by way of conciliation and concession; their object is not so much to give expression to their own personal views of the question, as to press incisive arguments against the Arians. For the time being, they thought it enough to show that the words of the Savior, no matter how interpreted, militated against neither His divinity nor His eternal generation. The fact is that we are too much given to dragging patristic texts out of their settings, and forgetting the circumstances that provoked them. Interpreted as they should be, in the light of the heresies of their day, they would not be nearly so astonishing and perplexing to us.

Yet this solution, we must admit, seems insufficient. Upon closer examination, the doctrine of the Greek Fathers on the knowledge of Christ is much more complex that might at first appear on the surface. After the opinion just quoted, St. Athanasius adds that the progress that Jesus made in wisdom consisted in a « fuller manifestation of his divinity ». St. Gregory Nazianzene says that « the wisdom that Christ possessed was manifested little by little. » And

2. Or. XXX, 15; P. G., XXXVI, 124.
3. Adversus Apollinarem, 24; P. G., XLV, 1176.
5. De Incarnatione, l. XI, c. 11, n. 8).
7. Or. XLIII, 38; P. G. XXXVI, 548.
St. Cyril of Alexandria observes that the Savior «manifested his prerogatives in proportion to his age», or that «he showed more wisdom in proportion as he grew older, in order to conform to the manner of man's being». There seems to be contradiction here between the first texts and those that follow. In the first, they say that Christ as man was subject to ignorance; and then, in the others, they say that Christ as man knew all things, but that He was content to manifest His knowledge only in proportion to His age. That there is more than apparent contradiction here, no one believes. The second texts are just as truly part of the Fathers' views as are the first. There is a very simple solution of the apparent difficulty. There is not the slightest doubt that Christ was ignorant of many things, merely as man, that is, as enlightened by purely human and natural lights; and yet, even as man, He knew these very same things by the supernatural lights in which His humanity participated by virtue of the hypostatic union; and, according as His age and circumstances demanded, He learned by natural means what He already knew supernaturally. So He learned things He did not know: and He advanced in wisdom, but in a very special manner, a manner perfectly suited to the dignity of the Incarnate Word. This, it seems, was the thought of St. Athanasius, and of the other Fathers, who use expressions like those of Athanasius. The Fathers outlined the distinctions which were later to be made by the Scholastics, who recognized in the human soul of Christ a twofold knowledge, one supernatural, the knowledge of vision, which is an infused knowledge, imparted to Christ by reason of the hypostatic union; and the other a purely natural knowledge, capable, like all our knowledge, of increase.

Against the semi-Arians who perpetuated the traditions of their forerunners, St. John Chrysostom is more categoric.

« When », he writes. « the Savior says 'not even the Son knows the day of the last judgment', it is to prevent the Apostles not only from knowing it, but even from inquiring about it. That this was the spirit in which He spoke, we have proof if we consider how, after the resurrection, He repressed the excessive curiosity of His disciples. Before that, He had told them that the last days would be shown by many signs; and here, He tells them simply that it is not theirs to know the day nor the hour. If the Son of God were ever ignorant of that, pray, when did He learn it? Could He learn it from us? But dare any one say so? He knows the Father, and that as intimately as the Father knows the Son; and still does not know that day! And besides, the Holy Ghost searches the abyss of God. And he, too, ignorant of that day! Not only does He know the day, but He knows also how He will judge, how He will penetrate into the innermost recesses of our hearts; and yet we would have it that He is ignorant of far less important things. If all things were made by Him, and without Him was made nothing, how could He be ignorant of that day? He that made the ages, made also their periods and their days; and how could He be ignorant of what He Himself has made? »

The Latin Fathers. — Among the Latin Fathers, some speak in very much the same way as St. Athanasius. If Christ showed some ignorance, says St. Hilary, if He suffered hunger and thirst, if He wept, this could take place only in His humanity. And St. Fulgentius argues from this fact

1. in Matth., homil. XLII, 1; P. G., LVIII, 703.)
2. De Trinitate, 1, IX, 15; P. L., X, 342: Non ergo quia nescire se diem et momentum Filii dicit, nescire credendus est, siculi neque cum secundum hominem aut fle, aut dormit, aut tristis est. Deus obnoxius esse aut lacrymis aut timori, aut somno est confinundus; sed salva Unigeniti in se veritale, secundum carnis infirmitatem, fletum, somnum, ineditam, siilim, lactitudinem, metum pari necesse est secundum hominem natura, diei atque horae professus esse intelligatur inscientiam.
that Christ displayed some lack of knowledge in order to show that He had a human soul\(^1\). Such language was prompted by the same apologetic reasons as prompted the Greek Fathers, and it must be explained in the same way. St. Ambrose is aware that from his own times many held that Christ as man lacked altogether the knowledge of certain things. But, for Him, this lack of knowledge was only apparent\(^2\).

The majority of the Latin Fathers adopted the very definite language of St. John Chrysostom. If the Gospel speaks of advance in the human knowledge of our Lord, this can but refer to the successive manifestations of a knowledge supernatural and perfect from the beginning. St. Augustine has some very pronounced views on this point. What the Apostles were not supposed to know, Christ said that He Himself did not know: He professed to know only what they had a right to know\(^3\).

In the human soul of our Lord there was no ignorance,

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1. *Ad Trasim.* reg., 1, 1, 8; *P. L.*, LXX, 231.

2. *De Fide*, 1, V, 229: *Maxull enim Dominus nimio in discipulos amore propensus, potentibus his quae cognita inutilia judicaret, vider ignorare quod noverat, quam negare; plusque amat nostram utilitatem instruire quam suam potentiam demonstrare.* 221. *Sunt tamen plerique non ita timidiores ut ego; malo alta timere, quam sapere: sunt tamen plerique eo freti quod scriptum est: Et Jesus proficiebat aetate et sapientia et gratia apud Deum et homines (Luke, ii, 52), qui dicunt confiderent quod secundum divinitatem quidem ea quae futura sunt, ignorare non potuit, sed secundum nostrae conditionis assumptionem ignorare se quasi Filium hominis ante crucem dictum... 222. *Filius qui cum hominibus conversatus est, et hominem egit, et carnis susceptis, nostrum assumpsit affectum, ut nostra ignorantiam nescire se dicaret non quia alicud ipse nesciret; non etsi homo in veritate corporis videbatur, erat tamen vita, erat lux, et virtus exibat de eo quae vulnera sauci et ssa auctoritate sanabat.*

3. *De Trinitate*, 1, 1, xi; *P. L.*, XLII, 837: *Hoc enim nescit, quod nescientes facile, id est, quod non ita sciebat ut tunc discipulis indicaret: sicut dictum est ad Abraham: a Nunc cognovi quod timeas Deum*. (Gen. xxii, 12), id est, nunc feci ut cognosceres, quia et ipse sibi in illa tentatione probatus innotuit... *Hoc ergo inter illos nesciebat, quod per illum scire non poterat. Et hoc solum se scire dicebat, quod eos per illum scire oportiebat.*
because His soul was united to the Word and enjoyed perfect knowledge from the very beginning 1.

Such was the view of nearly all the contemporaries of the bishop of Hippo, at least in the Western Church. This fact is made evident by the condemnation of Leporius, a monk who, in 427, taught among other errors that Christ was subject to ignorance. St. Augustine made this monk sign a retraction, and in this he acknowledged having taught that Christ, in so far as He was man, suffered human ignorance. Then he professed to reject and anathematize his old teaching, since ignorance was impossible in the human intellect of Him who had enlightened the prophets. This document was approved and signed by five bishops from the North of Africa or the South of Gaul 2.

The Agnoetae. — The Greek Fathers, as well as the Latin Fathers, taught, as we have seen, that Christ, as man, had from the beginning supernatural knowledge in all its fulness, but that His natural knowledge was capable of increase. By human means, then, the Savior learned what before He had known only by reason of His supernatural knowledge; thus, to men, He manifested a certain lack of knowledge and a certain progress in knowledge.

At the beginning of the sixth century, certain Monophysites, with Themistius at their head, launched the opinion that Christ was absolutely ignorant of the day of the final judgment. These men were called Agnoetae 3. Theirs was a strange doctrine indeed. Had they been pure Monophysites, they should have admitted that in Christ the human nature was absorbed by the divine; and consequently, far

1. de peccatorum meritis, l. II, 48; P. L., XLIV, 180 : Quam plane ignorantiam nullo modo crediderim fuisse in infante illo, in quo Verbum caro factum est, ut habitaret in nobis, nec illam ipsius animi infirmitatem in Christo parvulo fuerim suspicatus, quam videmus in parvulis.
2. Liber emendationis, 10; P. L., XXXI, 1230.
from lessening the Savior's prerogatives, they should have exalted them. But pure Monophysites they were not; they held that Christ's nature was a mixture of the human and the divine, and that it was susceptible to corruption in the flesh and to ignorance in the intellect.

Eulogius, Patriarch of Alexandria, issued a refutation against Themistius, in a tract entitled « Against the Agnoetae ». In this tract, he maintained that our Savior's humanity, since it is hypostatically united to the Word of God, is ignorant of things neither present nor future. St. Gregory the Great wrote Eulogius a letter, congratulating him on his treatise against the Agnoetae. In a second letter to Eulogius, St. Gregory drew up the distinction which should have guided the Fathers of the fourth and fifth centuries, and would have prevented them from making such apparently contradictory statements. Christ, said Gregory, knew even in His human nature the day of the last judgment; not, it is true, by the light of His human reason, but by supernatural light.

§ 11

SCHOLASTIC THEOLOGY.

Root Principle. — In order to show just what was Christ's knowledge, St. Thomas started with this principle: If the Word of God became man, He must have taken a human nature possessing all the perfections which belong to

1. There is a brief of this tract in Photius, Biblioth., cod. ccxx; P. G., CIII, 1081.
2. Epist., l. X, epist. XXXIX; P. L., LXXVII, 1091.
3. Ibid., epist. XXXIX : Incarnatus Unigenitus factusque pro nobis homo perfectus, in natura quidem humanitatis novit diem et horam judicii, sed tamen hunc non ex natura humanitatis novit. Quod ergo in ipsa novit, quia Deus homo factus, diem et horam judicii per deitatis suae potentiam novit.
humanity, except such as might prove contrary to the ends of the Incarnation; as, for example, human personality, exemption from suffering and death. This principle leads the Holy Doctor to the distinction between the two kinds of knowledge in Christ: the one possessed by virtue of His divinity — an infinite knowledge; the other possessed as man, in virtue of Christ's human intellect. It is this latter principle which St. Thomas discusses.

The Beatific Vision. — In His human intellect, Christ must have been endowed with all the gifts which a human intellect is capable of receiving. Now this consisted in the supernatural order, first, of the immediate, the intuitive, the direct vision of God. This knowledge produces infinite happiness in the will; it is called the beatific vision.

Christ's human intellect received this knowledge in an eminent degree, and from the very beginning. Hence,

1. This principle sums up the four articles of the Summa theol., III, q. v. Suarez puts it in this way: Anima Christi a principio habitu omnum perfectionem, cuius carentia necessaria aut utilis non fuit ad nostram Redemptionem. De Inc., disp. XXXII.

2. Sum. theol., III, q. ix, a. 1: Non autem fuit conveniens quod Filius Dei humanam naturam imperfectam assumeret, sed perfectam, utpote qua mediatrice totum humanum genus ad perfectum erat reducendum. Et ideo oportuit quod anima Christi esset perfecta per aliquam scientiam praeter scientiam divinam: aliocin anima Christi esset imperfectior animabus aliorum hominum.

3. Ibid., q. x, a. 4: Visio divinae essentiae convenit omnibus beatissimis secundum participationem luminis derivatives in eos a fonte Verbi Dei. Hinc autem Verbo Dei propriis ludgatur anima Christi, quae est unita Verbo in persona, quam quaexis alia creatura. Et ideo plenius recipit influentiam luminis, in quo Deus videtur ab ipso Verbo, quam quaececumque alia creatura. Et ideo prae ceteris creaturis perfectius videt ipsam primam veritatem, quae est Dei essentia.

4. This conclusion, altogether in accord with the doctrine of St. Thomas, is given also by Suarez, De Inc., disp. XXV, sect. 1, n. 4: Christus semper fuit Filius Dei naturalis; ergo haeres; ergo possessor; neque enim tempore indigebat ad fruendum hæreditate; neque interventura erat in morum Patris, ut Filius in possessionem Milleretur; neque propri actatem impediri poterat, ut supra ostensum est... Non est credibile divinam personam non statim
from this moment His intelligence contemplated the divine Word and the divine essence, and that in a higher degree than any creature. Nevertheless, this intellect was incapable of comprehending fully the divinity; for God alone can have an adequate knowledge of Himself. But in God, the intellect of Christ saw all beings, past, present, and future.

Infused Knowledge. — By infused knowledge is meant a knowledge due to lights of a preternatural character, communicated immediately by God. There are two kinds of infused knowledge: the one includes knowledge that man cannot attain by his own industry, but gets solely by preternatural light: the other, knowledge which man might attain by himself, but which in fact is imparted by preternatural light.

The Savior's intellect possessed infused knowledge, at least the knowledge of the first kind. It was not enough to

ditasse naturam suam omnibus donis gratiae et gloriae, et omnem contra-rium imperfectionem ab anima sua abjecisse; carere autem felicitate magna est imperfectio quae nec nobis crat necessaria, nec divinam personam debeat.

1. Sum. theol., IIIa, q. x, a. 1: Sic facta est unio naturarum in persona Christi, quod tamen proprietates uniusque naturae inconfusa permanerit, ita scilicet quod increatum manserit increatum, et creatum manserit infra limites creaturarum. Est autem impossible quod aliqua creatura comprehendat divinam essentiam. eo quod infinitum non comprehenditur a finito. Et ideo dicendum quod anima Christi nullo modo comprehendit divinam essentiam.


2. Ibid., a. 2.

3. As to the infused knowledge of the second degree, called knowledge infused per accidens, to distinguish it from infused knowledge of the first degree, called knowledge infused per se, a great many theologians hold that Christ obtained infused knowledge of the first degree only. They hold this opinion because infused knowledge of the second degree seems to be but a duplicate of acquired knowledge. Cf. Thos. Aq., Sum. theol., IIIa, q. ix, a.
see God, and in Him to see all creatures, by the beatific vision; but it was fit and proper that Christ’s intellect should know these beings in themselves, and by the light that makes them intelligible.

Through this knowledge, our Lord had all the knowledge which the angels have concerning creatures both spiritual and material; He was acquainted with the entire supernatural economy in regard to the work of the Redemption; He knew all that men can know by revelation, whether by the gift of prophecy or by any of the other gifts of the Holy Ghost.

This knowledge, however, was not completely in actu; it was merely an habitual state, and was actually present to the Savior’s intellect now under one aspect, now under another, according as he willed it.

Acquired, or Experimental Knowledge. — Just as it was fit and proper that Christ have the most perfect human nature possible, so also was it becoming that He have the natural faculties of man, enabling Him to gather the sensible data of things in the material world, and to abstract from

3-4. — Vasquez, De Inc., disp. XLV, c. ii. — Ch. Pesch concludes his exposition of this question by saying that we are not bound to hold that Christ had infused knowledge of the second degree, infused knowledge per accidens: Dicit totam hanc scientiam per accidens infusam negare. Cf. Christologia, sect. vi, prop. XXI, p. 132.

1. Sum theol., IIIa, q. ix, a. 3: Ita praeter scientiam divinam et increatum est in Christo secundum ejus animam scientiam beata, qua cognoscit Verbum, et res in Verbo; et scientia infusa, sive indita, per quam cognoscit res in propria natura per species intelligibiles humanae mentis proportionatas.

2. Ch. Pesch, Christ., sect. vi, prop. xix, p. 133: Non quidem putandum est omnia haec objecta semper actu praesentiauisse menti Christi per scientiam infusam, quia haec objecta non apparent in alio objecto primum, in quo possint unico actu omnia cognosci, neque Christus potuit tot simul actus habere quol sunt objecta, quia hoc virtutem connaturalen creaturae excedit. Ergo Christus pro voluntate sua modo haec modo illa objecta considerabat, et quidem probabilius hi actus fiunt per modum simplicis intelligentiae sine discursu quia haec scientia propter suam perfectionem non indiget discursu.
these sensible data a knowledge of these material things. Knowledge so acquired, from the elaboration of sensible data, is called acquired, or experimental knowledge 1.

Thus it was that Our Lord acquired the knowledge of whatever a man of His day could learn experimentally 2. Christ learned these things by his own efforts, unaided by men 3 or angels, and that with the greatest facility 4. No matter at what period we consider Him, He knew always, as perfectly as could be known, whatever it became Him to know. In this sense, the acquired knowledge of the Savior, though constantly undergoing development, was always perfect 5.

1. Sum theol., III 1, q. ix, a. 4 : Nihil eorum quae Deus in nostra natura plantavit, defuit humanae naturae assumptae a Dei Verbo. Manifestum est autem quod in humana natura Deus plantavit non solum intellectum possibilem, sed etiam intellectum agentem. Unde necesse est dicere, quod in anima Christi fuit non solum intellectus possibilis, sed etiam intellectus agens. Si autem in aliis Deus, et natura nihil frustra faciunt multo minus in anima Christi aliquid fuit frustra. Frustra autem est quod non habet propriam operationem; cum omnis res sit propter suam operationem. Propria operatio intellectus agentis est facere species intelligibiles actu, abstrahendo eas a phantasmatibus; unde dicitur in l. III de Anima quod intellectus agens est quo est omnia facere. Sic igitur necesse est dicere, quod in Christo fuerint aliquae species intelligibiles per actionem intellectus agentis in intellectu possibili ejus receptae; quod est esse in ipso scientiam acquisitam, quam quidam experimentalem nominant.

2. Sum. theol., q. xii, a. 1.

3. Ibid., a. 3.

4. Ibid., a. 4.

5. Ibid., a. 2 : Quia inconveniens videtur quod aliqua naturalis actio intelligibilis Christo deesset, cum extrahere species intelligibiles a phantasmatibus sit quaedam naturalis actio hominis secundum intellectum agentem, conveniens videtur hanc etiam actionem in Christo ponere. Et ex hoc sequitur quod in anima Christi atquis habitus scientiae fuerit, qui per hujusmodi abstractionem specierum poterit augmentari; ex hoc scilicet quod intellectus agens post primas species intelligibiles abstractas a phantasmatibus poterat etiam alias et alias abstrahere.

The opinion of St. Thomas shifted somewhat on this point, as he himself very simply acknowledges in the body of the article. In In III Sent., dist. xiv, q. 1, a. 3, sol. 5, ad 3um, he says that Christ's intellect had no need of forming, by its own action, the species impressae necessary to the knowledge of persons and things about Him, for these species impressae were infused.
This view of an acquired and increasing knowledge enables us to explain the texts of the Gospel where it is question of ignorance and progress in the knowledge in Our Savior's soul.

§ III

RATIONALISTIC THEORIES CONdemned
BY THE CHURCH.

Hermann Schell’s Theology. — According to this author, Christ as man had extraordinary knowledge due to natural lights, but singularly strengthened by supernatural lights. He had not, however, a universal knowledge. Such knowledge, Schell held, is impossible to a human intellect, no matter how perfect, in our condition here below. The human brain would not be able to stand so rich an intellectual life.

And again, if we admit that Christ's human intellect possessed a knowledge of all things, what is to become of acquired knowledge, if all His knowledge was due to supernatural light? The Savior would then merely appear to learn what He already knew. Both His ignorance and His learning would have been but apparent. If inspired by the desire to show us that He was man, such pretense on the part of Christ would seem strange indeed and contrary to the divine plan, which was that the divine Word become man, like us in all things save sin alone. Furthermore, Christ Himself said that He did not know the day or the hour; and if He said so, it must be that He really did not know.

But are we to conclude from this, asks Schell, that the Savior's knowledge was imperfect? Not at all, he answers; this would be a gross exaggeration. The one thing necessary, is to limit Christ's knowledge « economically » to the mission which it was the Savior's purpose to fulfil on earth. At any time in His life, Christ always knew what it was
expedient for Him to know in order to fulfil His Messianic functions; but just as He renounced glory in becoming incarnate, so He renounced omniscience. This second renunciation was but another form of His self-abasement.

Criticism of this Doctrine. — In man, thought is exercised not irrespective of the brain. If Christ was a man like ourselves, it is objected, His brain would not have sufficed to so extraordinary a knowledge. In other words, the brain of the Child-Christ could not accomodate itself to the knowledge of vision or infused knowledge, especially if we maintain that both kinds of knowledge were perfect from the very beginning. This difficulty springs from a false principle; for, as remarks de Lugo, the beatific vision and infused knowledge are not operations of the human compositum, but operations of the soul alone, or of the soul transformed by the grace of God and having attained its fullest development, that is, of the soul raised up by preternatural dispositions and preternatural help. The soul of the Savior, then, and much more the soul of the Child-Christ, was capable of receiving the beatific vision and infused knowledge.

We cannot well understand the theology of St. Thomas

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2. De Inc., disp. xxii, sect. i, n° 5-11: *Christus non habuit regulariter  ullam operationem humanam nisi dependenter ab organis et dispositionibus connaturatis; sicut alii homines: nec enim ambulabat donec habuit organa bene disposita, nec loquebatur in infantia. Ergo nec habuit operationem humanam phantasiæ ante organum bene dispositum; ergo nec operationem intelligendi quia hæc tam pendet a phantasia quam phantasma ab organo disposito. Dixi operationem humanam intelligendi, ut excludam scientiam beatam et infusam et connaturalem animæ separatæ; hæ enim non sunt operationes hominis ut hominis, sed operationes animæ solius independentes omnino a materia.*
on this question, we are told, unless we take his point of view, which is quite subjective. If, says the Holy Doctor, the Word is made flesh, the body He takes must possess all the perfections compatible with the ends of the Incarnation. He ought, consequently, to have the beatific vision, infused knowledge, and acquired knowledge. But, let us observe again, such a construction must necessarily seem artificial to one who looks at the question from the objective point of view, that is to say, from the point of view of known facts. Is it necessary that the human intellect of Christ should know the same thing in so many ways? Would it not answer all purposes for Him to know it in a single way, be that what it may?

Such an objection, though at first sight quite specious, can be but the outcome of an imperfect knowledge of the theology it presumes to criticise. If we make a clear distinction between infused knowledge and experimental knowledge, as St. Thomas does, and this we must do if we claim that Christ did not possess infused knowledge of the second degree — we must see that these two kinds of knowledge bear upon different objects altogether, and do not duplicate each other. There is no doubt but the Savior's human soul knows by His knowledge of vision all that He knows by His infused knowledge and from His experimental knowledge. But, as St. Thomas says, it was not enough that Christ see God, and in God, by the beatific vision, see all creatures; it was fit also that He should know these beings in themselves, and by the light which makes them intelligible 1. It is quite one thing to see beings in their divine ideal, another to see them in themselves, as they really are. There would, then, have been something lacking in the Savior's knowledge if he had not had infused knowledge and experimental knowledge 2.

1. *Sum. theol.*, III. q. ix, a. 3.
2. We see it often stated that St. Bonaventure held that Christ's human
The theology of St. Thomas seems to us quite satisfactory. In propounding this teaching, the Holy Doctor and his disciples did not pretend to rob the question of all difficulties. Better than any one, perhaps, they understood that if it is so hard for an individual to know himself, it would be the height of absurdity for them to attempt to penetrate into the depths of the human soul which the divine Word made His by the hypostatic union. But at any rate, they have explained the mystery as far as our poor reason has a right to seek explanation; and after all, though there remains in their doctrine « enough obscurity for those who are not willing to see », there is « enough light for those who really wish to see ». 

The Theory of Loisy. — The starting point of Loisy's theology is his pet theory on Christ's teachings about the kingdom of heaven. The ordinary object of the preaching of Jesus, he claims, is the kingdom of heaven; and from the view point of this kingdom does Christ propound all his doctrines. But what is the nature of this kingdom?

During the latter half of the last century before Christ and at the beginning of our Christian era, men were looking for some frightful upheaval and overthrow of the social and cosmological order. The present world was to end, and a new order of things was to take its place. This was to be the manifestation of the justice of God on earth. The Messias was suddenly to appear. He was to judge the people of Israel and their oppressors; and he was to separate

soul had not infused knowledge, because it seemed to the saint that this knowledge would have been of no use. We have carefully perused all the references given, and we have been able to discover no such statement in his works. Here, on the contrary, is what the holy Doctor asserts : Habitus et species impressae fuerunt ipsi animae Christi in omnimoda plenitudine; hinc est quod Christus proficere non potuit cognitione simplicis notitiam (sed experientia tantum). In III Sent., dist. xiv, a. 3, q. 2.

3. Pascal, section vii, 430.
the good from the bad. The wicked were to be segregated and were to undergo dire punishment. This was to mark the beginning of the Messianic Kingdom, called the Kingdom of God, or the Kingdom of Heaven. It was to be the new theocracy, far superior to the first, and governed by the Messias in the name of God. The kingdom was to extend to the limits of the earth, and the Gentiles were to be called to form part of it. It was to belong primarily, however, to the children of Abraham; and Jerusalem was to remain the center of the religious world. There was to be unlimited material prosperity, but the kingdom was to be, first of all, one of holiness, that is, it was to be the kingdom of the life of God in the hearts of men. Such was the eschatological kingdom looked for by the contemporaries of Christ. It bears three distinct characteristics: First, it was to be catastrophic, that is, it was to be brought about by the overthrow of the present order of things; secondly, it was future, but not very far off; and lastly, it was to be national, though open to the Gentiles.

But did Christ really limit Himself to the preaching of this kingdom? Was the dominant note of His Gospel the eschatological note? Did Christ announce a kingdom that was to come in the near future, and that was to be catastrophic and national? Did He not rather speak of a kingdom that was to be above all a spiritual kingdom; of a kingdom that was present, by very reason of the fact that He himself was in the world; and a kingdom that was to be simply universal?

Loisy maintains that Christ went not beyond the eschatological kingdom expected by his contemporaries, though he refined their idea of it somewhat. The Savior's preaching, according to Loisy, may be summed up in the one

1. For a fuller account of the doctrine of the kingdom of God among Christ's contemporaries, see pp. 65-68 of this work.
text: « Do penance, for the kingdom of God is at hand » 1. In accordance with the eschatological view, conversion from sin and expiation for sin are necessary. Such was the message of Jesus; and the Gospel merely develops this idea 2. Consequently, when Christ sends his Apostles to preach, all that he tells them is this: « The kingdom of God is at hand » 3. He assures his disciples that many of them will be still alive, when the kingdom comes 4. And because the kingdom is near, he warns them to watch 5, to be ready 6, and to make good use of the talents that they have received. When his attention is called to the fact that Elias has not yet come, he answers that Elias came in the person of John the Baptist 7.

If a text seems to contradict his view, Loisy explains it away, quietly affirming that it is part of a « secondary stratum of Gospel tradition ». In this way he explains, for example, those passages in which Jesus affirms that, since the devils are cast out, the kingdom of God has come 8.

Loisy's views of the eschatological kingdom lead him to restrict in a singular manner the knowledge of Christ. The kingdom was not realized, at least under the exact form given in the Savior's teaching. Hence, he argues, Christ was ignorant of the future of his own work, the future of the Christian religion. Christ announced the Kingdom; lo came the Church 9.

Consistently with his view, Loisy would be compelled to affirm not only that Christ did not know the outcome

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1. Mat., iv, 17.
3. Mat., x, 7.
4 Mat., xvi, 28.
5. Mat., xxiv, 44; xxv, 1-12.
7. Mat., xvii, 12.
8. Mat., xvii, 12.
of his own work, but further that he was mistaken about it; for, in this case, it is no longer question of Christ's silence on a certain point, as it is in St. Mark \(^1\), but of the positive announcement of a fact which would not have come to pass. Here Christ's ignorance and error would consist in the fact that he believed and taught that the kingdom to come was to be the eschatological kingdom which had been heralded before the time of Christ, and not the purely spiritual kingdom that was to consist in the renewal of heart.

Thus, then, according to Loisy, Christ mistook for the same thing the essential element of the kingdom and the eschatological circumstances under which this kingdom was to appear. In this error, he was following the prophets and the apocalyptic authors. Moreover this eschatological form of kingdom was the only definite form that his mind could conceive of the absolute justice of God towards the elect, and towards the Son whom He had sent and who was to be thus glorified by Him. That this form of Jesus thought should now appear to us as merely symbolical, and not as really descriptive of the actual kingdom, as the anticipated history foreshadowing what was really to happen, is something at which we should be neither surprised nor scandalized.\(^2\)

**Criticism of Loisy's Doctrine.** — According to Loisy, Christ, in confounding the essential element of the Kingdom with the eschatological form under which it was to appear, made a gross mistake, since he taught that the kingdom that was to come was the eschatological kingdom and not that wholly spiritual kingdom that was to consist in the renewal of heart. And this error bearing on one of the essential

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1. Mark, xiii, 32.
2. L'Evangile et l'Église, pp. 108-111. — Loisy's views ventilated in L'Evangile et l'Église and in Autour d'un petit livre, have been restated and examined in the light of the texts involved, in his Évangiles synoptiques, vol. I-II.
points of Christ's doctrine, led into error or strengthened in their error, the Apostles and the first generation of Christians.

Now, such an assertion is something unheard of in Christian Tradition. The Greek Fathers, it is true, asked whether Christ, in His human knowledge, which was purely natural, was ignorant of certain things which He afterwards learned; but they never raised the question as to whether Christ had erred. In their opinion, error always implied some imperfection, and it was thought unworthy of the Word of God to assume a human nature subject to such infirmity.

This identification of error with moral imperfection, or sin, is not peculiar to the doctrine of the Greek Fathers; it flows quite naturally from the different ways of looking at the relation between intelligence and moral truth. « Truth », says Schleiermacher, « is the natural state of man; his faculties in their normal condition ought to lead him to it. Ignorance and doubt are not error; error enters only when the mind arrives at a false conclusion. Error can come, then, only when the mind has stopped too soon in its search after truth; and the mind, consequently, must have failed to love truth as it deserves, or it must have had some hidden interest in accepting this or that incomplete result. It is, therefore, quite impossible to distinguish absolutely between error and sin, at least in the order of truths which concern conscience and the soul. »

Error could not exist in the human soul of the Savior. To maintain that Christ made a mistake would be to deny His divinity. Moreover, although Loisy affirmed that Christ was « God to faith », and in another place that « the sentiment which Jesus had of his union with God is beyond all definition; it is enough to establish the fact that the expression

that he himself gave of it is, so for as we can grasp it, substantially equivalent to the Church's definition"¹, many fair intellects believed from the first that Loisy was bringing into question the absolute divinity of Christ. That there may have been other reasons leading Loisy to this conclusion, is quite possible. No one will deny that the view he entertained on the error of Christ in an essential point of His teaching, was in itself sufficient to lead him to this sad conclusion.

But, while the hypothesis of error in the human intellect of Christ is incompatible with the dogma of the hypostatic union, the same does not hold with respect to a certain ignorance in Christ's intellect. Error is a positive evil; ignorance but an infirmity. And we are well aware that Christ did not shrink from taking upon Himself our infirmities.

Yet, to admit that the human intellect of Christ did not know from the beginning, by supernatural light — and by supernatural light we mean the light of glory which imparts beatific vision, and the preternatural lights which impart infused knowledge, — all that it could know, is to break away from all patristic and scholastic tradition, and to propound a doctrine which seems quite irreconcilable with the dogma of the hypostatic union. If, on the other hand, we admit that the acquired knowledge of the Savior was constantly increasing, and that the Savior, at any period of His life whatsoever, always knew what it was proper for Him to know, we find that there is nothing in this that can shock the mind of a well-informed Catholic. This view, in fact, is the commonly accepted one in theology. « Can we not suppose », very justly observes Lepin, « that the Savior's supernatural knowledge, which had as its object all that can be derived from the divine light into a created intellect, and which attained with certainty to a knowledge of the last day, as well as of the other points with which His mission was concerned, dwelt in some way in a superior region of His soul, whence it influenced

partially and discreetly the knowledge that was to regulate His practical conduct and guide His speech? Can it not be admitted that Christ had an infused knowledge, a knowledge of the highest order, in perfect agreement with His ordinary practical knowledge; a knowledge excellent, to be sure, yet limited; incompatible with error, yet subject to ignorance; a knowledge subject to the influence of His higher light, in so far as conformable to His mission; and for the rest, more or less dependent upon His human resources? Such an hypothesis would very well account for the words of Jesus regarding His ignorance of the last day; it would explain the reserve and lack of precision that appear in His eschatological discourses; it would account fully for the testimonies that point to an experimental and progressive knowledge in Christ; and finally, it would in no way minimize that superior knowledge which is required by the hypostatic union, and to which Christ's whole history so thoroughly attests. 

Loisy's conclusions cannot, therefore, be admitted. But what are we to think of the difficulties that he has raised apropos of Christ's teaching on the Kingdom of God.

We grant, without the least hesitation, that the Savior's doctrine all points to the proclamation of the Kingdom of God; and that this is the central idea in Christ's teaching.

Loisy holds that Christ limited himself to presenting a more elevated view of the eschatological kingdom expected by his contemporaries, that is, a catastrophic kingdom, a kingdom to come in the near future, a national kingdom.

While some texts seem to give authority to such an interpretation, a greater number of others show, on the contrary, that Jesus speaks of a kingdom that is to be above all spiritual, that is present by the very fact that He Himself is personally in the world, an absolutely universal kingdom; in a word, a kingdom altogether transcending that looked for by the Jews.

For instance, we see that the kingdom is to be set up not by the sudden destruction and transformation of the world, but by the renewal of hearts. If anyone would be fitly converted, he must do penance for his sins and believe in him that God has sent. Then will he belong to the Kingdom of God. The chief manifestations of the life of the kingdom are mercy, the love of God, and the love of one's neighbour. Such a life is a sure pledge of life eternal. All these features point to the fact that the kingdom preached by Christ is wholly spiritual. So, too, this kingdom is present in the sense that it is established in the soul insensibly and by degrees in proportion as the Gospel is received; it is like the seed, which is sown and then grows silently, sprouting and expanding little by little. The kingdom is in your midst, says Jesus, and each one tries to enter therein. The proof of this is evident: the coming of the kingdom is to be contemporaneous with the victory over devils; and since devils are cast out, Jesus argues that the kingdom must have come.

Finally, Christ had no political aim; above all He had no intention of founding a sort of universal theocracy, the hegemony of which was to be entrusted to the Jewish people with the Messias at their head. On the contrary, He preached that the master of the vineyard would exterminate the vinedressers and give the vineyard to others, showing thereby that the kingdom of God would be taken from the Jews and given to mankind. Because the children of the kingdom refused to come to the feast prepared for them, the father of the family sent his servants out into the highways and the

3. Mat., ix, 2, 22; xv, 28.
5. Mat., xiii. — Mark, iv, 14-34.
7. Mat., xii, 28.
byways to gather in guests. "Many," says Christ, "will come from the east and the west, and will take their places at the feast with Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, in the kingdom of heaven, while the children of the kingdom will be thrown out into exterior darkness." The sermon on the mount is addressed to the whole world; and our Lord, when about to leave His Apostles, sends them to preach the Gospel to all men.

Though the kingdom preached by Christ is preeminently a spiritual kingdom, and a kingdom that is present because His own person has been given to the world, and finally a universal kingdom, yet we must admit that a certain number of texts will bear out the assertion that Christ preached at the same time a kingdom whose establishment was to be marked by frightful catastrophes, a kingdom which was to come in the near future, and which was to be national.

How are we to explain this dualism? Loisy meets the difficulty, as we have seen, by saying that the first portion of this preaching formed no part of the Savior's teachings, but represents the interpretation of the Apostles. Others mostly German deny more or less radically the authenticity of the second part.

According to Batiffol, the Savior's teaching bore not only upon the ruin of Jerusalem, but also on the end of the world. Though the evangelists reproduce faithfully the words of Jesus, they allow to creep in some of their apprehensions regarding the end of the world. This explains the difficulties found in some of the texts. Such influences it is the work of the exegete to pick out, to restrict, and to correct.

It seems to us that the doctrine of the end of the world forms an integral part of the Lord's teaching. There is one place in particular where editorial influence can be detected. This is the passage where it says that the disciples will still be living when the end comes¹, and that this generation will not pass away until all these things be accomplished². This we find stated otherwise in St. Luke. According to this Gospel, a long time is to elapse between the destruction of Jerusalem and the end of the existing universe, in order that Christian principles may gain authority in the world³. We must not, however, exaggerate the extent of this editorial influence in the Gospels. It may easily be that Jesus Himself, though He did not group all these events together, represented them in foreshortened perspective. He may have been speaking after the manner of the prophets; and the fact that He represented these events as almost on the same plane, does not necessarily imply that they were not separate in His mind.

If, in the course of His earthly career, Jesus was to fulfil only a part of His Messianic plan and leave the remainder for the end of the world, we can readily see how He might have represented the Kingdom of God as at once present and future. This explains the other aspect of His apparently dualistic teaching.

We have yet to examine another question; viz., how Christ could speak of a kingdom that was to be universal and yet national. Too much stress must not be put upon this feature of the Gospels; for, as a matter of fact, the Gospels do not dwell much upon the national character of the Kingdom of God. It is true that Christ claimed as the special end of His mission, the restricted apostolate of the sheep

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¹ Mat., xvi, 28.
² Mat., xvi, 34.
that were lost of the house of Israel. But while He said that it was proper that the children of the kingdom should take the first seats He showed by His whole teaching and His attitude that, in His mind, the restriction of salvation to the Jews alone, was to be merely temporary. He declared on several occasions that the Gospel of the Kingdom was to be preached to the whole world.

As a result of these considerations, we must conclude that the starting point of Loisy's theology that our Lord was content to proclaim in a purified form the eschatological kingdom expected by His contemporaries is altogether wrong. So, too, are the conclusions which he deduced from his false premises and afterwards tried to bolster up.

What the Church Condemned. — We have already seen how Eulogius opposed the doctrine of the Agnoetae. The acts of the Patriarch of Alexandria were approved by St. Gregory the Great. The Pope told Eulogius that his doctrine agreed with the teachings of St. Augustine, and that he had forced the Agnoeta Leporius to subscribe to it. From that time on, it has generally been admitted that Christ's human intellect knew, by supernatural light, all that it was capable of knowing; though this did not prevent Christ from having acquired, or experimental knowledge, susceptible of actual increase, but never defective.

This was the view held by St. Thomas and his entire school. Suarez held that the opposite doctrine was wrong

1. Mat., x, 6, xv, 24.
3. Cf. V. Rose, Studies on the Gospels, The Kingdom of God, pp. 123-124: *Israel is the chosen field of the Savior: it is the first to be called, it is the heir to which the chief legacy. But the fact no less remains that, from the outset of the Messianic manifestation, the whole world comes into the plane of spiritual conquest; and if He kept Israel for Himself, He gave to His disciples the universe as the field of their apostolate.*
and almost heretical. Petau also shared in this view.

In the decree Lamentabili, Pope Pius X condemned the proposition that said that « the natural sense of the Gospel texts is irreconcilable with the teachings of theology on the consciousness and the infallible knowledge of Jesus »; and also the proposition that said that « it is evident to all that are not guided by preconceived views, either that Jesus taught error about the early advent of the kingdom, or that the greater part of the doctrine found in the synoptic Gospels is absolutely unauthentic. These are the views held by Loisy and by Wellhausen.

Hence, the theological notes which Suarez affixes to the opinion of those who hold that there was incomplete knowledge in the Savior's human intellect, seem to us the only words apt to designate Loisy's views: they are erroneous and very near to heresy; and the contradictory doctrine, which we maintain, is a doctrine that is certain and almost defined.

ARTICLE III

Sentiments in the Savior's Soul.

The Psychology of Sentiments. — The word passion,
is used in two different senses: in a broad sense it is used to designate any affective phenomenon, be its nature what it may; it then means sensations, or feelings. This is the meaning attached to the word by the Scholastics and by the 17th century writers. In a more restricted sense — now quite common in modern philosophy — it means any affective phenomenon of greater intensity, or an affective phenomenon that is not only intense but also inordinate; that is, a phenomenon whose trend is contrary to the moral law.

But, in theology, the term passion, in a general sense, means any affective phenomenon, whether ordinary or more intense. To express disorder in the passions, theologians use the word concupiscence. It is in this sense that we used these terms in discussing the questions of the sanctity of Christ, as we do also when speaking of original sin, and of grace.

The two manifestations of passion, understood in the latter sense, are either sensations or sentiments. Sensation is not a representative phenomenon, but an affective one following upon a sensible representation or a simple organic impression; as, for example, the suffering of hunger or of thirst, or the feeling of pleasure that follows upon the gratification of either. It is material good that determines the sensation, and this determination is brought about either by the sensible representation of the material good or by its impression.

It is in these two features that sentiment differs from sensation. What determines sentiment is good of the spiritual order; as, for example, the perfection of our neighbor, the setting up of the kingdom of God in their hearts. This determination itself is consequent upon an idea, properly so called; that is, it flows from a phenomenon equally spiritual. But so close is the unity in man, that sentiment nearly always has its counterpart, so to speak, in the sensations, just as sensation easily provokes sentiment; and
sometimes the two are so bound up together that it is quite impossible for us to disengage them.

Sentiments in the Savior’s Soul. — This brief sketch will enable us to consider the Savior under a singularly interesting and instructive aspect: interesting, because it is in this that our Lord appears more clearly as man, like ourselves; instructive, because the sentiments of our Lord are so elevated that their very contemplation must elicit our admiration and our love for Him.

Now Jesus underwent the physical sufferings of hunger, of thirst, and of fatigue, as other men do. But, He also experienced human sentiments like our own. Thus He underwent suffering in all its forms: He experienced sadness so extreme that He wept; He experienced great joy, sympathy, anguish, indignation, horror and agony. No one no matter how much he may have suffered, can say to Him: «Lord, my sufferings are greater than Thine.»

Christ, then, experienced human sentiments like our own; and from what has been said, we can see how much

1. Mat., iv, 2. — John, iv, 6-8.
4. Mat., ix, 36.
9. Theologians have ever tried to explain how the Savior, enjoying the beatific vision as He did, could undergo such sufferings. The supreme happiness that must have filled His soul, hypostatically united to the divinity, did not prevent the bitter sadness in the Garden of Olives, nor the anguish on the cross. The glory, which, by virtue of this hypostatic union, must have full possession of His sacred body, had its effects suspended, as it were, in the oblation which the victim made of Himself from the moment of His entry into the world, until His last moment on Calvary. His glory broke through but for an instant, in His glorious transfiguration. The enjoyment of the beatific vision was limited to the superior part of Christ’s humanity; and only on the day of His resurrection did He enter completely into this glory.
delicacy and elevation there must have been in His soul. There were in the Savior’s soul, just as in the souls of men, passions, but passions freed from all concupiscence. His passions were perfectly ordered as to their object, that is, the good towards which they tended and inclined the Savior’s will; and in their source, too, since they were in no way the manifestation of a corrupted nature, and, finally, in their effects, since they did not disturb His will or the perfect calm of His intellect. The passions in Christ were, then, motions towards good, subject to His reason and His will, and causing none of those disturbances so closely allied to sin. We must not think, however, that Christ’s passions had lost all spontaneity. This would be to deprive His human nature of all its charm, and to take away from it one of the most beautiful features of our humanity¹.

1. There are, then, two natures in Christ, the divine nature and the human nature; but there is only one person, the person of the Word.

Now, it may happen that the nouns or adjectives belonging strictly to one of these two natures idiomata, are applied to the other, and vice versa. In this case, there is a kind of interchange of nouns and adjectives belonging properly to either, a communicatio idiomatum. It may be that this communication is not always in strict conformity with the truth. Thus, it would be false to say that Christ’s divinity is mortal, or that His humanity is divine.

It is quite important, then, to determine the rules to be followed, so as to avoid going counter to the truth in predicating of one of the natures the terms that belong properly to the other. In dialectics, that of which a thing is predicated is called the subject, or matter; that which is affirmed or denied of the subject is called the predicate or form. The nominative is called the direct case; the other cases are called indirect, or oblique cases.

A concrete noun is one that contains at once the subject and the form. It connotes the subject in the direct case, and the attribute in the oblique case. Take, for example, the concrete noun philosophus. This noun is equivalent to the expression subjectum habens philosophiam; in English, a man of knowledge.

An abstract noun designates only the form, but this in the direct case. An adjective designates only the form, but this in the indirect case.

From these principles we lay down the rules that govern the interchange of predicates.

Rule I : Communicatio idiomatum semper licita est in concrexis. Concrete nouns designating one nature can have as predicates nouns or adjectives
connoting the other nature. Thus, we may say: *Verbum est homo* — a simple attributive construction. We may also say: *Verbum est unus ex hominibus*, that is, one of the individual belonging to the human race — a case of attribution by specification. It is correct to say: *Verbum Incarnatum est hic homo* — an attribution by identification, for the attribute merely reproduces the subject.

Rule II: *Communicatio idiomatum generaliter prohibetur in abstractis.* Abstract nouns that belong properly to one of the two natures, cannot, as a rule, be predicated of nouns, either abstract or concrete, connoting the other nature. Thus, we should not say: *Humanitas est divinitas*, or *Divinitas est homo*.

We say *in general*, because in God the hypostasis and the substance are identical, and it may be that the word *divinitas* is used only apparently in the abstract, and that it stands in reality for the *Word*. If such were the case, it might, for instance, be said: *Divinitas passa est*.

Rule III: *Adjectiva non sumentur, nisi ex contextu servetur unio hypostatica.* Since there are adjectives that belong to either nature, we must take care to see in which sense they are used. If they imply that the human nature is united to the Word only accidently, we must discard them. It would be wrong to say, for instance: *Christus est deiificatus, seu est habens aliquid deitatis*; but it is correct to say: *Christus est divinus.*
CHAPTER III

CAUSES OF THE INCARNATION

General Idea. — The dogma of the Incarnation affirms the union of the finite with the infinite in the person of the Word. Though such a mystery is more than we can fathom, human reason still has a right to inquire into its causes, with the conviction that, impenetrable as the mystery in itself may be, a study of it must throw some light on the question.

Hence, we shall consider the three causes of the Incarnation: the final cause, the meritorious cause, and the efficient cause.

The Final Cause of the Incarnation. — Without a doubt the decree of the Incarnation was prompted by a number of ends, such as the glory of God through the glorification of the Word, the Redemption of the human race from the bondage of sin, and the instruction and edification of men.

But of all these causes, was not the Redemption the principal end, the determining motive? If man had not sinned, would the Redemption have taken place at all?

All admit as a datum of faith that the Incarnation, with all its attendant humiliating circumstances of suffering and death, was decreed by the Almighty with a view to the Redemption of the human race from the slavery of sin. Such is the doctrine of all the councils of the fourth and the fifth centuries; and their formulas on this point have
always been the same: *Qui propter nos homines et propter nostram salutem incarnatus est.* It is admitted on all sides that, had there been no sin, the Word would not have become Incarnate in a body passible and mortal. It is even granted that, had there been no fall, the Incarnation would have been possible, and even quite becoming.

But, as to the question now before us, some say that God decreed the Incarnation of the Word independently of the fact that he foresaw that man was to fall; that the Word would have been made flesh, even though man had not sinned. They hold that the fact that the Incarnation took place in a flesh that was passible and mortal, is due to God's prevision of the fall of man. Such was the opinion of Scotus\(^1\), of Suarez\(^2\), and of St. Francis of Sales\(^3\).

The others maintain that God decreed the Incarnation only because of His prevision of the sin of man, and that had man not sinned, the Word would not have become Incarnate. This was the opinion of St. Thomas\(^4\), of St. Bonaventure\(^5\), of Vasquez\(^6\), of Cardinal de Lugo\(^7\), of Petan\(^8\), and of Hürter\(^9\), and Pesch\(^10\).

According to the Scotistic opinion, the first plan of the creation, or the first intention of God, would have been as follows: The first object of the decree was the glorification of the Word, which consists in the union of the Word to a human nature, perfect in its order and perfect in the order of supernatural goods. God then created angels and men,

1. *In III*\(^m\), dist. VII, q. iii.
3. Treatise on the love God, l. II, ch. iv.
4. *Sum. theol.*, III\(^a\), q. 1, a. 3.
5. *In III Sent.*, dist. I, q. ii, a. 2.
6. *In III*\(^m\), disp. I, c. I.
8. *De Inc.*, l, II, c. xvii, n. 7.
to serve as a sort of court to the Incarnate Word. In order that they might be worthy of attending the Incarnate Word, these beings were to be perfect, each in his own order, and perfect in the order of supernatural goods. These gifts both natural and supernatural, were to be given these creatures solely in view of the Incarnate Word. And lastly, always with the same aim in view, God would decree the creation of the most perfect world possible.

Had the first plan been realized. God would, according to the order of execution, which is the reverse of the order of intention, have first created a most perfect world, and then men and angels, both perfect in the gifts of nature and of grace. Midway in the course of time, the Word would have appeared in a glorified human nature.

It was possible, however, to thwart the divine plan. According to God's will, men and angels were to be free creatures who, by the proper use of their wills, might permit the primitive plan to be carried out; and, by the misuse of this same free will, might cause the Almighty to modify His first designs, though they could not nullify them altogether.

Now, God foresaw from all eternity the fall of men and angels; and just as He conceived from all eternity the plan to be carried out if angels and men did not fall, so, too, from all eternity He conceived the modified plan that was actually to be carried out, since men and angels were to fall. Both the primitive and the modified plans, since they were conceived from all eternity, bear to each other but a logical relation of anteriority and posteriority.

According to this second plan, then, the divine Word, before entering into glory, was to renounce freely this glory, and to pass through a period of humiliation and suffering, even to the death of the cross. In this way was He to expiate the sins of men, though not of angels. After the accomplishment of this task, He was to be glorified. For his sin, man was to be condemned to misery in body and
soul; he was to regain only gradually the glory that God had destined to be his, and this by struggling painfully against the difficulties besetting him on all sides, and by uniting himself by love to the risen Christ. The world, also, was to be modified after the fall; instead of being an object of enjoyment for man, it was to be an object of pain and of physical suffering. The order of execution in either case is just the reverse of the order of intention; and either may be found by the simple inversion of the other.

This synthesis lacks neither beauty nor grandeur; nor are the arguments offered in its support without strength. The Incarnation is God's supreme work; it manifests, more than all His other works, His love, His wisdom, His power, and His holiness. To say that such a work was designed primarily with a view to the sin of man, and with a purely utilitarian object — hat of supplying the great means of reparation, — seems but little in accord with our idea of the nature of God. Furthermore, as says the council of Trent, the end of our justification is the glory of the Incarnate Word, and, hence, the glory of God. The glory of the Incarnate Word would be secured through the Redemption, but let us remember that God must have willed the end — that is, the glory of his Word — before the means — that is, the Redemption.

The Scotistic opinion is no doubt well-founded. The only exception that we take to it, on rational grounds, is that it implies in God several successive decrees. To this objection, the Scotists answer that God saw and decreed all things at the same time, and that the sequence in previsions and decrees exists only in our own minds, when we try to picture to ourselves the designs of the Almighty.

The Scotistic opinion is considered as probable. Even St. Thomas concedes that it may be said with probability that

1. Sess. VI, c. vii; Denz., 799. *Justificationis causax sunt finalis quidem gloria Dei et Christi.*
the Incarnation would have taken place, even had there been no fall.

Be this as it may, the contrary opinion, known as the Thomistic, is usually held as the more probable. The reason for this, says St. Bonaventure, is that while less well-founded than the other on a priori grounds, it is more in conformity with the authority of the Sacred Books.

In truth, it is evident, as we shall soon see, that throughout the Gospel, Jesus always says that He was sent for the salvation of men. It is evident that He foresaw and accepted His death as the chief part of His Messianic mission.

The Scotists have tried to weaken this argument by saying that the Gospel treats of the Incarnation only in its humiliating aspect, and not as it would have been if man had not committed sin. To anyone familiar with the doctrine of the New Testament, this answer must indeed appear somewhat subtle.

Furthermore, when it is question of explaining the designs of the Almighty, the simplest views are usually the soundest. On this score the Thomistic view must certainly find preference. A few deft strokes will suffice to sketch the Creator's design of the world. God decrees that angels and men shall be created, and that, at the same time, they shall be raised by His grace to a supernatural order. Man is to be free: he can sin, or he need not. If he chooses to sin, he will lose grace and all his descendants will come into the world without grace. The second alternative was the one

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1. In III Sent., dist. I, q. 1, a. 3, sol.
2. In III Sent., dist. I, q. 11, a. 2: Quis horum modorum dicendi verior sit, novit ille, qui pro nobis incarnari dignatus est. Quis etiam horum aliter pra ponendus sit, difficile est videre, pro eo quod uterque modus catholicus est et a viris catholicis sustinetur. Uterque etiam modus excital animam ad devotionem secundum diversas considerationes. Videtur autem primus modus (postea scotistarum) magis consonare judicio rationis; secunda tamen (postea thomistarum) plus constat pietati fidei, quia auctoribus Sanctorum et Sacrae Scripturae magis concordat.
that was to be realized. Then God, in order to redeem man from the bondage of sin, decreed the Redemption of the world through the Incarnation of the Word in a flesh passible and mortal.

The Necessity of the Incarnation. — Whether the principal motive of the Incarnation is the glorification of Christ and of God, or the Redemption of the world, we ask ourselves in what measure this motive determines or necessitates the fact of the Incarnation.

St. Anselm, in his Cur Deus homo, undertakes to prove from reason, apart from the Gospel and Tradition, that, given the fall of man, the Incarnation was necessary. The following is a brief of his arguments. From the moment that God decreed that man should be created, since He foresaw the fall, He must at the same time have decreed the restoration of this fallen humanity. This would be in accord with the absolute order. Restoration was possible only by a satisfaction equal to the offense; that is, by a satisfaction of infinite value. But such a satisfaction is clearly beyond the reach of man. Hence, to offer to God the homage which His justice demands, the Word of God must become Incarnate.

If the first part of the argument be admitted, the conclusion necessarily follows. But to maintain that God, since He foresaw the fall, could not create man without at the same time decreeing his restoration by offering a satisfaction equal to the offense, is to bind God by a necessity that is altogether irreconcilable with His liberty. Furthermore, we thereby make the Incarnation itself dependent upon this necessity, whereas Holy Writ represents the work of the Incarnation as above all a manifestation of God's love and of His mercy upon sinful man. It must be confessed that there is no limit to the straying of human reason when it undertakes to explain,

1. Cf. I. i, c. 11, 15, 20, 21; P. L., CLVIII.
unassisted, the mysteries of God. St. Anselm’s view on the question is quite generally rejected.

Some philosophers, adopting even more extreme views than that of St. Anselm, have gone so far as to say that, by the very hypothesis of the Creation, the Incarnation was necessary on God’s part. If God, says Malebranche, deigns to create a world, he must make it a world that will be to His glory. Now, to attain this end, the world must in some way show the eminent perfections of its maker; for a work does honor to its maker by revealing some of the excellences in which its author glories. Only by God’s finding some way to render His work divine, could it attain to this dignity; and there could be no other way to accomplish this but by union with a divine person.

Against these authors we maintain that the Incarnation was necessary to God neither as the consequence of His pre- vision of the fall nor as its antecedent. God is free in His external operations, and He is in no way held to seek in them the greatest perfection.

Even after the fall, God might have decreed not to redeem man, and consequently to deprive him forever of eternal life. If instead of doing this, He decreed the Redemption of man by the Incarnation of His divine Son, it is due simply to His goodness.

Likewise, God could have raised man again to the supernatural order without exacting any satisfaction at all, or only an imperfect satisfaction. He might, for example, have brought men to contrition for their sins, by His grace; or He might have entrusted the work of humanity’s expiation to a just man, raised to an extraordinary degree of sanctity.

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1. We shall take up this question more at length in our third part, p. 330-333.
However, in the hypothesis that God would require adequate satisfaction, — and this has been the case — the Incarnation became necessary; for it is true that the gravity of the offense depends upon the dignity of the person offended, and man's sin offers God an insult as it were infinite. Now, such an injury, only the homage of the Incarnate Word could repair.

The Fitness of the Incarnation. — Though the Incarnation was not antecedently necessary, or became necessary only on the condition that God would require adequate satisfaction, yet it was most fitting that it should take place, no matter in what light we view it.

God is holiness itself; nothing is more opposed to Him than sin, for sin is the denial of God. In order, therefore, to show man the enormity of sinful disorder, though might have granted His pardon without any exaction whatsoever, or might have accepted only partial satisfaction, God imposed an adequate satisfaction that could be rendered only by the bloody death of the Incarnate Word.

In this way, He proves to us His infinite love. On the whole, had God pardoned us without any satisfaction at all, or with only partial satisfaction, He would thereby have taught us less effectively His detestation of sin; He would have shown less love for us, since to love is to give one's self. But in the Incarnation, God went to the extreme in giving Himself, for here He united Himself hypostatically to our humanity in order to dwell amongst us and to suffer and die for us.

Again the Incarnation manifests in the highest degree the wisdom and the power of God. In His mercy, God would save sinful man; in His holiness, He would procure salvation by way of strict justice, that is, by exacting a work which could

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1. Thom. Aq., *Sum. theol.*, IIIa q. 1, a, 2, ad 2 mum. — Suarez, *De Inc.*, disp. IV, sect. 2, n. 5. — De Lugo, *De Inc.*, disp. V.
repair in a worthy manner the injury done. It remained for His wisdom to find a means of reconciliation. The Word of God would become Incarnate in an humble body and would offer the great sacrifice of expiation. Here the divine power intervened and completed this great work by uniting in one and the same person the infinite nature of God and the finite nature of man.

The Incarnation, altogether worthy of God as it is, wanted nothing to make it most fit for man also. By it God conferred upon man the inestimable dignity of the closest union with the divinity, and at the same time gave man the most sublime lessons on the horror with which sin should inspire him, and the respect that man owes his own nature, which was judged fit to be united to the Word of God.

It was quite fitting, also, that the Son rather than any other person should become Incarnate. In this way the same person was at once the Son of God and the Son of man; the world was restored by the Word of God, by whom it was first called out of nothing; for it is according to the image of this Word that the world was made.

The Meritorious Cause of the Incarnation. — Did man by his actions deserve to have the Word become Incarnate for him?

Before attempting to answer this question, we must make clear our idea of merit. Merit, as explained at length in the tract on Grace, is the claim that a good work has upon reward. There are two kinds of merit: the first is that which a work has in strict right, because the work itself possesses some intrinsic value and because there is a contract

between the one doing the work and him for whom it is done. This is called merit *de condigno*. The other is that which the work has merely by *reason of fitness*. In the second case, the work possesses a certain intrinsic value, but it is rewarded chiefly because it is done for a master, bountiful as well as powerful and merciful, who is pleased to shower his gifts upon others. This is called merit *de congruo*.

Now, clearly Christ in no way merited the Incarnation, since this great mystery was accomplished from the very moment of the Savior’s conception.

On the authority of the history of the people of Israel, it is taught that the Patriarchs of the Old Testament merited by their good works, but only *de congruo*, certain circumstances of the Incarnation, such as the assumption of human nature from the stock of Israel.

The question is also asked whether the Blessed Virgin merited to become the mother of the only Son of God, according to the flesh. The answer usually given is that she did merit this great privilege, but merely out of fitness. St. Thomas takes this congruous merit in its usual sense when he says that Mary, by her correspondence to the grace and the revelations given her, merited to become the Mother of God. Cardinal de Lugo has a long discussion on this point. The conclusion he comes to is that the Blessed Virgin merited this glorious privilege only by way of congruity very broadly understood. She merited to become the Mother of God in this sense, that she was found worthy to become the Mother according to the flesh of the Word of God. In liturgical language, where much use is made of this consideration, — as, for example, in the *Regina Caeli*, where it is said: *Quia quem meruisti portare.....*, — the word *mereri* is synonymous with *dignari*.

1. *Sum. theol.*, IIIa q. II, a. 11, ad 3um.
2. *De Lugo, De Inc.*, disp. V, VI, VII.
Efficient Cause of the Incarnation. — The Incarnation may mean either the action by which the Word of God was united to humanity — which might be translated into Latin by the word \textit{unicio}; or it may mean the permanent union of the Word of God with humanity — in Latin \textit{unio}.

The permanent union of the Word of God to humanity belongs properly to the Word of God, because, strictly speaking, it is the Word of God that became flesh. But the action by which this union was effected is something exterior to the divine life; it is what is called \textit{operatio ad extra}. All such operations belong to the three Persons in common. Hence, this union, in the active sense of \textit{unicio}, was effected by the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost. To illustrate this doctrine, we may consider a person who, with the aid of two other persons, puts on a garment. Only one person is clothed, but three persons cooperate in clothing that one.

If, however, we accept the Trinitarian theology of the Greek Fathers, according to whom the Holy Ghost is the term of the divine life, it will be said that the Incarnation, taken in the sense of \textit{unicio}, must be attributed rather to the third Person of the Trinity. This view, too, the Gospel narrative of the Infancy would seem to bear out.
PART THE THIRD

CHRIST THE REDEEMER

« I believe in only one Lord, Jesus Christ, the only Son of God, who for us men and for our salvation came down from heaven, and having taken flesh of the Virgin Mary, by the operation of the Holy Ghost, was made man, who for us was crucified and suffered under Pontius Pilate.... » So reads the creed that defines and exposes the dogma of the Redemption.

God might have pardoned us without exacting anything of us, but He did not choose to do so. He willed rather to accomplish this by Redemption, a Redemption that would give perfect satisfaction. In order to carry out this great plan, the Word of God, God of God, Light of Light, true God of true God, born of the Father before all ages, of the same nature as the Father, was made Incarnate in a flesh subject to suffering, to poverty, and to death.

The Incarnation of the Word in an humble flesh, is the first mysterious aspect of the dogma of the Redemption. To our limited intellect, it would seem that, if the Word became flesh, it must unite itself to a flesh not only free from sin, but even from all the consequences of sin. How could the eternal Word of the Father, infinitely holy, become the responsible subject of a humanity in which resided, in the

1. Denz., 86.
highest degree, some of the consequences of the sin of the first man! And yet, God so willed it, that Adam's sinful humanity might in Christ become an atoning humanity.

So, the Incarnation took place in lowly flesh; the work of expiation was begun. This alone might have sufficed; for, to accomplish an adequate redemption, it would have been enough for this poor humanity, to which the Word was now united, to send up one plaintive wail asking forgiveness of God the Father. Yet, according to the divine plan, the work was just beginning. « Holocausts for sin did not please thee. Then said I: Behold I come to do thy will, O God. »

Now become the victim for the sins of the human race, Jesus will spend His whole life in complete and perpetual sacrifice. Scarcely is He born when, despite the poverty by which He willed to be surrounded, He is persecuted.

After a period of silence and obscurity, the time comes for Him to proclaim to man that the Kingdom of God has come, that all men must do penance and believe in Him, if they would share in the kingdom. In accomplishing this part of His mission, Jesus not only spent Himself by giving Himself without measure, but He suffered, besides, all sorts of abuses from men from their rudeness, their indifference, their jealousy, their hypocrisy, their ingratitude, their treason, and their cruelty. But not a murmur; He knew neither hate nor contempt. Called blasphemer by the chiefs of the Jewish nation; treated like a fool; considered a base demagogue by the civil authorities and by the representatives of Caesar, the head of the civilized word; denied by Peter, the man of His right; beaten with whips, and crowned with thorns; fastened to the cross, the gibbet of those condemned to death, He stands everything, and the only words that fall from His dying lips are: « Father, forgive them: they know not what they do. »

2. Luke xxiii, 34
But we cannot linger here looking on at this sad spectacle of a victim surrounded by all the horrors of death. We must penetrate beneath the surface and behold the very soul of our Savior, if we would learn the extent of the sacrifice He is making. This awful death was in accordance with His will, just as were the countless humiliations that led up to it. Yes, Jesus accepted this sacrifice; and crushing as it appears to us, it is but a faint tongue to tell the sorrows that pierced His heart. But whence this extreme sorrow? It springs from His viewing the sins of men living lives obstinately opposed to the will of God; it comes from the love that He bears His heavenly Father; from His burning desire to reconcile mankind to His Father, by wiping out all sin from the world. Such are the sentiments that swell the heart of Jesus. In these dispositions of sorrowful anguish, of love, and of divine magnanimity, Christ the Redeemer, in the name of men of all times and of all lands, in the name of all humanity sprung from the sinful Adam, offers His sorrow and His bruised humanity to wipe out the sins of the world. When the task is accomplished, He dies contented: *Consummatum est.*

Such is the doctrine of the Redemption, considered as a whole. We shall now proceed to examine its various aspects, and to make each aspect the object of our minute investigation. We shall take up separately the fact of the Redemption; the character of this fact, or vicarious satisfaction; and its nature, or the work of the Redemption in itself. Finally, we shall study the three offices of Christ the Redeemer and the homage that we owe Him.

This will be done in five chapters, as follows:

Chapter I. — *The Fact of the Redemption.*
Chapter II. — *Vicarious Satisfaction.*
Chapter III. — *The Work of the Redemption.*
Chapter IV. — *The Three Offices of Christ the Redeemer.*
Chapter V. — *The Worship of Christ the Redeemer.*
CHAPTER FIRST

THE FACT OF THE REDEMPTION

As a result of the sin of the first man, all men are born in sin. They are, furthermore, all subject to concupiscence. Though concupiscence is not sin, still it is responsible for a great many sins.

Our condition, therefore, on coming into this world, is truly one of slavery. Besides the fact we carry about with us a weight, as it were, that hampers our souls in their noblest flights, we always feel a powerful inclination to sin.

Now, Jesus Christ, by His suffering and death, offered expiation for the sins of men.

Before giving us the life of grace, which was to remove from us the stain of sin and to hold in check the evil propensities of our nature, God willed that the homage of reparation be offered Him. This Christ rendered to God by offering an expiation in reparation, an expiation that was the price demanded by God's justice, and He thereby broke the fetters of sin and released us from its bondage. It was by His sufferings and death that Christ reclaimed all men from the servitude of sin.

This is the doctrine which the Church holds on the mystery of our Redemption. It is found in the Nicene creed, that of Constantinople and the Athanasian creed; and

1. Denz., 54.
2. Denz., 86.
3. Denz., 40.
almost every ecumenical council renewed the definition. We shall now examine the origin of this doctrine in Holy Writ and in the Tradition of the Fathers; then we shall study its exposition and its synthesis, as given by the theologians of the Middle Ages.

ARTICLE I

Holy Scripture.

§ I

THE DOCTRINE OF THE REDEMPTION IN THE OLD TESTAMENT.

The Prophecy of Isaiah. — God, whose goodness and mercy are infinite, would not leave man without hope. From the time of the fall, glimpses are given here and there of the main outlines of the Redemption.

A Messias was to come, who was to expiate by his sufferings the sins of the people. This Messias is prefigured in the sacrifice of Abraham, and in the various Levitical sacrifices, especially in that of the Paschal Lamb. The psalmist pictures this Messias in song, the seer foretells him in pro-

2. Genes., iii, 15. In this verse, God says that he will put enmity between the serpent, the symbol of the devil, and the woman, as well as all her posterity. But, "it is not only to Jesus Christ and to His work that this oracle applies. While Jesus represents in an eminent manner the posterity of the woman, there are other children included in that posterity. These are the faithful of both the Old and the New covenants, the best part of mankind, all the children of God who have been or who will be, in the course of the ages, in struggle with the posterity of the serpent, that is with the enemies of God and of His reign, who serve under the spirit of evil. This promise has been called the Prolevangelion, because it is the foreshadowing of the Gospel, as it were, or faint outline of the Messias ». A. Crandon, La Sainte Bible, p. 3, note.
4. Ps. xxii.
phecy. Nowhere do we find the doctrine more fully developed than in the second part of Isaias. The circumstances of the Savior's passion are there described down to the most minute detail. His death is represented as an expiation for the sins of the people. This part of Isaias has been justly called the *Passio secundum Isaiam*.

This is the important document that critics have vainly assailed, in order to convince men that the delineation of the suffering Just One is but a poetic personification of the just ones in Israel, who were to be stricken to save the nation:

LII, 13-15: « Behold my Servant, he will prosper; he shall be exalted and extolled, and shall be exceeding high. As many have been astonished at him, so inglorious was his visage, so strange his form among men, so will many rejoice in him; kings shall shut their mouths at him, for they shall see what they have not been told, they shall learn what they have not heard. »

LIII, 1-11: « Who hath believed our report? And to whom is the arm of Yahweh revealed? And he shall grow up as a tender plant before him, and as a root out of a thirsty ground. There is no beauty in him, nor comeliness; and we have seen him, and there was no sightliness, that we should be desirous of him. Despised, and the most abject of men, a man of sorrows; and acquainted with our infirmities. And his look was as it were hidden and despised, whereupon we esteemed him nothing. Surely he hath borne our infirmities and carried our sorrows. And we thought him as it were a leper, and as one struck by God. But he was wounded for our iniquities, he was bruised for our sins. The chastisement of our peace was upon him, and by his

1. Is. LII, 13. LIII, 11.

2. This hypothesis which, some years ago numbered many adherents, is being more and more given up. To-day almost everyone admits the individuality of the Servant of God. The various opinions on this question are given in the work of Condamin, *Le livre d'Isaie*, p. 328-329.
bruises we are healed. All we like sheep have gone astray, everyone hath turned aside into his own way; and Yahweh hath laid on him the iniquity of us all. He was offered because it was his own will, and he opened not his mouth. He shall be led as a sheep to the slaughter, and shall be dumb as a lamb before his shearer, and he shall not open his mouth. He was taken away from distress and from judgment. Who shall declare his generation? Because he is cut off the land of the living; for the wickedness of my people have I struck him. And he shall give the ungodly for his burial, and the rich for his death. Because he hath done no iniquity, neither was there deceit in his mouth. And Yahweh was pleased to bruise him in infirmity: if he shall lay down his life for sin, he shall see a long-lived seed, and the will of Yahweh shall be prosperous in his hand ».

Did Christ's Contemporaries Expect a Suffering Messias? — Strange as may seem, the contemporaries of the Savior had come to put their hopes entirely in a glorious Messias. He was to appear suddenly; and after the final judgment, he was to reestablish the Kingdom of Israel, and was to be its King. In his reign, there would be no bounds to the prosperity of the Kingdom. Holiness also was to rule; the life of God was to reign in the hearts of men, for the King-Messias was to be also a great Prophet.

Some remnants, however, of the old tradition of a suffering Messias remained; but these had but few advocates, and they exercised but little influence upon the masses 1.

It would seem, too, that the doctrine of the transfer of expiation and of merit should have persevered as a common teaching, at least in the schools. It was admitted that the just could expiate and merit for the guilty. Only a century before, this doctrine had inspired the hearts of the Machabees with admirable sentiments of devotion: « But I, like my

brethren, offer up my life and my body for the laws of our fathers: calling upon God to be speedily merciful to our nation, and that thou by torments and stripes mayst confess that he alone is God. But in me and in my brethren the wrath of the Almighty, which hath justly been brought upon all our nation, shall cease »

These ideas were the toothing-stones of their hopes. Before entering upon His glory, the Savior was indeed, to live in humiliation and suffering, that He might expiate the sins of his people. But if we would see the full and clear revelation of this doctrine, it is to the New Testament that we must go.

§ II

THE DOCTRINE OF THE REDEMPTION IN THE NEW TESTAMENT.

The Doctrine of the Synoptic Gospels. — « And his name will be called Jesus » 2, said the angel to Joseph, « for he shall save his people from their sins » 3. Jesus, throughout His Gospel, said that He was sent to save men: « The Son of man is come to find and to save that which was lost » 4.

What is the nature of this salvation? Men are sinners; sin separates them from God, blinds them, makes them morally and physically sick, oppresses them. Jesus came to remit their sins, and thereby to bring them back to God, to assist and comfort them both in body and soul, and to deliver them. That is salvation.

But let us harken to His own words: « Come to me », He says, « all ye that labor, and are burdened, and I will

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1. II Machab., vii, 37-38.
2. Jesus (from the Hebrew Yehoschoua', contracted, after the exile, into Yeschoua', literally Yahweh is Savior), that is, Savior.
refresh you. He refers here to weariness of soul and sickness of body. Then let us look at His works. Jesus tells the paralytic that his sins are forgiven him; and, because the Pharisees are scandalized at this, He at once cures the sick man of his disease. This He does, He tells us, in order to show men that when He told the sick man that his sins were forgiven, He spoke the truth, for His words have the power to produce this effect, as they can see when Jesus commands the disease to leave the sick one. Jesus forgives the sins of the sinful woman. As a condition for the remission of sin, he requires the forgiveness of injuries, humility of heart, trust in God and in Him whom God has sent, a confidence resting on love and assurance; and above all He calls for penitence, that is, repentance and change of heart, ἐπιτάφειον, for this disposition includes and supplements all the others.

While working the salvation of men through the remission of sins, Jesus foresees and accepts death on the cross. At the very beginning of His mission in Galilee, He says: «My disciples cannot fast while the bridegroom is with them; but the day will come when the bridegroom will be taken away, and then they will do penance». This is but a covert allusion; but at the end of this period of His ministry, after Peter’s confession, Jesus speaks of His death in plain terms. «Then he began to show to His disciples that the Son of man must suffer many things and be of rejected by the ancients, and by the high priests and the scribes, and be

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1. Mat., xi, 28.
put to death, and after three days rise again\(^1\). Note that the Savior uses the word « must », ἀπαντέω, which implies more than a mere fitness, and implies the idea of strict obligation.

From this time on, the Savior frequently speaks of His death. On the occasion of the miracles that excited the enthusiasm of His disciples, He said to them: « The Son of man will be delivered into the hands of men: they shall kill him, and the third day he shall rise again\(^2\) ». And when going up to Jerusalem for the last time, Jesus took the twelve aside, on the way, and said to them: « Behold we go up to Jerusalem, and the Son of man shall be betrayed to the chief priests and the scribes, and they shall condemn him to death, and shall deliver him to the Gentiles to be mocked, and scourged, and crucified; and the third day he shall rise again »\(^3\). From that time on, the thought of His death never leaves Him. He asks the sons of Zebedee whether they will have the courage to drink of His chalice\(^4\). In the midst of the glories of the Transfiguration, He discourses with Moses and Elias on His approaching death\(^5\). He is to die at Jerusalem, and His soul awaits this baptism of blood\(^6\). He is the Son whom the vine-dressers are to put to death\(^7\). In the ointment which Mary Magdalen pours upon His feet, He sees the anticipation of His burial\(^8\). And finally after having drunk the farewell cup\(^9\), on the night of His agony, in spite of His human dread, He freely accepts the chalice from the hands of His heavenly Father\(^10\), and willingly gives Himself up to His enemies.

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From all these texts, the genuineness of which can be questioned by none but the most arbitrary criticism 1, it is evident that Jesus foresaw His death and accepted it as an obligation. Nor could it be said that this obligation was purely accidental, a mere outcome of the circumstances. "The Son of man must be put to death" 2, said the Savior; and again, "that which is written must be fulfilled in me: He has been numbered among the wicked" 3. Christ, then, had to die, for God His Father had so willed it, and the prophets had foretold it. His death was one of the duties of His Messianic function, and it was a duty inherent in this function, according to the disposition of God Himself 4.

We may go even further and say that the Savior established a real relation between His death and the salvation of man.

The mother of the sons of Zebedee had just made her vain request. Jesus took occasion of this to tell His disciples that His kingdom is not like the kingdoms of the princes of this world. In Christ's kingdom whoever would be great must become the servant of all; "for the Son of man also is

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1. This Loisy says: "From the time of the confession of Simon Peter, Jesus is supposed to have discussed on several occasions the fate that awaited him as Messiah". But in these discourses, the same author says that "there appears no formal sentence retained as the Lord's saying"; their "general purport" besides, "is based upon accomplished facts and upon the theme of early Christian preaching". L'Evangile et l'Eglise, p. 85.


4. "This duty belongs to the Messianic function of which He is the titular: His death is an undertaking attaching to His mission as founder of the kingdom of God". V. Rose, Studies on the Gospels, p. 243. — "From all these traits it must be concluded that death did not surprise Jesus as something altogether unforeseen, that He did not go to His death as to an inevitable end, but rather that He predicted it and accepted it as a duty. He is the Son of man; He is the Servant; a life of suffering is part of the work of the Servant, and it looms up before Him". P. Batiffol, Enseignement de Jésus, p. 244. — "Not only did the death of the Messias seem to impose itself on Him as a fact, it seemed, also obligatory as a duty". J. Rivière, The Doctrine of the Atonement, p. 92.
not come to be ministered unto, but to minister and to give his life a ransom for many (καὶ δόθηκεν τῷ ὕπνῳ αὐτῷ λύτρον ἀντὶ πολλῶν) » 1. Mark well the Savior's expression: He will give His life, and this as a ransom, λύτρον, a ransom for many. In biblical language, the word λύτρον means the price paid either for the purchase of something, as a field 2, or slaves 3, or to free someone from slavery 4, or even from the penalty of death 5. There can be not even the slightest doubt but Jesus promised to give His life to free men from slavery. But what kind of slavery? This Christ explains at the Last Supper. « Having taken bread, He blessed it and broke it, giving it to His Apostles, saying: Take ye, and eat; this is my body. In like manner He took the chalice, and having given thanks, He gave it to them saying: Drink ye all of this, for this is my blood, [the blood] of the New Testament, shed for the multitude in the remission of sins 6 ». Christ, then, sheds His blood to seal — nay more, to establish — the new Covenant. And the terms of this Covenant will be these: Sin sets up a barrier between God and His people; by the new Covenant sin will be forgiven. Hence St. Matthew says that Jesus offers His life for the remission of the sins of the people, to free them from the slavery of sin, and to obtain for them salvation 7.

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1. Mat., xx, 28. — Mark, x, 45.
5. Prov., xiii, 8.
7. As we have seen, the declaration following the request of the sons of Zebedee, and the narrative of the Last Supper, show clearly the relation that existed between Christ's death and the salvation of men. Rationalistic criticism has attacked these passages. Loisy in particular has attempted to cast doubt upon the authenticity of the synoptic Gospels by saying that whatever appears in them concerning the expiatory character of the death of Christ, may be due to the influence of St. Paul's theology, 1 Cor., xi, 23-26. Cf. L'Evangile et l'Église, pp. 115-116. — Autour d'un petit livre, pp. 237-238. — Les Évangiles
The synoptic Gospels, therefore, make it clear that throughout the Gospel Jesus always said that He had been sent to save men; that He foresaw His death and accepted it as a duty; and that He established a real relation between His death and the salvation of men.

The Teaching of the Gospel according to St. John. — The Word, both Life and Light, became man in order to bring to men the fulness of His life and light. He is the bread of life, the vine that gives life to the branches, a fountain of living water. Hence, Christ came into the world to give life and light, in other words, to bring salvation.

He saves men by means of His teaching and His miracles; but above all by the offering of His life. « I am the good shepherd. The good shepherd lays down his life for his sheep... And I, too, give my life for my sheep. And elsewhere He represents Himself as the bread that came down from heaven and gives life eternal; and this bread is His « flesh for the life of the world ». His sacrifice will bear rich fruit: « Unless the grain of wheat falling into the ground die; itself remaineth alone; but, if it die, it bringeth forth much fruit ». And this law obtains in the spiritual world as well: « He that loveth his life shall lose it; and he that hateth his life in this world keepeth it unto life eternal ». Through His death the Savior will draw all men to Him.

Synoptiques, vol. II, pp. 534-544. But Loisy offers no serious argument in proof of his assertion. What offends his critical sense in the texts just quoted, is the fact that the doctrine they contain is of the highest importance.

1. John, i, 4, 16.
2. John, vi.
5. John, x, 10-15.
6. John, vi, 52.
7. John, xii, 24-25.
8. John, xii, 32.
Now this he said, adds the evangelist, signifying what death he should die.  

Thus according to St. John’s teaching, Jesus came into the world to save men, and the principal means to this end was His death. The doctrine of the disciple whom Jesus loved, bears out the teaching of the Synoptic Gospels.

St. John insists more, however, upon the motives of the Redemption. Love prompted God the Father to decree the salvation of men through the giving of His only Son. « God so loved the world as to give his only Son, in order that he that believes in him may not perish, but may have life everlasting. » And this mission the Son takes up freely, and out of love. « I love the Father; and as the Father hath given me commandment, so do I. »

The teaching of St. Paul’s Epistles. — Jesus saved men by His death. This doctrine, so precisely stated in the four Gospels, is the central point of St. Paul’s teaching.

As a result of the sin of Adam, all men are born in sin, that is, deprived of the holiness of the Spirit of God, or more simply, deprived of grace. They are, moreover, subject to the law of the flesh, which invades the intellect, the will, and the inferior powers of sensation, representation, and desire — concupiscence in its threefold form. As a result, all men are, in the words of the Apostle, under the bondage of sin; and in such a state they are the enemies of God, and the objects of His just wrath.

To the slavery of sin, the Mosaic law has added another

1. John, xii, 33.
2. John, iii, 16.
5. Rom., v, 19.
6. Rom., vi, 7, 16-17, 20; vii, 14.
fetter. The law in itself is holy and spiritual; but in these later times, men are more given to the things of the flesh than in earlier times, and they are practically no longer in a condition to fulfil the law. And since the law still continues to show them their duty, without giving them the power to perform it, it has become an occasion of ruin and has made sin abound.

Though men are in this sad plight, God, impelled by His bountiful love, determined to save them by reconciliation. When the fulness of time that he had determined was accomplished, God revealed his plan to restore all things in Christ.

Then Jesus Christ appeared as the one charged with the fulfilment of this great mystery. In some passages the Apostle connects our salvation with the entire mission of our Savior; but more often he ascribes it to the death of Jesus on the cross. « Being justified », he writes to the Romans, « freely by his grace, through the Redemption that is in Christ Jesus, whom God hath proposed to be a propitiation, through faith in his blood, to the showing of his justice, for the remission of former sins; through the forbearance of God, for the showing of his justice in this time; for that he himself may be just, and the justifier of him that is of the faith of Jesus Christ ». A little farther on, writing in the same strain, he says: « For... when we were enemies, we were reconciled to God by the death of his Son. There are many texts in which the Apostle teaches this doctrine. We may cite farther the Epistle to the Colossians. « It hath well pleased the Father that all fulness should dwell in him; and through him to reconcile all things unto himself,
making peace through the blood of his cross, both as to the things that are on earth, and the things that are in heaven. And you, whereas you were some time alienated and enemies in mind in evil works: yet now he hath reconciled in the body of his flesh through death, to present you holy and unspotted, and blameless before him, if so you continue grounded and settled in the faith. In the next chapter, the Apostle uses even stronger language. « You were dead », he says, « in your sins, and the uncircumcision of your flesh; he hath quickened you together with him [Christ], forgiving you all offences. He has blotted out the decree that was against us, which was contrary to us (τὸ καθ' ἡμῶν διερήμενον τοῖς ἐξομάκαυν ἡν ὑπεναντίων ἡμῶν); and he hath taken the same out of the way, fastening it to the cross », just as we do with a cancelled deed, when we file it away.

It was through love, indeed, that God decreed the salvation of men; yet he would not grant them salvation by a pardon pure and simple. His justice demanded some expiation.

This twofold consideration brings us face to face with the mystery of our Redemption. God's justice (ζυγιστὶν 0εω), in the language of the Apostle, is God's holiness seeking to communicate itself to men, but impeded in its communication, by sin. In His justice, or holiness, however, God did not choose to save men until they had satisfied for their sins by a proper expiation. By abusing his freedom, Adam insulted God and transgressed the positive command laid

1. Col., i, 19-23.
4. This is the meaning which J. Tixeront, History of Dogma, vol. i, p. 79, attaches to the word justice (God's) in St. Paul; — J. Rivière, op. cit., p. 49; — A. Lemonnier, Épitres de saint Paul, vol. i, p. 254; — F. Prat, Théologie de saint Paul, p. 263. — E. Tobac, in his remarkable thesis on le Problème de la justification dans saint Paul, pp. 113-130, takes the expression to mean God's justifying or saving activity.
down by the Almighty. In the first man all his descendants sinned, and all have fallen afterwards into a number of personal faults. Before forgiving them, God required expiation. The love of God prompting Jesus to render free obedience even to the death of the cross; such is the expiation offered by Our Lord to His heavenly Father, in the name of all men. Then God’s justifying justice or His sanctifying holiness is no longer opposed to what He sanctifies and justifies, to the saving of men by their reconciliation to Himself, and to their forgiveness by the remission of their sins.

It will now be easy to deduce from the Apostle’s teachings the chief characteristics of the Redemption considered in itself.

1° Jesus expiates the sins of men by rendering out of love His perfect and free obedience.

2° The Apostle calls this expiation a ransom (αὐτόπτησιν), the price of the redemption of men from the slavery of sin, or more concretely, our Redemption (ἀποκαταστάσις), our purchase.

3° The Redemption was brought about by the substitution of Christ for sinful man. This was not a merely penal substitution; as though God, concerned only about the payment of a penalty, had accepted this payment from Christ rather than from men. It was rather the gift of Christ, an oblation carried even to Calvary. It was a gift freely given, and prompted by the most perfect love.

1. I Tim., ii. 5-6.
2. Rom., iii. 24-27; — Eph., 1, 7; — Col., 1, 14; — Tit., ii, 14.
3. Cf. J. Rivière, op. cit., pp. 55-58. This interpretation, it seems to us is a decisive blow to the objections of Protestants, according to whom our Catholic doctrine of a real and vicarious Redemption is founded upon a misinterpretation of the text by the Vulgate. Where the Apostle says that Christ died προς (I Thess. v, 10), ὑπὲρ (II Cor., v, 14, 20), the Vulgate translates, pro. Now, it is argued this preposition pro is the translation for the preposition ἀντι, and not for προς or ὑπὲρ. The correct meaning of προς and of ὑπὲρ is in behalf of, or more exactly in view of. But it should be remarked that, in order to express fully the thought of the Apostle, the preposition ὑπὲρ, and not
If the individual would avail himself of this salvation, he must in a certain measure renew in himself this very obedience of Jesus Christ; and the principle upon which he must fall back in his self-sacrifice is faith. And by faith, as everyone knows, the Apostle does not mean a purely intellectual adherence, or a vague and barren confidence, but a life resting upon a certitude that cannot be shaken, and a life full of hope and love.

**ARTICLE II**

The Tradition of the Fathers.

**General Idea.** — The doctrine of the Redemption found in the synoptic Gospels and in the Gospel of St. John, a doctrine that was so thoroughly analyzed by St. Paul, formed a complex whole that proved quite difficult of assimilation. While Tradition affirmed the doctrine, it was slow to grasp its elements in detail, and did so only by degrees. We shall, therefore, treat the question in accordance with its various stages of development, as found in Tradition.

**Apostolic Fathers and Apologists.** — St. Clement held that our salvation was the result of our Savior’s acquiescence to the will of God the Father in accepting death, and of the love that God had for us. It was the love of God the Father that impelled Him to bring about our reconciliation through the death of Christ, His only Son. St. Ignatius of Antioch

ἀντί should be used. For, as long as Our Lord offered more than a merely penal substitution altogether passive, such a preposition as would denote His voluntary intention, must be used. Nevertheless, in suffering as He did, the Savior truly expiated the sins of men; He expiated for them. Hence, the meaning of ἀντί is contained in the expression ὑπὲρ, at least when St. Paul says that Christ died ὑπὲρ τάντων. This is why our Vulgate correctly translates ὑπὲρ by pro.

1. Clem., Epist. ad Cor., xlix, 6: « God reunited us to himself by love: it
says that our salvation was the sole object of Christ's mission on earth. This life of humiliation and suffering, however, won our salvation only by being crowned by the death on the cross.

In the epistle of Barnabas, the doctrine of the Redemption assumes the complete proportions of a vast system embracing both the Old and the New Testament. Jesus took flesh to suffer death. By this death, there were attained two effects: first, he annihilated the Jewish race, as a nation; and secondly, he broke the covenant. The Jews believed themselves entitled in a very special manner to the paternal bounty of God; but there was nothing in this. God gave them commandments, and these they interpreted after the manner of the Pagans; God raised up prophets in their midst, but the Jews had not understood their oracles, and the prophets they put to death. It required but one more offence, and the wrath predicted by Zachary would be upon them. « They will strike the shepherd of the flock, and the sheep will be dispersed. » Then, in us who find remission of sin in His death, God raises up unto himself a holy people. Sin is an infraction of the moral law, not of the legal prescriptions of the Old Testament. By the death of the body of Christ, sin is effaced. This effacement comes about not only from the fact that Christ's blood is poured out before the throne of God,

was because of the love that God bore us that Jesus Christ, in accordance with the will of God, shed His blood for us, gave His flesh for our flesh, His soul for our souls. »

1. IGN., Epist. ad Polyc., iii, 2 : « He that was immortal and invisible, became visible for our sakes; he was incorruptible and impassible, and he became passible in every way because of us. »

2. Epist. ad Rom., vi, 1 : « I seek him that died for us (τὸν ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν ἀποθανόντα); I want him that arose for us. »

3. BARN., xiv, 3-4.

4. BARN., xvi, 1-2.

5. BARN., v, 11.

6. ZACH., xiii, 7. — BARN., Epist., v, 12.

7. Ibid., xvi, 7.
but also from the fact that the faithful are, as it were, washed in this blood. This takes place when the faithful are united to Christ in Baptism, which at once effects the remission of sins and imparts the gift of faith. Our sins were leading us on to error and death; by them we were brought under the empire of death and error. By His death, and by uniting us to Himself in Baptism, Christ effected our release from this captivity. Once vivified by this spirit which is poured out upon us out of the abundance of the fountains of the Lord, we become the people of Jesus.

The author of the epistle to Diognetus develops further this view by contrasting the justice of Christ and the injustice of men. Without going beyond the relation of the Son of God to our salvation, he shows that it was owing to His eminent holiness that Christ was enabled to cover our sins before the face of God; that is, that He could compensate for the outrage offered to God by the sins of men.

1. Ibid., xi, 8.
2. Ibid., xiv, 5-7.
3. Ibid., i, 3.
4. Epist. ad Diognet., ix: "Having ceased in His eternal decrees to manifest Himself to the world, God, as long as the former times endured suffered men to be borne along by unruly impulses, being drawn away by the desire of pleasure and various lusts. Not that He at all delighted in their sins, He merely tolerated them; not that He approved of the injustice of those days, but He was preparing for the justice of the present day. He acted in this manner towards us in order that, once convinced that for our own works we were unworthy of life, it should now be vouchsafed to us through the kindness of God; and that once we had shown that we were of ourselves incapable of entering the kingdom of God, we might through the power of God be made able. When our cup of wickedness was filled to overflowing, and when it had been clearly shown that its reward, chastisement and death was impending over us, O immense love of God! He did not turn from us in hate, He did not cast us from Him, He did not take revenge. But, on the contrary, in His great long-suffering, He bore with us; nay more, filled with compassion for us, He Himself took on Him the burden of our sin, and delivered His own Son as a ransom for us (αὔτός τον ἵνα ἀπέδωσεν λυτρον ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν), the holy One for sinners, the innocent One for the wicked, the just One for the unjust, the incorruptible One for the corruptible, the immortal One for them that are mortal. What else was there to cover our iniquities, save His righteousness (Τί γὰρ ἓλλα τὰς ἁμαρτίας ἡμῶν)
This brief sketch demonstrates how false it is to say that the Apostolic Fathers are neither interesting nor original. It would be more exact to say that there are, here and there, certain gaps: to show, for instance, that the author of the epistle to Diognetus does not insist sufficiently upon the efficacy of the Savior’s death. But, as Rivière remarks, he was not unmindful of Christ’s death, but at the same time, he does not expressly mention it.

The deficiency found in the epistle to Diognetus is largely made up for in Barnabas, who insists less upon the eminent sanctity of Jesus, but says in no unmistakable terms that it is through His death that Jesus has redeemed us.

It would be easier to understand how rationalistic critics could urge the objection that the apologist Fathers are somewhat silent on the dogma of the Redemption. But it would be easy to show that this hardly found a place in their teaching. What they were most solicitous about was the establishment of the fact that the Christian religion admitted none of the infamies imputed to it, and that Christianity contained the truths vainly sought by pagan philosophers. St. Justin, however, is an exception. He shows that Christ, realizing in Himself the prophecies and figures of the Old Testament, offers Himself as a sacrifice for all sinners that are willing to do penance. His death took on the character

Who could have justified us, wicked and sinful as we were, save only the Son of God?... O sweet exchange! O sublime providence! O benefits surpassing all expectation! To think of the unrighteousness of a vast multitude disappearing in the righteousness of a single one, and the righteousness of that one justifying this vast multitude of sinners. Thus, God in former times, showed how powerless we were to attain salvation by our own unaided efforts; and in the latter times He has given us a Savior, able to save those who were unable to save themselves. On either hand God compels our confidence in His love.

2. Rivière, op. cit., p. 32.
3. Dial., XL.
of a penalty for sins. It is the sins of the people, he says, that led to Christ’s death. God willed that Christ should take upon Himself this curse of all, and Christ was subject to the divine will.

The Greek Fathers from the End of the Second Century to the Middle of the fifth Century. — Some Protestant historians, make the unqualified statement that the Greek Fathers attribute the salvation of men, not to the bloody death of Christ, but to the Incarnation of the Word. They call this view the theory of physical or mystical Redemption, in opposition to the theory of the Latin Fathers, which they call the theory of bloody or realistic Redemption. The truth is that some of the Greek Fathers, while they did not overlook the various facts of our Lord’s life and especially His death, and while they connected the salvation of men with the bloody expiation on Calvary, saw above all the acts of the Savior’s life the great mystery of the Incarnation. In their eyes, this is the central fact. From it all others radiate, as to it they owe all the merit they possess. Looking at the Incarnation in this light, they do not hesitate to ascribe our salvation to it. To one who understands it rightly, such a conception is unobjectionable. The work of the Redemption does, as a matter of fact, embrace the whole life of Christ on earth, with its termination on Calvary. It must needs be accomplished by the Incarnate Word, and must end in the death on the cross. In explaining the Redemption, we may insist more upon its relation to its origin or upon its relation to its end. The important point is to exclude neither.

St. Irenaeus, at the close of the second century, insisted rather upon the first of these views. God had created Adam

1. Dial., XCV.
after His own image and likeness, by the communication of His own Spirit.

From this there arose two privileges: the privilege of incorruptibility, and that of immortality. By an act of disobedience Adam offended God, and God withdrew His image and likeness, and with it the twofold gift of incorruptibility and immortality. Thus Adam became corrupt and mortal. But, as all of Adam's descendants had sinned in him, all likewise lost the image and likeness of God, together with the advantages that went with them. But God in His goodness, did not wish such a state of things to continue. So He gave us a Savior, through whom we might regain what we had lost through Adam; namely, existence according to the image and likeness of God.

Hence, the Word of God became man in order that man thus reunited to the Word of God might recover, the image and likeness of God; the Son of God became the Son of man that man might receive adoption and become a son of God; the incorruptible and the immortal united Himself to what was corruptible and mortal, that He might render it incorruptible and immortal; in a word, Jesus Christ became what we are, in order that we might become what He is.

1. Haer. 1. V, ch. vi, 1: «A perfect man consists of a mixture and union of a soul, which bears the Spirit of the Father, and a body, which was moulded after the image of God. If the soul were lacking, man would be simply an animal carnal, imperfect: he would bear in his flesh the image of God, but he would not possess the likeness through the Spirit.»

2. Haer., 1. Ill, ch. xviii, 1-2 : «When He [the Son of God] became Incarnate and was made man, He embraced in His nature the whole of mankind and gave us — thus comprehended in himself — salvation; so that what we had lost through Adam — existence according to the image and likeness of God — we might regain in Christ Jesus (longam hominum expositionem in seipso recapitulavit, in compendio nobis salutem praestans, ut quod perideramus in Adam, id est secundum imaginem et similitudinem esse Dei, hoc in Christo Jesu recuperamus). For it was impossible for man, once vanquished and impoverished, as a result of His disobedience (elisus per inobedientiam), again to recover his lost perfection and the prize of victory.»
is. This is the antidote of life, communicated to humanity by the Incarnation of the Word\(^1\).

From what precedes, we might be led to suppose that, according to St. Irenaeus, humanity was saved by the mere fact of the Word taking on Him our nature. Such, however, was not the belief that the holy bishop entertained. He says elsewhere that the Incarnation merely gave us a Savior, and that this Savior was then to fulfil the work of our salvation. Adam offended God by his disobedience: in him all men have sinned. The Savior summing up in Himself all mankind, is to be obedient even unto death upon the cross, and in this way he will repair the injury done to the Father\(^2\). In this sense, then, it is true to say that St. Irenaeus ascribes the salvation of men to the Incarnation; but for him, the Incarnation perseveres throughout a life of obedience even unto the death of the cross.

The doctrine of St. Hippolytus resembles very closely that of St. Irenaeus. Like Irenaeus, Hippolytus celebrates the saving virtue of the Incarnation of the Word\(^3\); but like him, also, he holds that it was through death on the cross that Christ redeemed us\(^4\).

Origen, however, looked at the work of Redemption more especially with a view to its end. The Incarnation, he

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2. Haer., I. V, ch. xxi, 2: « Adam had infringed God's precept; this infringement was repaired by Jesus Christ, who obeyed all the precepts of the law and all his Father's commands ». Ch. xvi, 3: « In the first Adam, we offended God by violating his precept; in the second Adam, we have been reconciled, by becoming obedient even to the death of the cross »; I. II, ch. xx, 3: « By his passion, he (Christ) destroyed death, and dissipated error, corruption, and ignorance; he manifested the truth and gave incorruptibility ».
3. De Christo et Antichristo, 3-4, p. 6-7, Achelis edit. : He (the Word) wishes to make us all sons of God..... The Word of God, in fact, who was without flesh took a holy flesh in the womb of a holy virgin, in order to unite our mortal body to His power (ἐπως συγκεράσας τὸ θυρτὸν ημῶν σῶμα τῇ ἐκυπτού δυνάμει), to combine the corruptible with incorruptible, the weak with the strong, and thus to save man, who was lost. »
4. Ibid., 26, p. 19: « By His death, He conquered death ».
teaches, merely gives us a Savior. That Savior lives among men and works out their salvation by the shedding of His blood. Sin demands expiation, and expiation requires a victim. But the legal victims are but provisionary and imperfect; Jesus Christ alone can blot out the sins of the world.

Origen did not enjoy sufficient prestige to bring men to his position. After his time, St. Athanasius chose rather the view of St. Irenaeus. God, says Athanasius, in his De Incarnatione Verbi, created man and imprinted upon him his likeness, the shadow, as it were, of the divine Word. Man sinned, and thereby lost this likeness; and as a result was subject to corruption and death. Man remained in this condition until God could no longer bear to see so debased a creature that had once participated in the likeness of the divine Word. Hence the divine plan of salvation.

Since it was impossible that a creature save creatures, the Word of God had to take a body; and in this way restore to humanity what it had lost, that is, the divine likeness.

1. In Rom., l. III, 8; P. G., XIV, 946: « But what is still more sublime is that. He is our propitiation by His blood; that is, by offering His body, He has rendered God propitious to us... For God is just, and as such He cannot justify the unjust; that is why He gives us a propitiator; that by faith in Him those might be justified who could not be justified by their own works ». And again, Origen comes back to this thought and develops it in magnificent terms, in which he points out that this doctrine is the doctrine of St. John, as well as of St. Paul (col. 950): « Jesus Christ is both priest and victim: priest, as we learn from the Psalms and from the epistle to the Hebrews; victim, as St. John attests when He says: « Behold the lamb of God that taketh away the sins of the world » (1, 29). In as much as He is a victim He is our propitiation, in this sense, that he secures the remission of our sins by the shedding of His blood... For, if He did not remit sin, this propitiation would not be real ».

2. Ibid., l. IV, 12.
3. In Num., hom. XXIV, 1; P. G., XII, 755-759.
5. Or. de Inc. Verbi, 5.
6. Epist. ad Adelph., 8; P. G., XXVI, 1081, 1083 : Κτίσμα δὲ υπὸ κτίσματος οὐκ ἂν ποτε σωθῇ, ὡσπερ οὐσὶ υπὸ κτίσματος ἔκτισθαι τα κτίσματα εἰ μὴ κτίστης ἦν ὁ Λόγος.
together with incorruptibility and immortality. Would it not seem, then, that Ritschl is right when he calls Athanasius the doctor of the physical Redemption? Undoubtedly so, if we confine our attention to but one side of the simile given by the illustrious Alexandrine. But there is another side, and Ritschl is inexcusable for not having seen this side. It was impossible for a creature to save creatures, hence the Word of God had to become man, that He might communicate to mankind His own likeness and incorruptibility. But we must not overlook the fact that man, as a result of his sin, was condemned to death; and divine veracity demanded that the sentence of death be carried out. Hence, God willed that the Word take flesh of our race and die in our stead, that death might be destroyed.

From the second portion of the doctrine of St. Atha-

1. Orat de Inc. Verbi, 44: "It was altogether fitting that the divine Word take upon Himself a body in order to restore everlasting life to our own bodies... Straw is by nature very inflammable: keep away the fire from it, and it will not be burnt: but straw it remains, and as such it fears fire which is ever able to consume it. But surround it with asbestos — a substance which seems to be fire proof — and then it is safe and no longer dreads fire, owing to this incombustible covering. So is it with death and our body. Had death been destroyed by merely an act of the divine will, the body would have remained mortal and corruptible, for that is its very nature. In order to overcome this, the bodiless Word of God put on a body. So now the body no longer fears death, for it is surrounded by the sheath of life ».


4. Ibid., 9: "The Word took a body in order to die for all... He offered His body to death as a host and a spotless victim. He paid the debt due to death, and God's rights were secured. But at the same time, He restored to men — like to whom His human nature had made Him — the privileges of immortality.... And here is a twofold wonder: first, that the death of all of us took place in the Saviors' body, and that death was destroyed because of the Word that dwelt in the Savior's body..... Corruption has no longer any terrors for men, because the Word was pleased to dwell amongst them in a like body. If a great king were to come to some city and take up his abode in one of its houses not only is that city honored but no brigand dares to attack it, the mere presence of the king is a safeguard to it. So is it with the King of Heaven. Once he had come into the religion of humanity and dwelt in a body like our own, all attacks from the enemy were at an end, and corruption was destroyed.
CHRIST THE REDEEMER

niasus, we must, then, conclude that for him, as for St. Irenæus, the Incarnation was simply the means of giving us a Savior that could save. Yet it was only through His bloody death on Calvary that He wrought our salvation. In uniting Himself to our flesh the Word imparted to it the divine likeness, together with His incorruptibility; in a word, He gave us eternal life, which consists in the life of grace for the soul, and in the privilege of a glorious resurrection for the body. But this life was communicated only after the Savior had, by His own death, suffered the penalty of death imposed upon us.

While St. Athanasius, at Alexandria, viewed the work of the Redemption from the position of St. Irenæus, Eusebius of Caesarea came back to Origen’s point of view, and pushed this to its logical extent. Since man, created to the image of the Word, had sinned and fallen into corruption, the Word decided to intervene to save mankind. He became flesh and dwelt amongst men, devoting Himself to the restoration of man by word and example. Now, His mission as man was to save us from our sins, by suffering and by being accursed for us. He offered Himself, then, in sacrifice for the whole world¹. Under the old Law, when one of the faithful wished to wipe out his sins, he personified his life in some set victim, which was immunolized in his stead, and was symbolical of the immolation of his own heart; and God accepted this symbolical immolation by substitution². But this was only

1 *Demonstr. Evangel.*, l. IV, ch. xii; *P. G.*, LXII, 284: «There is not one cause (to explain the coming of the Incarnate Word), but there are several: the first is, that the reign of the Logos be established over the living and the dead; the second, that the Logos might cleanse our sin by allowing Himself to be struck and by becoming a curse for us; the third, that He might offer Himself in sacrifice for the whole world (ὅπως τὰς ἁμαρτίας ἄπομαχον ἁμαρτίας, ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν τραβέκε τι καὶ γενόμενος ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν κατάρα... ὥς ἄντερεον θεοῦ καὶ μεγάλη θυσία ὑπὲρ τοῦ σύμπαντος κόσμου προσκυνεῖ θεῷ); the fourth, that He might overthrow the empire of Satan; and the fifth, that He might secure for His disciples everlasting life with God».

a figure of the sacrifice that Christ was to offer. Having become the victim for all the sins of men, he was immolated in their stead, and suffered the penalty due to their sins.

The doctrine of Eusebius of Caesarea was held also by Cyril of Jerusalem, by St. Basil, by St. Gregory Nazianzene, and by St. John Chrysostom.

Finally, in his defence of the dogma of the hypostatic union against the Nestorians, St. Cyril of Alexandria at the same time developed the dogma of the Redemption. He realized the relation that existed between these two dogmas, and hence was led to combine the two views, taken by his predecessors.

St. Cyril's first object was to refute the arguments of his predecessors.

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1. Ibid., 1. I, ch. x; 1. X, ch. 1: "He (the Incarnate Word) suffered chastisement for us; it was not He that merited the sufferings He underwent, but it was we, for our multitude of faults; so He became the cause for the remission of our sins, by undergoing death for us, by taking upon Himself the sufferings, the insults, and the outrages due us, and by drawing upon Himself the malediction that was our just desert, even to being accursed for us..... In order to wash our sins He was fastened to the cross, where we belonged; for He became the substitute of our souls and the ransom for us (ἀντιψώχον ἡμῶν καὶ ἀντὶλυτρων γεγεννημένως).

2. Cf. Catech., III, 12; P. G., XXXIII, 441: "He who died for us was not a little thing, He was not a victim devoid of reason, nor an ordinary man, nor even an angel: but God made man. The iniquity of sinners was not so great as the justice of Him who died for us; we have not committed sin equal in magnitude to the justice of Him who for us delivered up His soul."

3. In Psalm. XLVIII, 3-4; P. G., XXIX, 437: "Moses did not deliver his people from sin; furthermore, he could not even offer an expiation to God for himself, when he was in sin. We are not to look to man for our expiation; we are to look to one that transcends our nature, to Jesus Christ, the God man, who alone can offer to God sufficient expiation for us all."

4. Or., XLV, 28; P. G., XXXVI, 661: "We need the Incarnation and the death of a God, in order to live; we died with Him, that we might be purified; we rose together with Him, because we also died with Him; we have been glorified together with Him, because we rose again together with Him."

5. In Gal., II, 8; P. G., LXI, 646: "We all stood under divine condemnation: we deserved the direst punishment. We were accused by the law, and God had condemned us. We were to die as in the days of the deluge; and virtually we were already dead. Jesus Christ reclaimed us from death by delivering Himself up to death. The presence of Christ allayed the wrath of God."
CHRIST THE REDEEMER.

adversaries, who saw in Christ but a moral union of the humanity with the divinity. He speaks of the fact — evident to all who admit the authenticity of the Sacred Books — that Christ saved men by His death on the cross. He saved men; that is, He destroyed sin, and by that very fact, the death that sin entailed. He saved men by a bloody death, for such was the penalty for the sins of men. If Christ really saved men by His death, it cannot be that He was merely man; for the death of any more man would have been of no avail. The Savior of the world could have been none other but the Incarnate Word. St. Cyril sums up his whole argument in the phrase: « The Savior's object was to die for us, and to do this in order to destroy death; and since the destruction of death was beyond the powers of our nature, the Word of God had to become Incarnate ».

The Latin Fathers from the Beginning of the third

1. In Joan., II, 1, 29; P. G., LXXIII, 192: « For one only Lamb died for all to save the whole flock; one died for all to regain them all... So, while we were guilty of many sins, and consequently under sentence of death and corruption, the Father gave us His Son as a ransom, one for all, because all things are in Him and He is better than all. So He died for us all, in order that we might all have life in Him... For we were in Him who died for us and for us rose again. And once sin was destroyed, how can it be otherwise than that death which is its result is destroyed? The roots being dead, how can the branches survive? Sin being destroyed, how could we henceforth die? »

2. In Isaiah, LIII; P. G., LXX, 1174: « It was not for His own sins, but for ours that he was stricken. We had disobeyed God, and it was we who should have been chastised. But the penalty that was due to sinners, fell upon Him. God struck Him because of our sins, in order to absolve us from the penalty.

3. De recta fide ad reginas, 7; P. G., LXXVI, 1208: « If Christ had been but an ordinary man, how could His death have saved the world, since the death of so many saintly men, like Abraham, Jacob and Moses, was of no avail? But the death of Christ did save us. If, then, the death of one sufficed for all, this one must have been superior to all others by His divine nature. »

4. De rect. fid. ad reg., 7: « How could one die for all, and be the equivalent of all, if his sufferings were but the sufferings of a man? But if it was God who suffered in human nature, then we can say, and say rightly, that the death of this one was equivalent to the life of all; for it was not the death of a man like ourselves, but of a God incarnate. »

5. Ibid., 31.
Century to the Middle of the Fifth Century. — Protestant historians are pleased to pit the theology of the Redemption, as found in the Latin Fathers, against that of the Greeks, with the evident intention of accentuating the difference between them. Thus, Harnack says that whereas the Greeks taught rather a mystical Redemption, the Latins stopped at the realistic. With the Latins, the Incarnation is always taken for granted, and Christ's death is put foremost as the punctum saliens. They weigh the value of His death; and they show how it makes up for the injury done to God by sin. The theologians of the Middle Ages reduced these points to a synthesis and easily discerned in the concept of the Redemption three essential features: the vicarious substitution of Christ; the penal satisfaction offered by Christ to God the Father; and the deliverance of men from sin and their restoration to the privileges of their primal state.

We have already seen what is to be thought of this opinion regarding the doctrine of the Greek Fathers. If some of them have placed the mystical aspect of the Redemption in bolder relief, this was in no way detrimental to its realistic aspect. And gradually the realistic aspect came more and more to the front.

Now, the Latin Fathers maintained a doctrine fundamentally like that of the Greeks. Though they always attached a lesser importance to the mystical aspect of the Redemption, they never failed to point out this aspect. In saying that it was, above all, by the death of the Cross that Christ saved mankind, they agree perfectly with Origen, Eusebius of Caesarea, Cyril of Jerusalem, St. Basil, St. Gregory Nazianzene, St. John Chrysostom, and St. Cyril of Alexandria.

Tertullian, to whom Harnack ascribes preeminently the realistic theology of the Redemption, does indeed say that it was by dying on the cross that Christ saved us; but he does so

in concise terms, quite becoming the traditional doctrine he hands down. Our sins, he says, were the cause of the death of Christ. Moreover, this death is a sacrifice. By this means did Christ redeem us from our sins, and deliver us from death. Now, if the sacrifice offered by Christ was so efficacious, it must be that He was the Son of God. Here surely the mystical and the realistic concepts meet.

The doctrine propounded by St. Cyprian is somewhat similar to this. We were bought and vivified by the blood of Christ, the Son of God; and once delivered from sin and restored to the possession of eternal life, we became the adopted sons of God.

St. Ambrose treats of the traditional doctrine of the Redemption in language at once strong and elegant. It is by the sum total of the works of His earthly life that Christ redeemed us; but these works had to be crowned by the

1. Tertullian was the first to make use of the term satisfaction. But he used the word only to designate the reparation of personal sins by the performance of painful works, such as fasting, almsgiving, and other penitential works. Cf. De patientia, xiii. — De oratione, 23. — De paenitentia. 5, 7, 8. — De pudicitia, 13. — De cultu feminarum, 1. 1. — De jejunio, 3. (Cf. J. Riverre, op. cit., pp. 251 and 255.

2. De cultu feminarum, 1. 1: Propter tuum (Eva) meritum, id est mortem, etiam Filius Dei mori debuit.


4. De fuga in persecut., 12: Ut autem redimas hominem tuum nummis, quem sanguine suo redemit Christus, quam indignum Deo et dispositione ejus, qui Filio suo non pepercit pro te, ut fieret maledictum pro nobis, quae maledictus qui pependit in ligno; qui tamquam avis ad victimam ducet est... et inter iniquos deputatus est, et traditus est in mortem, mortem autem crucis: totum hoc ut nos a peccatis lucraretur.

5. De pudicitia, 22: Quis alienam mortem s a solvit nisi solus Dei Filius? Ad hoc enim venerat ut ipsa, a delicto purus et omnino sanctus, pro peccatoribus obiret.

6. Ibid.


9. Ibid.
death on the cross. This death is the sacrifice prefigured under the Old Law; it is the penalty for the sins of men, suffered by Christ in their place. If Christ redeemed us from death, it is only because he is the Son of God. Neither man nor angel could have saved the world. Christ accepted death freely, fulfilling to the end the will of the Father, continues the Ambrosiaster; and, adds its author, the sacrifice consisted above all, in the mind of His heavenly Father, in His obedience even unto the death of the cross.

St. Augustine's teachings embody the views of the Latin Fathers that preceded him, and he formulates the principles which St. Thomas will later use in his work on the dogma of the Redemption.

He held that the Incarnation depended upon the fall of man. Had man not sinned, the Son of God would have become Incarnate. But this does not mean that the Incar-

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2. Ibid., 1. I, 4.


4. In Luc., x, 56-57; P. L., XVI, 299-300: Pro me doluit, qui pro se nihil habuit ut doleret... Doles, Domine, non tua sed mea vulnera: non tuam mortem, sed nostram infirmitatem, Infirmatus es, sed propter peccata nostra.

5. In Luc., vi, 109; P. L., XV, 1698: Quoniam nullus hominum tantus esse potuit, qui totius peccata tolleret mundi... idcirco non unus e plebe, non unus e numero, sed Filius Dei a Deo Patre electus est, qui, cum supra omnes esset, pro omnibus se posset offere: quem mori oportuit, ut, cum esset fortior morte, alios liberaret.

6. Ibid., iv, 9.

7. De excessu Sat., ii, 46; P. L., XVI, 1327: Potuit Christus non mori si voluisset; sed neque refugiendum mortem putavit, neque melius nos quam moriendo servasset.

8. AMBROSIAST., Rom., v, 6-10; P. L., XVII, 90-91: Christus Deo se dicitur obtulisse, dum occidi se passus est, in Dei Patris sui voluntate perdurans... Immeritus qui occiditur placet Deo, non quia occiditur sed quia usque ad mortem justitiam conservavit.

9. Serm. clxxiv, 2; P. L., XXXVIII, 940: Si homo non perisset, Filius hominis non venisset.
nation was absolutely necessary for our salvation; God might have saved us otherwise. But, given the plan of salvation freely adopted by God, the Incarnation became necessary.

After showing the rôle of the Incarnation in the work of the Redemption, St. Augustine says that Christ saved us by His death, the death announced by the sacrifices of the Old Testament, and continued in the Mass. This sacrifice is one of expiation; it is a sacrifice that reconciles men with God, and delivers them from death. But if Christ saved us it was by taking upon Himself the punishment due to our sins. St. Augustine does not overlook the moral side of the Incarnation and the Redemption. He says that in this twofold mystery God manifests His love in the


2. Contra Faustum, xxvi; P. L., XLII, 385: Hujus sacrificii caro et sanguis, ante adventum Christi, per victimas promittebatur; in passione Christi, per ipsam veritatem reddebatur; post ascensum Christi per sacramentum memoriae celebratur.

3. De Trin., l. iv, xiii, 17; P. L., XLII, 899: Morte sua quippe uno verissimo sacrificio pro nobis obtato quidquid culparum erat... purgavit, abolevit, extinxit.

4. Ibid., xiv, 19: Idem ipse unus verusque mediator, per sacrificium pacis reconcilians nos Deo.

5. In Joan., vol. XII, 10 and 11; P. L., XXXV, 1489-1490: Ipsa morte liberavit nos a morte; morte occisis mortem occidit... Ergo mortem suscepit et mortem suspendit in cruce: et de ipsa morte liberantur mortales... In morte Christi nescit mortua est, quia vita mortuam occidit mortem, plebitudo vitae deglutit mortem.

6. Contra duas epist. Pelag., l. IV, iv, 6; P. L., XLIV, 613: Pro nobis mortem hoc est peccati poenam, sine peccato subire dignatus est... Solum pro nobis suscepsit sine malis meritis poenam ut nos per illum sine bonis meritis consequeremur gratiam. Quia sicut nobis non debebatur aliquid bona, sta illi aliquid mali. Commendans ergo dilectionem suam in eos quibus erat daturus indebitam vitam, pati pro eis voluit indebitam mortem.

7. De catech. rud., iv, 7-8; P. L. xi, 314-316: Quae major causa est adventus Domini, nisi ut ostenderet Deus dilectionem suam in nobis... Si amare pigebat saltem nunc redamare non pigeat... Dominus Jesus Christus, Deus homo, et divinus in nos dilectionis indicium est et humano apud nos humiliatis exemplum.
highest degree and invites us to love Him in return; and that He gives us an example of perfect humility¹.

**ARTICLE III**

Scholastic Theology.

St. Anselm. — In his *Cur Deus homo*, St. Anselm proves why God became man². His argument is so cogent that it deserves to be reproduced quite in full.

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1. Among the motives given by the Fathers to explain the necessity of the Redemption, there is one that has been peculiarly distorted by liberal Protestants, in their attempts to cast ridicule upon our Catholic doctrine. It is this, that the Redemption by the blood of Jesus-Christ was necessary to satisfy the rights of the devil. This theory assumes two forms quite different. In the former, God and the devil appear as two rival powers. In withdrawing himself from God through sin, man has given himself to the devil, who has, as a result, a right over him. In order to deliver men from the power of Satan, God was obliged in justice to pay the devil a ransom. This ransom was the blood of Jesus Christ. Cf. Iren., *Haer.*, I, III, ch. xviii, 7; I V. ch. II, — Orig. In Ex., homil., vi, 9; In Malth., xvi, 8. — Ambros., *Epist.*, lxxii, 8-9. The latter does not speak of the enfranchisement of man by the paying of a ransom to the devil. But in that explanation the devil received from God the right to put men to death because of their sins. This right he carried out on Jesus Christ, who was innocent. In doing this he exceeded his rights; he abused his power. And God, in order to punish him, deprived the devil of his captives. Cf. John Chrysos., *In Joan.*, hom. lxxiii, 2-3. — Cyr. Alex., *In Joan.*, I, VI. — Hilar., *In Malth.*, III, 2. — August., *De libero arbitrio*, I, III, ch. x, 29-31; *De Trinitate*, I, XIII, ch. xii, 16-19. — Leo Magn., *Serm.*, LVI, 1; LVIII, 1.

These two theories are very well explained in Rivière's *Doctrine of the At-one-ment*, part 5th, ch. xxi-xxii. The second view is less surprising than the first; for it limits in a singular manner the power of the devil over men. Critics are more successful in their attacks upon the first. But, is it quite true that in supporting this view the Fathers intended to ascribe to the devil a strict right over sinful men? This seems doubtful. St. Irenaeus, for example, declares categorically that we were « debtors only to God, whose precept we had transgressed ». *Haer.*, I, V, ch. xvi, 3. The Fathers in question merely wished to say, in poetic or juridical form, that, on account of our sin, we belonged to the devil, in the sense that God had issued a decree permitting the devil to chastise us from the moment we became sinners. It is only this decree that they have in mind, it would seem, when they say that God gave a note, a bill *chirographus*, acknowledging the rights of the devil over humanity. Christ annulled this bill, by giving men the power to avoid sin and escape the chastisement of the devil. And the means to do this is grace merited by the sacrifice on Calvary.

2. Cf. this treatise in *P. L. CLVIII*, 361-430.
Man, a rational and free creature, should render obedience to God by making his own will conform to that of the Creator. By so acting, as it is his duty to do, he recognizes God as his sovereign Master: he gives honor to God. But if man disobeys God, by his very disobedience he dishonors and offends Him. This rebelliousness is sin. If man would obtain pardon for his sins, he must first perform an act of submission which will compensate for the sin; in other words, he must do something that will honor God to the same degree as the sin dishonored him. This is what St. Anselm calls satisfying: it is satisfaction

It would not be becoming for God to forgive purely out of mercy, without requiring any satisfaction. His mercy could not prevail over His dignity; and the least refusal to do Him honor is incompatible with His dignity. Hence, either created man will serve God in innocence, or he will have to repair the dishonor offered to God. Failing to do this, he will be punished. If the sinner withdraws himself from the will of the God who commands, he must fall under the hand of the God who punishes. Hence, if man sins, satisfaction is necessary.

The fact is that man has sinned, and satisfaction has become necessary. But men have been unable to pay their debt. And the satisfaction must be proportionate to the sin. If it were otherwise there would remain a certain disorder. But what had men to give, which they did not already owe? Besides, the heinousness of the offence de-

1. C. 1, ch. 1: Omnis voluntas rationalis creaturarum subjecta debet esse voluntati Dei... Hunc honorem debitum qui Deo non reddet aufferit Deo quod suum est et Deum exhonoret, et hoc est peccare... Sic ergo debet omnis qui peccat honorem quem rapuit Deo solvere; et haec est satisfactio.

2. Cf. I. 1, ch. xv: Ipsa namque perversitas spontanea satisfactio vel a non satisfaciunte poenae exactio in cadem universitate locum tenet suum et ordinis pulchritudinem... Necessae est ut omne peccatum satisfactio aut poena sequatur.

pends upon the dignity of the person offended; and this person was God, whose majesty is infinite.

The conclusion necessarily follows. In the hypothesis that sin was committed, God owed it to Himself to exact satisfaction. This satisfaction could be rendered only by a man sprung from the guilty race. But this man must be without sin and not under obligation of rendering satisfaction for himself. And he must at the same time be God, that the satisfaction offered by him might be of infinite value.

In what did this satisfaction consist? Christ could not render this satisfaction by acts of obedience alone, for these He already owed God, just as every creature owes them. It was only by the performance of an act that He did not owe, that He could render proper satisfaction. And such an act was His voluntary acceptance of death on the cross. Once this was done, satisfaction was rendered, and God forgave men.

At the close of his arguments, St. Anselm lays down a principle that he was to develop later on in his Meditations. God, he says, had no need of redeeming us. Adequate satisfaction by the bloody expiation of the Incarnate Word became necessary, only on condition that God decreed to create man though He foresaw that man would fall. God might well not have created man, especially in view of the fact that man would sin and that sin would require such a sacrifice. Yet God willed to create man; and, foreseeing his sin, He decreed at the same time to send the Incarnate Word for man's Redemption. This was the plan carried out. To create man under such conditions, God must have loved us beyond anything we can imagine; He must have loved us infinitely. It is God's love, His merciful

2. Medit. vi, xi; P. L., CLVIII.
love, that is responsible for the whole scheme of creation and Redemption.

Successors to St. Anselm. — St. Anselm's doctrine, admirable as it is for the rigor of its logic, as well as for the light it throws upon the Godhead, had yet about it certain rigid features that must be toned down to make it altogether acceptable. To this task his successors devoted themselves.

St. Bernard holds that, while suffering the penalty for our sins, Christ taught us how we should love God and how we should detest sin. Hugh of St Victor admits that God might have saved us otherwise than he did. Peter Lombard insists upon the fact that Christ's sacrifice was the penalty due for the sins of men, and that in suffering this penalty Christ freed us from sin. Alexander of Hales shows that at the same time that Christ offers satisfaction for our sins and merits for us a life of grace, he excites in us, by the example of His Passion, love, faith, and compassion, and shows us the necessity of imitating Him. St. Bonaventure's doctrine on the Redemption is found in his Commentary on the sentences. By perfect obedience throughout His life and unto His death upon the cross, the Savior merited our reconciliation with God and cancelled the account which was against us and dispensed us with the penalty for our sins. This Redemption was not absolutely necessary, but only becoming. It became necessary only under the actual plan of Providence, which, through interfered with, must be carried out.

1. Sermo de Passione, 4-7; P. L., CLXXXIII, 266-267. St. Bernard gave out this doctrine against Abelard who taught that Christ had redeemed us solely by giving us an example of such a nature as to excite in us a love of God and an aversion to sin.
4. Sum. theol., pars IIIa, quaest. XVIII, membra VI, art. 1-4.
5. In III Sent., dist. XVIII, art. 1, quaest. 3; dis. XIX, art. 1, quaest. 1-4.
6. Ibid., dist. XX, art. 1, quaest. 1-4.
Likewise the Passion was not absolutely necessary. Even the slightest suffering of the God man would have sufficed.

Saint Thomas. — A man was still wanted with a mind sufficiently powerful and flexible to think anew the doctrinal synthesis of St. Anselm and qualify it with the additions proposed by so many illustrious doctors. This man was St. Thomas.

According to the teaching of the Angel of the School, God might have allowed men to remain in their sin; in other words, the Redemption was not necessary but only fit, because it manifested in the highest degree the attributes of God: His mercy, justice, wisdom, and power. Furthermore, God might have granted His forgiveness without exacting adequate satisfaction, or even without exacting any satisfaction at all. His justice would not have been injured thereby. Consequently the Incarnation itself was not necessary. It was, however becoming, whether for leading us to good by exciting our faith, our hope, and our love, or for turning us from sin.

Nevertheless, in the hypothesis — which is now a fact — that God required adequate satisfaction, Redemption through the expiation of the Incarnate Word became necessary; for mortal sin is an action by which man turns completely away from God, his last end, and becomes attached to creatures. Hence the injury to God. And as the gravity of the offense is proportionate to the dignity of the one offended, sin may be said to give infinite dishonor. Now, such a dishonor

1. Ibid., q. 6, ad 4am.
2. In IIIa Sent., dist. xx, q. 1, art. 1, sol. 1, and ii.
3. Sum. theol., IIIa, q. xlvi, a. 2, ad 3am.
4. Ibid., IIIa q. 1, a. 1.
5. Ibid., IIIa, q. 1, a. 2, ad 2am: Peccatum contra Deum commissum quamdam infinitatem habet ex infinitate divinæ majestatis. This principle of the theology of St. Thomas was questioned by Duns Scotus, who held
could be repaired only by the homage of the Incarnate Word.

There is no doubt but that in the opinion of St. Thomas, as well as in that of St. Bonaventure, but a single act of the Incarnate Word would have been enough for adequate reparation. But, just as God had decreed adequate reparation, so He decreed that this reparation should be made by the Passion of the Savior. And it was quite fitting that this should be so; for in that way God would make us understand better the horror that we should entertain for sin, and make us see the greatness of His love. God would give us, in Christ, the most perfect example of obedience, humility, constancy, and justice. Hence, since God exacted adequate satisfaction, expiation through the Incarnate Word was necessary; for God had decreed that this expiation be made through Christ’s Passion.

St. Thomas carries his investigations much further. He examines how the Passion of Christ satisfied for sin. So cruel were His sufferings, so great His sensibility, and so exalted the motives that inspired Christ, that His passion exceeded anything that man could undergo. He died out of love for God and men, to remove sin, the obstacle that separated creatures from God. This passion was imposed upon him as the principal portion of his Messianic work. In it obedience

that a pure creature, duly endowed with divine grace, was capable of offering an equivalent satisfaction, on the supposition that God would require such; for sin has by no means an infinite gravity. Cf. Duns Scotus, In III

1. Sum. theol., III, q. xlvi, a 3: Per hoc autem quod homo per Christi passionem liberatus est, multa concurrent ad salutem hominis pertinentia, præter liberationem a peccato. Primo enim per hoc homo cognoscit quantum Deus hominem diligat, et per hoc provocatur ad eum diligendum, in quo perfectio humanæ salutis consistit. Secundo, quia per hoc dedit nobis exemplum obedientix, humilitatis, constantix, justitix et ceterarum virtutum in passione Christi ostensarum, qux sunt necessarix ad humanam salutem...

2. Ibid., III, q. xlvi, a. 5-8.
was joined to love. Far from lessening the love, it rendered it even greater. Moreover, the essential quality of the Passion was its freedom. Such was the work of love and obedience by which the Savior satisfied for man's sin.

Christ's satisfaction lay in this, that He offered to God a homage not only equal to that refused by men, but far superior to it. Besides, He merited that man be reconciled to God and be given the life of grace. His satisfaction bore also the character of penalty for sin. God had decreed that our sins should be pardoned only by means of an atonement proportionate to the fault, and Christ made this expiatory sacrifice on the cross and thereby obtained the remission of our sins. We should observe, however, that, according to St. Thomas, Christ's Passion, though truly a penalty, is above all a satisfaction, viz., a sublime homage of love and obedience offered to God to blot out the dishonor caused by the sins of men.

1. Sum. theol., IIIa, q. xlvi, a. 1-3.
2. Sabatier opines that the idea of St. Thomas on satisfaction is founded on « Roman Law » and practically amounts to a satisfaction made through the legal punishment deserved and undergone. Cf. La doctrine de l'expiation et son évolution historique, p. 59. Harnack observes that, on the contrary, this idea hardly obtains in the works of St. Thomas. Cf. History of Dogma, vol. VI, pp. 192-193. Harnack's observation is correct, but his regret is out of place. For this idea of penal substitution, even though well founded, is none the less secondary. St. Thomas understood too well that the Passion of Christ, though it was a penalty, and the penalty for our sins, was preeminently a sublime act of love and obedience: this is why he did not make satisfaction consist in a mere penal vengeance, but rather, with St. Anselm, in a work of high moral order. Cf. J. Rivière, op. cit., ii, p. 103-104.
CHAPTER II

VICARIOUS SATISFACTION

The preceding chapters, while treating principally of the fact of the Redemption, taught us something also of the manner of this act. This question, both because of its intrinsic importance and because of the objections that Protestants have urged against it, deserves special treatment. Hence, we shall give in the first place the doctrine of the Church, and we shall then see what is to be thought of the objections urged against this doctrine.

The Church's Doctrine. — The fulfilment of the moral law, whether natural or positive, consists in obedience to God's will, of which this law is the expression; in recognizing God as our Master; and in proclaiming His omnipotence and His infinite wisdom. To put it more simply, the fulfilment of the moral law consists in obeying God's will and thereby honoring Him. The transgression of this law, on the other hand, consists in disobeying God and thereby dishonoring and offending Him. An act of disobedience by which we dishonor and offend God is called sin.

If man sins, God has a right, before pardoning him, to demand that the dishonor caused by man's disobedience be repaired by the homage of submission; and this is satisfaction. Let us add farther, that God has a right to demand proportionate satisfaction; that is, an act which honors Him to the same degree that sin dishonored Him.
With these principles in mind, let us recall our own sad history and the manner in which God intervened to save us. By transgressing the precept imposed upon him, man dishonored God. God might have allowed man to remain in this state; or he might have forgiven man without exacting any satisfaction at all, or upon the condition of a merely partial satisfaction. But this he did not do. Prompted by His love and by the desire to show us at the same time—for our greater good—the extent of His justice, as well as the opposition that exists between sin and Himself, He decreed that we obtain forgiveness by making proper satisfaction. It was His love, therefore, that led Him to forgive us and to grant His forgiveness only upon the payment of an adequate ransom.

But then it is evident that man was powerless to offer such a satisfaction; for, by the very fact that God was the one dishonored by sin, the gravity of sin was, we may say, infinite. Then it was that God determined to save us through the expiation of the Incarnate Word.

A single act of submission performed by our divine Redeemer would have sufficed to offer God the honor required by Him for perfect reparation. But we should not thereby have understood sufficiently the extent of the justice and the holiness of God, and the opposition that exists between God and sin. We should not, then, have been sufficiently inspired with horror for sin, and consequently we should have more lightly risked our salvation. Hence it was that God made our satisfaction depend upon the obedience of the Incarnate Word; upon an obedience freely given and ever inspired by love for men and by contempt for the sins that crushed them; an obedience carried even unto the death of the cross. Thus did our Savior satisfy for us, and this is what we mean by the dogma of vicarious satisfaction.

This dogma, as old as the Church in substance, if not in technical form, is contained in the dogma of the Redemption. And even in its explicit formula, the dogma of the
vicarious satisfaction is proclaimed in one of the chapters of the council of Trent, where it is said that Christ merited our justification by satisfying for our sins\. With the intention of putting to an end all controversies on this point, the Fathers of the Vatican council drew up this doctrine in a special proposition, but this unfortunately remained in rough draft\. Protestant attacks. — Of late years the doctrine of vicarious satisfaction has been furiously attacked by Protestants. They have, it is true, but raised old objections, many of which are found in the old text-books among the difficulties usually given either to clear up some question or to exercise the mind of the students.

First Objection. — Sabatier accuses Catholic theologians of having perverted the meaning of the Passion and death of Christ. They have made it, according to this writer, a merely penal satisfaction offered to appease God's wrath and to satisfy His vengeance.  

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1. Sess. VI, c. vii, Denz., 799: *Jesus Christus... sua sanctissima passio in ligno crucis nobis justificationem meruit, et pro nobis Deo Patri satisfecit.*

2. This proposition is quoted in Hurter, vol. II, p. 531, and in Rivière, op. cit., I, p. 11: *Si quis non confiteatur ipsum Deum Verbum in assumpta carne patiendo et moriendo pro peccatis nostris potuisse satisfacere vel vere et proprie satisfecisse: A. S.*

3. Cf. A. Sabatier, *La doctrine de l'expiation et son évolution historique*: « Has Jesus even the remotest idea of dying in order to render to the justice of his Father a penal satisfaction, without which the Father would no longer be Father?  (p. 23). And again: « Even so punishment is necessary; such is the Roman and the Jewish law. To forgive one that repents from his heart, is the Gospel teaching. The superiority of the Christian notion of the Father consists precisely in this rising above the sentiments of reprisal and vindication; it lies in wishing not the death of the sinner, but rather his conversion and his life.  (p. 95). That, then, is a very low notion of justice, which claims punishment for punishment's sake, for the pleasure of causing suffering.  (p. 100).
Answer. — But assuredly such is not our teaching; it is the doctrine neither of St. Anselm nor of St. Thomas. We look upon the Passion of Christ as above all a sublime homage of love and obedience offered by our Savior to God the Father to repair the injury done by man's sin.

This satisfaction, to be sure, is also a penalty for sin; but by this we do not mean at all a punishment exacted merely for the sake of punishment, or for the pleasure of causing pain — a sort of divine vengeance. If God requires that sin be punished by a penalty proportionate to it, by a penalty which amply satisfies the divine justice, He does so merely out of love and mercy, and in accord with His divine plan of salvation. He wishes to show us thereby the extent of His justice and of His holiness; He wishes to show us the great opposition that exists between sin and Himself, in order to inspire us with a horror for what offends Him and to ground us more thoroughly in virtue.

Second Objection. — Sabatier points out that, according to Catholic theologians, man's reconciliation with God comes about through the cessation of the conflict which sin raises between God's justice and His love. God could no longer love us because His offended justice would no longer permit of this. Satisfaction had to be rendered; and only after this had been offered could God's love again be exercised towards us. Hence, far from being the effect of God's love, the Savior's Passion was rather its cause, its motive.

1. It is to be observed that when we speak of the avenging justice, or of the wrath of God, this metaphor — with which we can scarcely dispense — is used simply to signify holiness in the presence of sin. It is equivalent to the Latin term justitia in its broad sense, which implies a great deal more than the simple virtue of justice by which we render to every one what belongs to him.

2. Ibid. : « The most serious consequence flowing from the old juridical and legal view, was the introduction of an irreconcilable dualism in the notion of the Christian God... One would think that there was an internal conflict.
Answer. — It is difficult to imagine how our teaching on the Redemption could be more grossly misrepresented. True, indeed, God might have kept back His forgiveness; and, if He forgave sinners, it was through love that He did so. His forgiveness might have been granted without making any exactions on the part of man, or with the exaction of a merely partial satisfaction. If He chose to require adequate satisfaction, it was only to show us the chasm that sin puts between us and Himself. So warned, we would more studiously avoid sin and all the more carefully refrain from endangering our salvation. Love, then, is the cause of our Redemption such as it was wrought. Love has done everything.

Third Objection. — It nevertheless remains true, continues Sabatier, that God could not, according to your theology, pardon solely out of love.

Answer. — This objection is perhaps directed against the doctrine of St. Anselm. But we should not forget that...
this great doctor was the first to attempt to formulate as he did the doctrine of the Redemption. The rigidity of his system, however, was softened down by those who took up his line of thought; and even to-day theologians do not hesitate to criticise St. Anselm on these grounds.

To find the last word on the doctrine of the Redemption, we must turn to the works of St. Thomas, and not to those of St. Anselm.

Fourth Objection. — Sabatier does not yield. With direct reference to the doctrine of satisfaction as exposed by St. Anselm, and referring indirectly to the doctrine as taught by the Church, he claims that Anselm drew his theory from the idea of germanic Law, according to which, every misdemeanor entails the payment of a certain sum of money, or Wergeld. This is not properly speaking a punishment, but rather a fine, a simple compensation, a satisfaction. This is what St. Anselm had in mind when he laid down the principle: *Necesse est ut omne peccatum satisfactio aut poena sequatur*.

Answer. — The two ideas are not identical; the likeness is artificial. Though St. Anselm does not insist upon the penal nature of satisfaction, he always takes it for granted; for him satisfaction includes the payment of the penalty for the sins of men. Moreover, this idea of penal satisfaction, if not formally expressed, is found in substance in patristic tradition. And finally, this opinion, which Sabatier does not yield.
tier borrows from Ritschl, is discarded by Loofs and Harnack.

Fifth Objection. — What Harnack most objects to in the doctrine of Satisfaction, is the fact that this satisfaction gives God the honor of which sin deprived Him. How, he asks, could God's honor be in any way affected?

Answer. — Catholic theology has always made a distinction between God's internal essential honor and His honor ad extra, which depends upon the manner in which creatures carry out the plan of creation. The lower creatures honor God out of necessity, by the natural exercise of their powers; but man must glorify God freely, by fulfilling the moral law inscribed in the heart and the positive law given by revelation. If man fails to tend towards God, he causes a certain disorder in the Creator's plan and thereby fails to recognize God's sovereignty. Such is the dishonor caused by sin; and Christ, by being obedient even unto the death of the cross, repaired this dishonor.

Sixth Objection. — Harnack does not see how Christ could remain free in accepting his sufferings and his death, since we claim that His Passion was imposed upon Him by the will of God, and that this was the chief part of His Messianic function.

Answer. — In the union of these two ideas there is indeed a mystery which theologians have sought by various hypotheses to elucidate. In explaining this question we

1. Loofs, Leitfaden zum Studium der Dogmengeschichte, p. 271 (3d. ed.).
3. History of Dogma, VI, p. 72.
4. Ibid., 73.
said that Christ's impeccability sprang from the fact that He was confirmed in grace; and that confirmation in grace does not preclude the exercise of free will.

Seventh Objection. — For all these reasons Protestants conclude that Christ's Redemption had but the moral value of example; this example was the life of Christ, which was crowned by a death that was accepted for the triumph of truth and love. In the light of this principle they explain human life and show the place that Christ's example should occupy in our lives. We ought to conform to the law of duty by becoming more and more our own masters; that is, by putting our will above our senses and by renouncing our evil inclinations. This is conversion, moral regeneration. But how are we to make up for the moral evil that preceded or that accompanies this conversion? Where are we to look for that satisfaction which God in His absolute justice demands? We shall find it in the intense pain that we must undergo, if we would be true observers of the moral law — a hard and uncongenial task, indeed! But Christ will help us in its performance. He realized to a sublime degree the moral perfection which the conscience of each one holds before him; and in this way He is our example, and, consequently, our Savior.

Answer. — This doctrine, first maintained by Abelard and later taught by the Socinians in the fifteenth century, has found no abler expositor than Kant. After Kant, Ritschl took it up and gave it a less austere and a more sentimental character; whilst Sabatier became its propagator in France.

2. A good exposition of the doctrine of Ritschl may be found in Rivière, op. cit., I, pp. 22-26.
3. Cf. Doctrine de l'expiation: « There are no grounds for saying that Jesus on the cross was under any special supernatural condemnation... Jesus suffers more and better than Socrates, the martyrs, the sages, or in a word, all
We have only to remark that we too admit that by His life, sufferings, and death, Christ has given the world the most beautiful example of the virtues that men should practice. Perhaps no one has stated this doctrine with greater precision than has St. Thomas¹. But furthermore, appealing to Holy Writ, to the Tradition of the Fathers, to the teachings of the Schoolmen, and the definitions of the Church, we maintain that, by a life obedient even unto the death of the cross, a life constantly inspired by the love of God and man, Christ rendered satisfaction for the dishonor offered to God and thus paid the penalty due the sins of man and required by the infinite justice and love of God; Christ merited the reconciliation between God and men, and imparted to men the life of grace.

¹ Cf. supra, p. 334-336.
CHAPTER III

THE WORK OF THE REDEMPTION.

After having established the fact of the Redemption and shown in it the character of satisfaction, there now remains to be considered the work of the Redemption in itself, in order that we may understand better its divine economy.

By His life of suffering, which ended on the cross, our Lord Jesus Christ bought the human race out of the bondage of sin; and that He might bring all men, generation after generation to the end of time, to avail themselves of this salvation, Christ has continued His work of Redemption, principally through the ministry of His priests. We shall consider first the Work of the Redemption as performed by our Lord in the course of His passible and mortal life, and then the Continuation of His work of Redemption.

ARTICLE I

The Work of the Redemption Accomplished by Our Lord.

Object and Division of this Article. — The work of the Redemption consisted in Christ's offering Himself to God the Father as a sacrifice of expiation for the sins of all men.

Expiatory Sacrifice for the Sins of the People, According to Leviticus. — Leviticus distinguishes three kinds of...
bloody sacrifices: the holocaust, or the sacrifice of adoration; the peace offering, of which there were two great classes: the sacrifice of thanksgiving and the sacrifice of expiation, or propitiation, so called because it was an expiation offered to God to render Him propitious, that is, to obtain of Him the forgiveness of sin. Of these sacrifices the last is the most important and the only one with which we need be concerned, for in a sense it contains the others; for, it had to be implicitly a sacrifice of adoration, of thanksgiving, and of expiation. God could grant His pardon only on the condition that His sovereignty, once ignored be again recognized, that gratitude be shown for His gifts, and that forgiveness be asked of Him.

This sacrifice then consisted in this that the Israelite who would obtain pardon for his sins should come to the temple and offer a pure victim, that is, a victim that possessed all the marks of legal purity. The sacrifice began by the rite of the imposition of hands, performed by the offerer upon the victim. This rite, wholly symbolical, made the victim a kind of substitution for the person of the offerer, and thenceforth the victim represented the offerer before God and bore the weight of his sin.

After the imposition of hands the victim was immolated by the priest, who wet his finger in the victim's blood.

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1. The unbloody sacrifices consisted of corn, wheat, unleavened bread, and of libations. Every day there was offered in the Holy place incense upon the altar of perfumes, there were presented the « loaves of proposition » upon the table of the sanctuary; and the oil that was used in the golden candelabrum was considered as a sort of sacrifice.

2. Lev., I, 3, IV, 21-24; XVI; XVII, 11. In the sacrifice for sin the victim is so clearly a substitute for the sinful person that it is almost always called the victim for sin, as though the iniquity of the one offering the sacrifice were transferred to the victim. St. Paul says boldly that Christ became sin for us (cf. II Cor., V, 21), that is, the victim for the sins of men.

3. Levites, lay people, or even sinners could immolate the victim. But only the priest could take the blood and make the aspersion. Furthermore, the High
and touched or sprinkled the four corners of the altar. The immolation of the victim and the sprinkling of blood were the principal parts of the sacrifice.

It was at this time that expiation, strictly so called, took place. The blood was considered to contain life. The shedding of this blood before the face of God, in the immolation of the victim and the aspersion that followed, was looked upon as the offering of a life. The victim represented the sinner and its blood or its life represented the blood or the life of the sinner; hence, in offering the blood or the life of the victim, the blood or the life of the sinner was symbolically offered. And as God sanctifies everything He touches, He sanctified the life of the sinner in accepting it in this symbolical form. He made the life of the sinner holy, that is, he cleansed it from sin and restored it the Spirit of holiness. In this renewal in the Spirit of holiness lay reconciliation with God.

But we must be careful to consider its symbolical character, if we would not get a false idea of Levitical sacrifices. It would be wrong to suppose that a merely external, a purely ritualistic substitution of the victim for the sinner, sufficed. In his heart the sinner had to offer himself to God and had to entertain sentiments of true repentance. The destruction of the victim before the face of God was but a

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Priest was the only one sufficiently pure to immolate the victims of the great annual expiation and to carry the blood to the altar and into the Holy of Holies.

1. This peculiarity of the Levitical sacrifice should be well marked. It seems to us that it throws a flood of light upon the nature of sacrifice. In order to have sacrifice, there must be shedding of blood by the immolation of the victim and the sprinkling of its blood. Now, the blood contains life, or is at least the means of sustaining life. Therefore through the shedding of blood, a life is offered or given. It must not be said that the sacrifice consists essentially in the offering of life, and that the immolation is but a symbol or a condition of this offering; the sacrifice consists essentially in the immolation and the offering of the victim; or, to be more exact, in the immolation and the offering which is included in the immolation.
sign of the sinner's repentance. This personal cooperation on the part of the sinner was absolutely necessary for his sanctification.

The sacrifice of expiation consisted, then, in immolating before the face of God a victim offered as a ransom to wipe out the debt of sin and to obtain the purification of the faithful by the restoration of the Spirit of holiness in his heart. God could not accept the life of the sinner, for his life was impure; nor did He wish to destroy the human race, given over as it was to sin; so he made a covenant with his people and they had to observe scrupulously the terms of this covenant.

There were two kinds of expiatory sacrifices: that offered for the transgressions of an individual, and that offered for the sins of the whole people. The latter took place once a year, at the feast of the Day of Atonement, which came five days before the feast of Tabernacles. After immolating the victim and sprinkling the four corners of the altar, the High Priest went and threw some blood towards the veil of the Holy of Holies. He also sprinkled, blood on the top of the Arc of the Covenant, where Yahweh was present in a special manner. The Arc was called the propitiatory, that is, the place where God forgives His people.

By His Death on the Cross, Jesus Offered the Great Sacrifice of Expiation for the Sins of the People. — This

1. A sacrifice offered without the proper sentiments in the soul of the one who offered it, was an abomination in the sight of God. One has but to recall these verses of the Miserere to know this, Ps. L, 18-19:

   *Holocaustis non delectaberis.*
   *Sacrificium Deo spiritus contribulatus;*
   *Cor contritum et humilium, Deus, non despicius.*

2. Lev., xvi. On that day the High Priest first offered a calf for sin. Then he had two goats brought to the door of the tabernacle. Lots were drawn to see which of these would be sacrificed to the Lord, and which was to be chased into the desert. The one to be sacrificed was then immolated and his blood was used to sprinkle the altar and the veil of the Holy of Holies. The High
doctrine, taught by the council of Trent, is found in the Epistle to the Hebrews. We find there that Christ, on entering into the world, declared the inefficiency of the sacrifices of the Old Law and announced that He came to offer a sacrifice, which was to consist principally in the shedding of His blood. This was to be the great sacrifice of expiation for the sins of the whole people. It was to be offered not only for the Jewish people, but for all the elect of God. Hence was the blood shed in the Holy of Holies.

This last expression must be taken in a spiritual sense only. Every sacrifice must be offered in a temple. The sacrifices of the Old Law were offered in the Levitical temple; the sacrifice of Christ will require another temple. This, says our Epistle, is the true temple, the only one worthy of the name, made by God and not by men. It is the temple that Moses contemplated on the mountain; it is the temple of heaven, of which the earthly temple was but the foreshadowing. But heaven means principally God as related to His glorified creatures. It would seem, then, that in saying that Christ was to offer His sacrifice in a temple far superior to the temple of the Old Law, the Epistle to the Hebrews means that, in offering His sacrifice, Christ would enter into far closer and more direct relation with God than did the High Priest of the Old Law. As we have seen, the High Priest entered only once a year into the Holy of Holies, in order to sprinkle blood upon the Propitiatory.

Christ, then, offered the great sacrifice of propitiation for the sins of the people. But, since the sacrifice of expiation embraced implicitly all the other sacrifices, Christ's

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5. Hebr., ix, 12.
expiatory sacrifice was at once a sacrifice of adoration, of thanksgiving, and of petition.

Christ's Sacrifice Did Away with All the Sacrifices of the Old Covenant and is the Only Sacrifice of the New Covenant. — The Old Covenant had its sacrifice of expiation for the sins of the people, and also a number of other sacrifices. But these were merely carnal ordinances imposed upon the people until there would come an epoch of reform. These sacrifices were intended to foreshadow far in advance the new order of things. They had no efficacy, other than their efficacy as figures; but Christ came and, by shedding His blood, realized the sacrifice prefigured. His bloody death was the price of the transgressor under the old order; hence could the elect receive forgiveness for their sins through the renewal of the Spirit of Holiness in them. Such a result could be attained only by His death; for without the shedding of blood there could be no pardon. As the heir comes into possession of the heritage only at the death of the testator, so the elect come into the possession of the gifts of salvation at the death of Christ.

But, since the old order was but the figure of the new, the realization of the latter did away with the former. Christ crowned all by a single sacrifice, which is the only sacrifice of the New Law and will ever remain such 1.

The Sacrifice of Christ Consisted in His Bloody Death Accepted out of Love for Men. — Christ offered himself once to take away the sins of the elect 2. It was impossible for the blood of victims to have of themselves — that is without being related to a higher sacrifice — the power of obtaining the forgiveness of sins. When coming into the world, Christ said to his Father: "Sacrifices and oblations Thou wouldst

2. Hebr., ix, 14, 28.
not ... Behold I come, to do Thy will, O Lord ». And the Epistle goes on to say that Christ abolished the old sacrifices, and obtained the forgiveness of sins through the sacrifice He offered. It is in virtue of His will that we are sanctified 1. Nor is this teaching confined to the Epistle to the Hebrews. We find it also in the Epistle to the Ephesians, where it is said that Christ so loved us as to give Himself up as a sacrifice for our sins 2. Christ’s sacrifice consists, then, in His death, which was willed out of love for us and was intended to secure us the means of procuring us the greatest good that can exist, the salvation of our souls.

All the Other Sufferings of Christ’s Life Derived their Redeeming Value from their Relation to the Sacrifice of the Cross. — While the Gospels point out only the relation that existed between the salvation of man and the death of Christ, St. Paul establishes a relation also between the other works of Christ and His sacrifice. He says, for example, that Christ underwent the humiliation of the Incarnation and became obedient unto the death of the cross, for the Redemption of men 3. And again the Apostle attributes salvation to the death of Christ.

The Epistle to the Hebrews, in particular, is quite formal on this point. Since man’s reclamation from sin could be brought about only by blood, immolation was necessary. The new life is regarded as a treasure that we could inherit only through the death of the testator 4. The Savior, then, worked out our salvation by means of all the works of His life, but particularly by His death.

These two views may be easily harmonized. There is no doubt but the Word might have saved men by merely

1. Hebr., x, 1-10.
2. Eph., v, 2.
3. Philipp., ii, 4-11.
undergoing the humiliation of the Incarnation, or by a single act of the human nature that he took by the hypostatic union. But it was God's will that the Incarnate Word should suffer on the cross, in order to save men; and to this will must the Word conform. Yet, all the actions of His life were to contribute to this great work, for all were to tend to the death on the cross as to their sole end. We must conclude, therefore, that Christ saved us by all the acts of His life, which ended in bloody expiation on Calvary. His entire life was one grand perpetual sacrifice.

Spiritual writers of the seventeenth century took hold of this doctrine and made it the subject of lofty dogmatic meditations. Leaving aside some of its accidental and sometimes excessive forms, to adhere to its essentials, we find in it nothing but what is admirable and in strict conformity with Scripture and Tradition. Christ's sacrifice has its offering; the sacrifice takes place when, upon His entry into the world, Christ takes it upon Himself to redeem man by His bloody death on Calvary. The prelude of His sacrifice is His entire submission to the will of God; its consummation is found in the death of the cross, accepted out of love for men; its fruits are the glorification of Christ by His victory over death and His victory over sin. These fruits are to be reaped throughout the ages, if the faithful will only cooperate.

The Priesthood of Christ. — Christ’s priesthood has something in common with the priesthood of the sons of Levi. Like theirs, it is to be conferred upon a man chosen from among men, who is to be set up for men in the service of God. And this is that He may know men well and may have compassion upon them, and this in a way that will lead Him to a complete and perpetual sacrifice of Himself.

This love of compassion is the foundation upon which the priesthood must rest. Christ realized this ideal so perfectly that we may say that compassionate charity was the dominant character of his humanity.

Apart from this one feature, all the traits of Christ’s priesthood are quite different from these of the old priesthood. Christ sprang not from the priestly tribe of Levi, but from the royal tribe of Juda; He is the founder of a new priesthood, the true priesthood prefigured under the Old Law. What is this priest, that His priesthood was for so many ages prefigured by another priesthood? The Epistle to the Hebrews says: « Christ also (i.e., like the Levites) did not glorify himself to be made a high priest; but he that said unto him: Thou art my Son, this day have I begotten thee ». As he said in another place: « Thou art

1. *Hebr.*, iv, 14-16; v. 1-3.

2. *Hebr.*, vii, 11-17. God chose the tribe of Levi for the service of the sanctuary. All the members of this tribe were to take part in sacred functions and to live by the altar; but they were not all priests. The priesthood was reserved to the family of Aaron. The head of this family was the only one called simply « Priest »; later on, « Pontiff », and « High Priest ». The lower Levites, who constituted the bulk of the tribe, could immolate victims, except those of the Day of Atonement, but they could never perform the ceremony of the sprinkling of blood. Besides this, they had a number of delicate offices in watching the temple and tending to it, and in carrying the Tabernacle and the other objects used in worship. Cf. *Ex.*, xxviii; xxix; — *Lev.*, vii; — *Num.*, iv, 1-19; xviii, 20-32.

a priest forever according to the order of Melchisedech. The Holy Ghost would teach us by this that Christ does not simply unite in His person the two qualities of Son of God and Priest, but that the former is the foundation of the latter, and that he is priest because he is the Son of God. It is because Christ was the Son of God that he became the priest of the New Testament, and did offer everywhere and for all time a sacrifice supremely efficacious in blotting out the sins of men.

It is said in this passage that Christ is a priest according to the order of Melchisedech. In the biblical sense, this means after the manner of Melchisedech, like Melchisedech. To show where the resemblance lies, the Epistle to the Hebrews draws a picture of that mysterious personage, and in this we find that he was clothed with a priesthood that was principally one of justice and peace, and was meant to be not only the figure but the actual preparation of the priesthood of Christ. Christ's priesthood was to be, above all, one of justice and peace. From the dignity of the Son of God made man, who is now risen and can die no more, we see that this priesthood was to be forever held by the same High Priest, and that His priesthood was to be the only priesthood and was to last for eternity.

In summing up we may say that the priesthood of the New Testament is vested in a man who is not only filled with love for his kind and who carries that love the extent of complete and perpetual sacrifice, but who is also the only Son of God, so that His priesthood is all-powerful in the sight of God. This priesthood is to establish justice and peace throughout the world. And finally, since it is eternally vested in the same High Priest, it is eternal and unique. These are the characteristics that constitute what, to

1. *Hebr.*, v, 4-6.
use biblical language, may be called the priestly order of Christ.

ARTICLE II

Continuation of the Work of the Redemption.

Object and Division of this Article. — According to the great law of expiation as contained in the Sacred Books, sin could be pardoned only by sacrifice. In order to expiate the sins of the world, therefore, the Word of God became man and offered in His humanity the sacrifice demanded by the divine justice. To perpetuate the sacrifice of the cross unto all times, Christ, on the eve of His death instituted the Eucharistic sacrifice and the ecclesiastical Priesthood. By these means He continues the work of the Redemption.

The Eucharistic Sacrifice. — Though in shedding His blood and in offering His life, the God-man represented human kind before the throne of God; though His expiation was for this reason the expiation of the human family, yet individuals were still wanting. Jesus was alone to offer Himself in sacrifice; He was in the midst of a vast, awful solitude. Hence, the sacrifice of the cross had to be renewed, and that in a manner that would not leave Christ alone to offer it, but would make men partakers with Him. This is the main reason for the Eucharistic sacrifice.

On the altar, just as on the cross, Jesus Christ immolates Himself and offers Himself for the sins of men. But on the cross He shed His blood in the offering; while on the altar He offers Himself in a mysterious, though real, immolation. On the Cross He immolated and offered Himself in order to make reparation for us and to merit grace; on the altar He immolates and offers Himself in union with us, that the satisfaction and the merits of Calvary may be applied to us. On the cross there was no intermediary; on the altar Christ
again offers Himself, but He has associated with Him a man whom He has consecrated and made His priest. Now Christ makes use of this priest, in renewing His sacrifice and offering. He makes use of the voice of this man, of his heart, which is marked with the effigy of the heart of Christ, and of his consecrated hands. Moreover, in this divine sacrifice of the Eucharist, we both partake in the fruits of the great sacrifice of the Redemption, and we commemorate it and strengthen the remembrance of it in our souls. The Eucharistic sacrifice is, then, the renewal and perpetuation of the sacrifice of the cross: it renews it in order to continue that sacrifice for ever.

In this sacrifice, says the council of Trent¹, Christ represents or renews the sacrifice of the cross through the ministry of His priests, in order to commemorate that sacrifice, but also and above all, in order to allow the application of its effects to sinners².


2. From these considerations we may see the spirit in which we ought to attend at Holy Mass. Since on the altar our Savior represents or renews the sacrifice of the cross in order that now the faithful may offer themselves in sacrifice with Him, they that attend Mass must hearken to His invitation. After asking His forgiveness for all the faults they have committed, they will offer Him all that they possess — their intellect, their hearts, and their physical powers. Once united in this way to the Savior, as the grains of wheat — to use the beautiful comparison of St. Cyprian — that have been ground and moulded so that they now form but one Eucharistic bread, so will they ask Him to accept them with Him in sacrifice and expiation for their own sins and for the sins of their brethren: they will now form but a single victim with Him, a victim pure and agreeable in the sight of God: Hostiam puram, hostiam sanctam, hostiam immaculatam, placentem Deo, Deo acceptabilem. If they receive holy Communion, they will bear in mind that it is at this moment that they participate most actively in the sacrifice, and so they will renew their sentiments of union and self-oblation. And all through the day they will strive to live in a manner becoming Christians united with Jesus Christ and sacrificed with Him: they will strive to imitate His virtues, they will have recourse to His Holy Spirit, and they will endeavor to spread His kingdom in the world.

If they prefer, they may not only offer themselves in sacrifice with our Lord, but they may also have in mind the intentions that He had on the cross and that He still has on the altar. This method is well known. It consists in
The Ecclesiastical Priesthood. — Under the New Law, then, there is but one sacrifice, the sacrifice of Christ. But this sacrifice is to be renewed to the end of time in the sacrifice of the Eucharist. So, too, there is but one priesthood, the priesthood of Christ; there is but one priest, and that priest is Christ. If men are priests, they are so only in the measure in which they partake of the priesthood of Christ, High Priest; hence they are called ministers of Christ our Priest, to signify that they should devote all that they are and all that they have, whether in the natural order or in the supernatural, to the service of Christ the High Priest.

They form but one with Him. Consequently they are chosen from among men that, like Christ, they may know men and may be able to compassionate with them in their miseries.

But it is not enough for them to resemble Christ in being men. He is truly the Son of God, and this is but just, since He is the one true priest. But before calling men to the priesthood, Christ would have them resemble Him in this second aspect also, in so far as a mere creature can resemble the only Son of God. He would have them be the adopted sons of God more completely than the simple faithful. The process of preparation for a priest is a long one. God communicates to them for a long time in advance the gifts of the holy Ghost in order to get them accustomed to living the same life as Himself and to help them to imitate His virtues. When they have become like Him to a greater degree than the average sharing in the four ends of sacrifice: adoration, gratitude or thanksgiving, petition, and propitiation, that is the offering that has for its object the application of the merits of the sacrifice of the cross.

Sometimes the pious souls that assist at Mass merely recite their beads. This devotion is very natural. No one shared more completely in the sacrifice of the cross than did the Blessed Virgin; no one participated in this sacrifice with more perfect dispositions. It is therefore a very wise plan to assist at the Holy Sacrifice in union with Mary immolating and offering herself with her divine Son.
faithful, the moment has arrived to make them partakers in His priesthood. This comes about in a very special manner, in order to imprint upon their hearts the image of Christ's priestly heart, and to enable them to offer themselves in sacrifice for the Redemption of the world by Him, with Him, in Him, and in the same transport of love for God and souls.  

1. These conditions enable us to understand how the Holy Mass should be said. On the one hand men are priests only by the participation of the priesthood of Christ. On the other hand, Christ, in an outburst of love for God and man, renews His sacrifice in order to obtain the application of the satisfactions and merits of the sacrifice of the cross. A priest who wishes to exercise his office, and not remain merely passive, will try to share in this disposition of love that animates the Savior when He renews His sacrifice for our salvation. If he unites himself thus in spirit with the Savior, it cannot be but all his works will be inspired by sentiments of love for God and men, and that he will devote himself in perpetual and entire sacrifice.
CHAPTER IV

THE THREE OFFICES OF CHRIST THE REDEEMER.

The object of this chapter is to give a brief survey of the doctrines already seen. We shall here consider the three offices of Christ the Redeemer as found in the Prophetic Books, in the writings of the contemporaries of our Lord, and in the New Testament.

Doctrine of the Prophets. — The Messias foretold by the Prophets was to fulfil in an admirable manner the three great offices of the Jewish people, the offices of Prophet, Priest, and King.

The day is coming, said the prophets, when there will be awful cataclysms. Those that are living in sin will perish; and then the new theocratic kingdom will be set up. God will set the Messias King over the kingdom; and his power will know no bounds. Peace will prevail, and material prosperity, such as was never before heard of, will be enjoyed.

The revolution accompanying the advent of God’s kingdom will be rather a moral or religious one. The Messias, Prophet as well as King, will cause justice and holiness to reign in all hearts.

The Messias will also be a priest, and that according to the order of Melchisedech. On the other hand, as the

2. Ps. cx, 4.
Servant of God, he will live in humiliation and sufferings, and will give his life to save the multitudes. It is not made clear how he will be priest in this and that manner; the synthesis of these two ideas is not made.

In order to accomplish his work, the Messias, will possess the fulness of the Spirit of God. He will be Emmanuel, God with us. He will be called « Wonderful Counsellor, God the Mighty, Father of the world to come, the Prince of peace ». Him it is that the Psalmist salutes in the canticle when he celebrates his beauty, his majesty, his power, and his justice.

He will be, in a preeminent manner, the Son of God.

Daniel beholds one like unto the Son of man coming in the clouds of heaven in great glory.

Doctrine of Christ's Contemporaries. — During the last half of the closing century of the old era and at the beginning of the new, there was expected a Messias King who was to reestablish, in a superior manner, the old theocracy.

Yet the eminent holiness of the Messias was exalted and men delighted in describing the work of sanctification that was to be wrought in the world. The Messias King was to be a Prophet also, and that of an eminent quality.

The priestly character of the Messias was not thought of. If this idea existed at all, it was confined to some few uninfluential centers.

Doctrine of the New Testament. — In beginning his account of Christ's preaching at Jerusalem, St. Matthew says that « all this was done that it might be fulfilled which was spoken by the prophets, saying : « Tell ye the daughter of

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1. Is., lxxi, 13; lxxii, 1-11.
2. Is., xi, 1-3.
3. Is., ix, 5.
4. Ps. lxx, 3-10.
5. Ps. ii, 7.
Sion: Behold thy king cometh to thee, meek, and sitting upon an ass, and a colt the foal of her that is used to the yoke. The disciples went therefore and did as Jesus commanded them. And they brought an ass and her colt, and laid their garments upon them and made him sit thereon. And a very great multitude spread their garments in the way, and others cut branches from the trees and strewed them in the way. And the multitudes that went before Jesus and that followed him cried out: «Hosanna to the Son of David. Blessed is he that cometh in the name of the Lord. Hosanna in the highest». And when he came into Jerusalem, the whole city was moved. They asked: «Who is this?» And the people answered: «This is Jesus, the Prophet from Nazareth in Galilee».

This was the same crowd that some time later led Jesus from the Sanhedrim to the pretorium of Pilate, and rebuked Him for making Himself the Son of God and the king of the Jews. Pilate listened to their complaints, then he asked Jesus, «Art thou the King of the Jews?» And Jesus answered: «I am». He is, indeed; but in the sense which He Himself explains, and which St. John relates: «My kingdom is not of this world. If my kingdom were of this world my servants would surely have striven to prevent my being delivered to the Jews; but no, my kingdom is not from hence...». For this was I born, and for this came I into the world: that I should give testimony to the truth. Every one that is of the truth heareth my word.» Hence, Christ is our King: he is the Light that enlightens us, the Life that quickens us, and the Way in which we must walk if we would go to the Father. He is our King: he is the Shepherd whom we must follow if we would share in the fruits of salvation; He is the one that expiates our sins, the one to whom we must unite ourselves by grace, the one with whom we must pray, work, and do

1. Matt., xxii, 4-11.
penance. Otherwise there is no salvation for us. He is our King, too, in this sense, that he is the Head of the Church, a society both spiritual and visible, through which He continues the work of the Redemption. This royalty was His by right upon coming into the world; but in fact He acquired it little by little, by His humiliation and His labors during His earthly life. His royalty was proclaimed before the world only on the day of His glorious Resurrection 1.

But, in Jesus, the title of King is identical with that of Prophet, very different indeed from what was expected by the people of Jerusalem who acclaimed Him King on His triumphal entry into their city. He is both the prophet who is to announce the Kingdom of God and to foretell its duration for all time; and He is, moreover, to set up this kingdom in the world.

The prophets proclaimed that the Messias would be the High Priest according to the order of Melchisedech, that he would be the Servant of God, and that he would suffer a bloody death for the salvation of His people. His contemporaries, as we have seen, overlooked this teaching. But Jesus made it clear both in His preaching and in His actions 2. He always claimed that He was sent for the salvation of men; He foresaw and accepted His death as a duty; and, furthermore, He established a real relation between His death and man's salvation. His sacrifice did away with all the sacrifices of the Old Testament and remains the sole sacrifice of the New Law. This sacrifice consists in the bloody death He underwent for men and in the humiliations of His entire life, which was one long preparation for the sacrifice of the cross. He offered Himself as a sacrifice for men, thus uniting in a most intimate way the two characters of the priesthood of the New Testament, viz., that of victim and that of priest.

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CHAPTER V

THE WORSHIP OF CHRIST THE REDEEMER.

Now that we are about to bring to a close these Studies on Christ, the Incarnate Word and the Redeemer, we must examine the kind of homage, or worship, that is due Him.

Preliminary Remarks. — To honor anyone we must recognize the excellence of his qualities by performing both interiorly and exteriorly all the acts which his excellence requires or makes fit. Now, that honor which is given to a person of notable superiority, and manifested by more perfect, or more special acts, is called worship. Worship is inspired by the profound sentiments of respect engendered by the excellence of the one honored. This sentiment may be analyzed into the simpler sentiments of admiration, of love for the perfection contemplated, of humility, of fear springing from a sense of our own infirmity and the danger we are in of being crushed, as it were, by the power of the moral personality in whose presence we stand. This is the subjective basis of worship. But what determines the manifold sentiment whence worship springs, is the excellence of the person represented. And this is the objective basis of worship.

To appreciate the moral value of worship, we must examine both its subjective and its objective foundations. If we merely wish to determine whether the worship offered be legitimate, we more often confine our attention to the
objective basis, which is called the formal, or the proper object or motive.

The worship given to God or the Saints — that is, religious worship — may be viewed in two ways. We may examine its formal, or proper object, and we may consider its manner.

Since God is our Master, we ought to serve Him; that is, we ought to do not our own will, but His. In thus serving God, we honor Him, we pay Him homage. This homage given to God is called the homage of adoration; the προσκύνησις of the Greeks. The saints were God's perfect servants. And we ought to recognize this fact by the performance of certain required or becoming acts. The homage we pay to them is called the homage of simple honor, of veneration; the Greeks called this ἐυαγιστία. The homage paid to the Blessed Virgin, the Queen of Saints, is one of simple honor, of veneration, but it is superior to that offered to the Saints. This the Greeks called ὑπερπροσκύνεια.1

The homage of adoration or of simple honor may be either absolute or relative. It is absolute when offered directly to God or to his Saints; it is relative when offered directly to objects that have some special relation to God and to His Saints, and only indirectly to God or the Saints. This relative homage, however, is paid to these objects merely because of their relation to the person, and it is proportionate to the closeness of this relation, for homage is essentially the honor offered a person.

With these few notions in mind, we may now give the doctrine of the worship of Christ the Redeemer. Christ's humanity, hypostatically united to the Word of God, is worthy of the homage of adoration, whether we consider this humanity in its entirety or only in its Sacred heart. The worship of the True Cross, as well as that of Images of the Cross, is wholly legitimate.

Christ's Humanity Hypostatically United to the Word of God is Worthy of the Homage of Adoration. — Worship is honor offered a person either directly or indirectly, according to whether it is question of absolute or of relative worship. The person is the ultimate subject to which the nature of an individual and the operations performed by him, are related. Hence, it is the subject to which we must ascribe the merit of the demerit of actions, the honor or the dishonor resulting; and the opprobrium or the homage due. Now, Christ is the Word made flesh. Hence, the homage due to Christ is the same as that due to the Word; and this is the homage of adoration.

Quite evidently, this homage, to be legitimate, must be offered to Christ's humanity not in an abstract manner but in a concrete manner; that is, as hypostatically united to the Word.

Though this would be enough to show the legitimate character of the worship of Christ's humanity, we may add some positive arguments. It is said in St. John that we must offer Christ the same honor as we offer God the Father; and in St. Paul, that, after the Resurrection, Christ received a name at which every knee should bend.

The heretics of the fifth and sixth centuries, who hold that Christ was a person apart from the Word, or that in Him there was a sort of mixture of the human and the divine, went astray also in the worship that they gave Christ. They were condemned precisely on this point by the second council of Constantinople, which anathematized all who said that we were not to worship in one and the same adoration the Word made flesh. Hence, it is wrong to hold with the Jansenistic synod of Pistoria, whose doctrine

1. Thomassin, Dogmata theologica, l. XI, ch. II-III.
2. John, v, 23; xii, 24; xiv, 21-23.
4. Denz., 221.
was condemned by Pius VI⁴, that to pay directly to the humanity of Christ, or to any part of that humanity, the worship of adoration, is to render divine homage to a mere creature.

The Heart of Jesus, Being Hypostatically United to the Word, Deserves the Worship of Adoration. — This doctrine is dogmatically defined by the condemnation of the Jansenist council of Pistoria, which censured those who favored the worship of the Sacred Heart on the plea that they were paying a homage of adoration to the human heart of Christ apart from his divinity². It may also be regarded as a logical conclusion of the argument for the worship of Christ’s humanity in its entirety.

In fact, worship is the honor given a person directly or indirectly. Whether we consider Christ’s humanity in its integrity or only the heart; whether it be question of the love of which the heart is regarded as a symbol, or of the heart itself, this humanity does not belong to any person except to the Person of the Word. Consequently the worship that we owe to this humanity, whether in whole or in part, is the same as that we owe to the Person of the Word. And the homage that we owe to the Person of the Word is the homage of adoration.

This argument obtains not only for the worship of the Sacred Heart but also for the worship of the Precious blood, of the Savior’s Wounds, and of His whole Passion. Let us remark, however, that howsoever legitimate these devotions may be in themselves, they should first receive the special

1. Denz., 1561.
2. Denz., 1563. When the faithful pay homage to the heart of Jesus, they do not isolate His heart from His divinity; they adore the heart of the Person of the Word to whom it is inseparably united... *illud (cor) adorant ut est cor Jesu, cor nempo personae Verbi, cui inseparabiliter unitum est, ad eum modum, quo exsangue corpus Christi in triduo mortis sine separatione aut praecisione a divinitate, adorabile fuit in sepulchro.*
approbation of the Church, before being made public. No public devotion should be held without receiving this special approbation.

The Proper Object of the Devotion to the Sacred Heart. — The devotion to the Sacred Heart has for its object the heart of flesh of the Man-God. But it does not stop at the adoration of the material heart whose pulsing sent the precious blood through the Lord's body. Its object is above all the love of Christ, of which the material heart is the symbol. « The object of this devotion », says the Blessed Margaret Mary, « is the love of Christ under the symbol of His human heart ». This was the doctrine that was taught with perfect clearness the moment the worship was officially recognized. « There exists a confusion in more than one mind », says the Answer to the Exceptions of the Promoter of the Faith; « they look at the proper object of the feast of the Heart of Jesus in a purely material way... as they would the relic of a Saint, kept religiously in a reliquary. This is a grave mistake. We must not regard the feast of the Sacred Heart in this way. How, then, is it to be regarded? This we shall answer in a few articles. We must look upon the Sacred Heart of Jesus:

« 1° As being one (because of the close union) with His soul and His divine Person.
« 2° As the symbol or the natural seat of all His interior sentiments, and, in particular, of the vast love He entertains for His heavenly Father and for all men.
« 3° As the center of all the inward pain that our Savior suffered all during His life, and especially during His Passion.
« 4° Nor must we forget the wound inflicted in His heart while on the cross. This was caused not so much by the soldier's lance as by the love that Jesus bore us.
« All this is proper to the Heart of Jesus, all this unites with the heart itself in making it the object of the feast. It follows, therefore, — and this is a point quite worthy of
consideration — that this object, so understood, truly embraces the inmost soul of our Lord Jesus Christ."

We sometimes hear the objection that the heart is not the seat of the affections, and that experiments go to show that the source of affective sentiments is the brain. This physiological problem in no way concerns the question of our devotion. The Church did not establish this doctrine on a physiological basis, but upon the universally accepted fact that the heart is regarded as the symbol and the emblem of love.

And this comes from the fact that the heart is at least the organ that manifests love. All passions, in any way strong, are accompanied by physical disturbance in the heart. The emotion of love grips and controls it, either hastening or retarding its pulsations. Hence, the heart of Christ is looked upon as the symbol of love, in this devotion.

There is still another question. What love of Jesus is this that we consider in the devotion to the Sacred Heart? The question has received but little attention from theologians. If we examine the texts authorizing the devotion, and take into account the popular trend of the devotion, we must say, it would seem, that the devotion to the Sacred Heart

1. Memoriale, 17, 18; Niles, pp. 145-146.

2. In a beautiful treatise entitled Dévotion au Sacré-Cœur de Jésus, part II, ch. ii, pp. 175-177, Bainvel gives an account of what took place in 1726, when, Father de Galliffet asked for the establishment of the feast. He had the imprudence to make his petition on the plea that the heart is the organ of love. The Promoter of the Faith, Prosper Lambertini, later Pope Benedict XIV, although personally in favor of the cause, conscientiously urged his objections against it as «advocatus diaboli». He observed that the postulator assumed as a fact that the heart is, as was commonly said, the sensible co-principle of the virtues and the affections, and the seat of all our joys and sorrows. And he pointed out that there was concerned here a philosophical problem, since modern philosophers placed love, hate, and the other affections of the soul, not in the heart, as the seat, but in the brain. Hence the feast was not authorized. When the request was renewed, under Clement XIII, in 1765, the plea then urged was that the heart is the symbol of love. This time authorization was granted.

3. See the excellent essay of Bainvel, op. laud., part II, ch. i, pp. 151-165, T. I.
has for its object the material heart of our Lord, regarded as the symbol of His human love, this human love itself being inspired by the love of the divine Word. Or, to put it more simply, the object of this devotion is the material heart of Jesus regarded as the symbol of the love of the Incarnate Word. Yet, we would put in the first place the human love of our Savior, and in the second the love of the divine Word. And without excluding the love of the divine Word for His Father, we should be inclined to consider it as above all the love of the Incarnate Word for men.

The Worship of the True Cross, as well as That of the Image of the Cross, is a Wholly Legitimate Devotion. — The homage offered to Christ’s humanity, whether in its integrity or in its component parts, as, for example, in His heart, is an absolute worship, because it is paid to Christ’s humanity conjointly with the Person of the Word. Such is not the case with the worship of the relics of the Passion of Christ, for example, the worship of the True Cross. The latter is but a relative worship; it is a homage offered to the Cross directly and to the Person of Christ indirectly.

Yet, since the true cross derives its excellence from the Person of Christ, this relative worship of the true cross must be a homage of relative adoration.

Equally worthy of this worship are the images and reproductions of the true cross; but in a lesser degree, for these have but a figurative relation to the Passion of Christ. In a word, these objects are but sensible stimuli, which the Church uses to excite devotion in the hearts of the faithful.

1. The feast of the Sacred Heart, instituted by Clement XIII, in 1765, was extended to the whole Church by Pius IX, in 1856. In 1875, the same Pope invited the faithful all over the world to consecrate themselves to the Sacred Heart. In 1890, Pope Leo XIII raised the feast to the rank of a double of the first class; and in 1900, he consecrated to the Sacred Heart the whole human race.
And because of their figurative value, these objects may be used in worship only when they are in good condition. But the cross, as well as the other objects of our Savior's Passion, since it has more than a merely figurative value, deserves the same worship whether it is whole and intact or only in fragments.
CONCLUSION

The eternal Word of the Father took to Himself a human nature perfect in the order of natural and of supernatural goods. He did this in order to work out the salvation of the human race. Such is the dogma of the Redemption.

To attain this end, the divine Word had so to unite this nature to Himself as to make it the human nature of the Word. In this way the operations performed by and in this human nature acquired an infinite value, on account of their relation to the Person of the Word. This is the dogma of the Incarnation.

These two dogmas enable us to outline the moral portrait of our Lord. The Incarnation could not have taken place unless the human nature of Christ had been deprived of what would render it incommunicable to the eternal Word; i. e., of that which rendered it so distinct from all other natures as to make it altogether unsusceptible of union with any other nature, or even with the divine Word of God. What renders human nature so entirely distinct from all other natures is what is called the constitutive element of personality. Hence, we hold that in Christ human nature was actually deprived of its own personality, and had no other personality but that of the Word.

But, while the Incarnation required that the human nature of Christ be stripped of its own personality, the
learn by revelation; and it was particularly enlightened on the whole supernatural economy connected with the work of the Redemption. Yet, this knowledge existed only in a state of habit; it was actually present in the Savior's intellect, now under one aspect, now under another, as He willed it. There is nothing surprising in the fact that Christ's human soul had a knowledge of this kind from the beginning; for it was exercised independently of organic conditions, solely by His human intellect flooded with light both preternatural and supernatural.

Furthermore, by the exercise of His intellect, Christ learned all that any man of the time might learn. But, at whatever period of His life we choose to consider Him, He always knew perfectly whatever it was fit and proper for Him to know.

Thus Christ was and is, for ever true God and true man. His humanity was clothed with all possible perfections, except that of human personality and those of exemption from death and suffering. Human personality was incompatible with hypostatic union; exemption from death and suffering were incompatible with the object of the Incarnation.